

United Nations Peace Operations and the Management of World Order

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Abstract

The thesis critically examines the advance of United Nations peacekeeping as an instrument for managing various facets of a post-colonial world order. The first part of the study explores the structural role of UN peace operations in a world of sovereign states as well as the internal political struggle to shape the parameters and direction of the UN's work. As far as the former is concerned, it is suggested that peace operations should be understood as very specific political activities that have been forged to provide for either a transition from one social system to another, or deployed to buttress a particular world social order. Concurrently, it is argued that the expansion of peacekeeping must also be seen in the context of the internal ideological and political battle to determine the orientation of the world body. While this has witnessed the organisation briefly challenged during the 1970s by Third World states determined to direct the UN's gaze onto the regulation of the private international economy, the matter has been settled (for now) in favour of the organisation directing its energies to advocating particular forms of liberal governance within Southern societies. Both dynamics—the wider structural role of peace operations and the narrower internal struggle to determine the content of the UN's work—are necessary in order to understand the political connotations of these practices and their predominance in the organisation's activities today. After analysing the political specificity of UN peace practices, the study moves on to look at their utilisation in the African context—in Angola, Rwanda, and Somalia—paying particular attention to the wider political transformations underway in each context and the role of the UN in pursuing such ends. The thesis concludes with a set of observations about the place of the UN in managing world order in the Southern hemisphere.

Contents

Acknowledgements	4
Preface: United Nations Peace Operations in Perspective	5
1. United Nations Peace Operations and World Order: A critical reappraisal of purposes and practices, 1948-1987	18
2. Defining the Work of the United Nations: From the challenge of Third World activism to the resurgent Western security agenda	46
3. Reorienting the United Nations in a Post Second World Context: The advance of peace operations	63
4. United Nations Misadventures in Somalia: Militarised liberal internationalism in the early 1990s	91
5. Post-Colonial Rwanda and United Nations Conveyance Operations: From trusteeship to neo-liberal state transformation	125
6. Manufacturing Peace in Angola: The Lusaka Protocol and the standard of UN peace operations	155
7. United Nations Peace Operations and the Management of the World Political Order in the Periphery	189
Appendices:	
1. UN Security Council Vetoes January 1989–December 2005	221
2. UN Peacekeeping Operations January 1989–December 2005	223
Bibliography	225

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Preface

United Nations Peace Operations in Perspective

‘Peacekeeping operations symbolise the world community’s will to peace and represent the impartial, practical expression of that will’ Javier Perez de Cuellar (Noble Peace Prize acceptance speech, 1988).

‘...Universal and lasting peace, seen as the greatest aim of collective endeavour, tends to go hand-in-hand with a freezing of the world’s political, economic and military map as it is at the time of the constitution of the organisation. Again, this involves a remarkably primitive notion of the Cosmopolis, in that the idea of peace is opposed not only to that of war but also, implicitly, to the notions of social change, development and productive rivalry.’ Danilo Zolo (Cosmopolis, 1994).

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Second World the United Nations (UN) has moved to the centre of the regulation and management of conflict in Southern states and societies. This has seen the organisation take on new and varied tasks in the ordering and reordering of numerous societies including: monitoring cease-fires, quartering and demobilisation; organising, overseeing and verifying democratic elections; establishing, advising and running international tribunals; and even assuming, albeit temporarily, executive authority over entire African and Asian states.¹ Remarkable as these ‘new’ roles may be, they are now routinely treated as a natural and normal set of activities for the UN to be preoccupied with. In today’s post-Cold War milieu, peace operations have been thoroughly internalised and naturalised.

The primary aim of this study is to explain the context of such a radical alteration in the scope and extent of UN peace activities through a historical and conceptual re-evaluation of the functions of these practices in world order management, and through an extended discussion of several UN encounters with post-colonial states. It is suggested that it is practically meaningless to view these practices as anything other than deeply political regimes for overseeing social transitions in the periphery of the world system. More specifically, it challenges the assertion that

¹ For a brief description of some of these new activities see UN document: ST/ESA/246, 1996, ‘An Inventory of Post-Conflict Peace-Building Activities’.

such activities, from the 1940s to the 2000s, can be separated from the political project of making and remaking post-colonial states and societies along certain liberal political economy lines.²

Remarkably little has been written on the wider ramifications of the huge projects of domestic constitution of several Southern states that the UN has been entrusted with, and the consequences of these for how we understand the political and ideological specificity of international bodies, such as the UN, charged with the management of these practices. In fact, the sheer extent of UN involvement in the domestic affairs of Southern societies has not generated any sizable or coherent body of academic work that has critiqued these practices in anything other than vocational, even anodyne, terms.³ To be more precise, the focus of literature on United Nations peacekeeping and peacemaking activities has largely been on technical and practical issues: problems of 'command and control' in the field; issues of aid coordination; discussion of 'rapid reaction forces' or 'regional' peacekeeping initiatives; techniques for third-party mediation; as well as general debate about the effectiveness and 'lessons' of various forms of peace activities.⁴ The broader surveys of these activities tend to maintain a focus on the merits of various approaches to peacemaking—for example the virtues of power-political paradigms that see conflict within societies as best resolved when there is a 'ripe-moment' between mutually exclusive armed belligerents compared to those more liberally attuned approaches that see such conflicts as best addressed via governance programmes and civil society targeted projects.

² For UN peace operations as liberal projects, see: Roland Paris, 'International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'', *Review of International Studies*, vol.28, no.4 (2002), pp.637-656. In the context of the historic role of US foreign policy in promoting liberal modernity in the post-1945 period, see: William Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). From the perspective of the remaking of Eastern Europe in the post-1989 milieu, see: Peter Gowan, *The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid for World Dominance* (London: Verso, 1999), pp.187-247. And, in the context of Africa's relationship with Western modernity, see: Tom Young, 'A Project to be Realised: Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa', *Millennium: journal of international studies*, vol.24, no.3 (1995), pp.527-546; and Tom Young, 'You Europeans, you are just like fish! Some Sceptical Reflections on Modernity and Democratisation in Africa', *Cadernos de Estudos Africanos*, no.3, (Julho/Dezembro 2002), pp.113-125.

³ There is, however, a disparate literature from a variety of academic disciplines that has critiqued the UN's post-Cold War activities. Among others: François Debrix, *Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping: the United Nations and the Mobilization of Ideology* (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Alex de Waal, *Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa* (Oxford: James Currey, 1997); Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* (London: Zed Books, 2001); Liisa H. Maliki, *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); Danilo Zolo, *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

⁴ For example, the widely used: Luc Reyhler and Thania Paffenholz, (eds.) *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

Consequently, what is most striking when surveying the literature is the vocational content of the material, and the generally uncritical character of the subject area.⁵ Apart from the exigencies of governments, international organisations and institutes in requiring ‘policy-relevant’ material, this is perhaps also a result of the conceptual categorisation of the subject as ‘conflict resolution’ or ‘humanitarian intervention’, where the wider contexts of these undertakings are left unquestioned. Sociologically, what is unambiguous is that such material is nearly exclusively produced in a world in which there is an intimate relationship between ‘practitioners’, ‘professionals’ and ‘academics.’⁶ As a result discussion and debate is largely, if not exclusively, ‘problem-solving’ in nature in that it does not question the origins, development and framework that has underpinned the frontal advance of peace operations in international politics, and in that it has naturalised the guiding presumptions of such activities—namely ‘neutrality’, ‘impartiality’, and even ‘peace’. Ultimately, most mainstream literature takes as its starting point the self-declared purpose of the United Nations as noted in the preamble of its 1945 Charter as a sacred and consecrated given: ‘We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.’

⁵ It is plain that much of the literature is designed for direct import into the practice of UN conflict resolution. This includes more conceptual material relating to the nature of conflict and conditions necessary for its resolution. In the early 1990s, for example, the work of Professor William Zartman (broadly part of power-political approaches to conflict resolution) on precipitating ‘hurting stalemates’ through ‘balancing’ the parties became influential in the UN and the first Clinton administration. One recent UN memoir by a prominent senior official, Sir Marrack Goulding, confirmed this when he wrote: ‘When, in 1993, I became responsible for the UN’s efforts at peacemaking and, especially, preventative diplomacy, I found Zartman’s concept a useful tool for identifying which actual or potential conflict’s might be worth the UN’s attention.’ Marrack Goulding, *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002), p.22.

⁶ Much of the literature is produced by ‘ex-practitioners’. For a small sample: Goulding, *Peacemonger*; Brian Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1987); Margaret Anstee, *Never learn to Type: A Woman at the United Nations* (London: Wiley, 2003); Chester Crocker, *High Noon in a Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Tough Neighborhood* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Cameron Hume, *Ending Mozambique’s War: the Role of Mediation and Good Offices* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1994). Although there are countless conflict resolution organisations, much of the literature *with reach* is produced by a handful of foundations based in the Anglo-American world and close to the UN establishment, including: International Peace Academy (IPA); US Institute of Peace (USIP); Ford Foundation; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; International Crisis Group (ICG); the Stimson Centre; Ralph Bunche Institute; and within the UN itself, publications from the UN University. Overall, there is a close relationship between these largely American think tanks, foundations and the UN itself—with many of its staff slipping seamlessly between them. In this, the milieu of conflict resolution shares a noticeable and perhaps unsurprising sociological similarity with International Relations, particularly in the US. In IR see Stanley Hoffman, ‘An American Social Science: International Relations’, *Daedalus*, vol.106, no.3 (1977), pp.41-60. It should perhaps also be noted that certain institutes and foundations have historically had a close working relationship with US national security institutions, particularly the CIA. This is documented as far as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations are concerned and is also relevant to several international studies centres (e.g. MIT’s CENIS). See: Bruce Cumings, ‘Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War’, *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars*, vol.29, no.1 (1997), pp.6-26; and Francis Stoner Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper: the CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 1999), pp.135-145.

The United Nations conflict-resolution milieu

Despite the uncritical nature of UN peacekeeping literature in the Anglo-American academic milieu, a veritable cottage industry has developed over a short period of time to meet the needs of the public and private bodies that have conducted or advanced these types of activities in the South. Indeed, with the rapid expansion of UN peace operations from the early 1990s, commentators and new experts have sought en masse to formulate theories of international conflict resolution and successful UN peacekeeping. Over the last couple of decades these have generally progressed from ‘power-political’ (realist) ideas of ‘balancing’ local forces and pursuing ‘hurting stalemates’ that can be translated into power-sharing agreements, to ‘human-centred’ (liberal) approaches that insist on the political and economic rights of the individual above that of the state, regime or faction and that posit the importance of ‘good internal governance’ for domestic social harmony.⁷ What is immediately striking about such literature, apart from the increasing utilisation of elementary international relations theory to explain deep-rooted social conflict in the South, is that all this material accepts that some form of intervention and regulation of peripheral societies is desirable and necessary. There are, of course, fundamental differences of opinion as to what the template of intervention should be—from traditional third-party diplomacy and power-sharing agreements to international ‘peace enforcement’. But, in general, this is a narrow technical debate about the best medium of intervention and not a debate that questions the political contingencies of these activities per se. In fact, if anything, the tendency in the literature is to stress the paucity of UN intervention, the ‘indifference’ of the UN Security Council, and the bureaucratic inertia of UN managers towards social violence in the Southern hemisphere.⁸ The common critique of the UN and its peace roles hence relates to its *lack* of intervention at the borderlands of the world system, in places such as the Congo and Sudan.

⁷ For reviews of various theories of international conflict resolution, from power-political to human-centred approaches, see the following edited volumes produced in large part by practitioner-academics: Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson with Pamela Aall (eds.) *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1996); Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson and Pamela Aall (eds.) *Herding Cats Multiparty: Mediation in a Complex World*, (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1999).

⁸ See Michael Barnett for the most lucid example of this type of argument in the academic literature, especially in the Rwandan context. Michael Barnett, ‘Peacekeeping, Indifference, and Genocide in Rwanda’ in Raymond Duvall, Hugh Gusterson, Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, (eds.) *Cultures of Insecurity*, (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), pp.173-202; and Michael Barnett, *Eyewitness to a genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).

Of course, what this mainstream critique reflects on a deeper conceptual level is the normative belief among Western practitioner-academics of their responsibility, even duty, to help progress post-colonial societies towards liberal modernity. Indeed in our current context there is absolutely no question of the legitimacy of intervening through the mechanism of UN peace operations in the Southern hemisphere; it is simply taken for granted that some states and societies require various degrees of regulation and liberal progression until such a time as they are suitably 'developed'. There are even a growing number of British and American commentators who are openly advocating a return of classic colonialism and extolling the virtues of American empire.⁹ As one prominent advocate, Sebastian Mallaby, explains: 'After more than two millennia of empire, orderly societies now refuse to impose their own institutions on disorderly ones. This anti-imperialist restraint is becoming harder to sustain, however, as the disorder in poor countries grows more threatening.'¹⁰ To solve this problem, Mallaby advocates the creation of: 'A new international body with...nation-building muscle and expertise...[that] could be deployed wherever its American-led board decided, thus replacing the ad hoc begging and arm-twisting of current peacekeeping efforts.'¹¹

But beyond the parody of the 'new imperialist' fringe of the global governance literature some tentative endeavours have been made to contextualise UN practices in the South. Here there are a handful of scholars within this community of practitioners and commentators who have acknowledged that a Western 'civilising mission' pervades UN peace practices and its attendant commentary. Roland Paris, perhaps the most self-reflective commentator in the mainstream literature, has clearly shown for instance how these operations already form part of a wider liberal project that are reminiscent of colonial practices.¹² While certainly not the first to point-up these types of ideological continuities—this has been explored more generally in the African context

⁹ Otherwise known as the 'new imperialism literature'. See the work of: Sebastian Mallaby, Robert Cooper, and Max Boot. But perhaps most forthright has been the work of Niall Ferguson who has extensively argued that empire—specifically the British and potentially in the future an American—has been one of history's greatest modernising forces. For Ferguson this process, which he labels 'Anglobalisation', has on balance been a positive global development. Niall Ferguson, *Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World* (New York; Basic Books, 2003).

¹⁰ Sebastian Mallaby 'The Reluctant Imperialist', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.81, issue 2 (March-April 2002), p.2.

¹¹ Ibid. p.6.

¹² In his recent monograph, *How War's End*, Paris seeks to resolve the debate between power-political and liberal approaches to peace operations by putting forward a theory of 'Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation', or IBL. The idea here being that a more long-term project of societal reconstruction would provide a more solid foundation for the liberal project. Roland Paris, *How War's End* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). On the civilising mission of peace operations, see: Paris, 'International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice'', pp.637-ff.

and in relation to the good governance programmes of the World Bank—Paris’s work has at least begun to question the inherent political predispositions and connotations of UN peace operations in the 1990s.¹³ But the problem with the type of work that Paris has produced—indeed with the great deal of mainstream literature—is that it neglects the specific and unique role of the UN in a post-European empire era and how, in different times and in different places, the UN has forged a role for itself in administering the affairs of Southern societies. Perhaps most importantly, very little is revealed in this literature about what these types of practices amount to in terms of the management of post-colonial affairs, and with relation to evolving forms of world order.

For a more satisfactory discussion of these questions it is necessary to make use of a far more disparate and critical set of commentators who have examined various dimensions of international organisations and international intervention. In terms of the growing utilisation of Western force in the South, the most pertinent critique has been produced by David Chandler—who has examined the way in which recent international intervention in the Balkans and in Africa has served to erode what he labels the UN Charter System of sovereign-equality and returned the international system to a previous ‘Westphalian’ era of ‘might-is-right.’¹⁴ While this study agrees with the type of conclusion that Chandler puts forward with relation to the decline of certain features of sovereign-equality in the South, the emphasis in what follows is to show the longer history of engagement that the UN has had with many post-colonial societies, the local and wider politics of such encounters, and the various structural transformations that the UN has often been charged with administering to subject peoples.

But so far as Chandler’s arguments relating to the end of ‘sovereign-equality’ are concerned, it may be inferred from what follows that while it has indeed been substantially modified over time to a much more empirical criteria for judging and respecting sovereignty in the periphery, it is also clear that in the broader scheme of events the idea of sovereign-equality has always been an unstable and fluctuating international norm. For a start, the prominence of this concept in the UN—in its resolutions, statements, and general policy positions—partly reflected the reaction of

¹³ With relation to Africa: Young, ‘A Project to be Realised: Global Liberalism and Contemporary Africa’. With relation to the World Bank: Graham Harrison, ‘The World Bank, Governance and Theories of Political Action in Africa’ *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, vol.7, issue 2 (2005), pp.240-260; and David Williams and Tom Young, ‘Governance, the World Bank and Liberal Theory’ *Political Studies*, vol.42, no.1 (1994), pp.84-100.

¹⁴ David Chandler: *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto, 2002); ‘The People-Centered Approach to Peace Operations: The New UN Agenda’, *International Peacekeeping*, vol.8, no.1 (2001), pp.1-19; ‘International Justice.’ *New Left Review*, no.6 (2000), pp.55-66.

Third World states (in the ascendancy within the organisation at the time) to what they perceived as the increasing tendency of the US (and European states) to directly and covertly intervene in the local politics of these societies, in instances such as that which occurred in Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, Congo, Chile, Angola and elsewhere throughout the post-1945 period.¹⁵ With relation to Chandler's conclusions relating to a division of labour between NATO and the UN, with the former carrying out the military tasks and the latter following-up with the conduct of civilian roles, it is broadly clear that this has indeed been the tendency in so far as it relates to important geo-strategic areas of the world system—such as on the edges of European capitalism in the Balkans, in the repositories of vital raw materials such as Iraq, and in other areas of historic geo-political competition, such as Afghanistan. In other cases, at the periphery of the world system, the division of labour that Chandler indicates is emerging would seem to be much less prevalent. Rather, it would appear that a far more generalised and basic system of United Nations surveillance, regulation and administration is emerging in these borderland areas.

Much more generally there are a set of scholars in the field of international political economy—Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, and Craig Murphy—who have pioneered critical Gramscian approaches to international organisations.¹⁶ While this literature has little if anything to say about the nature of UN peace operations, their general conceptualisation and accounts of the role and place of the United Nations in world order and as an instrument of hegemony are instructive. This is especially the case with relation to understanding the institutionally contingent nature of the UN's various activities and the ideological battles within any given international organisation to shape its 'programme of work' and general orientation.¹⁷ The recent work of Peter Gowan on the US and international order has also provided this study with some of its wider grounding—especially as it relates to the way Gowan has conceptualised and clarified some of the formative

¹⁵ For a record of post-1945 US interventions in the Third World: William Blum, *Killing Hope: US Military and CIA Interventions since World War II*, (London: Zed Books, 2003).

¹⁶ Robert W. Cox, 'Gramsci, hegemony, and international relations: an essay in method' *Millennium: journal of international studies*, vol.12, no.2 (1983), pp.162-175; Stephan Gill (ed.) *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Craig N. Murphy, *International Organization and Industrial Change: Global Governance since 1850*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994).

¹⁷ See Robert Cox's writings on the nature of international organisations and hegemony. In particular the rarely cited article in the Canadian scholarly publication, *International Journal*: Robert W. Cox 'The crisis of world order and the problem of international organization in the 1980s' *International Journal*, no.35 (1980), pp.370-395. See also Robert W. Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: reflections on some recent literature' *International Organization*, vol.33, no.2 (1979), pp.257-301.

politics and functions of the UN.¹⁸ It is the broad outlook, if not the precise theory and conclusions, of the above work that this study hopes to engage and develop.

United Nations peace operations as political operations

The general contention of the study is that in order to critically assess the UN's peace activities it is necessary to place them in their historical context (1946-2004) and to analyse them according to, on the one hand, the wider relations of political and economic power that brought them about, and on the other, the narrower organisational struggle to define the very substance and outlook of the UN's work. Here in the wider context, the analysis seeks to demonstrate that peacekeeping has developed from an ad-hoc mechanism designed to help manage the transition to formal independence and a device used to institutionalise and police a certain set of post-colonial relationships in the periphery, to an all-encompassing apparatus used to facilitate the reorganisation of state-society relationships along narrow neo-liberal lines including, where necessary, facilitating the transfer of power from one elite to another.¹⁹

To be sure there are broad continuities in the development of UN peacekeeping. Most obviously, the object and zone of intervention has always been, and is always likely to be, at the very borderlands of the international system. The guiding political grammar for understanding such interventions remains, with the occasional important exception, that of a supreme umpire whether it be between that of an old imperial power and one of its ex-colonial subjects, or between that of two elites within a particular post-colonial crisis; and finally the political, one might say historic, task of such peace operations has been to help smooth-out, in the broadest sense at least, crises that have led to the contestation of the public-political sphere, the state system, which has ultimately formed an important precondition for a private world economy and therefore remained an elementary facet of the post-1945 liberal peace settlement.²⁰ At the very least, UN peace

¹⁸ Especially, Peter Gowan, 'US:UN' *New Left Review*, no.24 (2003), pp.5-28; Peter Gowan, 'Watchdogs of a Liberal Peace' *New Left Review*, no.11 (2001), pp.79-93; and Peter Gowan, 'The American Campaign For Global Sovereignty', in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.) *Socialist Register, 2003, Fighting Identities: Race, Religion and Ethno-Nationalism*, (London: Merlin Press, 2003), pp.2-27.

¹⁹ Since the 1980s, the UN has presided over several elections that have seen the transfer of power from one regime to another. A seminal case here was Nicaragua (ONUVEN) when the incumbent Sandinistas were voted out of power. In Angola with UNAVEM II, as we will examine in Chapter Six, there was an expectation among the international community generally, that a transition would occur from the MPLA to UNITA. For a variety of reasons—including the utilisation by the MPLA of a Brazilian PR company and the increasing militancy of UNITA's public rhetoric—and to the surprise of a great many Western capitals this outcome did not occur.

²⁰ Justin Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society* (London: Verso, 1994).

operations have been about helping to manage the institutionalisation and transmission of various visions of liberal modernity in the periphery of the world system—whether it be the buffering of nation-states, the policing of the international political economy or latterly, though not without antecedents, the intricate restructuring of state-society relations.

Equally however, the changes in peace operations have not been insignificant. To cite a few: the object of intervention has generally transformed from managing interstate to ostensibly ‘internal’ conflict; and whereas such operations have in the first four decades of their existence remained ad-hoc and mostly cautious, peace activities are now much more widely utilised as a form of ‘global governance’. But more significant, there has been a transformation from the general objectives of what can be considered ‘traditional’ peacekeeping—that is, helping to police the nominal separation of the state-system from the private world-economy even if, in places, temporary eccentricities were permitted—to ‘second-generation’ operations that have a very specific and universal set of prescriptions for how the post-colonial state, society, and economy should be organised and divided. This template now also includes specific political governance preferences—namely a measure of formal pluralism—and is necessarily more intensive, intrusive and micro-managed than most ‘traditional’ peace operations.

Of course this has not been a seamless or necessarily unproblematic process. Nor is it an irreversible or irrevocable one. Indeed, such an evolution in peacekeeping, moulded and promoted as it has been by US signiory, has taken place in the context of seminal struggles to constitute and reconstitute the UN from its founding to the present day and this is where the narrower internal politics of the organisation becomes pertinent: peace operations have themselves been a deeply political project in that they represent a particular minority vision of what the UN should be preoccupied with and it has only been latterly, in light of the rapid disintegration of organised Third World resistance at the UN during the 1980s, that they have gained uncontested ascendancy.²¹ In many respects, the First Gulf War (1991) reflected the final

²¹ Prior to this, of course, the Non-Aligned Caucus at the UN had made a concerted effort to redefine and extend UN oversight into public and private international economic relations (for example the New International Economic Order, Centre for Transnational Corporations, Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States). The aim here was to instigate some form of public regulation of the private economy. This was the nadir of Western influence in the UN and a time during which a growing belligerency was being directed at the organisation by several Western governments. These internal struggles will be discussed at some length in Chapter Two. For a general sense of the embittered and indignant feeling in the US (and other Western states for that matter) at this apparent usurpation of the UN, see former US UN Ambassador Daniel Moynihan’s memoir of the period: Daniel Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1979).

capitulation of opposition Southern ‘caucuses’ at the United Nations (Non-Aligned and G-77) and the formal re-launch of the organisation as a security body. Crucially, this development has necessarily required the reorganisation of the International Secretariat around peace activities and a greatly expanded role for international officials in the management of political and socio-economic conflict in the periphery of the international system. As to be expected, this has thrown-up numerous challenges relating to the limits and boundaries of UN influence, and most significantly, the appropriate means for pursuing the lately restored and resurgent liberal political economy agenda of the organisation. But despite the formidable challenges the secretary-general and international technocrats have had to face in running and managing such large-scale political and socio-economic projects, from the Congo in 1960 to East Timor in 1999 the UN has developed a certain capacity, some advocates may say a ‘comparative advantage’, for administering such tasks. One has only to think of recent debates that have advocated the UN as the only body capable of running a direct election in Iraq under such adverse conditions; and nor is this simply or solely related to issues of international legitimacy or predictable patterns of Anglo-American political pressure on the top-rungs of the Secretariat for there are also very experienced and well-trained UN personnel that are perhaps the only professionals adept enough at the art of international election staging able to manage this political demand at such short notice. It is the very execution of these reformed peace roles in three seminal African contexts during the rapid expansion of these practices in the 1990s—especially their wider functions and their intercession in local politics—that form the subject of the middle-three chapters of the study.

What quickly becomes evident during this investigation of UN encounters in the African milieu is that UN peace operations are fairly intrusive mechanisms for regulating post-colonial affairs and that they often reflect, in their design and implementation, a wider political agenda. In most cases, the structural design and actual implementation of the operation are not only intended to usher in a new social order in these places, but they are also often calibrated to advance one local elite or force at the expense of another. It is suggested here that on the broadest level this reflects the way in which the UN has come to act as a mediator of inter-capitalist competition in the periphery—or, more accurately, the way in which the UN has historically served to advance a US agenda in local political contexts, sometimes against that of other G-8 interests. In any event, what emerges from these African encounters is the way in which the UN has become an important arbitrator of the ‘native question’, a force that now regulates aspects of political life in the Southern hemisphere.

The structure and methodology of the thesis

The thesis unfolds largely in the order set out above. The first three chapters provide the general historical, political and institutional context in which to situate the current UN predilection towards peace operations. Chapter One sets the scene by discussing the historic role of the UN and its peacekeeping in fashioning a world social order of nation-states and a private world economy out of European empire blocks. Chapter Two then moves on to show how these early peacekeeping activities were set aside when the organisation moved out of the orbit of total US tutelage in the late 1960s and towards alternative visions of UN work. In essence, the line of reasoning in these opening two chapters is that peace operations are deeply political practices reflective, historically at least, of a US vision of world order. Indeed, Chapter Three goes on to show how, when the organisation moves back towards the orbit of G-7 control in the late 1980s, its ‘programme of work’ and general outlook is reoriented again towards conducting an extreme set of peace practices in the periphery. The contention here is that the UN is calibrated to fit into a new specialised international division of labour, which was as a whole designed to extend and deepen the liberal capitalist system after the collapse of the ‘Second’ and ‘Third’ worlds. The UN’s role in this new division of labour is to help manage and bolster the transmission of the political facets of this liberal capitalist order to the most peripheral parts of the global system. The three chapters that follow the broad discussion of the rise of UN peace operations in international politics—on Somalia, Rwanda and Angola respectively—explore different facets of this new UN role. The general focus with relation to these three African encounters is on the functions and the local politics of these UN operations. It is also highlighted how, in many instances, the UN has played a far more protracted role in these societies’ post-colonial journeys than is commonly admitted by the mainstream literature. The study concludes with a set of observations about these practices and about world order management in the periphery more generally.

The methodology of the thesis is relatively straightforward. The research for the UN-African encounters is based upon a comparative case-study approach to social inquiry—a technique that is particularly useful for investigating phenomenon in the social and political world in which there are few examples, and for which direct empirical material is difficult to attain. Beyond the general interest of each example of UN operations examined, the choice of case studies relates to chronology, regional spacing and the varying forms of action that the UN took in each set of

circumstances.²² But above all else, each instance of a UN operation treated in this study is insightful because of the various ways in which they shed light on the methods harnessed and abandoned by international officials during this experimental but broadly transformative period, and the way in which the UN in general is reoriented towards the political reconstruction of many peripheral post-colonial states and societies. More generally, the research method and work undertaken for this thesis is mainly, but not exclusively, archival: official and unofficial United Nations documents (letters, draft and final Security Council resolutions, reports of the secretary-general, verbatim records, and where relevant agency reports or Commissions of Inquiry) are compared and contrasted with each other and other sources, such as the print-media, non-governmental and governmental material, in order to provide a picture of the wider and local politics of UN peace operations as well as institutional UN reform. This has been supplemented, where possible, with confidential interviews and e-mail communications with relevant officials, and by general insights garnered as a participant-observer of the Fifty-Fifth Session of the General Assembly and the Security Council in New York in 2000.

²² Each instance examined in detail (Angola, Rwanda, and Somalia) represents three-different regions of sub-Saharan Africa (East, Central and Southern), a different time-period, and a different manifestation of UN peace operation.

Chapter 1

United Nations Peace Operations and World Order: A critical reappraisal of purposes and practices, 1948-1987

‘The United Nations is the preeminent institution of multilateralism.’ Shashi Tharoor (‘Why America still needs the United Nations’, *Foreign Affairs*, 2003).

‘...By the beginning of 1945 Washington resolved to define the organisation in a manner which sacrificed little American freedom of action, and opened up new modalities for attaining its objectives. The United States determined to oppose its other allies’ creating blocs and spheres of interest, but also to shape the future United Nations in a manner that acknowledged not just great power among the members of the Security Council, but also the distinctive role of the United States as the most powerful nation on earth.’ Gabriel Kolko (The Politics of War, 1968).

The purposes and practices of UN peace operations

The enduring representation of UN peace operations during the Cold War is invariably that of lightly armed peacekeepers, or ‘blue helmets’, inhabiting precariously demilitarised zones between two adversarial states. The image is one of an international brigade of soldiers helping to sustain a cold peace by buffering two or more armed groups. Here one only has to think of a south pacific Fijian battalion policing Southern Lebanon for twenty years, or that of a Swedish unit helping to keep the North apart from the South of Cyprus since 1964.²³ Similarly, the narrative that has undeniably dominated the issue of peacekeeping has, perhaps unsurprisingly, revolved around the discourse of bi-polar Cold War politics; a superpower stand-off in the Security Council disabled the possibility of collective security as envisaged in the UN Charter, which in turn led to the practical and functional need to manage potential regional conflagrations in some other ad hoc way. As A. B. Fetherston writes: ‘It was this need to avert the potential escalation of local conflicts into superpower confrontations, coupled with an inability to act, that led to the development of peacekeeping.’²⁴ Conceptually, therefore, peacekeeping during this period was generally looked at as a broadly functionalist response of certain UN officials and delegates and a few of its middle ranking member-states intended to circumnavigate the particularities, and deficiencies, of a bi-polar security system. For such efforts, the UN earned the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize. As Javier Perez de Cuellar noted in the UN’s acceptance speech:

²³ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: UNDPI, 1996, Third Edition), pp.698-700, p.706.

²⁴ A.B. Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), p.12.

‘The award of the noble peace prize to United Nations peacekeeping operations gives recognition to an idea of striking originality and power...the technique which has come to be called peacekeeping uses soldiers as the servants of peace rather than as the instruments of war. It introduces into the military sphere the principle of non-violence. It provides an honourable alternative to conflict and a means of reducing strife and tension, so that a solution can be sought through negotiation. Never before in history have military forces been employed internationally not to wage war, not to establish domination and not to serve the interests of any power or group of powers, but rather to prevent conflict between peoples.’²⁵

Beyond the platitudes of such remarks, however, the contours of this speech outline succinctly the common mode of envisaging such actions. Not simply functional any longer, peacekeeping has developed over time into a regular and relatively reliable part of the international regulation of war and peace—in short part of an emerging world society. Javier Perez de Cuellar again: ‘In our striving for a world at peace with itself, and governed by the rule of law, I believe that peacekeeping operations play a vital and significant role. In some ways they are analogous to the role of the civil police in the development of peaceful, law-abiding nation states.’²⁶

In explaining the purpose of these activities, and noticeable in the above citation, there is often a reliance on metaphors, especially by ex-practitioners turned commentators—peacekeepers are at one time international ‘firemen’, at another a global ‘police’ force, and still others, and rather remarkably considering ideologies of nationalism, ‘repositories’ or temporary ‘custodians’ of national sovereignty.²⁷ The suggestive imagery of such language is perhaps an attempt to posit the ethos of peacekeeping as one that is essentially ‘civil’, part of the fabric of cosmopolitan governance in the international system and yet beyond the particular political machinations or prejudices of any one of its constitutive parts.²⁸ One is to suppose that a UN ‘Blue helmet’ like a

²⁵ 1988 Noble Peace Prize acceptance speech by Javier Perez de Cuellar. Available at: <www.nobleprize.org/peace>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ A new discourse, primarily produced and reproduced by ex-UN officials and one that has become relatively pervasive among UN advocates, focuses on the way in which the UN has been utilised as a convenient ‘scapegoat’ for great power inaction. A formative advocate of such a line of reasoning is Sir Brian Urquhart. For example: Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, p.138.

²⁸ Danilo Zolo vociferously attacks this kind of cosmopolitan philosophy, which ‘...has come for us to assume all the overbearing dominance of an idol’ and is ‘...liable, for instance, to lend justification to the theory of ‘humanitarian intervention’ by the great powers in the political, economic and social problems of other states, even against the wishes of their governments or of majorities or minorities within those countries.’ Zolo, *Cosmopolis*, p.xiv.

fireman, or a police officer, does not choose which international emergency to respond to: a fire is a fire.

And in one sense this is absolutely correct for classic peacekeeping operations, especially during the first few decades of their development, which were surreptitiously designed to help keep the peace and preserve international order. Put a little less charitably, part of their function was to maintain the status quo. The central problem however arises if we seek to question or problematise the prevalent order, which was not natural, neutral or, during the early Cold War period, even universal. Here it should be recalled that the post-1945 liberal order, which consisted of a 'UN Charter System' (that is, according to David Held a world of formally equal nation-states)²⁹ and Bretton Woods Institutions (designed to promote and underpin a private world economy), was one that was in competition (up until the late 1950s at least) with a closed colonial world order led by Britain as well as with the centrally planned economies of the Second World.³⁰ This 1945 order—its institutions and their outlook—were designed and developed to provide the material and ideological bedrock of US post-world war power and purpose by providing for a political and economic division of the world that would supplant the formal colonial system.³¹

²⁹ David Held, *From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p.85. For a distinct and, at the time, controversial account of the rise of a US designed order in the post-1945 world, see Michael Cox, 'Western Capitalism and the Cold War System' in Martin Shaw (ed.) *War, State, and Society* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp.136-194. Here, Cox shows how in the immediate post-1945 period the Soviet 'threat' was in actuality part of a US constructed 'Cold War System' that's major utility for US planners was that it served to discipline Western Europe, and public opinion within the US, behind an American-led world capitalist system. For Cox, the existence of the Soviet Union *helped*, not hindered, a US authored liberal order.

³⁰ As Churchill wrote to Eden in early 1945: 'If the Americans want to take Japanese Islands which they have conquered, let them do so with our blessing and any form of words that may be agreeable to them. But 'Hands off the British Empire' is our maxim.' Churchill cited in: Gabriel Kolko, *The Politics of War: Allied Diplomacy and the World Crisis of 1943-1945* (New York: Vintage, 1968), p.465. But it should be recalled that the UK was forced by the US to open up its preferential imperial trading system to American companies as a pivotal condition for the \$3.75 billion loan that the UK received from the Truman Administration and for the cancellation of \$20 billion of the 'lend-lease' account. Dean Acheson, *Present at Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p.324. Melvyn Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), p.63.

³¹ For a historical background of the US construction of post-1945 world institutions, see: Acheson, *Present at Creation*; Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: the Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Cordon Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull: Volume II* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948); Kolko, *The Politics Of War*; Gabriel Kolko and Joyce Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); Stephen Schlesinger, *Act of Creation: the Founding of the United Nations* (Oxford: Westview, 2003). In International Relations, see: Gowan, 'US:UN'; Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*; M. Cox, 'Western Capitalism'; Robert W. Cox, 'Social forces, states, and world orders: beyond international relations theory', *Millennium: journal of international studies*, vol.10, no.2 (1981), pp.126-155; Bruce Cumings, 'The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the

No matter how such plans went awry with the support of colonialism here, or the sidelining of one or all of the multilateral institutions at one time or another there, a world of nation-states separated from a liberal world economy was essentially a world order promoted to prise open world markets and resources for American private and public power.³² US State Department officials like Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton, no less than Treasury ones, were not coy: 'We need markets—big markets—around the world in which to buy and sell.'³³ And yet, as Claire Wilcox, assistant to the above Under-Secretary, noted in 1949: 'Freedom of international trade depends on the freedom of domestic economic life...governed by competition between independent enterprises in free markets.'³⁴ 'Freedom of domestic life' and the promotion of the nation-state as a vehicle to enforce such a freedom, the basic prerequisites of American power as it was projected in the 1940s and since, was the cornerstone of the nascent order.³⁵ Certainly, from the British establishment's standpoint this was, as the Labour party bitterly put it in 1946, 'Wall Street imperialism'.³⁶

In these respects the United Nations was partly established, from the perspective of the US at least, to help formalise and universalise the political division of the world along the lines of nation-states, and its consequent roles in peace activities confirmed this. Indeed, the United Nations was largely a product of US planning and diplomacy. From 1939 the US State Department was secretly preparing for post-war international order in various bodies, such as the distinguished Advisory Committee of Postwar Foreign Policy and, in the early 1940s, the influential Informal Political Agenda Group in the State Department under Leo Pavolsky.³⁷ As is to be expected, many powerful figures from the US establishment were involved in these working groups—for example in the Advisory Committee, Isaiah Bowman (President of John Hopkins University) and Norman Davies (President of the Council on Foreign Relations) both of whom

East', in M.J. Hogan (ed.) *The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp.87-101.

³² An argument put forward by: Ellen Meiksins Woods, *Empire of Capital* (London: Verso, 2003), pp.131-132.

³³ William Clayton cited in: Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, p.14.

³⁴ Claire Wilcox cited in: Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, p.17.

³⁵ This type of reasoning follows Justin Rosenberg, who has argued that this 1945 American inspired international order: '...like domestic social power, will have two linked aspects: a public political aspect which concerns the management of the state-system, and a private political aspect which effects the extraction and relaying of surpluses. It means the rise of a new kind of empire: the empire of civil society.' Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*, p.131. See too: Woods. *Empire of Capital*, pp.131-132.

³⁶ British Labour party member cited in: Kolko, *The Limits of Power*, p.65.

³⁷ Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp.5-29; Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp.33-51.

were well aware of the historical imperatives of establishing new modalities of imperial power to replace the system upon which British hegemony had been organised.³⁸ Furthermore, it is widely accepted by historians that the plans for the UN that implicitly formed the basis of discussion and agreement at Dumbarton Oaks and subsequently San Francisco were those of the State Department and Leo Pavolsky.³⁹ There were, of course, exceptions: for example the issue of 'Trusteeship' was put in 'cold storage' during Dumbarton Oaks for fear of alienating the British.⁴⁰ From the State Department's perspective in the 1940s, one purpose of a universal and general world body was to undercut moves for a world split along great power spheres of influence—an outcome and policy that both Stalin and Churchill coveted for the UN. Here, the theory was, despite interdepartmental disagreements within the US, that a general organisation would help open empire blocks and allow for a formal US role in Europe much more than an organisation that placed a large emphasis on regional pacts and spheres of influence.⁴¹ Still, there was much opposition to this: for one, the US War Department preferred straight geo-strategic policies, largely in order to requisition Pacific island bases outright, and to justify exclusive US dominion over the Americas.⁴² Such ideas, of course, worried diplomats at the State Department who understood that outright annexations would provide a pretext for continued protectionism of the British and Soviets 'spheres'. In some respects, the resolution to these issues for the US was the Trusteeship system and Article 82 of the UN Charter, which allowed for territories to be labelled 'Strategic' and thereby directly monitored by the relevant Security Council members and Article 51 and Article 52 on regional arrangements.⁴³ So despite different points of view regarding the merits of universalism versus regionalism that existed within the US establishment, between for example Cordon Hull and Sumner Welles, and the vacillation of Franklin D. Roosevelt on this matter too, by the end of the San Francisco Conference there had come to be some bi-partisan understanding regarding both the conceptual imperatives of a universal system and the practical need to accommodate, temporarily at least, British exceptionalism and protect the prospect for unilateral US action in its own hemisphere.⁴⁴ Or, as John J. McCloy the War Department's representative at San Francisco relayed to his Secretary of State Henry J. Stimson: '...I've been taking the view that we ought to have our cake and eat it too; that we ought to be free to operate

³⁸ For an in-depth treatment of Isaiah Bowman, see the recent account of his influence on US geo-political thinking by Neil Smith, *American Empire: Roosevelt's Geographer and the prelude to Globalisation* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003).

³⁹ Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p.64, p.71; Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, p.48.

⁴⁰ Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p.69.

⁴¹ Kolko, *The Politics of War*, p.457, pp.465-466; Gowan, 'US:UN', p.11.

⁴² Kolko, *The Politics of War*, pp.465-6.

⁴³ Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp.175-193; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, p.474.

⁴⁴ Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p.24; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, pp.468-70; Gowan, 'US:UN', pp.20-1.

under this regional arrangement in South America, at the same time intervene promptly in Europe; we oughtn't to give away either asset.'⁴⁵

While the UK, and France for that matter, did not necessarily envisage such a role for the organisation this is what came to pass through a variety of processes and dynamics internal and external to the UN too extensive to detail here.⁴⁶ The political corollary of this was that UN peace operations were invariably deployed to manage the transition from one world order to another in particularly problematic places, or positioned to prohibit the potential withdrawal of a state and its society from the liberal world system. In short, UN activities in the realm of international security must be seen as part and parcel of a very particular order—resembling not so much a universal and transcendental 'peace interest' so much as a political project designed to achieve peace settlements according to an exacting set of criteria.

From this perspective, therefore, UN peacekeepers look less benevolent and more complicit as a regulating mechanism in a particular political and socio-economic international hierarchy. Indeed, such operations as undertaken by the UN functioned fundamentally to promote, preserve and extend the unique political and economic post-World War II settlement. More specifically the functions of peace operations have historically fallen into two broad sets of activities: here the distinction to be made is between those peace activities that were about providing for a transition from one social system (the closed colonial) to another (the internationalised state-system and private world economy), such as that which occurred in the rarely discussed Dutch East Indies (Indonesia and West Irian) and the much more infamous 1961 Congo operation, and those peace activities that essentially sought to prohibit modifications in the political or economic principles of the state-system, such as the formative Suez episode. It is also evident that both types of peace operations—conveyance operations or policing ones—must be seen in the broader context of the transformation from a world of empires to a world of 'modest' nation-states, in which the economy is largely separated from the public and political domain.⁴⁷ Indeed, as we will see in the

⁴⁵ McCloy cited in: Kolko, *The Politics of War*, p.470.

⁴⁶ For an overall discussion on the politics of forging the UN, see: Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks* and Kolko, *The Politics of War*, pp.457-482.

⁴⁷ By 'conveyance operation' it is meant a peace operation conducted by the UN that's primary purpose is the transfer of a bounded community from one social and political system to another, such as from a colony to an independent nation-state. The 'Modest Nation State' is a reference to Michael Mann's argument relating to the historical and sociological roots of the modern state and its spread across the globe. Mann argues that the 'modest nation state' is part of a social order universalised by the middle of the twentieth century that has come to exclude forms of economic power and moral regulation (even though Mann argues that the state is increasingly becoming active in the moral sphere). In this view the 'modest nation

next section this is clearly shown in the negotiations that led to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) deployed to defuse the Suez crisis in 1956, ostensibly for some the first bona fide peacekeeping operation.

On the other hand, and in some ways the hidden story of peace operations, is that of UN observers and intermediaries deployed to help mediate the transition from one political and socio-economic system to another. One can think of a variety of examples here, nominally all issues of decolonisation, such as that of Indonesia and West Irian (1962-9), the Congo (1960) and South West Africa (1989). Of course, it could be argued that all peacekeeping was broadly related to decolonisation, from the division of the British Empire in India and its attendant consequences for Kashmir (UNMOGIP) for example, to Palestine and the imperial imposition of a two-state 'solution' and the resultant need to police 'the parties' (UNTSO). Yet, while there is good reason to argue this point in the broadest sense, it is analytically useful to differentiate those instances in which the UN was directly involved in providing for a transition from the colonial to the post-colonial from those in which the UN was deployed to stall the violent consequences of the decolonisation process because it is the former that has come in various guises to dominate a new generation of peace operations in the 1990s and 2000s. In other words, the operations of the contemporary period mark a striking resemblance to those 'transition' ones noted above in that they are seeking to preside over a transformation from one form of political and socio-economic complex to another. Here, should it be useful to labour the application of metaphors to UN activities further, there is a pedigree of operations under which the primary task has been to act as a 'mid-wife', or perhaps more pejoratively, 'handmaiden', to nascent international political and socio-economic orders. Before going on to look at the early genealogy of such roles and functions, it is useful to review briefly the tasks most associated with peace operations during the Cold War—namely military peacekeeping deployed to keep various interstate combatants apart.

state' has replaced the 'multi-national empire model' and the 'fascist model', both of which took on extensive control of 'economic life' and the regulation of morality. Michael Mann, 'Has Globalisation Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?' *Review of International Political Economy*, vol.4, no.3 (1997), pp.476-496.

The Suez Crisis, UNEF and the regulation of post-colonial states

Classic UN peacekeeping operations that seek to buffer two armed state actors are a rarity today.⁴⁸ Some do remain, in Kashmir, Cyprus, Lebanon, pending comprehensive settlements involving reunification or final arbitration. While some of these operations were established to help soothe violent discord caused by the imperial partition of Eastern lands—in Jammu and Kashmir, Jerusalem—peacekeeping as a form of non-violent but armed intercession was also developed to manage relations between ex-colonial powers and their former colonies, as in the case with Egypt and UNEF.⁴⁹ In this instance, the use of international troops was not only developed as a temporary substitute and proxy for direct Western control of the Suez Canal Zone and the Sinai, it was also utilised to help institutionalise certain restrictions, in principle and in practice, on the political economy of this post-colonial state.

This is especially relevant to the way in which both UN sponsored negotiations with Egypt following the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company but preceding Western invasion, and the deployment of UN troops after this punitive action began, precluded the potential possibility that Egypt should have *unconditional sovereignty* over the canal and its company. Indeed, although it was well understood by the UN and Eisenhower Administration that Egyptian sensibilities must be accounted for, it was taken as given that for the crisis to be resolved Suez would have to be tied into an agreement broadly similar to the imperial regime that had governed it in the past—the Constantinople Convention of 1888. Remarkable in this post-colonial crisis therefore, was not only the audacity of Anglo-French actions, but also the way in which the UN broadly enforced Western demands on Egypt.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ One UN interstate peacekeeping operation that has been recently deployed is UNMEE—setup in September 2000 to monitor a cease-fire between Ethiopia and Eritrea. See Appendix Two for details of peace operations deployed in the post-1989 period.

⁴⁹ The account of Suez described here is necessarily brief and limited to the involvement of the UN. It does not, for example, detail the crisis of Anglo-American relations that it precipitated nor the unilateral measures taken by the Eisenhower Administration (such as economic action) to discipline its allies. For general accounts of Suez see: Donald Neff, *Warriors at Suez: Eisenhower takes America into the Middle East* (Vermont: Amana Books, 1988); Mohammed Heikal, *Cutting the Loin's Tale: Suez through Egyptian Eyes* (New York: Arbor House, 1987); and Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, (eds.) *Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).

⁵⁰ The UN secretary-general was crucial in securing from Nasser the demands of the '18 states' announced at the London Suez Conference (16-24 August 1956). As we will see these were encapsulated in UN S/RES/118 (1956).

Most accounts of UN involvement in the crisis, however, have tended to focus on one element of this episode, the functional innovations of UNEF for managing interstate conflicts and its diplomatic rationale. Here, commentators have tended to contend that UNEF was largely the result of international pressure—particularly US opposition to military action—to force a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt and thereby precipitate a British and French withdrawal. As Alan James put it: ‘The reality was...that two major Western states were virtually being frog-marched away from the scene of their crime by their leader’ and for this reason, according to former UN Under-Secretary-General Sir Brian Urquhart ‘...the main task before the UN was to find a way to save their faces and to allow them to withdraw with what dignity they could salvage, as soon as possible.’⁵¹ This general narrative is usually extended to detail the semantics of this path breaking form of multilateral diplomacy, such as: the source and standards of troop contributors; logistics and equipment, including even the origins of the applicable uniforms; and the principles under which such a deployment would occur.⁵² Here, for example, details of the shuttle diplomacy that the secretary-general performed in order to negotiate the entry of UNEF troops into Egypt. Overall, most are agreed, ‘UNEF was a great victory for common sense, innovation, hard work, and intelligent leadership’ and that Dag Hammarskjöld’s suggestions had been ‘...a conceptual masterpiece in a completely new field, the blueprint for a non-violent, international military operation.’⁵³

As previously indicated, far less has been written from Egypt’s perspective in what must have been a salutary and humbling lesson on the exigencies of the international political economy.⁵⁴ In fact, it is remarkable how little attention is given to the fact that it was Egypt that capitulated to more or less every Western demand *before* the invasion and *as a result* of mediation by Dag Hammarskjöld, and that by the time the British and French aerial attacks began, Egypt was in absolutely no position to reject a proposed UN force. So while no doubt there was an element of embarrassment and awkwardness that the Western alliance, particularly among the British and

⁵¹ Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p.212 and Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, p.132.

⁵² See the accounts of UNEF by: Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*; James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*; Fetherston, *Towards a Theory of United Nations Peacekeeping*; and Agostinho Zacarias, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996).

⁵³ Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, p.33, p.138.

⁵⁴ Publicly, especially in the Arab world, President Nasser came out of the crisis a nationalist hero who had successfully fought-off European imperial, and Israeli, ambitions in the region. To a large extent, in the popular imagination this image remains today.

French, suffered, it is equally valid to question the settled status-quo that UNEF legitimised and help institutionalise.⁵⁵

Following Nasser's nationalisation of the Canal Company, negotiations with the interested parties had taken place in various forums, including two conferences in London.⁵⁶ Western powers, including Britain, France, and the US, had objected to the nationalisation of the canal on the basis that it was in contravention of the Constantinople Convention (1888) and despite the fact that Nasser had guaranteed free navigation of the waterway. As Britain and France related it to the Security Council in September 1956, they were opposed to the:

‘...Situation created by the unilateral action of the Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of international operation of the Suez Canal, which was confirmed by and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of 1888.’⁵⁷

In fact the Constantinople Convention mentioned nothing relating to the private or public operation of the canal, or the running of the Universal Suez Canal Company; rather its main provisions related to the ‘...free use of the Canal, in time of war as in times of peace’, which should be accorded to every vessel ‘...of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag.’⁵⁸ For Egypt the nationalisation of the canal was as much about the redistribution of dues earned from passing vessels—most of which was traditionally dispersed among the mainly Western stockholders that made-up the Canal Company—as it was a symbolic assertion of sovereignty. As Nasser stressed during his public announcement of the nationalisation of the Canal Company on 26 July 1956:

‘The Suez Canal was dug by the efforts of the sons of Egypt - 120,000 Egyptians died in the process. The Suez Canal Company, sitting in Paris, is a usurping company...why shouldn't we take it ourselves?’⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Because of the symbolism of the Suez crisis for the rise of US hegemony in the Near East and the decline of the British Empire most accounts naturally focus on this facet of the issue.

⁵⁶ France, Britain and the US held talks in London between 29 July and 2 August 1956 and a further twenty states participated in a further ‘London Suez Conference’ on 16-24 August 1956.

⁵⁷ S/3654, 23 September 1956.

⁵⁸ Constantinople Convention of the Suez Canal, 1888: Article I.

⁵⁹ Nasser's speech reproduced in Donald C. Watt, *Documents on the Suez Crisis* (London: RIIA, 1957), p.48.

At the outset, the US had put significant onus on the secretary-general to find a favourable outcome through a negotiated settlement.⁶⁰ Through 'Good Offices', Dag Hammarskjöld convened the relevant representatives and found agreement relatively rapidly—even if this may have been a function of an Egyptian attempt to disable growing British and French belligerency. In effect, the basis of the settlement of the crisis came to be Security Council Resolution 118 (1956), which had been formed out of the six principles that secretary-general Hammarskjöld had negotiated with the foreign ministers of Egypt, France and Britain.⁶¹ These included: the 'free and open transit' for all users of the Canal 'without discrimination'; that the sovereignty of Egypt 'should be respected'; the operation of the canal should be 'insulated from the politics of any country'; that Egypt and users were to agree on tolls and charges; as well as on a 'fair proportion' of the dues to the development of the Canal; and an agreement to refer all disputes for arbitration.⁶²

It is telling that two provisions of the resolution, three and six—'the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics of any country' and 'disputes...between Suez Canal Company and Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration'—run completely against point two: that 'the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected.' One might ask how was it possible for Egyptian sovereignty to be respected when the Canal, located on Egyptian territory, was to be insulated from the politics of any country? The 'politics of any country' provision quite clearly refers to Egypt for it is unclear how the domestic politics of other states would affect its everyday operation. And if 'politics' was to be excluded from the operation of the canal, this must impinge by definition on the dominion of the country. In a sense this provision went further in circumscribing Egyptian control of the canal than even the Constantinople Convention, which at least allowed in Article X for the possibility of the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire taking over the operation of the canal. Specifically, the Sultan: '...might find it necessary to take for securing by

⁶⁰ Dag Hammarskjöld had taken the initiative to mediate between the British, French and Egyptian governments with the support and encouragement of US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. Brian Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld* (London: The Bodley Head, 1972), p.73.

⁶¹ S/RES/118, October 13 1956. Mediation by Hammarskjöld had taken place from October 9 to 12 and resulted in his recounting of the understandings arrived at with the various parties to the Security Council on 13 October 1956. These formed the basis of Security Council Resolution 118 (1956). 'Yearbook of the United Nations 1955/56/57', available at <<http://domino.un.org/unispal>>.

⁶² It is worth noting that Security Council Resolution 118 (1956) is remarkably similar to the 'proposals' arrived at by eighteen states (including among others the UK, US and France and excluding Egypt, USSR, and India) during the London Suez Conference (16-24 August 1956). Here all of the central points of Security Council Resolution 118 are taken, more or less verbatim, from the London 'proposals': for example point 2 (c) of the 'Proposals', which sought the 'Insulation of the operation of the Canal from the politics of any nation.' See 'The 18-Power Proposals of the First London Conference, 16-24 August 1956', reproduced in: Watt, *Documents on the Suez Crisis*, p.53 and S/RES/118, October 13, 1956.

their own forces the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order.’⁶³ Equally, it could also be noted that it is unclear how the referral of all disputes for arbitration was in any way compatible with the sovereignty of the country. As Evan Luard put the issue in a rather innocuous way: ‘...Proposals would thus not have reversed nationalisation but would have submitted Egypt to a form of international responsibility.’⁶⁴

In these points, one can only assume that there were specified and internationally legitimated limits to the reach and authority of post-colonial states and conclude that the Suez Canal Zone was too important a strategic location and profitable enterprise to be in the hands of a popular nationalist and socialist Third World regime. To a large extent this was confirmed with the latter deployment of peacekeepers in the Canal Zone and in the Sinai, which served to internationalise the enforcement of the above provisions and served to put the ability of the Egyptian State to entirely govern this ‘international resource’ beyond its effective scope.

To be sure, these international interventions did not prohibit Nasser from nationalising foreign property, expanding state enterprises and experimenting with a centrally planned economy in the rest of the country. Far from it: the Suez invasions of late 1956 actually provided the Egyptian government with the pretext to appropriate British, French, as well as Jewish, property.⁶⁵ But it is clear that it was Nasser’s Arab Socialist demagoguery, and its potential ramifications for both the Suez Canal and the wider Middle East, that had so incised the Eden and Mollet governments into military action in the first place; their goal was nothing less than the overthrow of Nasser.⁶⁶

Such ambitions and action were much to the consternation of the UN secretary-general and the Eisenhower Administration, who together had invested a great deal of effort into resolving the crisis in a quiet manner, and in a way satisfactory to the Western Alliance.⁶⁷ The British and French invasion of the country—a plan coordinated with Israel—transformed the issue into a far larger one relating to European dominion over the Near East and competing Western visions for

⁶³ Constantinople Convention of the Suez Canal, 1888: Article X.

⁶⁴ Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2: The Age of Decolonisation, 1955-1965* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p.29.

⁶⁵ British, French and Jewish property seized in November 1956. British and UK banks in Egypt are nationalised in January 1957.

⁶⁶ As Nasser saw it: ‘Mollet will not be satisfied unless he has the Canal and my throat too’ cited in: Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld*, p.219. See also: Erskine Childers ‘Judgement on Suez’ reproduced in Harry Browne, *Flashpoints: Suez and Sinai* (London: Longman, 1971), p.111.

⁶⁷ It should be recalled that Hammar skjöld had put a significant amount of pressure on the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, to make the concessions that led to the ‘six principles.’ Urquhart, *Hammar skjöld*, p.168.

how international affairs should be regulated and enforced. Not inconsequential was the embryonic US security regime in the region embodied in the 1950 Tripartite Agreement and which later developed in 1957 into the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁶⁸ In one way, as we will come on to see, the intercession of UNEF was about enforcing this new order in which European gunship diplomacy was proscribed in favour of formal sovereign equality and reliable rentier states.⁶⁹

But even though UNEF was partly developed as a vehicle to extract Britain, France and Israel from Egyptian territory, it was also useful precisely because it enforced compliance, albeit informally and temporarily, of the Egyptian state to the provisions negotiated by the secretary-general and formalised in Security Council Resolution 118 (1956). This is particularly noticeable in some of the debates that surrounded the potential deployment of a force, and in the negotiations that Dag Hammarskjöld undertook with Nasser to secure the terms of entry and departure for the UN operation.

The idea of using peacekeepers to resolve the crisis precipitated by the invasion was first proposed by Lester Pearson, the Canadian Permanent Representative to the UN and former candidate for the post of secretary-general. It reflected the Canadian concern that deteriorating Anglo-American relations could seriously impinge on the country's position, considering its Commonwealth history and its North American neighbour. At first, Pearson had envisaged that British and French troops might actually participate in this '...truly international peace and police force' while a settlement was being worked out.⁷⁰ That this was out of the question became evident when the surreal potential of using Canadian forces—the Queen's Own Rifles no less—was rejected by Egypt for their unfavourable connotations.⁷¹ No wonder for a while when the issue was under discussion in the General Assembly, Eden was able to assure Parliament that: '...a UN force should eventually be associated with the Anglo-French police action.'⁷²

In the end, the degree of Western connivance in the UN operation was toned-down both in terms of the troops used and in the specific purposes mandated to the Emergency Force (even though

⁶⁸ The 1950 Tripartite Agreement was a set of understandings between Britain, France and the US regarding the defence of sovereign borders and armistice lines in the region. The Eisenhower Doctrine (5 January 1957), sought to firmly establish US pre-eminence in the Middle East above possible external peer competitors and local revisionist forces.

⁶⁹ A regional order ultimately guaranteed, as outlined in the Eisenhower Doctrine, by the use of covert and conventional US military force.

⁷⁰ Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, p.176.

⁷¹ Joseph P. Lash, *Hammarskjöld*, (London: Cassell, 1962), p.187.

⁷² Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, p.176.

Dag Hammarskjöld was insistent on using Canadian manpower in some form). The real innovation here seems to be that it formalised the use of middle-ranking powers in such international actions. To some extent, this has functioned as symbolic reassurance of the non-partisan nature of the organisation's security work—even if it does not indicate the wider structural and political logic of these interventions. Nonetheless, UNEF's mandate was far more ambiguous and undefined than the UK and France had hoped: it did not provide for the direct security of the Suez Canal much less for its re-establishment as a Western dominated private company. However it did provide for the intercession of international troops under formal Egyptian assent first to help disengage the forces in Port Said and its environs, and second to provide a buffer between Egypt and Israel on the armistice line. Thus with Egyptian permission, international troops were stationed on its territory, transforming its freedom of action considerably.

This 'internationalisation' of the Sinai Peninsula was further sealed by a guarantee secured by Dag Hammarskjöld regarding the longevity of the operation. Here it was widely felt that Nasser might withdraw the consent required for troops to be deployed and thereby scupper the operation.⁷³ Through persistent efforts—namely, the secretary-general's repeated threats that UNEF troops already deployed would be withdrawn immediately—Nasser assented to what was labelled the 'Good Faith Agreements'. In effect, it tied Egypt into accepting troops in the country until the crisis had been settled as *defined by the UN*:

'When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it [Egypt] will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956.'⁷⁴

While a decade later Egypt felt able to request a withdrawal of UNEF, up until then a great deal of anxiety among Arab states had been expressed about the indeterminate and open-ended nature

⁷³ The concept of consent is a tricky formal facet of UN peace operations (unless undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter). From the beginning (i.e. from UNEF) the necessity of consent was self-evident because of the theoretical sovereign equality of all states in the 'UN Charter System'. As consent was therefore imperative, in order not to undermine the system itself and the regime of intervention that it marked, different forms of international pressure were called for in order to ensure formal assent to UN deployment. This sometimes involved diplomatic pressure from one or more great power, or from the secretary-general himself, on local forces to consent to UN deployment.

⁷⁴ 'Good Faith Agreements' reproduced in: *The Blue Helmets*, p.41. Brian Urquhart states that Dag Hammarskjöld had threatened Nasser on three occasions with the immediate withdrawal of UNEF unless he assented to some form of understanding regarding the duration of the operation. Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, p.193.

of the operation. This was especially the case with UNEF's positions in Sharm el Sheikh, which were being used to enforce the free passage of Israeli ships through the Straits of Tiran.⁷⁵ And despite the public triumphalism of the Nasser regime, private understandings relating to the functioning of UNEF—especially in the Gaza Strip and Sinai—and the pure fact that the Force was operating solely on the Egyptian Side of the Armistice Line, underscored the constrained nature of this Arab state's autonomy.⁷⁶

In sum, it can be concluded that in lieu of formal coercive intervention by Western European states to enforce the re-imposition of its imperial system in the Suez—one that had seen the Canal occupied by Britain for a hundred years—a new type of global regime that was fully compatible with the sovereign equality of newly independent states was tentatively developed that served to 'internationalise' the region and indirectly circumscribe Egyptian autonomy of this 'international resource'. This was a significant development in a post-colonial world for it established a novel political formula for policing Southern states that had fallen foul of the international political economy, which did not necessarily rely on gunship diplomacy or impinge, at least formally, on the sovereignty of these new states.⁷⁷

Of course, not every classic interstate peacekeeping operation was analogous to the kind of processes and logic of the Suez one. Peacekeeping in Lebanon, the Golan Heights, Cyprus and Kashmir, were all operations designed to stall the violent consequences of the dismantling of formal empires and buttress these 'new' states. Ad-hoc, limited in scope and precariously positioned, these operations had no direct function in policing the international political economy other than reinforcing in the widest sense its political and public corollary, the 'modest nation-state'. Nonetheless this is an important detail in itself because of the formative importance of a

⁷⁵ Israel refused to allow UN troops to be deployed on its side of the Armistice line.

⁷⁶ Hammarskjöld had negotiated a secret 12-point memorandum of understanding on UNEF's activities with Nasser in April 1957, which included understandings regarding the continued stationing of UNEF in Sharm el Sheikh after the departure of the Israeli forces and thereby guaranteeing the free passage of Israeli ships, and an Egyptian commitment not to remilitarise the Gaza Strip. Nasser was naturally concerned to keep the agreement private. Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, pp.219-220.

⁷⁷ Without doubt, military action continued to be taken by the US and other powers to enforce or reinforce regional political and economic complexes. In the Far East, the US operation against North Korea, under UN auspices, was an early but extreme example of this: the US utilised the Security Council, its automatic majority in the General Assembly and the pliancy of the secretary-general, Trygve Lie, to authorise and legitimate an enforcement operation to restore South Korea to the Western capitalist system. But such actions could only be undertaken in extreme circumstances because the basis of the post-war system remained in principle, if not in practice, the sovereign equality of all states. UN peacekeeping with its doctrine of consent and the use of 'disinterested' forces was a useful innovation precisely because it was at once sensitive to these new modalities, able to preserve the structure and hierarchy of the post-1945 world order in a manner acceptable to many post-colonial states.

universal sovereign state-system for upholding a private world economy. Put another way, every one of these interstate operations was intimately part of a new social order that materialised in the post-war period that saw the international sphere reorganised along, as Justin Rosenberg has put it: ‘...a public political aspect which concerns the management of the state-system, and a private political aspect which effects the extraction and relaying of surpluses.’⁷⁸ In short, interstate peacekeeping was an intrinsic part of this new social order in the periphery—concerned primarily, although as we have seen in Suez and UNEF not exclusively, with the ‘political aspect’, the ‘management of the state-system’.

But there are a series of operations that the UN undertook in the early decades of its existence that went further than simply buttress, institutionalise and protect the new political order and that were actually centrally concerned with the transition from the colonial, to the sovereign. To a large extent, it is these formative operations—in Jerusalem, West Irian, Leopoldville and Windhoek—rather than the classic ‘interstate’ ones detailed above that are the secret ancestors of today’s Post-Cold War ‘second-generation’ operations. Entrusted with the management of transfer from one order to another within certain societies, these operations have acted as an important vehicle for the transmission of liberal modernity in the borderlands of the world system.

Early UN conveyance operations and the case of West Irian

In the first decades of the UN’s existence, the organisation deployed several operations intended to help facilitate the transition from colonial rule to sovereign independence. Although during this period a far rarer occurrence than the ‘classic’ interstate peacekeeping operations discussed above, these activities are important because they were directly involved in the transfer of bounded communities from one social order to another. In this detail they are important forerunners to ‘second-generation’ peace operations, which have been deployed repeatedly since the collapse of the Second World in 1989 to preside over a specific restructuring of the domestic ‘space’ along neo-liberal political economy lines. For this reason there is merit in examining these formative UN operations as a category in their own right.

One little discussed example of ‘transition’ operations was the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) and Security Force (UNSF), which briefly administered the territory of West Irian (otherwise known as West New Guinea or Irian Barat) between October 1962 and May

⁷⁸ Rosenberg, *The Empire of Civil Society*, p.131.

1963.⁷⁹ That this formative experience is infrequently addressed is surprising given that UNTEA was the first operation in which the UN had assumed executive authority in a territory, and the first occasion in which the UN had been allocated significant nation-building roles and functions.⁸⁰ One of the most noteworthy developments here was the key role that UN officials played in carrying through these tasks and the significant degree of autonomy bestowed upon the UN Secretariat in the process. In this regard what becomes striking when examining the operation and conduct of UNTEA is the nascent aptitude of the UN Secretariat in carrying out intricate political functions within Southern societies on behalf of its member-states.

Under the New York Agreements arrived at by the Indonesian and Dutch governments regarding West Irian, the tasks given to the UN Secretariat included among others: establishing a formal political institution under the UN Administrator's dispensation (IX and XXIII); reforming colonial institutions of law and order; guaranteeing private property (XXII); and preparing the unwitting indigenous population as the agreement put it '...psychologically for the impending change to Indonesian authority.'⁸¹ This wide ranging set of activities was all the more remarkable given that these tasks and functions were carried out in the context of a substantial proportion of the population (by some accounts one-third) remaining outside the centralised control of the Dutch authorities.⁸² Overall, as the authors of the third edition of the United Nations produced 'Blue Helmets', note: 'The transfer of authority implied a need to adapt existing institutions from the Dutch pattern to an Indonesian pattern.'⁸³

In contrast to interstate peacekeeping, what is particularly noticeable in this operation therefore are its large nation-building tasks and civilian dimensions. Here the UN is not so much concerned with policing the separation of armed forces, the demarcation of armistice lines or enforcing compliance to an international regime, although UNSF had key responsibilities in most of these

⁷⁹ For literature dealing with this event see: John Saltford, 'United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea), 1968 to 1969', *Indonesia*, no.69 (April 2000), pp.71-92; Paul Van de Veur, 'The United Nations in West New Guinea: a critique', *International Organization*, vol.18, no.1 (Winter 1964), pp.53-73.

⁸⁰ U Thant (acting secretary-general at the time) refers to the West Irian operation on only two pages of his 400-page or so memoir. In these references he does not hint at any of the controversies surrounding the affair and merely cursorily recounts the set-up of the operation: U Thant, *View From the UN* (London: David & Charles, 1977), pp.48-49. Sir Brian Urquhart, in his sweeping account of his four decades at the UN, does not refer to West Irian once.

⁸¹ Cited in: Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2*, p.342.

⁸² James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p.193. The population of the territory was estimated at 700,000.

⁸³ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.645.

regards; rather the UN is essentially involved in running and fashioning nascent territorial institutions designed to foster Indonesian rule. Of course, this is why UNTEA was primarily a civilian operation, made-up largely of international officials turned administrators. As we will see in later chapters, this was an important innovation because it ultimately bequeathed a decisive political role to the UN Secretariat in reshaping African and Asian societies.⁸⁴

For the moment however, it should be stressed that in the wider context these conveyance roles—providing for a transfer of direct control from the colonial to the post-colonial and helping to create the institutional context under which such a transfer could take place—were not a neutral or value-free set of activities. In the widest sense performing functions that helped institutionalise a world of nation-states was a deeply political project if only because it reproduced a form of international social organisation that was inimitable to US post-world war II strategic planning. This can be partly illustrated in the wider context under which UNTEA was brought about, and in the narrower manner in which UN officials sought to inhibit the potential prospect of the territory moving towards independence outside of the new Indonesian nation.

In the first place, UNTEA was designed as a mechanism to extricate the Dutch Empire out of the Pacific and tie the territory, regardless of the inclination of the indigenous inhabitants, into centralised Indonesian rule. After a period of escalating tension in the region that had seen insurgency and counter insurgency between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the Kennedy Administration moved decisively to the view that West Irian should be transferred to Indonesia.⁸⁵ Certainly US preoccupations at the time—tying Djakarta into the Western Alliance, ensuring access to raw materials in the Archipelago, and consolidating US maritime dominance of the Pacific—produced a US policy that was firmly behind the Sukarno government.⁸⁶ This was confirmed when the US prohibited Dutch military aircraft refuelling on American Air Force bases, and after the Kennedy Administration boycotted the inaugural ceremony of the New Guinean Council that the colonial authorities had instituted.⁸⁷ This US pressure combined with more general diplomatic isolation and the increasing costs of the territory on the metropolis itself

⁸⁴ While these practices were innovative as far as UN practices were concerned they were not unlike the traditional roles and functions of colonial administrators.

⁸⁵ James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, pp.186-92. Robert F. Kennedy in particular was concerned about retaining the large Indonesian Archipelago within the Western capitalist system.

⁸⁶ Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2*, p.336. US policy in this regard reflected the wider logic of the Kennedy Doctrine, which had placed far more emphasis on Third World regimes as interlocutors of American hegemony.

⁸⁷ Ibid. pp.337-38.

left the Dutch government with little option but to negotiate, which it did under US mediation in 1962.⁸⁸

To a large extent, the real issue became one of the modalities of transfer to Indonesia as opposed to any serious discussion of the possibility of self-rule for West Irian.⁸⁹ Here, the principal original point of difference had been that while the Netherlands held that the territory should move towards its own independence, ostensibly because of a separate West New Guinean identity which the authorities were busy constructing, the Indonesians maintained that as part of the Dutch East Indies, West Irian should be decolonised across-the-board as was the norm elsewhere.⁹⁰ The resort to unconditional negotiations mediated by the US and UN, however, reflected clearly the circumscribed negotiating position of the Dutch, which was forced in the final settlement to rescind on its main demands except for some ceremonial details that conferred the appearance of a principled Dutch withdrawal. In particular, the Dutch agreed to transfer authority to Djakarta via the UN and accepted a relatively weak provision calling for an 'Act of Free Choice' to take place on the territory before 1969 under Indonesian control but UN supervision. In terms of the wider structure of the operation, therefore, UNTEA was designed to serve as a mechanism for removing the Dutch from one of its last overseas strangleholds and ensuring the incorporation of West Irian into a friendly Indonesian state. As Alan James has written in relation to this episode: 'What...the principle of self-determination entailed was the break-up of empires, not the dismemberment of new, non-white states.'⁹¹

If there was any doubt about this on the ground, UNTEA officials ensured, from the domestic Papuan perspective at least, that any aspirations regarding self-rule outside the Indonesian orbit would be thwarted. Indeed, as has been the case in peace activities in other contexts, the structural objective of the operation was also reinforced by the practical interpretation of the UNTEA mandate by officials on the ground and in New York. For example, UN officials went to great efforts to prohibit anti-Indonesian demonstrations in the territory and to '...discourage dissent by Council members' all the while the integration of Indonesian police and administrators in the territory was being expedited.⁹² Most remarkable, however, was the pragmatic position of the

⁸⁸ James, *The Politics of Peacekeeping*, pp.185-192. U Thant recalls that he was encouraged by Robert F. Kennedy to mediate between the Indonesians and Dutch. Thant, *View From the UN*, p.48.

⁸⁹ Saltford, 'United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian', pp.71-72.

⁹⁰ Indonesia also made the claim that the territory had been part of central Javanese control since the sixth century.

⁹¹ James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, p.195.

⁹² Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2*, p.342.

UN vis-à-vis the 'Act of Free Choice' that Indonesia was to initiate before 1969. On this issue the UN secretary-general had certain rights and responsibilities under Article XVII and XXI of the New York Agreements that revolved around appointing a representative and retaining UN staff for the purpose of advising and assisting the Indonesian government in carrying through the 'Act of Free Choice'.⁹³ According to the Agreement, the 'Act of Free Choice' was to decide whether the territory would 'remain with Indonesia' or 'sever their ties with Indonesia' and would be carried out according to 'international standards.' Needless to say the precise interpretation of these provisions was absolutely central to the outcome of this 'Act of Free Choice.'

In this crucial matter, however, the Secretariat interpreted the provisions remarkably liberally with no relevant UN personnel visiting the territory until 1968 and a general acceptance of the preferred Indonesian method of 'free choice'—admittedly with some pleas for credibility by the UN representative, Bolivian diplomat Ortiz Sanz, appointed to oversee the issue.⁹⁴ Nonetheless, given the tight restrictions and control that the Indonesian state had applied to the territory after the withdrawal of UNTEA in 1963, and the reports of frantic military campaigns to subdue the natives in the interior after this transition, it would have been hard to avoid the conclusion and possibility that there was a strong antipathy towards the Javanese on the island. Indeed, the unpopularity of the Indonesian regime in West New Guinea was evident to all. As one Jakarta based American diplomat conceded in 1968: 'The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B-26s, to shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression.'⁹⁵ And yet there was a general reluctance on the part of UN officials to address this issue: the arrangements made by the Indonesians for the 'free choice' and carried out between July and August 1963 were by all accounts barely credible, with hastily convened representatives of councils isolated and asked to assent to continued Indonesian rule or be branded as traitors.

It was argued here by UN officials and Indonesians that because of the degree of political development of many of the inhabitants, or lack thereof, and due to the inhospitable terrain of the island, it was necessary to conduct an act of free choice by the Indonesian system of *musjawarah*,

⁹³ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.646.

⁹⁴ Ortiz Sanz proposed and pushed for minimally acceptable 'standards' for the conduct of the 'free choice'. By and large these were rejected and he eventually concluded, along with the Indonesians, that an act '...in accordance with international practice is indeed, impossible'. Cited in: Saltford, 'United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian', p.79.

⁹⁵ US diplomat cited in: Saltford, 'United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian', p.74.

which means by a process of council consultation. In practice this translated, as John Saltford has noted, into Indonesian soldiers and officials selecting and then isolating assembly members several weeks before the 'consultation' and giving direct instructions as to what to say in their speeches and how to vote.⁹⁶ Apart from the indignant responses of a few West African states to the whole process in the General Assembly, the rest of the international community led by the US was willing to play along with the Indonesian interpretation of this formal obligation.⁹⁷ UN officials, for their part, played a pivotal role in legitimising the process by sanctioning the Indonesian conduct of the 'act of free choice' and thereafter confirming that the Djakarta government had fulfilled its obligations vis-à-vis the New York Agreements and General Assembly Resolution 1752 (1962). In this regard, it is worth recalling the final report of Ortiz Sanz to the General Assembly affirming that an Act of Free Choice had been carried out, which was technically accurate but remarkably reticent. It noted that within: '...the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian practice, in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia.'⁹⁸ For the UN, and the international community more generally, this report by Sanz was the end of the matter; the UN had completed its final task as conferred to it by the New York Agreements and sanctioned by the General Assembly.

All in all, the UN's association with the territory of West New Guinea was a rather extraordinary affair that pointed-up some of the key structural and political roles of the organisation in a post-colonial world. Unlike so called 'classic' interstate peacekeeping, West Irian provided the first opportunity for the UN to become directly and fully involved in the business of constructing nation-states, both in terms of their internal state-society relations and in terms of how this was to fit into wider regional non-colonial state-structures. But apart from the overarching political logic and wider structural role of this episode of colonial transition, remarkable as it was for world order management, what UNTEA also highlights is the nascent political role of UN officials within these situations for forging the domestic conditions under which transfer is manufactured. This 'domestic' role had two intrinsic facets: UN officials as one time professional nation-builders caught-up in providing the institutional prerequisites for transfer and, at another, political instruments for fashioning a smooth and legitimated reallocation of power and authority via the

⁹⁶ Ibid. pp.86-88.

⁹⁷ Ghana and several Francophone West African states raised their objections to the Indonesian process in the General Assembly.

⁹⁸ UN A/7723, Annex I, 6 November 1969.

‘Act of Free Choice’. This was perhaps inevitable given the formal civil roles assigned to the UN by its representative organs; but in effect it introduced into world affairs a specialised set of international professionals who could be employed to take charge of administering territories and redesigning their public institutions. In this regard the management of post-colonial affairs no longer necessarily relied exclusively on the manpower of colonial powers.

UN mediators and officials: walking a straight-line?

While UNTEA was pioneering in the sense that it was the first operation to administer a territory and hence partake in nation-building functions, it was not the first instance of UN peace activities that included considerable political roles for top-UN officials. Here, mediation in Palestine, and the controversial 1961 Congo operation (ONUC), were early UN activities that bestowed upon officials significant political functions and leeway.⁹⁹ In both cases UN officials were charged with managing and mediating between groups in a post-colonial domestic context and were therefore required to a greater or lesser extent to adjudicate between them. In principle and in practice such a role reflected new regimes for managing ostensibly endogenous post-colonial issues and suggested a new object of authority in these societies. For instance, in lieu of tarnished British imperial mediation in the Near East, a UN mission gradually evolved to negotiate and secure an armistice between the Arabs and the nascent Israeli state, and institutionalise changing visions of a two-state solution. Structurally, therefore, the mediating arm of UNTSO replaced British rule from Government House in Jerusalem as the major advocate of an essentially imperial division of historic Palestine.¹⁰⁰ In this respect UN officials have played a role in replicating, wittingly or unwittingly, a particular vision of world order. As we have already seen this is what effectively happened in West New Guinea, where a UN representative helped ensure the incorporation of the territory into Indonesia. But perhaps one of the more notorious sets of actions by UN officials was during the Congo operation in 1961 (ONUC). Here UN officials had the ability to transform the domestic political landscape in favour of one or other social force or political grouping, as was seen by Andrew Cordier’s controversial and prejudiced decision to close airports and close-down national radio stations in the country after the unconstitutional dismissal of Patrice

⁹⁹ Various dimensions of the UN-Congo encounter are discussed in Chapter Seven.

¹⁰⁰ Trygve Lie was a particularly ‘outspoken’ advocate for partition in Palestine. Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 1: The Years of Western Dominance, 1945-1955* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), pp.343-346.

Lumumba as Prime Minister by the President Kasa Vubu.¹⁰¹ In this case, the top-UN official in Kinshasa undertook a political decision that was absolutely decisive in the fall of the Lumumba government and in the eventual rise of the Mobuto regime.

While an admittedly extreme case of UN action, what this episode demonstrated was that from the early years of the organisation UN officials were given important political roles in mediating affairs within some post-colonial states and that as a consequence they held some capacity to shape the landscape of these communities. Maybe not quite as decisive as the role of top-colonial administrators during the latter stages of say British colonialism, UN representatives and mediators nonetheless introduced into the affairs of decolonised states an added international political and diplomatic dynamic that, to a greater or lesser extent, changed the distribution of domestic order and power. Even seemingly benign administrative roles such as those that UNTEA held in what was considered an inconsequential piece of territory had immense political import; banning anti-Indonesian demonstrations, dissuading local leaders from voicing dissent, expediting the assimilation of Indonesian officials were crucial in smoothing the way for Indonesian rule in the land. All this of course belies the typical account of UN activity that takes as a given the impartial, neutral and disinterested role of UN officials and operations.

This falsehood becomes more evident once it is appreciated that every epoch of UN peace activities has generated a set of UN officials that have authored these processes and, in the early years at least, retained close links to Western institutions from which they emerged. An early and formative case was that of the African-American Ralph Bunche, between 1940-1971.¹⁰² A researcher in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS under William Donovan was the direct forerunner of the CIA) on African political development during the Second World War he later became an intrinsic part of the Department of State's negotiating team in Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, relating specifically to issues of trusteeship and decolonisation.¹⁰³ In this regard Bunche later came to be considered by the Truman Administration as the most effective spokesman and authority on issues of decolonisation and was often dispatched to argue the case

¹⁰¹ For a good recent reconstruction of these set of events, partly based on UN documents, see: Ludo De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba* (London: Verso, 2001).

¹⁰² The best treatment of Ralph Bunche remains the one written by long-time former associate in the UN and now 'Scholar in Residence' in the Ford Foundation in New York, Sir Brian Urquhart: *Ralph Bunche: an American odyssey* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993). Admittedly, a very sympathetic treatment of Bunche it nonetheless remains the most insightful and informative record of his activities in the UN.

¹⁰³ Ibid. p.102.

for independence with the British and French in various fora, such as the first session of the General Assembly held in London in 1946.¹⁰⁴ Having virtually written the articles on trusteeship in the UN Charter at San Francisco, he was later seconded to the UN, to the Trusteeship Council, which he was instrumental in establishing and securing colonial territories for.¹⁰⁵ Later, as Deputy to the UN Mediator Count Bernadotte in Palestine, Bunche wrote most of the various plans and proposals for partition, including the Bernadotte partition proposal.¹⁰⁶ After the assassination of Bernadotte by the Stern Gang in 1948, Bunche took on the role as Acting Mediator and was responsible for key UN decisions in the history of the conflict. Recognising the utility of Bunche, secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld appointed him 'Under Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs', in effect a position created to harness his talents in the event of any significant political activity undertaken by the UN.¹⁰⁷ While two such positions had been created—one for an American and one for a Soviet—it was widely recognised that this was a matter of creating symbolic balance and that Bunche remained the primary trouble-shooter in this regard. From this platform, Bunche became an instrumental interlocutor in the Suez crisis, Lebanon and especially the Congo. Throughout this time Bunche remained a prominent member of the East Coast political establishment (for a while president of American Political Studies Association) and retained the confidence of several US Administrations, including the Eisenhower Presidency during the McCarthy investigations of American citizens at the UN.¹⁰⁸

Regardless of how figures like Ralph Bunche are viewed, it is hard to deny that they were instrumental in the development of the UN and especially in its peace practices. In some respects they were historically as noteworthy as many of the UN Secretaries-General, because of their

¹⁰⁴ Ibid. p.130.

¹⁰⁵ As noted the issue of trusteeship was put into 'cold-storage' during Dumbarton Oaks so Bunche achieved little progress on this issue. But in San Francisco, Bunche gained the credit for the Trusteeship Council chapter (XIII) in the Charter as well as having a huge impact on Chapter XI and XII. Brian Urquhart surmises the impact of these articles as: '...the three chapters on dependent peoples and trusteeship gave a momentum and a legitimacy to decolonisation which allowed the process to be completed within thirty years of the San Francisco Conference, putting an end to the long era of colonial empires, and radically changing the membership of the United Nations. Bunche was to continue to play a central role in the historic process.' Ibid. pp.119-122.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid. p.176.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid. p.246.

¹⁰⁸ Shortly after his election, Eisenhower offered Bunche the position of US Deputy Representative to the UN. Ibid. p.244. Of Bunche's role in the UN, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff had apparently said: 'The President fully agrees with your view [Bunche] that you can best serve the nation in the United Nations.' Urquhart makes a point of denying that Bunche held this '...conception of his role in the United Nations.' Cited in: Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, p.262. Bunche won many US awards for his service to the US and UN, such as the Theodore Roosevelt Medal for Distinguished Service by the Theodore Roosevelt Association. Ibid. p.255.

deep institutional knowledge of the organisation, their political impact on places such as the Congo and Palestine, and in some cases their often-formative roles in shaping the Charter of the United Nations. But in Bunche's case, it is also apparent that he remained part of a small group of American officials that dominated the top-echelons of the Secretariat during its first few decades and who remained close throughout to the complex of private and public East Coast institutions that remained at the heart of US post-war power.¹⁰⁹ These included controversial and influential figures such as Dag Hammarskjöld's Executive Assistant, Andrew Cordier, and the Assistant secretary-general for Administrative and Financial Services from 1945 to 1954, Byron Price. It has been noted by Shirley Hazzard, a former UN employee and prominent American critic of the UN during the 1980s, that Price was: '...the secret agent of the United States government within the United Nations leadership' and that '...although his name scarcely appears in U.N. studies and memoirs of the period, the significant power over the Secretariat was in his hands.'¹¹⁰ Indeed, it may be recalled that Byron Price was instrumental in the clandestine process of the selection and vetting of US candidates and dismissal of US employees in the Secretariat that had been arranged with the State Department and officiated by Trygve Lie during the 1950s.

In sum what this brief discussion of officials and mediators has sought to highlight is that it is practically meaningless to assume that the UN's activities within states in the early years, and perhaps more generally, can be thought of in any way as independent, impartial, neutral and uniformly representative of the 'international community.' Certainly behind these assumptions is a whole range of political functions, and perhaps just as importantly, sociological complexes in which the UN was involved and an intrinsic part.

UN peace activities as political activities, the early years

The above discussion of UN peace activities has sought to contextualise the role of the UN's peace functions in the post-1945 world by showing their wider structural role in helping provide for a transition to a world of nation-states. Two types of such activities have been identified and examined briefly: those that were designed to cushion the inter-state consequences of decolonisation and manage post-colonial relationships; and those directly part of mediating the

¹⁰⁹ This is a reference to institutions such as the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. As previously noted, these East Coast organisations, among others, have historically had a close relationship with US national security and foreign policy institutions. See: Cumings, 'Boundary Displacement', pp.9-ff; Hoffman, 'An American Social Science', pp.49-50, and Saunders, *Who Paid the Piper*, p.35, pp.139-140, pp.144-5.

¹¹⁰ 'Reflections. Breaking Faith – I', Shirley Hazzard, *New Yorker*, vol.65, issue 32 (September 1989), p.66.

transition between two world orders. In both categories, UN operations are better seen as political operations because of their central role in ‘policing’, or administering the direct transfer to, a particular world system in the periphery. Undoubtedly, the activities of the UN, as shown in the cases of Suez and West New Guinea illustrate clearly the central role of the organisation in promoting a specific understanding of ‘peace’ in each context. In Suez, it was shown that apart from a method of rebuilding the Western Alliance and disentangling Britain and France from the Near East, UNEF was also a successful way of instituting an exacting political economy on an important geo-strategic resource and enforcing, in the case of the Straits of Tiran at least, free passage of Israeli shipping. It also confirmed the utility of the secretary-general in negotiating agreements and understandings with nationalist Third-World leaders.

West Irian, on the other hand, pointed-up important ways in which the UN managed a transition from Dutch to Indonesian rule and, crucially in this case, the way in which the potential possibility of an alternative future for the territory was precluded by both the structural nature of the operation and the narrower and politicised interpretation of the mandate by UN officials. Notable not only for the political task of nation building, therefore, UNTEA introduces into the milieu of ‘peace operations’ the international official with significant political sway over the direction of certain activities within Southern societies. Admittedly not the first instance of such politicised activities—the Congo was a far more contentious and problematic episode for the UN Secretariat—it nonetheless represented a milestone in the development of UN security roles because it formally administered the territory and was directly complicit in significant nation-building tasks.

On the whole, it is evident that from their inception peace operations can only be considered impartial, neutral and value-free if we accept that the post-1945 world order is a natural and universal one. However, if the post-World War II settlement is problematised and placed in the wider context of a decline in the world of Empires and the rise of extra-European powers, it becomes palpable to consider the prospect that UN peace operations are very specific to a new kind of social order and distribution of power. This is certainly backed-up by even the most cursory awareness that a world of nation-states promoted by the US was in direct competition with not only the Second World but with European Empires: in this view, peace operations during this period were about managing various aspects of decolonisation and institutionalising new sets of post-colonial relationships in the periphery. The political essence of these activities is underscored further if we scrutinise the activities of UN officials charged with the management of

these processes, particularly in those operations within societies because of the wide-ranging tasks allocated and the sheer degree of autonomy exercised. As will be examined in subsequent chapters, while a rarity in the early years of the Cold War, this development is now a central feature of most if not all of the many multi-dimensional peace operations deployed since the occasion of Namibia's independence in 1990 and required a complete overhaul of the internal organisation of the UN Secretariat.

Yet it is difficult to comprehend the increased resort to UN peace operations within Southern states after 1990, and the related expansion of UN influence that has necessarily accompanied such a rise, without looking at the transformation of UN as a whole over the years. In this regard the UN has itself been a site of institutional struggle, which has seen states and groups of states attempt to define the very content and outlook of the organisation's workload. It is at this internal level that the contingent character of the UN's peace roles and their political genesis becomes fully apparent simply because an organisation that is preoccupied by its peace and security functions at the expense of managing and regulating the world economy reflects a narrow, and ultimately Western vision of the UN's role in world affairs.

Chapter 2

Defining the Work of the United Nations:

From the challenge of Third World activism to the resurgent Western security agenda

‘International organisation can be thought of as a historical process rather than a given set of institutions.’ Robert W. Cox (‘The Crisis of World Order’, 1980).

‘Like all other institutions, the United Nations is changing, redefining its rules and its mission in the world. It has a limited but important role to play in a hungry and divided world that is already in the middle of a class war between the rich and poor nations – and doesn’t quite know it.’ James Reston (*The New York Times*, 23 May 1975).

Decolonisation and the ‘tyranny of the majority’

It has often been noted at one time or another that the United Nations is ‘in crisis’ or ‘in flux’, its future indeterminable due to its relations with one or other major power, or a result of some wayward activity in the periphery. In fact, every decade of the UN’s existence has thrown-up some difficulty concerning its supposed functioning and programme of work. These disputes are important to international life not least because they often represent various competing visions for how this sphere should be organised and arranged. And while today the specificity of the UN’s outlook is often taken as fixed and preset—that is, its orientation around peace operations, human rights and increasingly terrorism—this was clearly not the case during the Cold War when the organisation was at times racked by contests to shape and reshape its workload.

Although the early years of the UN were marked by what can only be considered, in Evan Luard’s terms, as ‘Western Domination’, by the 1960s the organisation had taken on a much more proactive stance on a number of issues.¹¹¹ Largely a function of the admission of new states to the world body, it was soon evident that as an organised group they might push the body into areas unforeseen by the original architects of the organisation, especially in the campaign for rapid and across-the-board decolonisation and in legislative programmes aimed at the regulation of the liberal world economy. In all, a majority of member-states sought to forge a United Nations that was concerned with challenging the settled status quo at the international level.¹¹²

¹¹¹ The phrase ‘The Years of Western Domination’ is the subtitle of Evan Luard’s first volume of *A History of the United Nations*.

¹¹² Hedley Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the West’, in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson (eds.) *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p.227.

Before the collapse of the Second World, the UN essentially encountered two general challenges relating to how the ‘international’ should be organised and divided and which were centred on transforming what was in essence a US sponsored view of international organisations. First, as we have already briefly discussed, there was the competition among great-powers to institute their various visions of world order in the organisation. In the UN this competition mainly took the form of European attempts during the early decades to hold on to empire blocks in the face of an institution that was designed by the US Department of State to universalise and regulate international political organisation around nation-states and hence open up new markets and regions to US public and private influence.¹¹³ Crucially, this campaign for the maintenance of colonies was conducted in the institutional context of new UN member-states that were determined to utilise the body to undo European dominion of African and Asian lands. Here, newly independent states made use of the deliberative organs of the UN to pressure publicly and diplomatically European powers to become first, more responsive to international observation of their administration of territories and second, to commit formally to some plan for ‘political development’ and eventual self-determination.¹¹⁴ As Evan Luard writes:

‘...Increasingly during this period the United Nations became an organisation that was concerned to bring about change, especially in colonial territories, and ceased therefore to be concerned to maintain peace at any price.’¹¹⁵

In some ways, as noted above, this was not necessarily a direct challenge to the institutional logic, or for that matter design, of the United Nations Organisation. Chapter 1, Article 1, of the United Nations Charter talks about the need to build international relations: ‘...on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination.’ Chapter XI, the ‘Declaration Regarding Non-Self-Governing Territories’, outlines the international obligations of colonial powers towards the development of self-government in territories that they administer, which should: ‘...take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each

¹¹³ On this facet of US post-war planning and some of the internal debates among US policymakers on the merits of universalism versus regional spheres, see: Gowan, ‘US:UN’, pp.11-15; Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, pp.64-65,71,167,248; Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, pp.1651-1659; Kolko, *The Politics of War*, pp.460-463; and Schlesinger, *Act of Creation*, pp.33-45, pp.175-193.

¹¹⁴ See for example, the seminal 1960 ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples’ discussed at length in: Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2*, pp.180-ff.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.* p.11.

territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement.’¹¹⁶ There should be little doubt here that the UN had been planned as a universal organisation and as the primary international security body precisely in order to undercut a Soviet and European vision of the world that prioritised ‘spheres of influence’ and empires and this is partly reflected in the Charter. Certainly, as far as great-power relations were concerned the UN was in principle engineered by Department of State policymakers to disentangle European control of large swathes of the globe and to allow for a greater official and institutional pretext for US world-order management.

Rather, what actually made the struggle for decolonisation so radical and counter-hegemonic in the UN was that in practice successive US administrations became less interested in such a general process once the UK and France opened up colonial economies to the US, and as East-West competition escalated. In the event, therefore, US Administrations played a rather ambiguous role in the process of decolonisation helping expedite the end of empire in places such as Suez and the Dutch East Indies and entrenching it in others, such as in Lusophone Africa.¹¹⁷ This ambiguity coupled with racial segregation in the US created polarised conflict within UN bodies, especially during the 1960s, between those forces seen as white, racist, colonial and Western, and those progressively more numeric non-white nation-states.¹¹⁸ Among others this led to the creation of treaties such as the ‘International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination’ (1965) that created a direct equivalence between colonialism, racial segregation and apartheid.¹¹⁹ Conventions such as these were no simple or straightforward outcome to achieve because there was bitter and protracted opposition by European states, as well as by the US and of course South Africa and Rhodesia, to these types of declarations.¹²⁰

As far as the UN as an institution was concerned, the upshot of this process was that it helped produce a growing group of disaffected and disenchanted states that increasingly saw their

¹¹⁶ *The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: UNDPI, 1997).

¹¹⁷ US support for French colonialism in Indochina and the resultant Vietnam War is probably the most significant and obvious example of the US commitment to selectively defend, in places officials deemed necessary, the remnants of the old European order.

¹¹⁸ This equivalence was exploited by Soviet officials who talked about ‘two-camps’, with the US the leader of the ‘Imperialist and Anti-Democratic Camp’ and the Soviet Union at the head of the ‘Anti-imperialist and Democratic Camp’. Cited in: Paul G. Lauren, *Power and Prejudice* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988), p.218.

¹¹⁹ A/2106 (XX), 21 December 1965 ‘International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination’; Bull, ‘The Revolt Against the West’, p.227.

¹²⁰ During this time the UN General Assembly podium became a platform to denounce and censure European colonialism in particular, and Western racism and imperialism in general. On this struggle in the UN, see: Gordon, *Power and Prejudice*, pp.197-232.

numeric advantages in representative organs of the UN as a potentially powerful method to democratise international affairs and challenge the international status-quo.¹²¹ This was a radical development because in the first decade of the UN's existence the organisation remained in composition, structure and outlook a creature of Western influence in general, and American foreign policy in particular.¹²²

Above all, the extent of UN connivance in US foreign policy during this period was seen in the manner in which the UN was harnessed to legitimate the 1950 US invasion of Korea and in the support by UN officials for the establishment of an F.B.I. 'field branch' in UN headquarters to monitor the activities of US citizens, and citizens of other states for that matter, working for the world body.¹²³ Certainly from a parliamentary perspective, during the early years the US could rally the General Assembly to any one of a number of proposals, such as the infamous 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution (1950), which allowed the Assembly to undertake decisions relating to peace and security if the Security Council was immobilised as a result of either a Soviet or, just as likely in the early years, a European veto. It should be recalled here that it was the Soviet absence from the Security Council as a protest against the blocking of the People's Republic of China (PRC) from admission to the United Nations that initially allowed the US-Korean action to proceed under UN authority. The US then introduced the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution in November 1950 into the General Assembly in anticipation of renewed Soviet activity in the Security Council. It stated that: '...if the Security Council because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately.'¹²⁴ But perhaps quite revealing here was that this 'Uniting For Peace' Resolution was first used in 1956 in order to circumvent UK and French, and not Soviet, vetoes; during its 750th meeting (30 October 1956), Britain and France vetoed a Security Council resolution tabled on the Israeli invasion of Egypt on 29 October 1956, which led the US to use the 'Uniting For

¹²¹ Bull, 'The Revolt Against the West', pp.220-228. As Paul Gordon Lauren has written of this process, the: '...revolutionary emergence of independent states in Africa and Asia virtually transformed the composition, character, tone, language, and much of the agenda of the United Nations.' Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p.232.

¹²² When the UN charter was signed there were 51 member-states. By 1975 the number of UN member-states had risen to 144. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, p.82.

¹²³ On the deployment of the F.B.I. agents in the UN, see: Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume I*, pp.353-357 and Hazzard, 'Reflections. Breaking Faith – I', pp.63-72.

¹²⁴ A/377 (V), 3 November 1950, cited in: Sydney Bailey and Sam Daws *The Procedure of the UN Security Council* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p.229.

Peace' resolution to activate General Assembly consideration of the matter.¹²⁵ It is also worth recalling that the US also held, for all intents and purposes, the Chinese Security Council seat as it was denying the entry of the PRC to the organisation and allowing the credentials of the exiled-nationalist regime in charge in Taiwan to be considered the legitimate representatives of the 'Republic of China.' At the outset of the negotiations on the UN in Dumbarton Oaks, Churchill had referred to this arrangement as the American 'Faggot Vote' designed to help open-up the British Empire.¹²⁶ As all these matters reveal, therefore, it is hardly controversial to note that during the 1940s and 1950s both the United Nations General Assembly and the International Secretariat were direct instruments of American foreign policy. As US Senator J. William Fulbright recalled of this period:

'Having controlled the United Nations for many years as tightly and as easily as a big-city boss controls his party-machine, we had got used to the idea that the United Nations was a place where we could work our will.'¹²⁷

The decolonisation process helped to end this complete domination of the General Assembly and other organs by the US and helped foster a new political dynamic and voice in the world body.¹²⁸ This nascent opposition formed the basis of what was during the 1970s to become the second, and perhaps here, far-more radical attempt to rewrite the regulation of international life. Under the rubric of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G-77), which incorporated African, Arab, Asian and Latin American Caucuses, a programme of action was proposed that sought to challenge the very conception of discrete international organisations engineered to manage separately various facets of a liberal international order. With the force of numbers, these states sought to overthrow this division of labour and move towards the political management of international economic affairs by drawing-in the General Assembly into overseeing corporate economic activity. More than any other legislative programme, this New International Economic Order (NIEO) as it became known reflected the most profound attempt to redesign the

¹²⁵ Ibid. p.233; Luard, *A History of the United Nations. Volume 2*, p.32.

¹²⁶ Churchill cited in Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks*, p.59. See too, Gowan, 'US:UN', p.12. The PRC was eventually admitted to the UN in October 1971.

¹²⁷ Senator J. William Fulbright cited in: Hazard, 'Reflections. Breaking Faith – I', p.76.

¹²⁸ From the perspective of a South African diplomat at the UN this change was clear: 'The complexion of the United Nations has changed from white to black.' Cited in: Lauren, *Power and Prejudice*, p.233.

international peace settlement that the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Truman Administration's had forged in the middle part of the 1940s.¹²⁹

The New International Economic Order and counter-hegemony in the UN

One of the distinct features of the 1945 post-World War II settlement was the unique way in which the international sphere was to be administrated. As we have already seen, this 'settlement' sought to supplant the imperial model of world organisation, with a public-political structure of 'modest' nation-states and a universal private-economic realm of the 'free-market'. In this liberal social order, the UN was created to manage the political, and public, side of international affairs and, despite the articles of the Charter pointing towards historic Keynesian compromises such as achieving 'full employment', other international organisations (IMF, World Bank) were designed as discrete quasi-private institutions created to help realise the free-market side of this structure.¹³⁰ It was of course the case that the economic side of this order, otherwise known as the Bretton Woods regime, was itself a very specific, and brief, inter-state capitalist arrangement—forged to facilitate a stable free-trade regime in a framework that would allow for national planning in domestic economies (primarily in order to allow governments to pursue 'full-employment' policies).¹³¹ In practice this entailed creating a global monetary regime that could manage matters of international currency-exchange without necessarily forcing governments to devalue their currencies, or curb domestic demand. Hence the role of the IMF as the 'lender-of-last-resort' to member-states that faced acute balance of payment deficits in the 1950s and 1960s. The other differentiating factor of this particular liberal order was that it allowed for national

¹²⁹ NIEO and its wider roots are only touched upon here. For comprehensive accounts of this period—the NIEO and the progress of conflict between the Third World and the US—see: Enrico Augelli and Craig Murphy, *America's Quest for Supremacy and the Third World* (London: Pinter Publishing, 1988); Stephen D. Krasner, *Structural Conflict—The Third World Against Global Liberalism* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1985); Robert W. Cox, 'Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: reflections on some recent literature', *International Organization*, vol.33, issue 2 (Spring 1979), pp.257-301.

¹³⁰ 'Keynesian' compromises in the UN Charter appear under Chapter IX: 'International Economic and Social Co-operation' Articles 55-60, which include the aim of promoting: '...higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social progress and development.' *The Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice*, Chapter IX, Article 55.

¹³¹ For a useful review of the process that led to this particular economic order including a discussion of the various battles between the US Treasury and State departments and their UK counterparts, as well as the role of new economic policy-making elites centred around John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White in the formation of a consensus on the issues, see: G. John Ikenberry, 'Creating Yesterday's New World Order' in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.) *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp.57-81. See also: Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money* (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp.150-157.

controls to be placed on the free and unhindered movement of private capital across interstate borders—an arrangement labelled as ‘...financial repression on an international scale’ by Peter Gowan.¹³² But despite this early ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Bretton Woods Institutions, they were still fundamentally part of a nascent universal liberal capitalist political economy because of their compartmentalised economic roles, which were screened off from the political and public world system.¹³³

Moreover, not only did these new world bodies represent the formal institutional cornerstones of this new kind of social organisation but they themselves came to mirror, especially in terms of their constitutions, this type of order; the UN was partially public and theoretically democratic in certain organs, while the IMF and World Bank operated as fundamentally private corporations. Indeed, even though the World Bank and IMF are formally part of the United Nations System, they operate in complete independence of the organisation. Their organisational structures and decision-making processes also differ greatly from UN political organs. In the IMF, voting power is determined by a country’s subscription, which is in turn determined by the country’s quota. The quota is arrived at on the basis of the size of the country’s economy and, periodically, by political negotiations and readjustments. As a result, decision-making remains largely in the hands of G-7 states. Still, the only state to retain the right to veto IMF loans remains the US. The World Bank operates a similar system—weighted voting according to subscriptions that has historically favoured the US and latterly other G-7 states—but it is also a significant actor in ‘security markets’. It is from these international capital markets that the World Bank attains a large proportion of its funds for ‘policy-based’ loans.¹³⁴

During the first decade or so this discrete division of international life was relatively easy for the US to enforce within the UN given its ability to corral the small number of member states in the General Assembly and its financial and military hold over Western Europe; even the protracted struggle for decolonisation that followed in the late 1950s and 1960s would further reinforce, in

¹³² Gowan, *The Global Gamble*, p.17; Eric Helleiner, ‘From Bretton Woods to Global Finance: a world turned upside down’ in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.163-165.

¹³³ The phrase ‘Embedded liberalism’ was coined by John Ruggie to describe the unique Keynesian compromises of the post-1945 liberal economic order. Andrew Walter, *World Power and World Money*, p.155.

¹³⁴ On the origins and development of these institutions, see: Paul Mosely, Jane Harrigan and John Toye, (eds.) *Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy Based Lending, Vols 1 and 2* (London: Routledge, 1991); Cheryl Payer, *The World Bank: A Critical Analysis* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982); Joseph Stiglitz, *Globalization and its discontents* (London: Penguin Books, 2002).

principle, such a social system despite the acrimony and animosity that it engendered among the Western alliance. But as argued above the process of decolonisation, along with other international developments, helped generate a 'new majority' in the deliberative organs of the UN that were officially 'non-aligned' and that were increasingly hostile to US foreign and economic policies.¹³⁵

In the area of economic development in particular there was an increasing resistance among Southern elites to the prescriptions of Western dominated international economic institutions, which had posited a nearly exclusive focus on endogenous economic reforms.¹³⁶ New international bodies such as the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) became countervailing diplomatic and intellectual forces that provided an alternative discourse on the nature of economic development and the sources of underdevelopment in the periphery that focused primarily on the international terms of trade and trans-national corporations.¹³⁷

The key point here is that such a view of the international political economy that gained a hold within UNCTAD and other forums invariably led to a course of action that necessitated the political management of market-forces in universal bodies such as the United Nations. Accordingly, the G-77 utilised the UN General Assembly in an attempt to legislate economic relations, most prominently through the 'Declaration of the New International Economic Order' (A/3201 and A/3202, Special Session VI, 1974) and the 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States' (A/3281, 1974). For instance in the above Charter, member-states resolved to establish new '...norms to govern international economic relations', which included among many other provisions, the 'right' of every state: to '...regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations'; to '...nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property'; and to

¹³⁵ Of particular concern to Third World states was US covert or outright intervention, as experienced in among many others: Vietnam (1952-1973), Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959-ff), Brazil (1964), Indonesia (1965), Chile (1973), Congo (1960-1965), Angola (1976-1992) and Nicaragua (1978-1990).

¹³⁶ Former secretary-general of UNCTAD, Kenneth Dadzie, has noted that the first decades of international development activities were largely formed out the Arthur Lewis's 'The Theory of Economic Growth', which focused on reform of the domestic economy. Kenneth Dadzie, 'The Problem of Economic Development', in Adam Roberts and Ben Kingsbury (eds.) *United Nations, Divided World: the UN's Role in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.299.

¹³⁷ During the 1960s, UNCTAD became a major conduit for debating North-South economic issues, largely in terms of centre-periphery paradigms. In this respect its first secretary-general, Raul Prebisch, was a central figure in the dissemination of an alternative theory of development and underdevelopment. Dadzie, 'The Problem of Economic Development', p.301; Marianne H. Marchand, 'North-South Relations', in Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. Underhill (eds.) *Political Economy and the Changing Global Order* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994), pp.290-293.

maintain its ‘...full permanent sovereignty...over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.’¹³⁸ These ‘rights’ were also situated in a general international context that should seek: ‘The achievement of more rational and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural changes in the world economy.’¹³⁹

Despite the controversy of such Articles these were serious Third World concerns—especially at what was perceived as the rise of Western neo-colonialism and imperialism from the 1950s. For instance, there was much concern in the Middle East following the British and American sponsored coup against Prime Minister Mossadeq in 1953 after he nationalised the Anglo-American Oil Company as well as, for that matter, after the British, French and Israeli invasion of Egypt after Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal Company in 1956. Elsewhere there was the example of the toppling of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo in 1961, and his murder later that same year, as well as the well-documented involvement of the CIA in the coup that brought down the popular nationalist-socialist leader Salvador Allende in Chile in September 1973. Such actions were invariably reflected in the Charter, such as in Chapter II, Article 1:

‘Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever.’¹⁴⁰

Hence it would be inaccurate to consider these proposals as simply economic. On the most basic level they include direct references to other international issues, such as the environment (Art.30), disarmament (Art.15), colonialism (Art.16), and the pursuit of international peace and security (Chapter I). More significantly, however, taken as whole they put forward a counter-veiling vision for how international affairs and international organisations should operate. Here, they did not refute the United Nations Organisation or its Charter, quite the contrary. These proposals actually reaffirmed: ‘...the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, in particular the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations and the achievement of international co-operation in solving international problems in the economic and social fields.’¹⁴¹ Rather, what resolutions and programmes of action such as the

¹³⁸ General Assembly Resolution, A/3281, 12 December 1974: ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.’

¹³⁹ ‘Charter on Economic Rights’, Chapter II, Article 10.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Chapter II, Article 1.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. Preamble.

Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States actually sought to achieve was the re-definition and re-articulation of the remit of the UN.¹⁴² That the General Assembly was the appropriate forum—among others—for the discussion of these issues, and that all policies regarding ‘...world economic, financial, monetary problems’ should be mediated equitably (Art.10). In short, it was a call for the democratisation among nation-states of the international political economy. Or, as Houari Boumedienne, President of Algeria noted in his opening address as President of the Special Session of the General Assembly in April 1974, the aim was to discuss the NIEO: ‘...with a view to establishing a new system of relations based on equality and the common interests of all states.’¹⁴³

In the event much of NIEO and its attendant programmes remained a dead letter. They contained many contradictory proposals and were plagued by differences within the G-77, which were made significantly worse by the real-politick of US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.¹⁴⁴ Later in the decade, the NIEO was finally killed-off by the US Department of Treasury’s interest rate policies and the denouement of the 1980s Debt Crisis. Nonetheless at the time, NIEO and the 1970s more generally, represented a period in which an alternative non-Western agenda took hold of the organisation. Furthermore, for the first time in the post-1945 period, this was an agenda that challenged, if only in spirit, the nature and conduct of international organisations.

Still, part of this alternative Non-Aligned agenda for the conduct of international relations was not entirely rhetorical for it did have some practical and significant import for the activities and organisation of UN organs. For example, against the will of Western states, the General Assembly established the Centre Against Apartheid in the International Secretariat in 1976, which became a vocal and active part of the anti-apartheid movement.¹⁴⁵ Now disbanded, in the

¹⁴² There has been much debate as to the nature of the NIEO, which is far too extensive to detail in full here. Suffice to note that much discussion revolves around the nature of the constituencies that the G-77 represented. Many conclude that NIEO was a statist movement—it sought the strengthening of the state vis-à-vis the market—which ultimately represented the interests of embedded Southern elites. See especially Cox, ‘Ideologies and the New International Economic Order: reflections on some recent literature’, pp.257-301.

¹⁴³ Houari Boumedienne cited in: Kurt Waldheim, *In the Eye of the Storm: the Memoirs of Kurt Waldheim* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1985), p.115.

¹⁴⁴ In Department of State preparations for the 1974 UN General Assembly Special Session, Secretary of State Kissinger made divide-and-rule a central pillar of US negotiating tactics. This was partly carried-out by the US seeking to create disagreements within the Group of 77, for example between OPEC and non-OPEC members of this Third World caucus. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, p.120.

¹⁴⁵ The director of the Centre, E.S. Reddy, became a prominent anti-apartheid spokesperson. For a brief history of the UN and Apartheid, see <www.undp.org.za/docs/apartheid/un-chron.html>. For a more

1970s and 1980s it helped organise numerous conferences and events and was an important disseminator of knowledge and public information on the issue contributing significantly to the international sanctions campaign. There was also the Division for Palestinian Rights (DPR) established in 1975 to help facilitate the work of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, which still includes consulting and liaising with NGOs, organising international conferences, producing studies and publications on the issue, and organising the 'International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People'.¹⁴⁶ As far as the international political economy and NIEO was concerned, by far the most significant organisational creation in the Secretariat during this period was the Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) (1974-1993), which was established to investigate and partly regulate the practices of these economic actors. Here, the centre was authorised to: conduct studies into the economic, political, social, and legal affects of transnational corporations (TNC) on developing countries; 'secure' agreements which eradicate the negative consequences of TNCs, and strengthen the positive facets of their work; and, perhaps most divisively, it was charged with '...strengthening the negotiating capacity of host countries, in particular developing countries in their dealing with TNCs.'¹⁴⁷ As we will see in the next chapter, this centre was one of the first programmes to be dismantled in the comprehensive reorganisation of the International Secretariat around peace operations that occurred in the early 1990s under Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

Taken together, however, these three Secretariat programmes reflected the shifting agenda of the organisation and its role, albeit temporary, as a vehicle for the political and economic transformation of international relations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They certainly showed how the UN could be harnessed as a counter-hegemonic force in international affairs, and demonstrated that the work of the organisation could be defined in a number of equally legitimate ways.

comprehensive account, see the UN Blue Book Series: United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid, 1948-1994* (New York: UNDPI, 1996).

¹⁴⁶ Despite the constant diplomatic efforts of the US and UK to close the division down, the DPR continues to retain the support of the majority of the General Assembly members necessary to protect its beleaguered presence in the Secretariat. On the work of the Division for Palestinian Rights, and access to the complete text of more or less every official document of the UN system relating to the 'Question of Palestine', see: <www.un.org/Depts/dpa/qpalnew/dpr.htm>.

¹⁴⁷ Cited from: <<http://www.benchpost.com/unctc/>>. This website has been created by ex-members of UNCTC to provide an institutional history of the Centre and an archive of its publications.

‘A World Restored’

As to be expected, such an agenda for international organisations encapsulated in the NIEO, and others on Palestine, South Africa and the like, came-up against the sustained and acrimonious opposition of Western states and pressure groups.¹⁴⁸ For commentators in the US in particular this was UN ‘Silly Season’, which had seen the organisation increasingly held hostage by the ‘automatic majority’ of the Third World.¹⁴⁹ Along with other General Assembly actions, in particular the ‘Zionism-Equals-Racism’ resolution (1975), the UN was increasingly seen as a hostile and ‘politicized’ institution that had no place in the foreign policy of the US.¹⁵⁰ John Scali, US Permanent Representative to the UN, famously put the matter this way in 1974:

‘When the rule of the majority becomes the tyranny of the majority, the minority will cease to respect or obey it.’¹⁵¹

Diatribes against the UN such as these in the US were commonplace during the 1970s and early 1980s.¹⁵² Of course from the start, the US has had at times an ambivalent, and occasionally rocky, relationship with the UN. From the McCarthy period of investigations of Secretariat staff in the 1950s through to the John Birch Society, who’s catch-phrase was ‘Get the US out of the UN, and the UN out of the US!’, to Bob Doyle’s taunting of Boutros-Ghali as ‘America’s Commander-in-Chief’, anti-UN feeling has been particularly strong among republicans and conservative associations and media. It should also be noted that the Democrats and the ‘liberal press’ have carried out their fair share of what is called in Turtle Bay as ‘UN Bashing’ (for example media reporting of the Zionism-Equals-Racism resolution and the vitriolic campaign carried out by James Rubin against Boutros-Ghali during his bid for a second-term as secretary-general in 1996). But in the 1970s the extent of US hostility to the UN was particularly shrill and protracted, reflecting the temporary collapse of Washington’s ability to shape the tone and tenor of General

¹⁴⁸ ‘The world restored’ is the title of Kissinger’s study on European real-politick: *The World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problem of Peace, 1812-22* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1957).

¹⁴⁹ David Reiff, ‘Up the Organisation: The Successful Failures of Kofi Annan’, *The New Republic*, vol.220, issue 5 (1 February 1999), p.22.

¹⁵⁰ US objection to the direction of certain programmes led to their withdrawal from some UN agencies, such as UNESCO in 1984. The term ‘politicization’ became one of derision used by US administration officials to describe a whole host of UN activities that they disagreed with. For instance as used *ad infinitum* by former US Ambassador Daniel Moynihan. Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, p.96.

¹⁵¹ Ambassador John Scali cited in: Mark D. Alleyne, *Global Lies? Propaganda, the UN and World Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003), p.90.

¹⁵² John Birch phrase cited in: Phyllis Bennis, *Calling the Shots: How Washington Dominates Today's UN* (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996), p.15.

Assembly output. It was also part-and-parcel of a larger crisis in America hegemony that manifested itself in the Vietnam quagmire, Watergate, the OPEC crisis and an unprecedented US balance of payments deficit that led to the Nixon Administration's calculated repudiation of the dollar-gold standard.¹⁵³ Certainly the systematic defeats of the US in the General Assembly, from the admission of the People's Republic of China to the UN to the 'Zionism-Equals-Racism' resolution, marked the nadir of US influence in the UN and seemed to portend the decline of American power and prestige, and the rise of a seemingly multipolar and interdependent world.¹⁵⁴ In this regard, Robert W. Cox's comments concerning the relationship between world order and modern international institutions are worth recalling at length:

'...International organisations can be redefined as the process of institutionalisation of hegemony. International institutions universalise the norms proper to a structure of world power, and that structure of power maintains itself through support of these institutions. In that sense, institutions are a ballast to the status-quo. But international institutions may also become vehicles for the articulation of a coherent counter-hegemonic set of values. In this sense they may become mediators between one world order and another.'¹⁵⁵

Writing in 1980, what Robert Cox failed to anticipate was how fragile these 'counter-hegemonic set of values' actually turned out to be in practice. Certainly, the usurpation of the United Nation's agenda of work by the South was a temporary affair—broken by the revitalisation and reorientation of the liberal world economy from the 1970s onwards. In the broadest sense this was due to the methodical dismantling in the 'Grand Area' of the US world system of the Bretton Woods regime, and its replacement with a nascent neo-liberal alternative.¹⁵⁶ Here the Nixon Administration's unilateral suspension of Gold-Dollar convertibility in August 1971 brought the whole edifice of managed post-World War II international currency-exchange relations to an

¹⁵³ It may be noted here that some commentators attribute the 1973 OPEC oil price hike directly to US statecraft—designed in part to discipline oil-dependent allies in Western Europe and East Asia. Gowan, *The Global Gamble*, pp.19-25.

¹⁵⁴ The PRC was finally admitted to the UN in a historic General Assembly vote on 25 October 1971—a victory apparently marked by the Tanzanian Ambassador and later secretary-general of the OAU (1989-2001), Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, performing a victory dance in the Assembly aisles. Bailey and Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, pp.183-185 and p.642. Much more generally the idea of a decline in US hegemony was a particular strong discourse in IPE. For a robust rebuttal of this common line of reasoning, see: Susan Strange, 'The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony', *International Organization*, vol.41, no.4 (1987), pp.551-74.

¹⁵⁵ Cox, 'The Crisis of World Order', p.377.

¹⁵⁶ The 'Grand Area' was a term coined by the US Council on Foreign Relations in the 1940s to denote, in Ikenberry's words '...the core regions of the world that the United States depended upon for its economic viability.' Ikenberry, 'Creating Yesterday's New World Order', p.63.

unceremonious end.¹⁵⁷ Even before this event, however, the Bretton Woods regime was being eroded by the decision of the UK and US in the 1960s to foster the development of unregulated ‘offshore’ capital-markets (‘Euro-markets’ in the City of London).¹⁵⁸ Later, in the mid-1970s, a further fatal blow was delivered to the post-1945 principle of global ‘financial repression’ by the removal of capital controls.¹⁵⁹ The new financial order that arose, with freely-fluctuating exchange-rates and the world’s leading private financial corporations engaging in relatively unhindered global usury, had the practical effect of forging a neo-classical international political economy. And given the fact that all this occurred during a time when the world was awash with OPEC Petrodollars, as Gowan has shown, very conveniently channelled through US private banks to non-oil producing Southern states desperate for balance-of-payments relief, meant that the US gained a powerful new *private* source of leverage over international affairs.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, when the ‘Debt Crisis’ ensued in the 1980s as a result of interest-rate rises, the World Bank was empowered to reschedule Southern debt and provide loans to shore-up balance of payments problems on the condition that subject states carry out a whole raft of economic reforms designed to deregulate their domestic economies.¹⁶¹

Much more specifically, however, the NIEO challenge to US hegemony in the UN system was met by material power. As Secretary of State Henry Kissinger warned in a speech to the University of Wisconsin in 1974: ‘...The support of the American people, which has been the lifeblood of the organisation, will be profoundly alienated unless fair play predominates and the numerical majority respects the views of the minority.’¹⁶² In the UN itself, the US threatened and cajoled member-states into moderating their actions partly through the financial crisis that it precipitated in the organisation: 1985 was the high-point of US disciplinary action against the organisation with fifty-percent of US contributions to the regular budget cut by the US Senate

¹⁵⁷ A decision brought-on by severe balance of payments problems that the US was facing as a result of the Vietnam War, other US global security commitments, and the legacy of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society programme. Enrico Augelli and Craig N. Murphy ‘Gramsci and International Relations: a general perspective and example from recent US policy toward the Third World’, in Stephan Gill (ed.) *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p.133.

¹⁵⁸ Gowan, *The Global Gamble*, p.17, pp.19-25, pp.39-43; and Helleiner, ‘From Bretton Woods to Global Finance’, pp.168-170.

¹⁵⁹ Gowan, *The Global Gamble*, pp.21-22.

¹⁶⁰ Gowan argues further that the 1973 OPEC oil rise was itself a product of US statecraft—not only designed to discipline insubordinate and industrially strengthening Western allies but also, crucially, pursued precisely because of the anticipated benefit for US private financial organisations and in-turn US state power over the international political economy (hence the removal of US capital controls in 1974 to lubricate the process). Gowan labels this new international monetary order the *Dollar-Wall Street Regime* (DWSR). Ibid. pp.19-38.

¹⁶¹ Ibid. pp.41-42.

¹⁶² Henry Kissinger cited in: Moynihan, *A Dangerous Place*, p.123.

unilaterally. Included here were: the Kassebaum Amendment (August 1985), the Sundquist Amendment (October 1985) and, indirectly relating to the UN but significant nonetheless, the Gramm-Rudman Act (December 1985).¹⁶³ But in large measure the Western conception of discrete international organisations dealing separately with various facets of a liberal order was restored by the new lease of life that the IMF and World Bank were given in the wake of the debt crisis. This was because their increased prominence in the management of the international economy not only undercut the so-called ‘politicisation’ of the General Assembly and its attempts to legislate for economic matters, but also because it began a course of action that saw the systematic restructuring of numerous G-77 states and societies along neo-classical political economy principles.

Briefly, during the debt crisis the World Bank moved away from project based lending and into balance-of-payments financing for Southern states that had become heavily indebted.¹⁶⁴ Such relief was predicated on the reordering of the domestic social sphere along specific neo-liberal lines: the privatisation of state-run industries and utilities; the reduction even eradication of state subsidies in the spheres of health and education; the general dismantling of protectionist trade and finance regimes and the promotion of export-orientated economies. These ‘structural adjustment’ programmes also included measures for the creation of favourable legal and regulatory environments for foreign capital. In the wake of many G-77 countries participating in World Bank structural adjustment programmes, therefore, the ‘neo-statist’ agenda of the NIEO became simply redundant.

Not only then were many Southern states forced to abandon any form of interventionary role in their economies by conditional loans to help straighten out balance of payment problems, but the very fact that the crisis of liquidity faced by a great deal of Southern states was being managed and regulated *discretely* and *privately* by the World Bank meant that the default liberal division of labour between international institutions had been successfully restored. This ‘division of labour’ was effectively reinforced during the 1980s with the gradual reinvigoration of the security and

¹⁶³ For facts and figures on US cuts to its UN contributions see: Maurice Bertrand, ‘Development of Efforts to Reform the UN’, in Adam Roberts and Ben Kingsbury (eds.) *United Nations, Divided World: the UN’s Role in International Relations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p.426.

¹⁶⁴ Also known as ‘policy-based lending’, these type of conditional loans were first deployed in the early 1980s (although they had been discussed openly for some time in policy circles). One of the first and most significant structural adjustment loan was the one signed by the Philippines in September 1980. On the modalities and significance of this conditional loan to the Filipino government, see: Robin Broad, *Unequal Alliance: The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Philippines* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988), p.11.

peace roles of the United Nations, especially the reanimation of the Security Council itself. Here a superpower rapprochement saw a Security Council resolution passed on the Iran-Iraq War in June 1987 (S/RES/598), which called for a ceasefire and the establishment of the UN Iran-Iraq Observer Group (UNIIMOG).¹⁶⁵ While for US Secretary of State Shultz ‘...nothing like this unanimous vote on an issue of real importance and difficulty had ever happened before in the history of the United Nations,’ for Javier Perez de Cueller ‘The adoption of this resolution marked the beginning of the disintegration of the stultifying shroud of the Cold War that had so long enveloped the Security Council’.¹⁶⁶ In all, this resolution—along with later agreement on a Namibian peace operation—reflected a significant ‘thaw’ in Security Council practice and the emergence of an assured activism in UN peacemaking enterprises within Southern states.¹⁶⁷

The preceding two-chapters have sought to provide a certain context for the rise and rise of peace operations in the United Nations. It has argued against the common mode of understanding such peace operations as a normal and natural set of activities for the UN to be preoccupied with. Rather, it has been suggested that these activities are best understood as essentially political practices that have their historical roots in a very specific international social order. In this regard, these practices have historically functioned to uphold in the periphery a world of new ‘modest’ nations-states and to help bring about, in places, a transition from the ‘colonial’ to the ‘sovereign’. The specificity of such peace operations is further revealed if it is acknowledged that such activities are not necessarily the innate or intrinsic set of functions around which the UN should be organised. As the brief outline above of some of the battles to determine the UN’s programme of work has sought to make plain, the agenda and organisation of the UN has been empirically defined and constituted in a number of ways. And of course, each particular programme of work is politically contingent, reflective of various competing visions for how we should manage international life. As we will now go on to see, the collapse of G-77 resistance to the peace and security agenda of the US-led Western world has had direct import for the United Nations, which has seen its International Secretariat stripped of political economy functions and reorganised around peace operations, and its diplomatic functions and autonomy within Southern states extended considerably.

¹⁶⁵ Goulding, *Peacemonger*, pp.123-138.

¹⁶⁶ US Secretary of State, George Shultz cited in: Javier Perez de Cueller, *Pilgrimage for Peace* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), p.159.

¹⁶⁷ Bailey and Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, p.49.

Chapter 3

Reorienting the United Nations in a Post Second World Context: The advance of peace operations

‘Its time to recognise that the UN must direct its limited resources to the world’s highest priorities, focusing on the tasks that it performs best. The UN’s bureaucracy should be smaller, with a clear organisational structure and sharp lines of responsibility. Each programme must be held to a simple standard – that is, it must make a tangible contribution to freedom, security, and well-being of real people in the real world.’ Remarks by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the 50th Session of the General Assembly, 25 September 1995.

‘...Future success demands that the UN focus, within its overall Charter mission, on those activities, or on those aspects of activities, that it does better than others.’ Secretary-general Kofi Annan (A/51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 21).

The UN in a uni-polar world

Both UN secretary-generals of the 1990s began their terms in office by responding to the concerns of powerful states, such as the one outlined by Warren Christopher above, by carrying-out comprehensive programmes of reform in the arena of the UN’s agenda of work. The content and progress of these reforms can tell us a great deal about the political underpinnings of the renewed activism of the UN in world affairs that has followed in the wake of the collapse of the Second World, particularly in the field of peace operations. Not only does such an approach highlight the contingent nature of these transformations but it also sheds light on the general object of intervention that these renewed practices are designed to address. The primary purpose of this chapter therefore is to detail the extensive programme of reform that the UN has been subjected to throughout the 1990s as a precursor to the subsequent discussion of UN experiences in the African context.

It argues that since the collapse of the Second World and the Soviet Union, the United Nations has undergone a significant reorganisation and restructuring around peace operations that promote formal pluralism and liberal human rights within Southern states. This reform process has taken place in response to intensive pressure from Western private and public actors, particularly in the US, which have stressed the need to ‘streamline’ the UN Secretariat, close down ‘outdated’ and ‘duplicative’ units and programmes, and concentrate on those activities that

the organisation apparently does 'best'.¹⁶⁸ Invariably, the burden of such a purge of programmes has fallen on those units and committees associated with political economy research and advocacy and that were seen to impinge on the dominion of international economic institutions and their particular economic orthodoxy. In 'revitalising' the United Nations then, a new specialised focus was anticipated for the organisation that precluded activities revolving around the international political economy (reserved in these cases for the Bretton Woods Institutions) and that, in its stead, concentrated on promoting liberal peace settlements within conflict-ridden Southern states.¹⁶⁹

In some respects this body of UN reform has occurred in the context of two inter-related possibilities for the organisation's future prospects: if the UN stripped itself of 'inefficient' and 'duplicative' programmes and paid greater emphasis on its peacemaking within states, then the organisation could assure itself of some fiscal security and a renewed place in managing world (political) affairs; but if the UN resisted the trend towards a revised division of labour at the international level that focused on managing separately the various facets of restructuring Southern states, and persisted in maintaining units with hostile political economy agendas, then the UN could face the real possibility of financial insolvency and potentially become sidelined from new forms of global governance.¹⁷⁰ Of course, to a large extent this has been a non-choice for the UN, and does not necessarily reflect the dynamics of change and power that the institution

¹⁶⁸ This discourse of organisational reform has been levelled at a variety of international institutions that have been traditionally seen as outside the orbit of complete Western control. Intense pressure to reform was exerted especially on UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UN Regional Commissions, and the UN Secretariat.

¹⁶⁹ The G-7 Political Communiqué of July 1991 was a typical example of Western statements-of-intent with relation to global governance: 'We believe the conditions now exist for the United Nations to fulfil completely the promise and the vision of its founders. A revitalised United Nations will have a central role in strengthening the international order. We commit ourselves to making the UN stronger, more efficient in order to protect human rights, to maintain peace and security for all and to deter aggression. We will make preventative diplomacy a top priority to help avert future conflicts by making clear to potential aggressors the consequences of their actions. The UN's role in peacekeeping should be reinforced and we are prepared to support this strongly.' G-7, 'Political Declaration: Strengthening the International Order', London, 16 July 1991. Available from: <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.

¹⁷⁰ The threat of 'irrelevance' has been one that has hung over the United Nations throughout the organisation's existence. The non-payment of arrears, primarily by the U.S. Congress, has been used regularly to force through programme reform. One of the most recent, and explicit, threats was made by President George W. Bush to the General Assembly in September 2002 when he warned delegates that if action was not taken on Iraq the UN faced becoming peripheral to world affairs: 'The conduct of the Iraqi regime is a threat to the authority of the United Nations, and a threat to peace. Iraq has answered a decade of U.N. demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test, and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honoured and enforced, or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?' 'Remarks by the President in Address to the United Nations General Assembly', September 12, 2002. *USUN Press Release # 131 (02)*.

is subject to: the inter-governmental machinery of the UN, largely unchanged since 1945, underwent an internal transformation in its distribution of forces during the 1990s that helped ensure that the organisation responded positively to the reform agenda of Western states. This is not only seen in the changed internal make-up of the General Assembly, which saw the admission of new states largely aligned to the US, but also a shift in power from the General Assembly to the Security Council that invariably followed the end of Soviet opposition, and its attendant veto, in the Council chamber.¹⁷¹ Just as importantly, G-77 states have had little option but to accept this process of reform, partly for the reasons stated immediately above, but also because of the denouement of organised resistance of Southern states that both the Debt Crisis and the collapse of the Second World entailed. Finally, of course, UN reform has transpired as an actual and ad-hoc outcome of the sustained and protracted material pressure of Western institutions on the UN's finances, notably in this case by the US Congress.

Still, there is some merit in viewing the reform process that the UN, and for that matter other international bodies, have undergone in the light of this general predicament that the UN has had to face-up to in a post-Second World context. This is not only because it highlights the wider logic of reconstitution that the UN has been subjected to but, perhaps more importantly for this investigation, because it also illustrates the specific political underpinnings of so-called 'second-generation' UN peace operations. In the latter regard, peace operations during the 1990s were not an unproblematic or uncontested set of activities (no matter how feeble resistance may have been). Apart from anything else they have been deployed as part of a political project that has seen the mechanisms of internal governance within post-colonial states come under intense

¹⁷¹ The rise of Security Council activism is underlined by the use—or non-use—of the veto in a post-1989 context, and by the deployment of peace operations. Between 1946-2005 there have been 212 public vetoes cast in the Security Council. Only 23 of these were cast between 1 January 1989 and September 2005 (mostly by the USA in order to block resolutions critical of Israel and its continued occupation of Palestinian Arab Territories). See Appendix One. Between 1948-1989, a total of 15 peacekeeping missions were deployed by the Security Council; in the period 1989 and September 2005, there has been a marked increase in activism, with 45 peacekeeping operations deployed. The majority of these have been deployed *within* states and largely in the Southern hemisphere (the exceptions here relate to the former Yugoslavia, Central America and Haiti, and in couple of Central Asian contexts). See Appendix Two. Changes in General Assembly make-up is reflected by the entrance of new members to the UN. In 2002 there were 191 UN member-states. Between 1990-1993 there was a 'second wave' of new members. In 1990: Namibia and Liechtenstein. In 1991: North Korea, South Korea, Micronesia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Marshall Islands. In 1992: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In 1993: Andorra, Czech Republic, Eritrea, Monaco, Slovak Republic, and FYR Macedonia. See: <www.un.org/english>.

Western scrutiny, and invariably, increased technocratic regulation and private corporate infiltration.¹⁷²

It is important to note at the outset, however, that this reconstitution of the UN is not necessarily far removed from the original functions and actions of the organisation in the post-1945 period. As we have already seen, the UN was fundamentally caught-up in providing the institutional prerequisites for a world of non-white nation-states in places such as West Irian, and policing post-colonial relationships in instances such as Suez. The UN also had a nascent set of political and civilian functionaries who helped facilitate these 'prerequisites' and that were profoundly embedded in the political and socio-economic milieu from which they originated. Rather, the argument of this chapter is that the above dimension of the UN's work has been fundamentally expanded, regularised and consolidated in a Department for Political Affairs, and that this has been carried out in order to concentrate the UN's attention on its new specialised niche market: focusing its resources on the '...needs of good internal governance' within the Southern hemisphere.¹⁷³ There is therefore both some continuity and some change in the UN's expanded peace roles in world order management. Not simply helping to provide for the structural division of the international sphere into a world of nation-states in the South separate from a private world economy, the UN is now deeply implicated in reorganising state-society relations and in advocating particular forms of '...good internal governance'. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these forms of 'good internal governance' are imitable to the models promoted by private and public complexes emanating from the Western hemisphere.

Just as significantly this interventionary set of activities has had the practical effect of forging post-colonial states that are deeply amenable to international governance, and to the associated needs and wants of global capital. But before going on to look at these new roles and functions in the Sub-Saharan African context, it is necessary to examine in more detail the process of reform that the UN has been subjected to during the 1990s.

¹⁷² Augelli and Murphy, 'Gramsci and International Relations', pp.134-137.

¹⁷³ This is a phrase that secretary-general Boutros-Boutros Ghali used in the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the report that symbolised a renewed UN activism in peace operations in the Southern hemisphere. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: DPI, 1992), paragraph 17.

The reorientation and restructuring of the United Nations System

The conception of reform that has been promoted and instituted in the UN during the 1990s has been a narrow and largely Western one. This is because reform has not focused on transforming the intergovernmental machinery of the UN itself but rather on transforming the programmatic, administrative and managerial facets of the organisation's life. Granted, there has been serious discussion of expanding the Security Council to include Germany and Japan but, by and large, this would not mark a change in the underlying structural principles that govern the Security Council and that are so central to the dynamics of power within the UN as a whole. In this respect, changes have been instituted under the title 'revitalisation', as opposed to 'reform', and reflect a political agenda that is designed to reorient the UN's functions in world order management without having to forfeit the advantages of control that mechanisms such as a veto yield. In this respect, the discourse of 'revitalisation' has become an important and useful alternative to attempts to provide for a far more fundamental overhaul of the UN system, and its machinery of control, that Southern states have naturally advocated.¹⁷⁴

But within the parameters of 'revitalisation', the UN has undergone momentous changes in its focus, and in its relationship with other international institutions. Most prominently, and relevant to this study, has been the way in which peace operations within Southern societies have come to dominate the UN's resources and persona.¹⁷⁵ In the organisational context, this has involved a dual process of reconstitution: on the one hand the enhancing of units involved around peace operations from electoral and human rights functions to humanitarian programmes and general political affairs; and on the other hand, the 'reallocation' and 'elimination' of UN units and committees that attend to the so-called hard economic issues of international terms of trade and commodity prices, the flow of global capital, technology transfer, industrialisation, and of course the regulation of transnational corporations. The logic of such a dual process relates to the pervasive discourse of 'efficiency', 'specialisation', and 'division of labour' that has pervaded US

¹⁷⁴ For a perspective from the South on UN reform, see: South Centre, *For a Strong and Democratic United Nations: A South Perspective on Reform* (London: Zed Books & South Centre, 1997).

¹⁷⁵ The UN's prioritisation of peace operations has been explicitly alluded to in the introduction of the August 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations: 'The United Nations was founded, in the words of its Charter, in order to 'save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.' Meeting this challenge is the most important function of the Organization, and, to a very significant degree, the yardstick by which it is judged by the peoples it exists to serve.' A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000: 'The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', paragraph 1. Henceforth, the Brahimi Report.

private and public policy pronouncements on UN reform since the early 1980s.¹⁷⁶ Gradually, such a discourse has been thoroughly internalised within the UN, in particular by the Chief Administrative Officer—that is, the secretary-general—who have been nominated and elected partly on their reform credentials, and who have had to negotiate the continued fiscal solvency of the organisation with powerful governmental bodies such as the US Congress.¹⁷⁷ In the words of former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms, the UN must simply ‘Reform or Die’.¹⁷⁸

The discourse of reform promoted by the likes of Senator Helms, and subsequently internalised by both Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan, has largely hinged on the principle of an efficient division of labour across the whole spectrum of global affairs between various international organisations so as to avoid duplication and so as to concentrate and consolidate resources on various organisational priorities.¹⁷⁹ The misleading notion here is that all international organisations have an internal governance structure and outward orientation that are both analogous and free of particular political predispositions. As we have already noted in the previous chapter this is not the case with the World Bank and IMF, which are largely constructed internally as private corporations.¹⁸⁰ Even the United Nations and WTO, formally democratic in many regards, are in essence institutions created to promote a very specific international social sphere.¹⁸¹ At the very least, shifting and juggling the agenda of the UN and distributing certain functions to other institutions is a process that has considerable political import for the character of these activities. Moving, for instance, macroeconomic research and advocacy from the UN

¹⁷⁶ For a critique of this largely G-7 reform discourse, see: ‘Reforming the United Nations: A View From the South’, *The South Centre* (Geneva), March 1995.

¹⁷⁷ For example, Princeton Lyman, US Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations in 1996, noted that the UN reform process had been driven: ‘Largely through the blunt instrument of [US] budget restrictions and budget caps.’ He also stressed that Annan had been supported by the US because of his reform credentials. Princeton Lyman (Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations), ‘News Conference on International Organization Affairs, DOS’, Washington D.C., 17 December 1996 (FDCH Political Transcripts).

¹⁷⁸ Jesse Helms, ‘Saving the UN; A Challenge to the Next secretary-general’, *Foreign Affairs*, vol.75, no.5 (September/October 1996), p.7.

¹⁷⁹ Kofi Annan ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’, paragraphs 27-34 and A/48/428, 29 September 1993: ‘Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations: Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: Report of the secretary-general’, paragraphs 115-120.

¹⁸⁰ On the internal governance structures of the IMF and World Bank see Chapter Two, pp.52-53.

¹⁸¹ As discussed in Chapter One, the United Nations was created to help construct a division of the international social sphere into nation-states separated from a private world economy. This was largely anticipated by US post-war planners to help open-up colonial and third world markets and resources to US private and public power. This order was in direct competition with the colonial and Second World model of world order.

Secretariat to more 'appropriate' institutions such as UNCTAD, the WTO or the IMF has the effect of transforming the very meaning and orientation of this research and work. As we will come on to see, this was a process that effectively happened to the UN's Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC), which after being moved out of the UN Secretariat and into a thoroughly restructured UNCTAD, was stripped of its advocacy role for Southern states.

Of course this kind of radical reconstitution has occurred in the wider context of the collapse of Command Economies and the profound dependence of many Southern regimes on international financial institutions. Furthermore, it has taken place against the backdrop of powerful new economic orthodoxies that have undercut the fundamental premises of units like the UNCTC and Conferences such as UNCTAD. While the rise of neo-liberalism in the World Bank and IMF is regularly cited here, it was perhaps the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and Agenda 21 that finally broke the taboo of the UN engaging with private enterprises. The least that can be said here is that the chimera of sustainable development, enshrined in Agenda 21, has conferred the UN with an explicit free market-friendly outlook, and bestowed 'Big Business' with much needed legitimacy at the international level.¹⁸² Furthermore, the discourse of sustainable development has in recent times allowed secretary-general Annan to launch several private-public initiatives, such as the much-vaunted 'Global Compact.'¹⁸³

The other side of the equation has been the concentration and monopolisation of peace activities directed exclusively on the Southern hemisphere *within* the UN, namely what is termed in the conflict-resolution business as preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping.¹⁸⁴ As we will examine in detail, this was a process that was initiated early in 1992 and that has continued through to the 'Brahimi Report' of August 2000. The foreground to these changes has been the on-going evolution of liberal forms of intervention in the South that culminates, at its apogee,

¹⁸² For a robust critique of sustainable development see: Timothy Doyle, 'Sustainable Development and Agenda 21: the secular bible of global free markets and plural democracy', *Third World Quarterly*, vol.19, no.4 (1998), pp.771-786.

¹⁸³ Annan's first UN-private initiative was the 'Business Humanitarian Forum' January (1999), which was suspended after it was revealed that the eleven transnational corporations involved had donated \$50,000 each to UNDP; Global Compact, the most recent and prominent UN-private enterprise initiative, is open to TNCs that make voluntary pledges on labour and environmental standards. For a brief review see: George Monbiot, 'Comment & Analysis: Getting into bed with big business: the UN is no longer just a joke', *The Guardian* (London), 31 August 2000.

¹⁸⁴ In recent years there has been some tentative moves towards utilising NATO as a 'military-arm' of peace operations. This was first seen in Kosovo in 1999 and most recently in Afghanistan following 'Operation Enduring Freedom' in 2001. So far moves to deploy NATO in Iraq have been resisted by some European states—even though it has been agreed that NATO will train a new Iraqi army.

with 'humanitarian' military intervention. In general, this has not only seen an increased activism in the realms of micro-managing political transitions in the periphery of the world-system, but also a thorough redefinition, among other things, of state sovereignty, the appropriate forms of public governance and, crucial for the new ideology of interventionism, regional and international security.¹⁸⁵ As far as the United Nations is concerned a symbolic marker here was the publication of secretary-general Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*, which provided a speculative outline the organisation's new focus and prerogatives. Written in response to a request of the Security Council Summit in January 1992, which sought to cement and bolster UN peace activities, the report stressed the role of democracy and human rights within states as a prerequisite for peace and development and outlined a revised rationale for international intervention:

'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has passed...It is the task of leaders of States to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.'¹⁸⁶

With regard to 'good internal governance', the secretary-general noted that: 'There is an obvious connection between democratic practices—such as the rule of law and transparency in decision-making—and the achievement of true peace and security in any new and stable political order.'¹⁸⁷ This clear normative statement in favour of particular forms of governance is one that underlines the intent of the UN to follow the general trend of international institutions towards managing and engineering social change within the boundaries of Southern states. This has ultimately been justified by the rise of liberal human rights discourse and related 'human security' paradigms that, among others, Kofi Annan has sort to advance:

'...Surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes against humanity. Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing

¹⁸⁵ On the rise of liberal-humanitarian intervention during the 1990s, see: Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars* and De Waal, *Famine Crimes*.

¹⁸⁶ *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 17.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.* paragraph 59.

nothing when we can. Armed intervention must always remain the option of last resort, but in the face of mass murder it is an option that cannot be relinquished.’¹⁸⁸

But as a first step, the authority to promote and prescribe certain forms of ‘good internal governance’ was deemed defensible in terms of a post-Cold War transformation of international politics that posed new threats of disintegrating states, ethnic cleansing, and destabilising humanitarian crises. That is, because major threats to international peace and security were situated in the essentially liberal discourse of globalisation and fragmentation, it was now a central concern of the world community to address internal governance, lest they lead to regional or international conflagrations.¹⁸⁹ In such a context, Boutros-Ghali in *An Agenda for Peace* reminded the membership of Article 43 of the UN Charter, the use of military force to restore international peace and security, and encouraged its reactivation. It was coyly added, to assure any concerns that Western states may have, that:

‘Forces under Article 43 may perhaps never be sufficiently large or well equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons. They would be useful, however, in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order.’¹⁹⁰

Setting aside the lack of reticence in such remarks, *An Agenda for Peace* underlines the emergence of a new complex of post-colonial relationships, in which the UN sought to emerge as a central arbiter. The internal reforms of the UN during this period, in both the political and economic spheres, reflect this endeavour. Indeed, as we will now see, the practical

¹⁸⁸ A/54/2000, April 3, 2000: ‘We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century, Report by the secretary-general Kofi Annan’, p.48. Henceforth the Millennium Report. This type of reasoning has been endorsed by the Security Council (S/RES/1296) and the 2000 UN Brahimi Report: ‘The targeting of civilians in armed conflict and the denial of humanitarian access to civilian populations afflicted by war may themselves constitute threats to international peace and security and thus be triggers for Security Council action’. The Brahimi Report (A/55/305–S/2000/809), paragraph 50.

¹⁸⁹ For the typical 1990s account of globalisation and fragmentation, and the rise of so-called ‘new wars’, see: Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). Kaldor suggests that ‘new wars’ (such as Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s) are novel in that they are driven by elites who utilise particularistic identities to remain in power, violence is decentralised around militias and is often targeted at civilians, and that a globalised war economy has developed. Much of this argument has been successfully rebutted as a simple ideological defence of Western military intervention; at the very least Kaldor’s ‘new’ war argument implies, as Paul Hirst has written, ‘...picking those who are the bearers of ‘civility’ and favouring them politically and economically, backing this up with external force.’ Paul Hirst, *War and Power in the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), p.86. For a wide ranging critique of new wars, see also: Stathis N. Kalyvas ‘New’ Wars and ‘Old’ Wars: A Valid Distinction?’ *World Politics*, vol.54, no.1 (2001), pp.99-118.

¹⁹⁰ *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 43.

implementation of this dual process of reconstitution has been—admittedly with some setbacks and inconsistencies—a determined process of remaking the UN in the image of a specialised agency promoting Western liberal modernity in the very periphery of the world state-system.

The shift towards peace operations

Within two months of taking office in January 1992, and barely one month after the Security Council declared the need to reform UN peace activities, secretary-general Boutros-Ghali unilaterally unveiled the first of a two stage restructuring of the International Secretariat.¹⁹¹ The primary intention of this 'first stage' of reform was to enhance the capacity of the UN in the field of preventative diplomacy, peace making and peacekeeping.¹⁹² To this end, Boutros-Ghali announced the creation of three new departments broadly dealing with peace activities: the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO); the Department of Political Affairs (DPA); and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). Simultaneously, every single unit or department concerned with economic, social and developmental issues was to be merged into one Department of Economic and Social Development (DESD).¹⁹³ This was held out to be the first stage of the reform of economic programmes with, as we will see in the following section, much more significant alterations carried out during the 'second stage' in December 1992.¹⁹⁴

As for the general onus of the February 1992 reform, it was explicitly calculated to increase UN resources on peace operations, and to shift the emphasis of these activities.¹⁹⁵ Crucially, the

¹⁹¹ Secretary-general Boutros-Ghali assumes office on 1 January 1992; Security Council Summit is held on 31 January 1992; Boutros-Ghali announces internal secretariat reform on 21 February 1992; this 'first stage' of reform takes effect in March 1992. For a review: A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 1-23.

¹⁹² A/46/882, 21 February 1992: 'Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations: Restructuring of the Secretariat of the Organization: Note by the secretary-general'. The report utilises the Security Council Summit as a mandate for this restructuring: 'As was evident during the recent Summit Meeting of the Security Council, and as may be seen from the Presidential statement issued on that occasion (S/23500), the Membership expects the Organization to develop an enhanced capacity for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping...in response to these concerns, I have decided to establish a Department of Political Affairs'. paragraphs 5-6.

¹⁹³ Ibid. paragraphs 8-10.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid. paragraph 9 and A/47/753, 3 December 1992: 'Restructuring and revitalization of the United Nations in the economic, social and related field: Programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993: Note by the secretary-general', paragraphs 1-5.

¹⁹⁵ Occasionally, the objective of prioritising peace activities has been explicitly acknowledged by UN officials, although the Secretariat must be careful not to understate the economic, social and developmental role of the UN: '...The pooling and shifting of resources that this restructuring [February 1992] has generated has made it possible to create new units, through the redeployment of staff, to meet new priority mandates of the Organization. Prominent among the new priority mandates are...the provision of electoral assistance to facilitate the democratisation process' A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 70-72. In

reform process initiated in 1992 sought to create a functional division of labour between the UN's various peace activities. With some important exceptions, the structural departmental reforms announced in 1992 remain in place today.¹⁹⁶ This is particularly pertinent with relation to the DPKO and DPA, which were created to enhance certain political aspects of the UN's activities.¹⁹⁷ While DPKO, formed out of the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) and later incorporating the Field Operations Division (FOD), was intended to focus on planning, deploying and implementing peacekeeping operations broadly conceived, the DPA assumed authority for the supervision of several new activities that the UN began to perform regularly in the early 1990s.¹⁹⁸ Central here were: the supervision, validation and, occasionally, organisation of electoral processes that were repeatedly part of comprehensive domestic peace settlements; the political negotiations and diplomacy of UN special representatives with 'contracting parties' and the international donor community; the pursuit of any human rights provisions that a mandate may include; and, generally, political relations with the Security Council.¹⁹⁹ The DPA was also to

general, the same report noted that: 'During the coming period, high priority will continue to be given to the strengthening of the Organization's ability to deal with the increased demands for peace making, peace keeping.' Ibid. paragraph 120.

¹⁹⁶ While the remit of both the DPA and DPKO may have changed over the years the structure remains: even the Report of the Panel on Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report), which had been given a wide remit to recommend any change, had been informally requested by Kofi Annan to leave DPA and DPKO as departments untouched. Confidential interview with senior UN DPA official, New York, 18 September 2000.

¹⁹⁷ ST/SGB/Organization Section DPA, 15 February 1996: 'Organisation Manual: A Description of the functions and organisation of the Department of Political Affairs.'

¹⁹⁸ The DPKO was initially formed out of the 'Office for Special Political Affairs' (OSPA), which had up until this point had the primary role of managing political negotiations and running all dimensions of peace operations, most notoriously in the Congo during the 1960s (as it will be recalled OSPA was run by Ralph Bunche until his death in the early 1970s and then by Sir Brian Urquhart until 1986). In the past, the OSPA had retained a certain ambiguity and seclusion, operating in the shadows and behind-the-scenes on political assignments delegated by the secretary-general. But when the UN ventured on occasion into far more prominent peace roles, especially those transition operations discussed previously, the OSPA was usually at its helm. This was initially because the OSPA operated as a vehicle to enable the secretary-general to engage UN 'trouble-shooter' Ralph Bunche in particularly sensitive tasks. Indeed, it should be recalled that Dag Hammarskjöld moved Bunche from Under Secretary-General for Trusteeship Affairs to a newly created Under Secretary-General for 'Special Political Affairs' in the early 1950s precisely for this purpose (USG for 'Special Political Affairs' was the forerunner to OSPA; in turn, USG for 'Special Political Affairs' was a title that replaced 'Under Secretary-General Without Portfolio', which had been a title that had caused some concern among the membership). Even though the post had been set up, according to Hammarskjöld, to deal with issues of an 'inter-departmental character', it became quickly associated and preoccupied with UN peace activities from Palestine, Congo, Cyprus and Kashmir to Lebanon and Bahrain. On OSPA, its origins and Ralph Bunche's development within it, see: Urquhart, *Ralph Bunche*, pp.243-247 and Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*, pp.79-85. Within a couple of years of its establishment, the DPKO incorporated the Field Operations Division in September 1993 and was reorganised internally by Kofi Annan (then USG for DPKO) to create a military logistics and permanent planning unit and a 24 hour situation room. A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 73-75.

¹⁹⁹ ST/SGB/1998/14, 20 August 1998: 'Secretary-General's Bulletin: Organization of the Department of Political Affairs', Section 2, Section 4, Section 6, Section 7.

focus a significant amount of resources on a new G-7 priority of 'preventative diplomacy'.²⁰⁰ What is noticeable in the above division of tasks is the attempt to centralise political activities within one 'mega-department', the DPA, and the introduction into the programmatic agenda of the UN a considerable emphasis on features of peace operations that deal directly with domestic governance: elections, human rights, institutional capacity-building, and preventative diplomacy.

The introduction and evolution of preventative diplomacy as a UN priority area is fairly indicative of this transformation. Even though the DPA included the regular administrative and 'servicing' roles of the Secretariat for major UN organs—for example, incorporating the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs (DPSCA) and the Office for Political and General Assembly Affairs and Secretariat Services (OPGAASS)—right from the start the department was to be the UN 'focal point' for preventative diplomacy. Indeed the official and formal rationale for the establishment of the DPA in 1992 was that the Security Council had expected increased emphasis on this area.²⁰¹ To this end the DPA incorporated divisions that were split according to geographical regions (Africa I, Africa II, Americas and Europe, and Asia and the Pacific) and whose main terms of reference was to: 'To monitor, analyse and assess political developments throughout the world'. Accordingly: '...Desk officers of the four DPA geographical divisions develop country profiles on their respective countries and then monitor developments over time.'²⁰² As a result, it was expected that the DPA would be able to: '...assist...in the alerting of relevant organs about impending crises or emergencies.'²⁰³

On the surface, the logic of such a focus related initially to a simple cost-efficiency calculation; Security Council members emphasised in January 1992 their preference for preventative action that would initiate appropriate domestic settlements without the necessity of costly peacekeeping and post-conflict operations.²⁰⁴ Latterly, a far more powerful rationale for these activities developed in the wake of the explosion in social violence that states such as Rwanda, Bosnia, Congo, and Burundi underwent during the 1990s. Seen in terms of massive human rights abuses, or 'crimes against humanity', African, Asian and increasingly former Soviet satellites have become the object of officially sanctioned UN Secretariat surveillance, and in a number of cases,

²⁰⁰ In the early 1990s, G-7 and P-5 states began to emphasise preventative diplomacy as a new part of global governance. For example: G-7 'Political Communiqué', 16 July 1991.

²⁰¹ A/46/882, 21 February 1992, paragraph 5-6; A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraph 68; and S/23500, 31 January 1992: 'Note by the President of the Security Council.'

²⁰² ST/SGB/Organization Section DPA, 15 February 1996, p.1 and p.5.

²⁰³ A/46/882, 21 February 1992, paragraph 5.

²⁰⁴ S/23500, 31 January 1992 and the Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 29.

subject to the diplomatic and political intercession of UN representatives.²⁰⁵ Either way, the departmental focus on preventative diplomacy has allowed for an increased inspection and observation of domestic order in Southern states. Needless to say, this new institutional activity and programme of work is one that would have been previously inconceivable for the UN to undertake (considering the sanctity of sovereignty and non-interference enshrined in the UN Charter) and which has met with the widespread suspicion of a number of G-77 states.²⁰⁶

And yet this attempt to institutionalise UN surveillance of certain less-privileged member-states has been fairly inconsequential when compared to the way in which this concept has served to pre-emptively encourage democratisation and liberalisation in the domestic context.²⁰⁷ Key in this regard has been the rise of special representatives and political missions, under the DPA rather than DPKO, which have become routinely deployed in the last few decades.²⁰⁸ Here, for instance, out of forty-four special representatives deployed by the UN at the end of 1994, sixteen were providing 'good-office' functions.²⁰⁹ Their roles, while varied, are in the first instance to forestall the outbreak of organised conflict and to shore-up any political settlements between local groups.²¹⁰ In the second instance however, special representatives perform peacemaking roles that seek to bring domestic groups to negotiated agreements and that are broadly in accordance with international standards and expectations. While this has entailed some reliance on power-sharing models of conflict resolution, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s, agreements have

²⁰⁵ The use of human rights discourse as a rationalisation for preventative diplomacy has been particularly noticeable during Kofi Annan's tenure. For the justification for these types of UN activities, see Kofi Annan: 'Millennium Report', A/54/2000, pp.47-49.

²⁰⁶ Confidential interview with senior UN official, New York, 1 December 2000, and confidential interview with senior UN DPA official, New York, 18 September 2000.

²⁰⁷ Country-Desk Officers have a paucity of information sources at their disposal and usually cover more than one state, often entire regions. This has led to the complaint by special representatives, who often require background information, that this facet of the DPA's work is as of yet little value. Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 21 September 2001 and confidential interview with former UN special representative, New York, 25 October 2000. Nonetheless, this dimension of work has recently been upgraded, following the Brahimi Report, and remains a controversial Secretariat structure.

²⁰⁸ There are three categories of Special Representatives: those heading peacekeeping or observer missions; those appointed by the secretary-general directly for the purposes of 'good-offices'; and those appointed to help the secretary-general in the 'discharge of certain aspects of his responsibilities.' A/C.5/48/26, 15 November 1993: 'Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Special Representatives, Envoys, and Related Positions', pp.2-3.

²⁰⁹ A/C.5/49/50, 8 December 1994: 'Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations, Special Representatives, Envoys, and Related Positions', paragraph 10-11.

²¹⁰ Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 21 September 2001 and A/C.5/48/26, 15 November 1993, paragraph 8.

invariably included, at the very least, a commitment to carry out some form of democratic elections in the future, and provisions to respect human rights and govern according to certain standards of transparency and accountability.²¹¹ In fact, more often than not, preventative diplomacy *on the ground* has aspired to liberalising structures and cultures of governance. As Kofi Annan asserts in his *Millennium Report*, in the long-term preventative diplomacy must ultimately be designed to:

‘...Promote human rights, to protect minority rights and to institute political arrangements in which all groups are represented.’²¹²

Undoubtedly, as we will see in the African context, special representatives—both those concerned with preventive diplomacy and those heading peacekeeping missions—now have an absolutely central role in ensuring the smooth transfer in state-society relations that UN peace activities are structured to advance. Like some of their forerunners in Jerusalem, the Congo and West Irian, these UN officials have a decisive role in ‘holding-the-ring’ between competing national elites, and are a considerable object of influence within these societies.

The establishment of the DPA in 1992 has, therefore, been relatively indicative of the changing roles and functions of the UN in the Southern hemisphere, as well as the reorientation of the UN itself. Its creation certainly underlines the wider peace activities that the UN undertakes and the expansion of functions that focus on governance within Southern states. This has been a work-in-progress throughout the 1990s and 2000s in that the DPA has progressively expanded and deepened its sphere of influence with regard to promoting ‘...good internal governance.’ On one level, this is because the division of labour between the DPA and DPKO has been a matter of change and dispute throughout the 1990s, with the remit of the DPA in particular constantly shifting.²¹³ While DPKO has always retained the authority for the management of peacekeeping operations—be they limited classical peacekeeping or extensive transitional ones—the DPA has at various times been allowed to encroach on the political management of these operations.²¹⁴ For

²¹¹ Ibid. paragraph 5. As of 2005, there were 84 Special representatives and Envoys employed by the UN. For current figures see: <www.un.org/english>.

²¹² ‘Millennium Report’ (A/54/2000), p.45.

²¹³ The internal structure of the DPA has changed regularly. Initially, for example, DPA was headed by two under-secretaries, whose responsibilities were largely divided along geographic lines. A/46/882, 21 February 1992, paragraph 6.

²¹⁴ DPKO was supposed to be in charge of operational, and the DPA in control of the political, facets of peace operations. Goulding, *Peacemonger*, pp.333-43.

example: reports of the secretary-general to the Security Council regarding operations are vetted by DPA; special representatives, who often simultaneously act as head of peacekeeping operations, are answerable to the DPA with regard to issues within its remit such as electoral affairs, political negotiations, and Security Council relations; and the recent upsurge in transitional authorities and the resultant emphasis on long-term peace-building through civil society programmes, human rights advocacy and capacity-building has given the DPA a greater responsibility for implementing peace settlements.

On another level, however, the DPA's focus on governance within states has been deepened and extended in unison with liberal theories of conflict and conflict-resolution, and as a result of 'failed' experiences in the field. This has been most noticeable with the concept of 'post-conflict peace-building' that has recently been introduced into the lexicon of UN peace discourse, and translated as a principal UN peace practice under the aegis of the DPA.²¹⁵ This new category of peace operation has developed against the backdrop of a growing realisation among practitioner-academics in the conflict resolution milieu that previous attempts at promoting democratisation and liberalisation may have proved superficial and unsustainable in the long-term.²¹⁶ In the realm of formal pluralism, for example, the Brahimi Report informs us that:

'... 'free and fair' elections should be viewed as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions... elections need the support of a broader process of democratisation and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.'²¹⁷

This type of logic has also been applied to law and order, human rights, and preventative diplomacy, and should therefore be seen as part of an attempt to deepen the process of state-society restructuring that UN peace operations enact.²¹⁸ Transitional Authorities in both East

²¹⁵ DPA becomes the 'focal point' for 'post-conflict peace-building' in 1997, during Kofi Annan's tenure. A/51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 121 action 5.

²¹⁶ For a candid example of this self-reflection in conflict resolution literature, see: Paris, 'International peacebuilding and the 'mission civilisatrice''.

²¹⁷ The Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 38.

²¹⁸ The Brahimi Report argues that a whole set of UN peace activities need to be deepened. For example, with relation to UN civilian police monitors it suggests that police officers must move beyond the simple '...attempt to discourage by their presence abusive or other unacceptable behaviour of local police officers.' Rather they should '...be tasked to reform, train, and restructure local police forces according to international standards for democratic policing and human rights...' Ibid. paragraph 39.

Timor and Kosovo can certainly be seen as part of this trend, and commitment, to implement a far more thorough restructuring of the domestic social 'space' in the Southern hemisphere. The introduction of 'post-conflict peace building', and its 'focal point' in the DPA, has therefore had significant import for the UN's remit in the realms of observing and reforming the internal governance regimes of Southern states and societies.

Despite these new UN roles, however, the general practitioner-academic account of peace reforms during the 1990s somehow focuses on the entirely functional need of the Secretariat to update its capacities in the wake of the rapid increase in peacekeeping operations that followed the end of the Cold War, and tends to stress *the lack* of adequate wherewithal to deal with such a transformation.²¹⁹ Indeed, if anything, commentators stress the paucity of resources at the disposal of the UN when it comes to peacekeeping, the cautious progress of peace and security sector reform, and the diminutive commitment of some permanent Security Council members towards these activities.²²⁰ Time and again, we are told that peacekeeping is carried out on a 'shoestring' and, contrary to this account, that the UN serves as an ideal 'dumping-ground' for international crises that powerful states have no intention of solving.²²¹ The UN is not so much an agency involved in restructuring the South, as an ideal scapegoat for reticent self-interested industrialised states. For most commentators, reform of the Secretariat's agenda of work has in fact not gone far enough.

In some ways it is understandable that commentators have come to these kinds of conclusions. After all, most have been deeply involved in one way or another in the implementation of these activities and are acutely aware of the deficiencies in strategy as well as the fluctuating attitudes in Western societies towards peace roles and 'nation building'.²²² But the tendency in the conflict-resolution field to look at these roles in terms of their adequate application as opposed to their political and socio-economic specificity is ultimately a narrow and partisan one. Because the parameters of these activities are widely considered as neutral, normal and generally desirable,

²¹⁹ Prominent examples of such a view would include: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished* (London: I.B.Tauris, 1999), pp.83-84, Goulding, *Peacemonger*, pp.341-342, and Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, pp.220-21.

²²⁰ Most recently put forward by: Linda Poleman, *We did nothing: why the truth doesn't always come out when the UN goes in* (London: Penguin Books, 2003); and Michael G. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend?* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

²²¹ Such as by Sir Brian Urquhart: Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War* and Brian Urquhart, 'Selecting the World's CEO: Remembering the Secretaries-General', *Foreign Affairs*, vol.74, no.3 (May/June 1995), pp.21-26.

²²² 'Rich and Afraid of Peacekeeping' Ramesh Thakur and David Malone, *International Herald Tribune*, 25 October 2000.

the issue is automatically one of appraising the appropriate progress of peace operations as opposed to probing their social implications or politically contingent nature. On the political level, the problem with this narrative is that it ignores the wider reform of international organisations during the 1990s—most importantly, a renewed division of labour at the level of the international and the refocused agenda of work within most of these organisations towards issues of internal governance, be it political, social, or economic. Taken as whole this reconstitution among and within international organisations belies the narrative of a necessary but insufficient process of UN peace and security sector reform. The organisation's peace activities may, perhaps, be defective and deficient, even superficial, but they are still an intrinsic part of a larger political project of recalibrating the international management of post-colonial relationships. As we have already seen, the net-effect of UN 'revitalisation' in the sphere of peace and security has been to shift the focus of the UN's peace functions from the inter-state regulation of post-colonial relationships to the domestic supervision and minute restructuring of Southern states. The least that can be said is that from the vista of institutional reform—where the extent of the UN's shift towards peace activities becomes fully apparent—it is clear that previously unthinkable areas of domestic political and social surveillance have been tentatively established in the UN's programme of work.

Overall, then, what is striking when examining the restructuring of peace activities in the UN during the 1990s, starting with the establishment of DPA and DPKO in 1992 and continuing through to the high-profile UN Brahimi Report in 2000, has been the way in which the orientation of UN Secretariat activity has progressively become geared towards the sphere of internal political governance. The establishment and development of the DPA has perhaps been the most conspicuous facet of this reorientation because of its predominant focus on the political and social surveillance and reform of Southern societies, which are invariably part-and-parcel of the ever expansive practices of 'preventative diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace-building'. But this process of expanding the UN's role in the internal affairs of states through the reform of peace activities has only been one side of this reorientation. Indeed, as we will now go on to see, the other side of the process of UN reconstitution has been the extraction from the UN's programme of work, all units, divisions, and committees that performed international political economy advocacy or research.

The purge of political economy research and advocacy

The 1990s have seen the economic and social dimensions of the UN's work face a ruthless reconstitution. This has largely consisted of a process of eliminating UN activities that have historically had an ambiguous and antagonistic attitude to free-market orthodoxy, and their replacement with programmes of work that are attuned to the broad endorsement, through sustainable development, of neo-liberal practices. In the latter regard, this new political economy orientation can be seen to be akin to the transformation of the UN's peace and security roles outlined above—the rise of preventative diplomacy and 'post-conflict peace-building' in the DPA—in that the organisation's programme of work has come to be broadly dominated by the promotion of very specific regimes of good governance within Southern states.

In the UN's economic sphere, this outcome has been realised by an internal discourse of reform that pivots on issues of the efficient allocation of organisational resources within and across the UN system.²²³ Simply put, the UN must focus its limited and strained resources on 'new' global priorities (failed and collapsed states, humanitarian emergencies, environmental issues, terrorism, drugs) and simultaneously reduce the wasteful duplication of activities at the intergovernmental level (allowing the World Bank, IMF and WTO to specialise on their macro-economic and micro-economic 'comparative advantages').²²⁴ At the same time, a new neo-liberal dispensation within the UN has been made possible by the ideology of sustainable development, which has undercut calls to actively regulate international economic processes and actors in favour of endorsing current global capitalist practices as the basis of both economic development and a sound environmental future.²²⁵ As global capitalism is now seen as the singular fulcrum to realise these aspirations, as opposed to a major source of North-South economic dependence and global environmental degradation, the UN has over time been able to legitimately internalise and promote such a view. This has of course been a protracted, uneven, and in some respects, an incomplete process: state and non-state opposition has from time to time appeared; reforms have gone unimplemented; and there have been unexpected reversals in this largely Western agenda.

²²³ For a rationalisation of reform: A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993: 'Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations: Programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993: revised estimates as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 47/212: Report of the secretary-general', paragraphs 7, 19, 22, 50, 53, and 55.

²²⁴ A/C.5/47/SR.14, 26 October 1992: 'Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Monday, 26 October 1992, 3 p.m. Agenda Item 103, 104, and 105', paragraph 27, 28 and 34. A/48/428, 29 September 1993, paragraphs 22, 26, 27, and 29.

²²⁵ On Agenda 21, see: Doyle, 'Sustainable Development and Agenda 21.'

But, by and large, the direction and dispensation of institutional reform is clear—the UN has been redirected towards the promotion of structures and cultures of internal governance that are imitable to current forms of global capitalism.

But an initial prerequisite for this new orientation has involved the purge of those programmes that were, for one reason or other, hostile to free-market orthodoxy. Here, it was argued in Chapter Two that even though the United Nations was primarily designed and developed to help promote a new form of global order based upon the modest nation-state, and a private world economy, in certain spheres the organisation briefly and temporarily began to challenge this particular international social order. During the 1970s, the NIEO and the Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States were formative aspects of this challenge, one that not only had ideological significance but one that also had practical implications for the content of the UN's programme of work.²²⁶ Indeed, we saw that committees such as that on Transnational Corporations (CTC), and conferences such as UNCTAD, were primarily deployed to challenge the discreet conception of international social order that the UN had originally been established to advance. It was also noted that the design of the UN featured a historic 'Keynesian compromise' in that it sanctioned a small measure of formal international regulation of the private economy in order to address problems of unemployment, and domestic social issues more generally. Chapter IX of the UN Charter, entitled 'International Economic and Social Co-operation', fundamentally reflected this subsidiary UN concern.

Historically, these types of social provisions and political economy outlooks have been the object of bitter antagonism between G-77 states and industrialised states, in particular by the US. Of course, even within the heartlands of advanced industrialised capitalism there has been a protracted and complex battle along these lines, culminating dramatically with the rise of the New Right in the US and UK in the 1980s and the systematic policy of state reconfiguration that was thereafter instituted. Within the UN this process was instigated in February 1992 with the amalgamation of all economic and social units and divisions within one secretariat department (Department of Economic and Social Development, DESD). This initial—'first'—stage of reform was later followed by the creation of three new departments and the reallocation of some key tasks across the UN System in December 1992.²²⁷ It was this 'second stage' of reform that finally expunged hostile political economy advocacy from the Secretariat and introduced new UN

²²⁶ On NIEO and Charter on the Economic Rights and Duties of States see Chapter Two.

²²⁷ A/47/753, 3 December 1992, paragraphs 7, 8, 13, and 14.

priority programmes such as the implementation of Agenda 21. This was a fairly controversial set of reforms: in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly in particular, objections were consistently raised by various G-77 states who generally felt that this Secretariat reorganisation reflected Western concerns and represented a diminution of the economic role of the UN.²²⁸ In this, there was ample justification—barely two months previously, for example, US Ambassador Perkins had informed the Fifth Committee that several functions of the newly established DESD were ‘duplicative’, ‘not useful’, and should be ‘reassigned or eliminated.’ Perkins continued that it was now an opportune time to:

‘...Eliminate marginally useful units and activities, in order to release the resources required for priority areas, such as human rights and urgent new operations.’²²⁹

It is perhaps unsurprising that the UN secretary-general responded positively and quickly to these types of managerial arguments. After all, Boutros-Ghali faced severe US material pressure to ‘reform or die’ and probably understood that this was a necessary price to pay for a revitalised peace and security role for the UN in a post-Second World context.²³⁰ Either way, restructuring proposals advocated by G-7 states throughout the 1990s have been acted on swiftly by the Secretariat.²³¹ This was certainly the case in the ‘second stage’ of Secretariat reform announced by Boutros-Ghali in December 1992, which responded to calls for reprioritising and reallocating specific economic and social units.

²²⁸ For an example of G-77 concerns see the summary records of Fifth Committee meetings in late 1992 and 1993. A/C.5/48/SR.18, 18 January 1994: ‘Summary Record of the 18th Meeting of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Tuesday, 16 November 1993, 10 a.m. Agenda Item 128, 129, and 125’, paragraphs 25-36 (Mr Marker, Pakistan) and paragraphs 50-53 (Mr Owade, Kenya). A/C.5/48/SR.14, 9 December 1993: ‘Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly, Wednesday, 10 November 1993, 10 a.m. Agenda Item 121, 128, and 129’, paragraphs 13-15 (Mr Ju Kuilin, China) and paragraphs 47-53 (Mr Khan, Bangladesh).

²²⁹ A/C.5/47/SR.14, 26 October 1992, paragraph 34.

²³⁰ Boutros-Ghali told the German paper, *Die Zeit*, in March 1992: ‘To make it absolutely clear to the Western public: I am not all that concerned about financial or technical assistance to the Third World. Your citizens in any case are sick and tired of being constantly asked to donate food or money.’ Cited in: Hussein Solomon, ‘Democratising the United Nations: A View From the South’, *Politeia: Journal for the Political Sciences* (Pretoria: UNISA), vol.15 no.1 (1996), p.6.

²³¹ This is especially noticeable with Kofi Annan’s reforms, which read as a near literal and verbatim set of G-7 recommendations. For a comparative example, see the G-7 ‘Economic Communiqué: making a success of globalisation for the benefit of all’, Lyon, G-7 Summit, June 28, 1996 (available from <www.g8.utoronto.ca>) with the reforms subsequently proposed by Kofi Annan in ‘Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform’, A/51/950, 14 July 1997.

Top of the list for ‘elimination’, perhaps, was the UN’s Centre on Transnational Corporations (CTC), which was finally reallocated in a neutralised form to UNCTAD in 1993.²³² Here, from the beginning of Boutros-Ghali’s term as secretary-general, the centre faced a gradual diminution of its roles and functions. During the first stage of reform in February 1992, for example, CTC lost a significant degree of autonomy when its status as an independent centre was ended.²³³ Its most controversial project, the non-binding ‘Code of Conduct’ for corporations that the centre’s staff had been negotiating for over a decade was gradually sidelined throughout this period of Secretariat transition, due in a large part to the opposition of G-7 states and business interests.²³⁴ Even though the centre had been instructed by the General Assembly to present a set of recommendations on transnational corporations to be considered for negotiation in the final text of the Rio Earth Summit (Agenda 21), its advocacy was consistently marginalised.²³⁵ In part the CTC was outmanoeuvred by private corporations under the Business Council for Sustainable Development (BCSD), which played a large role in the Summit’s preparatory work, financing, and conduct both within and outside the UN.²³⁶ While CTC recommendations were to become tangential to the Summit, the BCSD circulated widely their own suggestions for self-regulation at Rio.²³⁷ With Agenda 21 and its conspicuous lack of reference to multinational corporations, and its consequent internalisation in the UN’s programme of work through the newly created ‘Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development’ (DPCSD), there was little place for the kinds of activity that the CTC had originally provided. Its transfer to UNCTAD reflected this changed reality and provided for an opportunity to refocus the centre’s axis.²³⁸ Its research and technical assistance was now to be re-centred on the ‘...contribution of TNCs to

²³² One former CTC employee expressed the opinion that Boutros-Ghali had been placed under considerable pressure to dissolve the Centre by the US Department of State and by powerful lobby groups such as the Heritage Foundation. Confidential email communication with former senior UN CTC official, 1 June 2004.

²³³ The CTC became the ‘Division on Transnational Corporations and Management’ when it was merged into the newly created DESD in March 1992.

²³⁴ Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, *The Earth Brokers* (New York: Routledge, 1994).

²³⁵ See Chapter 2 in Joshua Karliner, *The Corporate Planet: ecology and politics in the age of globalisation* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1997); and George Monbiot, ‘Getting into bed with big business’, *The Guardian* (London), 31 August 2000.

²³⁶ It should also be noted that UNCED was headed at the time by Canadian businessman, Maurice Strong. It is widely accepted that Strong had a pivotal role, along with the Swiss philanthropist Schmidheiny of the BCSD, in fostering a pro-business environment. Strong has since played an important role in Annan’s reform process and in his several UN-private initiatives.

²³⁷ Chatterjee and Finger, *The Earth Brokers*, p.121.

²³⁸ Confidential email communication with former senior UN CTC official, 2 June 2004.

developing countries' and '...facilitating flows of foreign direct investment'.²³⁹ It is probably worth recalling here its 'terms of reference' as the Division on Transnational Corporations and Investment in UNCTAD:

'Reviewing and providing guidance to the secretariat on technical assistance to Governments interested in developing investment regimes and enabling environments so as to attract more foreign investment and support for enterprise developments, thereby contributing to economic growth and development of host countries.'²⁴⁰

It should also be noted that UNCTAD had itself faced a rapid process of reconstitution—for some reflecting a 'Houdini-like ability to survive'—from Cartagena in 1992 through to Midrand in 1996.²⁴¹ This saw UNCTAD secretary-general cut staff by 10 percent, narrow organisational activities, and refocus on free-market orientated technical assistance.²⁴² In Lyon, G-7 states hailed UNCTAD's '...thorough reform' as a '...point of reference' for future UN economic and social sector restructuring:

'We particularly appreciate the outcome of the 9th Session of UNCTAD at Midrand where...we succeeded in reforming UNCTAD's inter-governmental machinery and in refocusing its work on a small number of priorities to promote development through trade and investment.'²⁴³

Such commendations reflected a complete turnaround in G-7 attitudes towards UNCTAD and underlined the new orientation of this international body.²⁴⁴ This was also marked by UNCTAD's 1995 World Investment Report, where the change in tone towards a liberal political economy was palpable: transnational corporations, for example, now contributed to growth and development in

²³⁹ A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993: 'Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations: Programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993: revised estimates as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 47/212: Report of the secretary-general', paragraph 54.

²⁴⁰ 'Terms of Reference for UNCTAD's Commission on International Investment and Transnational Corporations', 31 March 1995. Available on-line from <www.unctad.org>.

²⁴¹ Mark Tran, 'UNCTAD changes its corporate tune', *The Guardian* (London), 20 May 1996.

²⁴² 'UNCTAD receives 'new lease of life'', *Africa Recovery*, vol.10, no.1, May 1996.

²⁴³ G-7, 'Economic Communiqué: making a success of globalisation for the benefit of all', Lyon, G-7 Summit, 28 June 1996. Available from <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.

²⁴⁴ Barely a year before, in the 'Halifax communiqué', the G-7 warned UNCTAD that its usefulness was dependent on eliminating '...overlaps with new organisations', a reference of course to the establishment of the WTO. 'G-7 Halifax Communiqué', Available from: <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.

the South by providing capital, employment, technology and 'efficient management techniques.'²⁴⁵

The orientation of economic and social departments within the UN Secretariat faced a similar transformation to that of UNCTAD, albeit a more subtle and at times ambiguous one. The second-stage of reform in 1992, for example, contained many details other than those involving the CTC that diminished UN international political economy advocacy. The short-lived Department of Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis (DESIP) was defined to shift the focus of secretariat research and analysis from international political economy processes to the domestic policy-making sphere. Indeed one of its pressing tasks was: 'The monitoring and assessment from a global perspective of economic and social policies and trends, *including analysis of efficient domestic macroeconomic management and relevant microeconomic issues*' (emphasis added).²⁴⁶ Needless to say this was a function that caused much consternation in Fifth Committee and General Assembly discussions.²⁴⁷ The simultaneous creation of the 'Department for Policy Coordination and Sustainable Development' (DPCSD) was not only intended to provide secretariat services to the deliberative organs regarding economic and social issues, but was also established to monitor and evaluate the implementation of Agenda 21, the '...secular bible of global free-markets and pluralist democracy'.²⁴⁸ Even though this is not the place to detail the historical and conceptual intricacies that have marked the rise of this new environmental and developmental orthodoxy, it cannot be overemphasised how decisive this new international priority has proved to be in transforming the UN's relationship with big business. Suffice to note that through the Business Council on Sustainable Development (BCSD) and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), multinational firms have actually advanced their formal and informal roles in international governance and have further fashioned their image as positive and responsible agents of social and economic transformation in the South. For the UN the internalisation of Agenda 21, with its embedded corporate management philosophy, has firmly legitimated free-market friendly approaches to economic and social problems.

²⁴⁵ Mark Tran, 'UNCTAD changes it's corporate tune', *The Guardian* (London), 20 May 1996.

²⁴⁶ A/C.5/47/88, 4 March 1993, paragraph 35 (C).

²⁴⁷ 'United Nations: Secretariat reform must respect programme mandates' Chakravarthi Raghavan, *SUNS-South-North Development Monitor* (Geneva), 31 March 1993. Available on-line: <www.sunsonline.org/trade/areas/develop/03311193.htm>. See also: A/RES/212, 6 April 1993: 'Review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations and programme budget for the biennium 1992-1993'.

²⁴⁸ A phrase used by Timothy Doyle in his critique of Agenda 21: 'Sustainable Development and Agenda 21', p.771.

This development has been particularly noticeable throughout Kofi Annan's tenure, during which several UN-private enterprise initiatives have been launched.²⁴⁹ Here, links have been enhanced with the ICC and established with the World Economic Forum in Davos (to which Annan is a regular participant), and business leaders are now frequently part of wider civil society consultations.²⁵⁰ The UN's current Global Compact is a case-in-point. Launched in July 2000, this 'compact' aimed at encouraging corporate responsibility through the commitment of CEOs and boards of directors to: '...core values of the UN in the area of human rights, labour standards and the environment.'²⁵¹ Annan warned that this was necessary because globalisation was far more fragile than realised and that there was a real prospect of '...local or national communities' reacting to the '...challenges and shortcomings of globalisation by repeating the mistakes of history, and turning in on themselves.'²⁵² The solution, Annan has regularly noted, includes private enterprise taking-up their responsibilities as 'global citizens' and helping the '...world's people share the benefits of globalisation.'²⁵³ Fortunately enough for private enterprises:

'Open markets offer the only realistic hope of pulling billions of people in developing countries out of abject poverty, while sustaining prosperity in the industrialised world.'²⁵⁴

Much of Annan's efforts at reforming the UN's economic and social programme of work have implicitly internalised and reflected such a view.²⁵⁵ This not only holds for the formalisation of links with the private sector but also for the way in which policy coordination and cooperation

²⁴⁹ For the full range of UN activities with private enterprise see: <www.un.org/partners/index.html>.

²⁵⁰ Yves Beigbeder, 'The United Nation Secretariat: Reform in Progress', in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom, (eds.) *The United Nations at the Millennium: The Principal Organs* (London: Continuum, 2000), p.218. The ICC has had a formal relationship with the UN since 1946 when it was given consultative status by ECOSOC. As noted on its own website, however, the relationship was often 'marred by...antagonism'. Happily the ICC notes that since the 1990s the UN now prefers to work with private enterprise. For further information see: <www.iccwbo.org/>.

²⁵¹ UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2000. Available from <www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm>.

²⁵² SG/SM/7495, 26 July 2000: 'secretary-general welcomes international corporate leaders to global compact meeting.'

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid.

²⁵⁵ William I. Robinson has argued in a recent monograph that the UN under Annan has forged a much closer relationship to transnational capital. He cites Annan: 'A strong United Nations is good for business.' William I. Robinson, *A Theory of Global Capitalism: production, class, and state in a transnational world* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2004), pp.115-116. On Annan's reforms in general, see: 'Reform of the United Nations by secretary-general Kofi Annan, A Chronology' (available from <www.un.org/reform/chron.htm>) and 'UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2000' (available from: <www.un.org/reform/dossier.htm>).

with Bretton Woods Institutions has taken root.²⁵⁶ In this regard, Annan has sought to clarify the various roles of each institution and has, as a part of this process, explicitly accepted the flight of macro-economic policy making to the IMF and WTO. Inversely, Annan has sought to solidify the UN's monopolisation of peace operations and humanitarian functions—activities that the UN apparently does 'best'.²⁵⁷ Though, having said this, the UN's relationship with the World Bank has in practice been far more complex and blurred because of their similar focus on endogenous restructuring in Southern states (for example the World Bank has a Post-Conflict Unit and regularly produces new treatise on the 'roots' of conflict in the South).²⁵⁸ But for Annan, this is all the more reason to consolidate and specialise the work of international agencies. Indeed, for the secretary-general it: '...brings added urgency to the task of ensuring an appropriate distribution of responsibilities between the World Bank Group and the United Nations for the benefit of programme countries. This should take the form of a functional rationalisation in a complementary and cooperative manner between the work of the United Nations and World Bank.'²⁵⁹

United Nations 'revitalisation', the 1990s and beyond

The above discussion of Secretariat restructuring has sought to provide a general picture of the process of reorientation that the United Nations has been subjected to during the 1990s. The aim has been not so much to provide for an exhaustive list and definitive account of each and every UN reform, or to discuss the wider international power-political dynamics that have informed such change. Rather, the objective has been to show how reform—broken down into the economic and political—can be viewed as a coherent project of reinstating a division of labour among international organisations and refocusing activities, across-the-board, towards the monitoring and reforming of state-society structures within post-colonial territories. Indeed the emphasis of the argument has been to imply that the axis of UN activity has faced a double

²⁵⁶ Other reforms included the merging of the three economic and social affairs departments established in 1992 under one department (Economic and Social Affairs) in March 1997—a suggestion originally made by the G-7 in Lyon in July 1996.

²⁵⁷ As Annan notes in 'Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform': 'The major source of institutional weakness in the United Nations is the fact that over the course of the past half century certain of its organisational features tended to become fragmented, duplicative, rigid, in some cases ineffective, in others superfluous...Future success demands that the UN focus, within its overall Charter mission, on those activities, or on those aspects of activities, that it does better than others...[and] requires that the United Nations devise effective means by which to collaborate with other international organisations and institutions of civil society' A/51/950, paragraph 11 and 21.

²⁵⁸ For details: <www.worldbank.org>.

²⁵⁹ A/51/950, 14 July 1997, paragraph 163.

transformation: a shift towards peace activities and away from political economy advocacy, and a general transformation of these roles from an exogenous to an endogenous focus.

In the wider context, these changes are perhaps to be expected. After all, the collapse of Command Economies as a rival socio-economic model, and the disintegration of the Second World as a force in world politics, have inevitably opened-up an irresistible opportunity to reconstitute international organisations. Global geo-political victories are typically followed by the imposition of new orders or the expansion of prevailing social systems. In this case, as Danilo Zolo has pointed out, there was little need to create new institutions or regimes from scratch. Rather, with the structures in place they simply required recalibrating and expanding.²⁶⁰ The symbolic marker here in world affairs was undoubtedly the First Gulf War (1991), which signified the emergence of a *universal* liberal-capitalist order and an expanded political role for the UN within it. But internally, the process had been in motion for some time: US pressure on UN finances was explicit throughout the 1980s and well into the 1990s; engineering control within the General Assembly became again a real and tantalising possibility with the entrance of friendly new and reconstituted states; and Soviet 'new thinking' left many former post-colonial regimes with little option but to cooperate with the US both within and outside of international organisations. The repeal of the Zionism Equals Racism resolution in the General Assembly in 1991 was an important milestone here.²⁶¹ As important, Soviet retreat in the Third-World and the resultant rise of 'regional conflict-resolution' allowed the Security Council to refocus its own efforts to managing post-colonial relationships free from the fetters of East-West rhetoric.²⁶² The resultant rise of peacekeeping operations deployed during this period has been staggering (45 missions between 1989 and 2005) and has left the UN, as an intergovernmental body, with little option but to follow the Security Council's lead.²⁶³

²⁶⁰ Danilo Zolo writes: 'The task facing the victors this time has therefore been one of reinterpreting the role of the United Nations and other international organisations in the light of the post-war situation.' Zolo, *Cosmopolis*, p.21.

²⁶¹ In 1991, the US managed to repeal the Zionism-Equals-Racism resolution through the force of numbers it corralled in the General Assembly. At the time, this was a rather remarkable feat considering the caucuses that backed the initial resolution, and the general difficulty that the US faces during every attempt to block the passing of General Assembly resolutions it considers hostile to Israel. Paul Lewis, 'U.N. Repeals its '75 Resolution Equating Zionism with Racism', *New York Times*, 17 December 1991 and A/RES/46/86, 16 December 1991: 'Elimination of racism and racial discrimination.'

²⁶² On the reasoning behind Soviet 'New Thinking' in the Third World, see: Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking For Our Country and the World* (London: Fontana, 1988).

²⁶³ See Appendix Two for details of UN peacekeeping operations deployed in the post-1989 period.

Certainly it took the end of East-West confrontation to allow for the UN to assume its full role in world affairs as envisaged by its US post-Second World War planners. The UN could manage the political side of a world of nation-states and other international financial institutions could help provide for a *universal* private world economy. But this time, the substance of each programme of work is basically different. The UN no longer primarily secures a world of modest-nation states by policing inter-state borders and the like, although this is occasionally still important. The UN, as with other international institutions, is now involved in the delicate and often messy business of restructuring state-society relations along neo-liberal lines in some of the most peripheral post-colonial territories. Managing transitions, between political and socio-economic systems and the elites that sustain them, is the UN's new strategic business. And as we will now move on to see in the African context, even though the UN has to date had fluctuating fortunes in this field of activity, it still remains absolutely central to the process of managing change in borderland states and crucial to the project of promoting a universal liberal social order.

Chapter 4

United Nations Misadventures in Somalia: Militarised liberal internationalism in the early 1990s

‘Somalia was a laboratory for all types of peacekeeping.’ UNOSOM II official cited in Thomas G. Weiss (‘Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention’, 1997).

‘Dear Mr. President...I share your satisfaction at the adoption of Security Council resolution 794. It underlines the grave concern felt by the international community at the humanitarian crisis in Somalia. It also marks a significant step forward in the evolution of the United Nations’ role in the post-Cold War era and will, I believe, strengthen the Organisation’s ability to intervene to maintain peace and security.’ Letter from the secretary-general of the UN to President George H. Bush discussing the activities of UNITAF, 8 December 1992.

Forging new UN peace roles in the South

The record of the UN in Somalia is one of ambitious projects and fateful blunders, in large part symptomatic of a variety of transformations that the world body has undergone at various moments. Perhaps the most significant and widely discussed of these projects was the experimental form of humanitarian military intervention that the UN embarked on from December 1992, first to ensure the secure delivery of aid to regions affected by famine (UNITAF—under US command and control) and then, later, to pursue comprehensive disarmament, security and centralised rule from Mogadishu (UNOSOM II—ostensibly with UN ‘executive authority’).²⁶⁴ These were significant moments in the early 1990s, not least because they indicated a post-Cold War structural shift of UN peace activities into the domain of direct military coercion. Needless to say at the time this was a radical and controversial departure from the traditional format of UN peace operations in that the organisation was more accustomed to deploying indirect forms of policing Southern societies—through consent, impartiality and adjudication—be they within or between states. But perhaps the more enduring controversy was the actual application of this form of militarised liberal internationalism, especially the disastrous consequences of the imperious way in which UN officials sought to impose their dominion on the country from May 1993. Certainly, what remains the lasting image of this episode, at least in the Anglo-American world, was the war that was waged against the Somali General Muhammad Aided in the summer of 1993.

²⁶⁴ UNITAF (United Task Force, December 1992 to March 1993) and UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia, March 1993 to March 1995).

This chapter explores the origins, progress and consequences of this misadventure in militarised liberal internationalism. It begins by suggesting that the civil war and famine that were precipitated by the collapse of the Siyad Barre regime in parts of Somalia in 1991 and 1992 provided a timely opportunity for the UN to expand, develop and consolidate its repertoire of peace practices. This was seen to be a necessary auxiliary to the reorganisation of the UN around peace operations that began in 1992, and especially as an adjunct to the conceptual re-articulation of these activities by the UN secretary-general in *An Agenda for Peace*. Indeed at the time it was felt by UN officials that forceful intervention in Somalia would help set the precedent, or exemplar, of what was termed a 'peace enforcement' operation. What this type of operation envisaged in the Somali context was a sort of ideal in 'international trusteeship', in which the UN would assume temporary executive authority in a 'collapsed state' in order to reconstruct acceptable forms of state-society relations.²⁶⁵ In the Somali situation this would entail the disarmament of the population, the creation of instruments and institutions of state control (such as a police force), and centralised rule from the capital. Strangely enough, this was not the first time that the UN felt it necessary to impose a unique regime of trusteeship on the territory; in the 1950s Somalia was subjected, against the explicit wishes of the population, to a re-imposition of Italian rule under the UN trusteeship system. This trusteeship was unique—considered at the time a pioneering form of international administration—imposing a strict timetable for 'progressing' the country towards liberal civilisation and establishing a set of mechanisms for the surveillance by the UN of such advancement.²⁶⁶

But besides the intriguing parallels of such experimental forms of UN administration, what remains particularly distinctive about UNOSOM II was the seminal role of UN officials in both constructing the ideological rationale and diplomatic framework for such intrusive intervention, and their subsequent 'executive authority' in carrying-out this operation. Indeed, it is the central contention of this chapter that the essence of the UN-Somalia adventure pivots around the rapid

²⁶⁵ Even though there was some loose-talk of a formal 'trusteeship' of Somalia, and a revival of the Trusteeship Council, among Western academics (I.M. Lewis one of them) and UN officials (Boutros-Ghali also raised the matter), the term is used here solely to denote an extensive regime of international administration. For the debate on a revival of the Trusteeship Council, from a sympathetic advocate, see: Peter Lyon, 'The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship' *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics*, vol.xxxi, no.1-3 (1993), pp.96-110.

²⁶⁶ On UN Trusteeship in Somalia, see: Alphonso Castagno, *Somalia*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1959), Mark Karp, *The Economics of Trusteeship in Somalia*, (Boston, MA: Boston University Press, 1960), Sylvia Pankhurst, *Ex-Italian Somaliland*, (London: Watts and Co, 1951) and Benjamin Rivlin, *The United Nations and Italian Colonies*, (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).

shift of emphasis in UN peace and security functions that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, especially the large but as of yet undefined role assigned to UN officials in managing these revised practices. In the Somali context, UN officials found themselves in uncharted waters—first successfully probing for a militarised peace operation within an already independent sovereign territory and later, and notably with much less success, seeking to aggressively pacify the population in order to reconstitute the central state. It is only through the prism of UN officials searching-out an active post-Cold War role in policing the Southern hemisphere that the nature of the Somali misadventure can be fully appreciated.

This is not to imply that the UN, much less UN officials, were the singular variables in explaining intervention in Somalia. Clearly other factors were central in creating the environment and momentum for action, from forces with humanitarian agendas such as USAID, CARE, HRW and prominent ‘Africanists’ and ‘humanitarians’ within the US Congress, to the eventual concurrence of the US Chief of Staffs’ and Executive.²⁶⁷ These were all important factors in the decision of the US to use its armed forces and to support—some may claim promote—an active and forceful UN response.²⁶⁸ But inevitably, accounts with these foci miss something about this UN adventure that relates to the laborious internal changes that the organisation was undergoing and the struggle among top-Secretariat managers to redefine their roles in shifting UN peace practices as far as possible. The least that can be said here is that the secretary-general for whatever reason took an extremely proactive position in advancing the military option. And on this score the literature that looks at the UN peacekeeping facet of the intervention retains a certain distance from discussing the politics of transformation that the UN was itself subject. To be sure, most of these commentators cursorily situate intervention in the context of the end of the Cold War and the

²⁶⁷ For an authoritative account of the US decision to intervene in Somalia, see: Jon Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia’, *International Security*, vol.26, no.4 (2002), pp.112-142.

²⁶⁸ One common explanation for the military intervention in Somalia revolves around the so-called ‘CNN-Effect’—the claim that through the explicit coverage of starvation and internecine violence, Western and especially US media organisations helped to put pressure on national governments (the US) and international organisations for intervention. While, of course, the media and its reporting in the Third World (especially during civil wars and famines) has recently helped mobilise public opinion, in the Somali case it has been shown that coverage actually followed (and did not lead) US and UN humanitarian initiatives. In fact it has been argued by Piers Robinson that the US government harnessed the media—and not the other way round—to provide positive initial reports of the military action. Piers Robinson, ‘The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?’ *Review of International Studies* 25 (2), 1999, pp.301-309. See too: Western, ‘Sources of Humanitarian Intervention’, p.114. It is much more the case, in Somalia at least, that the ‘CNN-effect’ was a significant cause of the precipitous *withdrawal* of US troops from Somalia following the brutal death (captured on TV) of US Army Rangers at the hands of Somali militiamen in 1993.

project of a 'New World Order'.²⁶⁹ But, by and large, the focus is the efficacy of various peacekeeping tools and the 'lessons' for future missions.²⁷⁰ Having said this, however, there is a disparate set of academics and researchers who have partially concluded—largely through an analysis of large-scale famine that UN officials portrayed in the country—that the role of the UN was less than benign or neutral.²⁷¹ These authors have questioned the discourse of famine and anarchy that the Secretariat used to justify action, especially the manipulation of data to strengthen and bolster their policy-positions. But useful as this literature is in mapping the inconsistencies in the representation of the humanitarian crisis by the UN and others, and in detailing the imperious nature of UNOSOM II in particular, there remains the question of understanding the rationale and logic of such action. It is only through an analysis that situates the UN-Somali misadventure in the context of ongoing external and internal efforts to shape the UN's programme of work that this question can be adequately addressed.

It is argued here that from the very outset of UN engagement in the Somali crisis, officials gradually deployed a variety of arguments that sought to legitimise and justify an international take-over of the country. On the one hand, like the parallel advocacy of certain elements within Western state bureaucracies and the independent efforts of a host of private voluntary organisations based largely in the US, this was simply a matter of talking-up the humanitarian crisis and the deterioration of the security situation in Somalia. But for the UN in particular it was much more than this; in order to legitimise and promote forceful action within a sovereign state the UN necessarily deployed a liberal humanitarian set of arguments that were in the ascendancy both within and outside the organisation. This focused on a discourse—available in part from *An Agenda for Peace*—that saw new threats to international peace and security arising from so-called globalisation. Disintegrating states, internecine violence and resource wars were the new hazards of the twentieth-first century that would necessitate UN attention and merit forceful action. There was also a moral imperative for the UN to act in these types of arguments that stressed the intrinsic rights of the individual above and beyond those of subject states. Sovereignty was conditional on the establishment of very specific forms of 'good governance'. As will be outlined later, such a view of conflict and conflict resolution infused the arguments put forward by the UN establishment for changing the basis for intervention in Somalia from one

²⁶⁹ James Mayall, *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experiences in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) and Cedric Thornberry, *The Development of International Peacekeeping*, (London: LSE Books, 1995).

²⁷⁰ Among many others: Weiss, 'Rekindling Hope'.

²⁷¹ De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, Debrix, *Re-Envisaging Peacekeeping*, and John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia? A Tale of Tragic Blunders*, (London: Haan, 1994).

based upon traditional peacekeeping values to one of armed intercession and international administration.

Once in Somalia, UN officials utilised an extraordinarily wide enforcement mandate to subdue armed elements within the state and impose their own vision of national reconciliation on the country. The UN was clearly in uncharted territory here in that hitherto the organisation had not conducted a peace operation within an already sovereign state, authorised under Chapter VII of the UN charter, and under ostensibly UN 'command and control'. This was an ambitious project; it was no less than the forced imposition of UN rule over one of its member states. And combined with the scale of the operation (28,000 military personnel and 2,800 civilian staff) and the resources available (such as the US Quick Reaction Force and US Army Rangers), UN officials found themselves in an immensely powerful but unfamiliar position.²⁷² The conduct of UN officials and military personnel within the country essentially reflected this predicament: in Mogadishu and New York, UN representatives sought to impose law and order, at each moment ratcheting up the level of violence and coercion at their disposal. This not only led to the 'random' and 'isolated' abuse of Somalis often accused of petty offences by UN peacekeepers, but also to the wholesale and protracted military attempt to decapitate the political leadership of the United Somali Congress (USC).²⁷³ Possibly as remarkable was the vitriolic rhetoric of UN officials that accompanied this course of events: a massacre in a conference hall full of Somali political leaders was 'surgical'; while crowds mowed down by UN troops were 'combatants' who used women and children as 'human shields'.²⁷⁴ Perhaps with no direct or recent experience of such a situation to draw-on, the UN leadership simply evoked the operating procedures and behavioural characteristics of its most powerful liberal states when dealing with 'small wars' in the periphery. And of course, for a great many Somalis this was just another form of foreign occupation and domination—or 'gumeysi'.²⁷⁵

²⁷² United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.722.

²⁷³ For an interesting account the use of violence in Somalia by UN peacekeepers, see: Sherene H. Razack, *Dark Threats and White Knights: The Somali Affair, Peacekeeping, and the New Imperialism*, (Toronto: UTP, 2004).

²⁷⁴ 'Manhunt' *The Economist* (London), vol.328, issue 7829, 18 September 1993, p.26, 'Bloody Sunday in Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), 15 June 1993, and 'Somalia: Hope Denied' *Africa Confidential*, vol.34, no.14, 16 July 1993. For a catalogue of abuses committed by UNOSOM II, see: African Rights, *Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces*, (London: African Rights, July 1993).

²⁷⁵ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* p.67.

The upshot of this experience for the UN is well known.²⁷⁶ But while many commentators have focused on the immediate effects of the death of 18 US Army Rangers in October 1993, tracking the resultant retreat of Clinton's policy of 'assertive multilateralism', three other consequences are stressed in this account. First, it was recognised by (most) UN conflict-resolution practitioners that waging-war for humanitarian ends may be desirable but was not, under current institutional arrangements, possible. Here, it was considered that it was far better to 'subcontract' such action to major Western powers or even regional organisations.²⁷⁷ The UN, it was felt, retained its comparative advantage in its original format for peacekeeping in the South, with its principles of 'impartiality' and 'neutrality'. Second, if military coercion was ruled-out as a principal UN peace activity in the South this did not mean that some form of UN temporary trusteeship premised on consent and neutrality could not be developed and utilised by the UN in so-called 'post-conflict peace-building'. Quite the contrary; the UN would now see this type of operation as a central pillar of any future expansion of peace activities. Finally, while debates raged about the utility of various forms of peace operation that the UN should undertake, the liberal-humanitarian discourse that was first used to justify armed action in Somalia emerged relatively unscathed—being utilised as an ideological template for intervention elsewhere in the South.

Experiments in the international regulation of Somalia in context

Peace enforcement in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 was not the first occasion in which the UN had developed experimental forms of international regulation in Somalia. Among other things, this was particularly relevant to the way in which the management of social change in Somalia has often been 'internationalised'. In fact during an earlier transition in social and political life among the Somali, the UN was given a special responsibility for overseeing the population's development towards sovereign independence under Italian Trusteeship. What was remarkable here was not that Italian rule was re-imposed upon the territory against the wishes of a great deal of the inhabitants, or even because of the record of Italy as an 'Axis-Power'—it was maintained by the UN that because Italy had colonised the country *before* the spectre of Fascism its 'belligerent' status was not an issue in discussions regarding its return to the Horn.²⁷⁸ But it was perhaps because of these exigencies, as well as wider geopolitical ones relating to the future of

²⁷⁶ See the volume edited by Walter Clarke and Jeffery Herbst *Learning From Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian Intervention*, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).

²⁷⁷ Giandomenico Picco, 'The U.N. and the Use of Force' *Foreign Affairs*, vol.73, issue 5 (Sept/Oct 1994), pp.14-18.

²⁷⁸ Rivlin, *The United Nations and Italian Colonies*, p.18.

other ex-Italian colonies (Cyrenaica, Fezzan and Tripolitania), that a relatively unique model of trusteeship was developed that conferred the UN with a significant role in the territory.²⁷⁹ Important here, were a variety of surveillance mechanisms and guarantees, such as an Advisory Council stationed in Mogadishu to advise and oversee the local Italian Administrator, the constitutional rights accorded to the 'Somali', the direct oversight of the UN General Assembly, and the relatively short time-limit set for a transition to independence.²⁸⁰

The Advisory Council was possibly the most important innovation. It established a three-person commission in Mogadishu (representatives from Egypt, Colombia, and the Philippines), which had some leverage over local forces. Article One of the Draft Trusteeship Agreement set the scene by stating that the Italian Authorities '...shall be aided and advised by an Advisory Council' who in Article Eight '...shall be fully informed...on all matters relating to the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the territory...'.²⁸¹ Moreover, the Administrative Authority was to '...seek the advice of the Advisory Council on all measures envisaged for the inauguration, development and subsequent establishment of self-government for the Territory'.²⁸² This was specified to include: the development of organs of self-government; economic and financial development; and labour, social and educational advancement.²⁸³ The Council even had some say over the establishment of military installations: 'The Administrating Authority, after consultation with the Advisory Council, may establish installations...for the defence of the territory.'²⁸⁴ As can be seen by these articles, a distinguishing feature of this Trusteeship was the role and position of international representatives in guiding and verifying the transition to sovereignty. But this did not singularly relate to the role and status of the Advisory Council; the Trusteeship Agreement also sought to open-up the territory further by stipulating the 'equal treatment' of all foreign nationals in the country including the right to

²⁷⁹ The negotiations relating to the dispensation of Italian colonies was a complex and protracted affair. As far as can be discerned, it seems that Italy (with the help of Latin American states) was able to secure a return to the Horn in exchange for giving-up a return to Libya. Trusteeship was seen to be important for Italian foreign policy because of its priority of being admitted to the United Nations and reintegrated into international society after World War II. Castagno, *Somalia*, p.399. Ben Rivlin surmised the matter this way: 'The anti-colonial bloc, which brought about the rejection of the plans to re-install Italy in Tripolitania, conceded Italian Trusteeship over Somaliland, but not without saddling Italy with a Advisory Council and making the ten-year limit unequivocal.' Rivlin, *The United Nations and Italian Colonies*, p.62.

²⁸⁰ This was the first occasion the UN Trusteeship Council imposed a finite time limit (10 years) on the administration of a territory by a European power.

²⁸¹ T/456, 31 January 1950, *Draft Trusteeship Agreement For the Territory of Somaliland Under Italian Administration* (As adopted by the Trusteeship Council at the eighth meeting on 27 January 1950).

²⁸² T/456, Article 8.

²⁸³ Ibid.

²⁸⁴ Ibid. Article 6.

trade, acquire property and so forth.²⁸⁵ This was particularly noticeable with relation to business, which posited that no discrimination should occur in ‘...matters relating to the grant of concessions for the development of natural resources.’²⁸⁶

More generally, the Trusteeship Agreement laid down an extensive list of benchmarks for the Administrating Authority to carry out in order to progress the advancement of the inhabitants towards liberal modernity. All areas of social and political life were covered from proscribing slavery, child and forced labour to controlling the trade in opium, ‘dangerous drugs’ and ‘spirituous liquors’.²⁸⁷ Special areas in need of advancement were signalled out for particular attention—like establishing a modern system of public education ‘...as rapidly as possible...so as to ensure that sufficient qualified personnel will be available when the territory becomes a sovereign independent State’.²⁸⁸ In sum a modern nation-state with ‘free political institutions’ was outlined as the core objective of Italian Trusteeship and UN oversight.

As it turned out, this experiment in nation-building and promoting constitutional democracy in the Somali context proved ephemeral—even though they did have a transformative impact on social relations.²⁸⁹ Here, as Ahmad Samatar has been at pains to point-out, along with the integration of Somali territory into the world economy (largely the export of cattle) and the related creation of various nascent merchant and bureaucratic classes orientated towards new external patrons, the colonial and later post-colonial state project had a corrosive effect on traditional kingship norms and values (such as *reer* and *xeer*).²⁹⁰ One of the most significant ‘transformations’ relates to the fashioning of clan conflict and competition as an elementary part

²⁸⁵ Ibid. Article 15.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

²⁸⁷ Ibid. Article 3.

²⁸⁸ Ibid. Article 4.

²⁸⁹ While the state temporarily survived until 1991, formal pluralism did not endure long after independence with a military coup that established a ‘Supreme Revolutionary Council’ led by General Siyad Barre in October 1969. On Siyad Barre’s rule, see Ahmed I. Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*, (London: Zed Books, 1988).

²⁹⁰ This is an argument put forward by Ahmed Samatar in reaction to what he considers the ‘axiomatic’ tendency in Somali-studies (following the influential British anthropologist I.M. Lewis) to consider the traditional pastoral clan structure as a primary and unchanged source of social power. Ahmed I. Samatar, ‘Somalia: Statelessness As Homelessness’, in Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Ismail Samatar (eds.) *The African State: Reconsiderations*. (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), p.228. According to Samatar, the old pastoral Somali traditions of kingship (now long transformed) consisted of *reer* and *xeer*. *Reer*, the household, refers to important social networks (based upon male lineage); while *xeer* refers to ‘...a code of conduct that sets specific guidelines for intra-and inter-kin transactions.’ Ibid. p.227.

of the Somali state and society.²⁹¹ Specifically, the implementation of the colonial state saw the systematic utilisation by the authorities of a ‘divide-and-rule’ approach towards Somali clans as one means of securing native subordination—the other main strategy of course remaining the frequent deployment of colonial force and violence.²⁹² The consequence of this tactic in the Somali context in particular has been far-reaching, with the example being repeated and institutionalised during the latter years of General Siyad Barre’s rule in the 1980s when his authority and reach were under serious contention, and during the 1990s (when at various points international and regional patrons have played one clan off against another during the civil war). So even though the post-colonial state disintegrated with the final collapse of the Siyad Barre’s regime in January 1991 (after a sustained military confrontation with USC) one of its lasting legacies was that it left various elements of the old regime, mainly bureaucrats and army officers, to lead their respective clans and sub-clans in their newly institutionalised struggle with each other.²⁹³

But another more immediately obvious legacy of the last years of the Barre regime, one that drew the attention of Western aid agencies and media organisations, was the famine that engulfed parts of the country in 1992. Here, it was the last year or so of fighting between the USC and the remnants of the Barre regime in the inter-riverine area of Southern Somalia in particular (the fertile areas around the Jubba and Shebelle rivers), which went a long way to create the conditions for the famine that gripped parts of the country.²⁹⁴ With food production effectively halted in the ‘bread-basket’ of Somalia, and the continued closure of Mogadishu and Kismayo ports due to fighting, severe food scarcity led to widespread famine in these areas in the first few months of 1992.²⁹⁵ Although statistics relating to the crisis vary considerably—and as we will later see, were manipulated for political ends—it seems worth stating for the sake of depicting the scale of the crisis some cautious figures: one million refugees and four-and-half million suffering severe malnutrition by the middle of 1992, and up to half-a-million deaths in the Bay region of the country by the end of the same year.²⁹⁶ It was this crisis, along with a further civil war that

²⁹¹ Martin Doornbos and John Markakis ‘State and Society in Crisis: What went Wrong in Somalia?’ in Mohamed Salih and Lennart Wohlgemuth (eds.) *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconciliation in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17–19 January 1994*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), p.16.

²⁹² Samatar, ‘Somalia: statelessness as homelessness’, p.229.

²⁹³ Ibid. p.231 and Doornbos and Markakis ‘State and Society in Crisis’, p.17.

²⁹⁴ John Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ *Foreign Policy*, issue 91 (summer 1993), pp.138-148.

²⁹⁵ The grain stocks of the southern regions of Somalia were wiped out during the occupation of these areas by Siyad Barre’s forces between September 1991 and April 1992. De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, p.163.

²⁹⁶ John Stevenson, ‘Hope Restored?’ pp.138-148.

erupted within the USC in Mogadishu in particular—between the Somali National Alliance (SNA) led by General Aideed and the Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA) led by Ali Mahdi—that activated international attention and eventually provided the pretext for military intervention in December 1992.

Faustian bargains in a post-Cold War Somalia: from UN engagement to the international military takeover

The expansive parameters of UNOSOM II, deployed with a wide mandate to secure the country and reconstruct the central state, was achieved partly as a result of the advocacy of UN managers. Throughout the preceding years, the UN had begun loyally stripping-back ‘outdated’ and ‘surplus’ UN activities and began implementing a far-reaching programme of organisational reform at the behest of G-7 states. Relevant UN officials were keen to press-forward with this transformation and fulfil their new specialists roles in peacemaking in the South. In large part, Somalia provided an ideal ‘testing ground’ for some of these functions—especially as it related to the changing basis for UN engagement in an essentially civil conflict and to the potential authority of the UN to coercively enforce local compliance. But as we will now go on to see, this enthusiasm to translate institutional reform into actual practice by UN managers was at first not reciprocated by some Security Council members; early in 1992, European states in particular were more concerned with the potential threat to their continental liberal political and economic order from the descent into conflict in the former Yugoslavia and this, temporarily, dampened any desire to activate new expansive operations at the borderlands of international capitalism. With some temerity, and the parallel advocacy of humanitarian forces in the US, UN officials led by Boutros-Ghali attempted to cement the revitalised UN mandate for managing the incorporation of ‘orphan’ Southern societies ‘forgotten’ after the Cold War back into the liberal international system.²⁹⁷ This largely entailed various forms of public and private advocacy, which centred on the construction of the ideological case for engagement and then armed intervention in Somalia.

The UN’s engagement with the civil war in Somali occurred during a radical shake-up of the UN’s programme of work and a concurrent functional reorganisation of the International Secretariat in 1992 around peace operations and away from issues concerning the international political economy. As we have already seen in Chapter Three, the new secretary-general, Dr. Boutros-Ghali, was quick to press forward with this conception of ‘reform’ advocated by the US,

²⁹⁷ Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.53, p.55.

UK and others—announcing barely a month into his term the first of a two-part restructuring of UN departments and divisions.²⁹⁸ Later the same year, in July, the secretary-general published *An Agenda for Peace*, a report requested by the Security Council, which sought to outline the future of UN peace activities.²⁹⁹ What both *An Agenda for Peace* and the practical reforms underlined was a striking trend towards focusing UN activities on issues of ‘good governance’ within Southern states—especially those members whose empirical sovereignty were in question as a result of armed violence. Among other controversial features of these reforms, the perceived downgrading of the conditions under which the UN has the authority to intercede in civil conflicts, and the implicit suggestion that ‘peace enforcement units’ may be needed to compel belligerents to abide by agreements, were particularly noticeable. *An Agenda for Peace* suggested that:

‘Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, *hitherto* with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.’³⁰⁰ (Emphasis added)

The clear implication of this definition was that future peacekeeping operations might be deployed without the prior consent of local groups. Further to this caveat was the suggestion that the UN should enforce ceasefire agreements:

‘Cease-fires have often been agreed to but not complied with, and the United Nations has sometimes been called upon to send forces to restore and maintain the cease-fire. This task can on occasion exceed the mission of peace-keeping forces and the expectations of peace-keeping force contributors. I recommend that the Council consider the utilisation of peace-enforcement units under clearly defined circumstances and with terms of reference specified in advance....Deployment and operation of such forces would be under the authorisation of the Security Council and would, as in the case of peace-keeping forces, be under the command of the secretary-general.’³⁰¹

²⁹⁸ Boutros-Ghali assumes office on 1 January 1992; Security Council Summit is held on 31 January 1992; Boutros-Ghali announces ‘first-stage’ of reform (relating to peace operations) on 21 February 1992. A/48/428, 21 February 1992 (See Chapter Three).

²⁹⁹ It will be recalled that the Security Council Summit held in January 1992 requested the new secretary-general to produce a report on UN peace and security activities.

³⁰⁰ *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 20.

³⁰¹ *Ibid.* paragraph 44.

It is in this changing institutional context that the UN's advocacy for a military-option in Somalia becomes most interesting. Until this time, Somalia was hardly on the UN radar: while UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and UNHCR had all suspended operations in January 1991 due to the 'security situation', the UN Secretariat had largely failed to involve itself in any of the conflict resolution activities that had been initiated regionally.³⁰² Between January and December 1991, Javier Perez de Cuellar issued only one report and one routine letter relating to Somalia.³⁰³ But from the beginning of Boutros-Ghali's term, the UN began to pay much more attention to the deteriorating humanitarian situation: a UN envoy, James Jonah, was dispatched in January 1992 to Mogadishu to assess the potential for a rapprochement between the two USC belligerents, 'Interim President' Ali Mahdi and General Muhammad Aideed, and returned in March to witness a vague cease-fire agreement verified by some '...means of a United Nations monitoring mechanism.'³⁰⁴ This paved the way for a Security Council resolution (S/RES/751, 1992) authorising the immediate deployment of UN observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu and later a 'security force' to protect relief supplies at Mogadishu port and its delivery to distribution centres in Mogadishu '...and its environs.'³⁰⁵ The secretary-general appointed a veteran Algerian diplomat, Muhammad Sahnoun, as special representative to oversee the implementation of resolution 751.

The problem for the UN was that despite the authorisation of a small peacekeeping operation, G-7 states were consumed with a bitter war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and were keen to focus Security Council attention on European efforts to resolve the crisis as opposed to any increase in activism in Somalia. In response, UN officials along with a variety of other (humanitarian) forces began to step-up the public profile of the Somali crisis. Sahnoun was a vital early contributor to this effort, making regular emotive statements on the issue of a Somali relief effort to Western donors and media outlets. In one early instance Sahnoun rhetorically asked journalists: 'Why can't we have the United Nations airlift operations the way they do in Sarajevo to avoid kids dying?'³⁰⁶ But in terms of diplomacy, the secretary-general's contrived conflict with the Security Council in July 1992 over the UN's endorsement of the London Plan for the cantonment of heavy weapons in

³⁰² Sahnoun cites three 'missed opportunities' for UN engagement with conflict resolution efforts in Somalia, the most important of which was the 1991 Djibouti Conference. Mohammad Sahnoun, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1994).

³⁰³ A/46/483, 19 September 1991.

³⁰⁴ Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996*, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p.18.

³⁰⁵ S/23829, 21 April 1992, paragraph 27.

³⁰⁶ 'U.N. Head Proposes Expanded Efforts for Somali Relief' *The New York Times* (NYC), 25 July 1992; 'The Squeezing of Sahnoun' *The Economist* (London), 7 November 1992, p.50.

Bosnia was the most significant.³⁰⁷ Dubbed by the French 'la petite guerre', Boutros-Ghali used this issue to imply that the Council were Eurocentric, interested only in strategic geopolitical conflicts.³⁰⁸ In an open letter to the Security Council on 22 July 1992, the secretary-general stated:

‘My concern is that if the Security Council continues to concentrate its attention and resources to such an extent on Yugoslav problems, this will be at the expense of the organisation’s ability to help resolve equally cruel and dangerous conflicts elsewhere, for example in Somalia.’³⁰⁹

This confrontation escalated into a full-scale public clash between British and UN managers, fought out largely in the Trans-Atlantic press. British leaks talked about Boutros-Ghali as an ‘unhumble servant’ with an ‘imperious style’, who would need to watch his future conduct lest he is put out to an early retirement.³¹⁰ The UN retorted with accusations of institutionalised British racism; or, as Boutros-Ghali controversially put it, ‘Maybe its because I’m a W.O.G.’³¹¹ Hyperbole aside, however, this was in many respects just a familial quarrel; the point surely was that Boutros-Ghali had been given a mandate by G-7 states to conduct sweeping changes within the organisation and its focus of work.³¹² This included a relatively wide remit to review the conceptual parameters of the UN’s peace and security activities, hence *An Agenda for Peace*. But when Boutros-Ghali readily carried-out these responsibilities and sought to translate some of them into practice he appeared to be letdown by the derisory commitment of G-7 states to actually follow through with these plans. It was not that UN managers were standing-up to Western powers; if it was it certainly was not on behalf of G-77 states, which saw the new UN administration executing an across-the-board set of US defined ‘reform’ proposals.³¹³ Rather it

³⁰⁷ ‘The Security Council’s Unhumble Servant’ *The Economist* (London), 8 August 1992.

³⁰⁸ ‘Boo Boo Plots Path to Disunity’ *The Sunday Times* (London), 9 August 1992; Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.54.

³⁰⁹ Boutros-Ghali cited in ‘Blunder by UN Chief Marks Him for Failure’ *The Times* (London), 28 July 1992.

³¹⁰ ‘The Security Council’s Unhumble Servant’ *The Economist* (London), 28 July 1992.

³¹¹ ‘UN Chief’s ‘WOG’ Outburst Over Bosnia Policy’ *The Times* (London), 4 August 1992.

³¹² G-7 Political Communiqué: ‘Strengthening the International Order’, London, 16 July 1991.

³¹³ Indeed, one fundamental misconception of this period in the Western press was that somehow Boutros-Ghali was defending Third World interests in this episode of confrontation with the Security Council. Southern orientated commentators had no such illusions. In general refer to: The South Centre, *For a Strong and Democratic United Nations*, pp.201-219.

was a plea to let the UN fulfil its promised role in policing the Southern hemisphere that had been temptingly held-out as an incentive to reorient around more 'contemporary' concerns.³¹⁴

In any event, the secretary-general's public outburst seemed to have concentrated-minds: only a few days later the Security Council endorsed an expansive vision of international involvement in the country set-out in the secretary-general's first report on UNOSOM I.³¹⁵ This report was significant because it was through the description of the situation in Somalia and the adequate international responses to it, that the UN moves toward an explicit liberal-humanitarian reading of the issues, such as those general ones put forward in *An Agenda for Peace*. Indeed, it is from this period that we begin to see emerge a discourse that generalised the humanitarian crisis and lawlessness of the country—the 'collapsed state' and 'primordial anarchy' theses—and implied that alternative strategies may be necessary to bring about an effective ceasefire. It claimed in the report for example that:

'Somalia is today a country without central, regional, or local administration, and without services: no electricity, no communications, no transport, no schools and no health services. Throughout the country, there are incredible scenes of hunger, disease and dying children.'³¹⁶

But this picture of events was contentious. This especially related to the portrayal of anarchy and indiscriminate famine that was relayed. In the first instance, the collapse of centralised structures of rule from Mogadishu did not in the Somali context translate into an absence of other forms of governance; Somaliland developed a 'relatively high degree of order and internal cohesion in the northern regions of the territory throughout this period and, to a lesser extent, the Somali clan system provided an alternative form of decentralised governance elsewhere.'³¹⁷ It was largely in

³¹⁴ For one example, see: US Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Address to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly, 25 September 1995 (Cited in Chapter Three).

³¹⁵ S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992. It is interesting to note in this context Conor Cruise O'Brien's suggestion that the diplomatic decision of the US to become more active in Somalia (i.e. with the offer of an airlift in August) was partly predicated on a fear that Boutros-Ghali may resign over 'la petite guerre.' 'Servant of too many masters' *The Times* (London), 18 August 1992.

³¹⁶ S/24343, 22 July 1992, paragraph 24.

³¹⁷ The debate in the literature about the nature of Somali society, particularly the question of the continued pervasiveness of pastoral traditions and structures, continues to divide scholars. On the one hand there are those, such as I.M. Lewis, who continue to stress the relatively unchanged nature of these pre-colonial traditions of governance and their salience for Somalia society. On the other hand, there are scholars who argue that the Somali clan social structure was radically transformed with the onset of colonialism, the intrusion of capitalism and, later, the imposition of a modern centralised state. See the following

Mogadishu, and some Southern regions, that life could have been considered ‘anarchic’, and only then because of the absence of centralised rule. In the second instance, the reach of the famine was highly differential and selective—it was largely concentrated on the Southern portions of the territory.³¹⁸ In relation to what was required as an appropriate response to this picture of the conflict, the secretary-general observed that: ‘The UN must adapt its involvement in Somalia. Its efforts need to be enlarged so that it can help bring about an effective cease-fire throughout the country...’ concluding that ‘...The desperate and complex situation in Somalia will require energetic and sustained efforts on the part of the international community to break the cycle of violence.’³¹⁹ To some extent then, these comments reflect a shift in thinking within the UN about the type of approach necessary to promote relief efforts and put an end to the civil war in the country. It intimated that neutral, non-confrontational, efforts may be inadequate to resolve the ‘cycle of violence’ and lawlessness ‘throughout’ the country.

Despite these remarks, and the quantitative shift in UN engagement that this report and the subsequent authorising resolution enacted (S/RES/767, 1992), the official basis of UN involvement remained centred on the customary approach to peacekeeping. The UN was an impartial and neutral observer involved at the invitation of the relevant parties—no matter how dubious the authority of Interim-President Mahdi’s UN representative was to issue such an invitation in the first place.³²⁰ Mediation efforts by Sahnoun, therefore, continued to centre on engaging and negotiating with various clans, as the major and legitimate parties to the conflict in the country, the deployment of the peacekeeping force and an effective cease-fire to facilitate such an operation. Yet while Sahnoun implemented this approach on the ground, in New York there was growing impatience with faction leaders—especially with General Aideed—over the timely negotiation of outstanding deployment issues. This was crucially reflected in the way in which UN officials in New York increasingly sought to politically isolate the major faction leaders from August 1992 onwards and the way in which, as part of this process, Sahnoun was marginalised from the operation.

exchanges: I.M. Lewis ‘Doing Violence to Ethnography: A Response to Catherine Besteman’ *Cultural Anthropology*, vol.13, no.1 (1998), pp.100-109; Catherine Besteman, ‘Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia’ *Cultural Anthropology*, vol.11, no.1 (1996), pp.120-133; and Catherine Besteman ‘Primordialist Blindness: A Reply to I.M Lewis’ *Cultural Anthropology*, vol.13, no.1 (1998), pp.109-121.

³¹⁸ De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, p.161.

³¹⁹ S/24343, 22 July 1992, paragraph 70.

³²⁰ As Ali Mahdi controlled Somalia’s government ministries, including the diplomatic service, UN involvement in the country tenuously relied on accepting the legitimacy and legality of Omar Ghalib’s (Somali ‘Prime Minister’) invitation to include Somalia on the Agenda of the Security Council, and his request for the world body to undertake effective ‘...action to end the fighting.’ S/23455, 20 January 1992.

However, this process has in part been shielded by a variety of recriminations surrounding Sahnoun's eventual resignation in October 1992, which has focused on his activities and the general approach that he adopted. Most misleading here is the presumption among many commentators and practitioners (taking on a legendary status in some quarters) that Sahnoun was somehow engaged in unconventional forms of conflict resolution that centred on 'bottom-up' peacemaking.³²¹ And to be sure, Sahnoun did incorporate elements of such an agenda: he adopted an open-door policy with relation to many Somali figures and groups and organised, along with the Swedish Life and Peace Institute, several conferences to bring together academics and tribal elders.³²² But, as noted above, Mohammad Sahnoun's priority for the majority of this period centred on negotiating with Somali factions (SNA and SSA) the deployment of a small UN observer force based upon the normal prerequisites for UN operations—namely the consent and cooperation of the parties and an effective cease-fire in which to deploy limited forces.³²³ So despite the much heralded policy of civil society outreach in the conflict resolution process that many commentators have ascribed to Sahnoun's tenure as special representative his mediating activities remained rather routine and conventional as far as UN practice was concerned; after all, at the time the UN was happily doing business with UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique.

As a result, the general assumption that Sahnoun was sidelined because of his civil society 'outreach' approach to Somali reconciliation is misplaced.³²⁴ Undoubtedly, the pretext for his dismissal revolved around accusations that he travelled too frequently outside of Somalia and that a conference in which he had been participating, with a range of Somali academics in the

³²¹ This view is implicit in much academic work on the subject. For instance: De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, pp.176-178. It is also a view cultivated by Sahnoun himself in his brief memoir of his experiences (*Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*), and by the Life and Peace Institute's Horn of Africa Centre, which sought the adoption by UNOSOM I of a '...bottom-up method for peace.' This consisted of: pursuing peace from the district level upward; the direct ownership of the process by Somalis; the extensive involvement of civil society figures; and a process with no time frames. Sture Normark, 'The Life and Peace Institute in Cooperation with UNOSOM Political Division' in Mohamed Salih and Lennart Wohlgemuth (eds.) *Crisis Management and the Politics of Reconstruction in Somalia: Statements from the Uppsala Forum, 17-19 January 1994*, (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1994), p.43.

³²² Ibid.

³²³ S/24343, 22 July 1992. As special representative, Sahnoun's role also consisted of co-ordinating and advancing humanitarian operations, which largely entailed lobbying for greater funds from various donors and negotiating the provision and movement of aid into the country.

³²⁴ For examples of this common view Normark 'The Life and Peace Institute', and in the media, 'Aides Departure Another Blow to U.N. in Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), 31 October 1992.

Seychelles, was unnecessarily expensive.³²⁵ There was also dismay at his high profile criticism of UN bureaucracy, especially for its absence from the Somali crisis throughout 1991.³²⁶ But placed in context, Sahnoun's time outside of Somalia was not excessive, at least compared to the week or so that James Jonah had spent in the country during his time as UN envoy.³²⁷ And the conference in the Seychelles had been partially organised by the Life and Peace Institute and, in any event, remained rather standard in terms of the meetings that the UN is accustomed to.

Rather, the major grounds for sidelining Sahnoun was the basic approach to conflict management that he was mandated to carry out, one that remained the standard practice utilised by the UN in various other contexts. In particular UN officials did not approve of the laborious process of negotiating and incessant shuttle diplomacy that Sahnoun adopted to secure agreement from General Aideed for the deployment of five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers.³²⁸ For the secretary-general, such an approach conferred unnecessary legitimacy and bargaining power on Aideed. As Boutros-Ghali admits in his recent UN memoirs:

'I was worried by his efforts to 'understand' the militia leaders, Aideed and Mahdi, and establish 'warm relations' with them. This...perpetuated the criminal establishment that had taken over the country, and lengthy negotiations between the warlords had to be

³²⁵ 'Somalia: Should Sahnoun Return?' *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, no.550, 14 November. 1992, Sahnoun, *Somalia*, p.40 and Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.57.

³²⁶ Sahnoun's comments became widely cited in the press at the time. One of his most cited related to the UN's absence from Somalia: 'A whole year slipped by whilst the UN and the international community, save for ICRC and a handful of NGOs, watched Somalia descend into this hell.' 'Aides Departure Another Blow to U.N. in Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), 31 October 1992. But Sahnoun's most high profile criticism of the UN came in a CBS '60 minutes programme' aired in October. There was also a suggestion of personal animosities with some highly placed UN officials in New York, especially James Jonah. On all these issues, see: 'U.N. Envoy to Somalia Says his Ouster is Official' *The New York Times* (NYC), 30 October 1992, 'Somalia: Should Sahnoun Return?' *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, no.550, 14 November 1992, 'The Squeezing of Sahnoun' *The Economist* (London), 7 November 1992, and 'Somalia: the UN Under Fire' *Africa Confidential*, vol.34, no.15, 30 July 1993.

³²⁷ On Jonah's activities see: S/23693, 11 March 1992, and Stevenson, 'Hope Restored?' pp.139-142.

³²⁸ Ali Mahdi, always seeking to bolster his position through international intervention, had accepted the deployment of observers on the first day of Sahnoun's arrival in the country (4 May 1992). Initially it had taken Sahnoun two months to secure the agreement of General Aideed to deploy the observers (9 May-15 July). S/24343. His task was made difficult by the justifiable perception that the UN was biased towards his rival Mahdi—as shown by the UN's implicit acceptance of the legitimacy of Mahdi's government and invitation to involve the organisation in the country (see footnote 320). Other incidents also reinforced this perception—such as the use of an Iluyshin aircraft contracted to a private firm but bearing UN insignia to deliver arms and currency to Mahdi, and the previous close association of Boutros-Ghali (as a former Egyptian diplomat) with the Barre regime. All this led to a general suspicion of many Somalis to the UN. 'Profile: Mohammad Sahnoun: A Diplomat Matches Wits With Chaos in Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), 20 September 1992.

carried out before food could be distributed within the various fiefdoms under their control.³²⁹

This impatience at UN headquarters with Sahnoun's protracted negotiations and the desire to expedite UN operations in the country is also reflected in the precipitous announcement from New York to enlarge UNOSOM I from five-hundred to three-thousand five-hundred security personnel in late August 1992.³³⁰ Here, the 'Report of the secretary-general on the situation in Somalia, proposing the deployment of four additional security units, each with 750 troops, in Bossasso, Berbera, Kismayo and the southwest' was released without the knowledge of Sahnoun and without any consultation with the SNA—both became aware of the proposal via the BBC World Service.³³¹ Considering the fact that Sahnoun had only just managed to secure agreement from General Aideed for the deployment of five-hundred UN troops (a protracted set of negotiations that took over two-months), this announcement clearly signalled the determination of the UN to side-step Sahnoun's ongoing dialogue with the factions and, perhaps much more significantly, marked a UN move towards imposing peacekeeping deployments *without* the prior consent of local groups—as was proposed in *An Agenda for Peace*. Indeed, this was exactly the type of outcome that could be logically inferred from the slight but significant redefinition of peacekeeping that *Agenda for Peace* put-forward: '...the deployment...hitherto with the consent of *all* parties concerned.'³³²

This type of policy was confirmed in the months following Sahnoun's departure from UNOSOM by a hardening of attitudes towards the 'militia leaders' by the UN. Here, Sahnoun's replacement, Ismit Kittani, abandoned the practice of shuttling between clan leaders, officially meeting Aideed and Mahdi only twice during his tenure, and toughened the content and tone of UN pronouncements towards these leaders.³³³ For many Somalis this new attitude was signalled before Kittani's arrival in October, with his authorisation of the deployment of Pakistani peacekeepers at Mogadishu airport—again, a move that was co-ordinated without the consent of

³²⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.56.

³³⁰ S/24480, 24 August 1992.

³³¹ Sahnoun, *Somalia*, p.38; 'Somalia: Regrets and Rancour for Sahnoun' *Indian Ocean Newsletter*, no.552, 28 November 1992, p.2; Stevenson, 'Hope Restored?' p.142.

³³² *An Agenda for Peace*, paragraph 20.

³³³ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* p.80, and De Waal, *Famine Crimes*, p.181. Kittani (an Iraqi Kurd) had held several high-level posts in the UN Secretariat, interspersed with stints in the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including 'Chef de Cabinet' for U Thant and Kurt Waldheim. He served as President of the General Assembly in 1981 and was Baghdad's representative to the UN in New York between 1985-89. 'An Old UN Hand is New Envoy to Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), 1 November 1993 and Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*, p.222, p.330.

Aideed and one that caused a considerable degree of animosity and hostility among the SNA.³³⁴ Yet Aideed and Mahdi were not the only Somali leaders to be singled out by 'Governor Kittani', as the residents of Mogadishu curtly referred to him.³³⁵ During his only visit to the break-away republic of Somaliland, lasting two-hours, he threatened to halt food-aid to the area if UN documents relating to the deployment of an Egyptian battalion in Berbera were not immediately signed on first inspection; and, shortly after this visit, ordered the closure of UNOSOM offices in the nascent republic.³³⁶

This new approach to dealing with Somalis—one that placed little emphasis on consensus building within the territory—needs to be viewed as part-and-parcel of a wider drive by the UN and some private and public humanitarian forces for a military intervention under UN auspices that had begun to gather momentum from October 1992.³³⁷ Indeed, from Kittani's appointment onwards, it was not only clear from UNOSOM policy that the customary methods for dealing with 'locals' were being summarily dismissed but that in New York the UN was preparing a case for intervention that was based upon a very partisan view of the situation.³³⁸ Perhaps most striking in this regard was a letter from the secretary-general to the Security Council on November 24, in which it was contended that the situation in Somalia had deteriorated to such an extent that the '...basic premises and principles' of UNOSOM I would require revision.³³⁹ Through the focus on a number of 'disturbing developments'—the shelling of a World Food

³³⁴ Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.28. The UN had secured agreement of the Hawadle sub-clan and not the USC for the deployment of UN troops at the airport.

³³⁵ 'Somalia: Beyond the Pax Americana' *Africa Confidential*, vol.33, no.25, 18 December 1992, p.2.

³³⁶ The UN has always been dismissive of Somaliland and its claims to independence. Here, Sahnoun was equally brisk in his dealings with the territory. 'Somalia: Beyond the Pax Americana' *Africa Confidential*, vol.33, no.25, 18 December 1992, p.2. More generally, see: John Drysdale, *Somaliland: Anatomy of Succession*, (London: Haan, 1992).

³³⁷ In the US, the drumbeat for intervention had begun to gather momentum in August 1992. The US Congress for example called for UN peacekeepers to be sent to Somalia in a resolution on 10 August 1992 (Resolution 132). There were also calls from private voluntary organisations (CARE—USA), and in the editorials of major US broadsheets, for intervention. For two examples, one from the beginning and one from the height of this process, see: 'The Hell Called Somalia' *The New York Times* (NYC), Editorial, 23 July 1992 and 'Shoot to Feed' *The New York Times* (NYC), Leslie H. Gelb, Editorial, 19 November 1992. The extent of the influence of these factors—the media and humanitarian forces—is usually taken to be central for the build-up to war. However, Robinson argues that media attention actually proceeded US government debate as to the efficacy of action in the country, and was to an extent a result of growing US governmental interest in intervention. Robinson 'The CNN Effect', p301-5. And Western, 'Sources of Humanitarian Intervention', p.144.

³³⁸ As African Rights stated: '...the situation in Somalia on the eve of the intervention was portrayed in unrealistically pessimistic colours. At the time, this served to justify the intervention; now, it serves to exaggerate the improvements that have occurred since.' *Somalia Operation Restore Hope: A Preliminary Assessment*, May 1993, p.5.

³³⁹ S/24859, 24 November 1992.

Programme ship and the closure of Mogadishu port—the secretary-general made the malevolent character of the factions the major concern.³⁴⁰ These events were then generalised to construct an inflated picture of conflict and violence in the country. One of the most contentious claims here was the UN's declaration that: '...humanitarian assistance that reaches its intended beneficiaries is often barely more than a trickle.' This view reflected the diplomatic position of the UN Secretariat, one that officials put forward in a briefing to an Informal Consultation of the Security Council on November 25 that between seventy-to-eighty percent of all international relief was being looted.³⁴¹ This figure represented the absolute extreme of all estimates relating to the plunder of aid, and did not reflect the disparity of relief lost over time, region and organisation. For some organisations and independent researchers, for example ICRC and Save the Children Fund, the contention was that no more than five-to-ten percent of aid was diverted.³⁴² The implication of such an extreme view of the situation that UN officials presented was that the delivery of aid was the *prima facie* issue that needed to be addressed by the Security Council. In this respect, the logical inference of the UN was that: '...the cycle of extortion and blackmail described above must be broken and security conditions established that will permit the distribution of relief supplies.'³⁴³

This letter was crucial in opening-up the diplomatic space for an enforcement operation. By giving 'urgent consideration to this state of affairs' and suggesting that it '...may be necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia', the secretary-general was setting the scene for a radical revision of UNOSOM. Indeed only a few days later, after negotiations with the US over a possible military intervention, Boutros-Ghali distributed a further letter presenting the Council with five possible options for the UN in Somalia.³⁴⁴ These options were unequivocally designed to promote various military operations in that the report

³⁴⁰ S/24859, 24 November 1992. According to African Rights, Mogadishu port may have been closed to the UN during November but it was open to ICRC, which had unloaded 2,000 tonnes of aid between 3 and 10 of November. *Somalia Operation Restore Hope*, p.4.

³⁴¹ S/24859, 24 November 1992. President of the Security Council, Hungarian Ambassador Erdos, released a statement after the consultation on behalf of the Council that 70-80% of aid was diverted. 'Bush Ready to Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food' *The New York Times* (NYC), 26 November 1992. According to African Rights, Kittani was the source of this extraordinary claim. African Rights, *Somalia Operation Restore Hope*, p.2.

³⁴² 'The Protest of Rakiya Omaar' *The Nation* (NYC), vol.255, issue 21, 21 December 1992, p.762.

³⁴³ S/24859, 24 November 1992.

³⁴⁴ S/24868, 29 November 1992. The US offer to lead a humanitarian intervention had been widely trailed in the US media before the options letter was publicly taken to the Council: 'Bush Ready to Send Troops to Protect Somalia Food' *The New York Times* (NYC), 26 November 1992. The US had its own rationale for intervention. Particularly pertinent it would seem was inter-department debate within the Administration that eventually endorsed a US intervention in Somalia as a way sidestepping pressure for US troops in Bosnia. Western, 'Sources of Humanitarian Intervention', p.118.

dismisses at the outset a continuation of existing peacekeeping efforts (option one), or withdrawal altogether (option two).³⁴⁵ Rather, it was declared that given the humanitarian situation presented in the previous letter: ‘...The Security Council now has no alternative but to decide to adopt more forceful measures to secure humanitarian operations.’³⁴⁶ With relation to more forceful measures, the option of staging a ‘show of force’ in Mogadishu was ruled out (option three) in favour of a country-wide enforcement operation carried out by either a UN member-state under UN auspices (option four), or by the UN itself (option five). While Boutros-Ghali stated his preference for option-five he noted an offer by the US Secretary of State for US armed forces to lead a UN mandated intervention (i.e. option four).³⁴⁷

What this brief review of the origins of UN engagement with Somalia, from UNOSOM I to a US led military intervention (UNITAF), has sought to relay are some of the institutional circumstances for such action. In the first place it is difficult to understand the evolution of UNOSOM from a conventional peacekeeping operation to a more coercive one if institutional and doctrinal changes that UN managers were underwriting at the time are ignored. It is only by recognising the attempt to operationalise a changing conceptual emphasis in the principles of peace operations—occasioned by *An Agenda for Peace* and certain changes in the UN’s programme of work—that the policy shifts of UNOSOM from August 1992 onwards make sense. There was a cogent direction to these shifts, and this was towards de-legitimising local actors as the authoritative source of consent and approval for UN deployment as well as a simultaneous move towards the view that ‘more forceful measures’ were a proportional international response to this type of humanitarian crisis (no matter how exaggerated this turned-out to be). The inference was that if local parties were unable to agree and consent to keep the peace in such a crisis, the UN had an obligation to ‘enforce’ a ceasefire—just as advocated in *Agenda for Peace*.

UNITAF was the first peace operation justified by the UN around these types of arguments. And in no small part the UN was vital in putting Somalia on the ‘international agenda’ and in constructing the ideological and diplomatic case for armed intervention. Certainly without the embellished and selective picture of events that UN managers offered the international community, and the breakdown in UN-Somali cooperation that followed the institutionalisation of a more confrontational approach to the major factions by UNOSOM I from September 1992, US military

³⁴⁵ S/24868, 29 November 1992.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

³⁴⁷ Ibid.

intervention could have been neither rationalised or defended. The role of the UN official here was crucial, and continued to be so. Indeed, after the authorisation of UNITAF, the UN fought for a more expansive definition of UNITAF's remit, with some successes and some disappointments. But in lieu of a wholesale US take-over of Somalia, the UN managed to negotiate the deployment of a UN 'enforcement' operation under UN command and control to replace UNITAF and carry out functions that the US had been reluctant to conduct. In fact, UNOSOM II reads like a wish list of Boutros-Ghali's demands for a internationalised take-over of Somalia—encompassing all the elements of peace-enforcement in Somalia that the UN had initially envisaged and providing that first, much longed for test case for the UN's new role in policing the borderlands of international capitalism. It is to this unique UN experiment in post-Cold War nation building and its fall from grace that our attention now turns.

UNOSOM II and the spectre of a UN leviathan

The creation of UNOSOM II represented a remarkable accomplishment for UN managers. This was in part because of the successful diplomatic manoeuvring of UN officials, who were able to negotiate with the US support for an extensive Chapter VII operation under UN control to replace UNITAF. This was not a trouble-free or simple process: the secretary-general engaged in extensive bargaining with the Bush and Clinton Administrations over the tasks of UNITAF, which centred on the refusal of UN officials to discuss a transfer of responsibilities from the US to a 'normal' peace-keeping operation until the UN was satisfied that some degree of disarmament had been carried-out.³⁴⁸ This dialogue began more or less immediately after the

³⁴⁸ There were several provisions in the resolution (S/RES/794) that authorised UNITAF, which frustrated, even limited, the UN's vision of peace enforcement in the country. The resolution was designed by the US to provide some leeway in the interpretation of provisions relating to the disarmament of the factions and to de-limit US engagement in Somalia. Furthermore, once deployed in Somalia the Pentagon employed a limited reading of the resolution: US troops avoided any form of disarmament, from small arms to heavy weapons, and ignored arms caches when stumbled upon; and the deployment of troops was restricted to the southern portion of the territory. As important the Bush Administration dispatched Ambassador Robert Oakley—a diplomat with extensive experience in Somalia—to smooth the deployment and exit of US troops. In practical terms this meant negotiating, to the annoyance of Boutros-Ghali, with General Aideed. The problem for the US, however, was that Boutros-Ghali was unwilling to 'sign-off' UNITAF as a success in achieving 'a secure environment' in Somalia (a necessary precondition for the transfer to a traditional UN peacekeeping operation) until the US had 'neutralised' Somali factions. In other words the UN would not sanction—at first even discuss—a withdrawal of US troops until some attempts at disarmament had been conducted. Boutros-Ghali in a report on UNITAF to the Security Council: 'I and my representatives...have taken the line that it would be difficult to move from the discussion of concepts to the formulation of concrete plans until more is known about the success of UNITAF in establishing a secure environment which would permit the transition to take place.' S/24992, 19 December 1992. See

adoption of resolution 794 (1992) authorising UNITAF, with Boutros-Ghali disclosing in public a set of 'discreet' understandings that had been reached with the US over the disarmament of Somali factions.³⁴⁹ And even though the Bush Administration (and later the Clinton Administration) remained steadfast in its narrow interpretation of UNITAF, in its eagerness to plan for an exit strategy it softened its public stance by carrying out some largely symbolic disarmament operations and, more importantly, consenting to UN requests for a countrywide UN run enforcement operation that would conduct tasks that the US were reluctant to perform.³⁵⁰

But from the perspective of this study, the creation of UNOSOM II was also an achievement in that it marked an extraordinary upgrading of the UN's peace roles in the South. UNOSOM II was, hitherto, the largest and most expensive operation that the UN deployed with 28,000 troops and 2,800 civilian staff at an annual cost of \$1.5 billion.³⁵¹ Its remit was qualitatively distinct as well: UNOSOM II was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to enforce a secure environment *throughout* Somalia and to pursue comprehensive disarmament. Indeed, UNOSOM's focus was not so much designed to create '...a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations', as UNITAF was authorised in resolution 794, as it was to '...assume responsibility for the consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia.'³⁵² The shift was significant in that it reflected the creation of an operation that had as its *raison d'être* the monopolisation of the means of legitimate coercion in the

also: 'U.N Wants Somalia Disarmed Before U.S. Leaves' *The New York Times* (NYC), 11 December 1992; 'Disarming Somalis Gains Priority' *The New York Times* (NYC), 28 December 1992.

³⁴⁹ Apart from the procedural attempt by the UN to enlarge the scope of UNITAF actions, as outline in previous footnote, Boutros-Ghali also engaged in public diplomacy designed to show that the US had committed to disarmament. He told *The New York Times* for example that Bush had 'discreetly promised' to disarm Somali groups. And to back-up the claim, Boutros-Ghali threatened to publish these understandings—partly followed through by their selective reproduction in a UN report to the Council on 18 December 1992—which explicitly linked the disarmament of 'lawless gangs' to the establishment of a secure environment and, consequently, the transfer to a conventional peacekeeping operation. 'U.N. Chief Says Letter to Bush Outlines U.S. Commitment to Disarm Somali Gangs', *The New York Times* (NYC), 13 December 1992; Letter dated 8 December 1992 from the secretary-general to the President of the United States discussing the establishment of a secure environment in Somalia and the need for continuous consultations'; and S/24992, 19 December 1992.

³⁵⁰ The US shifted its policy on disarmament towards the end of December: US patrols moved into North Mogadishu; private voluntary organisations were ordered to end their use of local armed groups for safe passage through Somalia; and heavy weapons would be destroyed when they were stumbled upon. 'Disarming Somalis Gains Priority' *The New York Times* (NYC), 28 December 1992. This shift was indirectly recorded in a letter from the US to the UN Security Council in January: S/25126, 19 January 1993. The idea of a peace enforcement operation under UN command and control is officially raised for the first time by the secretary-general in S/24992, 19 December 1992. In private US officials discussed the idea of a UN peace-enforcement operation to replace UNITAF on 18 December 1992. Boutros-Ghali, *The United Nations and Somalia*, p.42.

³⁵¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.722.

³⁵² S/RES/814, 26 March 1993.

territory. This was not simply a way of facilitating the admission of a UN operation in lieu of local consent—even though this may have been one initial aspect of its utility. As was stipulated in the report proposing UNOSOM II: ‘The deployment will be at the discretion of the secretary-general...and not subject to the agreement of any local faction leaders.’³⁵³ But it was also, crucially, a matter of casting UN authority in the country in direct opposition to other armed elements and antagonistic political forces in Somali society. Indeed, considering the necessary abrogation of all local and national legal codes and practices implied by resolution 814 (1992), every Somali was now theoretically at the mercy of UN forces: arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, and uninvestigated deaths at the hands of UN troops could all be legitimately condoned—and in no small measure they were.³⁵⁴

This ‘take-over’ of Somalia reflected a changed emphasis in the structural objectives of UN involvement. As already implied, the coercive dimension of UNOSOM II indicated a shift from a formal focus on the secure delivery of emergency aid to one of establishing general law and order. This new objective—dominating the ‘security environment’ and rolling-back armed elements—was seen to be the single most important prerequisite for reconstituting the central state.³⁵⁵ Indeed, the wider agenda animated by resolution 814 authorising UNOSOM II was one that tasked the UN with reconstituting the instruments and institutions of centralised rule from Mogadishu; the coercive side of this was simply the most innovative, prominent and ‘urgent’ aspect of this ambitious project.³⁵⁶ It was envisaged that security would be proceeded, with the assistance of the UN, with the establishment of a police force as well as other ‘...national and regional institutions and civil administration in the entire country.’³⁵⁷

The implications of such a revised UN agenda in Somalia was that the ostensible purpose was no longer to ‘...shoot-to-feed’, as an American advocate of such a policy labelled it, but one that was now directly designed to reincorporate the ‘anarchic’ and ‘lawless’ territory back into the liberal world order.³⁵⁸ Of course this was exactly what UN officials had been arguing for in the summer of 1992 when they spoke of Somalia as an ‘orphan’ conflict that had been ‘forgotten’ in favour of a ‘rich man’s war’ in Bosnia, near the heartlands of Western liberalism.³⁵⁹ In March 1993, with

³⁵³ S/25354, 3 March 1993. paragraph 97.

³⁵⁴ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* p.xviii.

³⁵⁵ S/25354, 3 March 1993. paragraph 100.

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ S/RES/814, 26 March 1993.

³⁵⁸ ‘Shoot to Feed’ *The New York Times* (NYC), 19 November 1992.

³⁵⁹ Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp.53-5.

the creation of UNOSOM II, the UN finally had the opportunity to make good its promise of returning the territory and its inhabitants back into the liberal fold. Here Madeline Albright's words to *The New York Times* in August 1993 rang true for many in the UN when she said:

'The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category of failed state into that of an emerging democracy. For Somalia's sake, and for ours, we must persevere.'³⁶⁰

The creation of UNOSOM II was, therefore, a significant moment for the UN. It presented the UN with its first opportunity to put into practice an expansive vision of UN peace practices that had been tentatively put forward, with Security Council encouragement, by UN managers. UNOSOM II would be an ideal test-case for such new lines of activities; very possibly it would be another '...significant step forward in the evolution of the United Nations role in the post-Cold War era.'³⁶¹ But these were a heady set of activities for UN officials to be tasked with. Arguably, not since the Congo in the 1960s had the UN been bestowed with such material power to determine the future of the inhabitants of a post-colonial society. And by all accounts the UN utilised to the limit these instruments of coercion at its disposal to compel elements to submit to the central state.

UN misadventures in Somalia

The UNOSOM II encounter was a violent and bitter affair, reflective perhaps of the intrinsic functions that the operation was charged with as well as the zealous determination of officials to carry these through. Indeed from the very beginning of the operation, UNOSOM managers adopted a stringent approach towards the enforcement provisions of the mandate, especially those that related to the disarmament of the local population. This attitude helped ferment a military confrontation with the SNA in which the UN—UNOSOM II, the secretary-general, and the Security Council—branded Aideed a 'war criminal' and 'outlaw' and authorised an extraordinary set of coercive activities designed to dismember the infrastructure of the faction and bring its leadership to international 'justice.'

³⁶⁰ Boutros-Ghali cites extensively Albright's New York Times letter. Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.96.

³⁶¹ 'Letter from the secretary-general of the UN to President George H. Bush discussing the activities of UNITAF, 8 December 1992.'

The specificity of UNOSOM's constitution—that is, its particular makeup—goes some way to explain the zeal with which this type of strategy was adopted. What is routinely noted in this regard is that even though the UN was officially in control of the operation, it was the US that really 'called-the-shots'. And in fact to a significant degree the operation was permeated by the US military in a variety of ways. Three aspects would seem to be important here. First, the Quick Reaction Force retained their own independent chain of command. Strikes by *these* units were occasionally carried-out without the prior knowledge of UN headquarters.³⁶² Second, the Deputy Force Commander of UNOSOM II, Major-General Thomas Montgomery, was considered by many to be the real person in charge of UN military activities.³⁶³ Finally, the special representative of UNOSOM II—the UN official responsible for the overall running of the operation—was a retired American serviceman who had been nominated by the Clinton Administration. Other Western liberal states involved—France and Italy in particular—were locked out of the key strategic positions of the operation and hence felt that they were unable to influence the direction of policy.³⁶⁴ On this account they occasionally pursued independent negotiations with local factions without UNOSOM II authorisation, much to the annoyance of DPKO in New York, who sort to cast-aside these 'rogue elements'.³⁶⁵ Some commentators suggest that had Italy—or France for that matter—been more central in the formulation of UNOSOM II policy a more consensual and tolerant approach may have emerged. Presumably this was because of their colonial encounters in the Horn of Africa and their 'special' understanding of Somali history and culture.

While this view may certainly be accurate, the problem with this line of argument is that it obscures from sight the UN agenda in creating and fostering the UNOSOM II project in the first

³⁶² Boutros-Ghali states that he had no foreknowledge of the disastrous October 3 attack by the US Delta Force on a house in Mogadishu in which 18 Rangers and around a thousand Somalis were killed. *Unvanquished*, p.103.

³⁶³ 'Somalia: The UN Under Fire' *Africa Confidential*, vol.34, no.15, 30 July 1993.

³⁶⁴ 'Somalia: In the Wake of UN Raids' *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, no.581, 26 June 1993; 'Italian General Who Refused Order In Somalia is Removed' *The New York Times* (NYC), 15 July 1993.

³⁶⁵ There was much consternation, for example, when an Italian contingent pursued negotiations with the SNA to retake the 'Pasta Factory' in Mogadishu. In response, Kofi Annan, without prior consultation with the Italian Authorities, announced the repatriation of General Loi (in charge of the Italian contingent) on 14 July 1993. The diplomatic spat that followed saw Italy threaten to withdraw its troops. A solution was found whereby Loi would carry on in his role (temporarily) and Italian troops moved to less 'sensitive' areas. Boutros-Ghali put the matter this way: 'Owing perhaps, to the particularly complex and dangerous conditions under which UNOSOM found itself operating, the actions of some contingent commanders had the effect of weakening the integrity of UNOSOM'S command structure. Following clarification at both the political and operational levels, these difficulties were settled.' S/26317, 17 August. paragraph 76. On the incident more generally: 'In Somalia, Machiavelli VS. Rambo', *The New York Times* (NYC), 22 July 1993.

place. It may be the case that the US had some special interest in UNOSOM II, and that this led to a much more belligerent approach than it may otherwise have been. But, having said this, there would have been no UNOSOM II—with its wide coercive elements and nation-building functions—had it not been for the specific UN and US endeavour to make an example out of the Somali crisis. The issue is clearly one of the intrinsic functions of UNOSOM II combined with the determination of UN officials to carry these through to their logical conclusions. In this regard, the role and position of the new UN special representative to Somalia is illustrative.

Special representative Admiral Jonathon Howe was arguably a driving force in the type of belligerent strategy that UNOSOM II adopted on the ground in Somalia. Here, Admiral Howe was prominent in the push to capture Aideed—at one point putting a price of \$25,000 for his arrest—and was quick to cast aside personnel who opposed his strategy.³⁶⁶ And perhaps more tellingly, at least from the Somali perspective, ‘Admiral Howe’ became mockingly known as ‘Animal Howe’ on the streets in Mogadishu on account of his penchant for the use of military force and rhetoric.³⁶⁷ But while the ‘hunt’ for Aideed resembled an earlier episode in Howe’s military career (Howe was involved with the snatching of General Noriega from Panama in 1991) it cannot be said, Born-Again Christian eccentricities apart, that Howe was diverging from known UN views on how to apply UNOSOM’s mandate.³⁶⁸ They may have diverged from the views of other Western liberal states, but they certainly did not digress from the views of top-ranking UN managers prominent in the oversight of the operation. Indeed, Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan (at this time Under-Secretary of DPKO) were clear in their preferences for these types of coercive actions and in their disdain for faction leaders, most notably General Aideed. In a specific response to criticism of the strategy that UNOSOM II had adopted, for example, the secretary-general reaffirmed the importance of operation’s military functions:

‘I am conscious of the feeling in some quarters that UNOSOM is deviating from its primary task...and is concentrating disproportionate efforts and resources in military

³⁶⁶ Howe declared the reward for Aideed, accompanied by ‘Wanted Posters’, on 17 June 1993. S/26022, 1 July 1993.

³⁶⁷ Mohamad Diriye Abdullahi, *Fiasco in Somalia: US-UN Intervention*, (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 1995), p.22.

³⁶⁸ Howe was an assistant to Admiral William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs during the Panama invasion, and was extensively involved in the hunt for Noriega. He was later Deputy National Security Advisor for President George H. Bush. As far as Born Again Christian influences on Howe are concerned, it has been widely noted by UN staff that he opened morning meetings with prayers, and that his public and private statements were infused with religious undertones. Michael Maren, ‘Cleaning Up From the Cold War in Somalia’ *Somalia News Update*, vol.2, no.25, 20 September 1993.

operations...However, the international community has known from the beginning that effective disarmament of all factions and warlords is *conditio sine qua non* for other aspects of UNOSOM's mandate...the fact remains that the country will not enjoy stability unless and until the criminal elements have been apprehended and brought to justice as demanded by the Security Council in its resolution 837 (1993).³⁶⁹

And one could well have seen 'Governor Kittani' apply such an approach had he been given the hallowed opportunity to lead US and UN forces. In fact, in terms of style, it could be argued that Howe actually applied certain trade-marks of Kittani's period as special representative, rarely leaving the UN compound in which he was based (otherwise known as the 'Camp of Murderers' among Mogadishu residents), or talking to relevant forces in Somali society. It should be remembered that it was during Kittani's tenure that the institutionalisation of a more belligerent approach towards local groups was first developed and fostered. The difference surely was that Howe, unlike Kittani, had the material capacity and mandate to carry through the policy of dismembering local groups. This capacity, and mandate, was precisely the type of operation that the UN had been arguing for since Kittani's and Boutros-Ghali's report outlining 'Five Options' in November 1992; the 'preferred' option it will be recalled was to replace the conventional peacekeeping operation in Somalia with a peace enforcement one under UN command throughout the country.³⁷⁰

What all this should reaffirm is that the peace operation that was consistently held out by UN managers—from October 1992 to July 1993—was one that would compel local forces to submit to the central state. Boutros Boutros-Ghali again: 'If certain factions refuse to disarm voluntarily, UNOSOM is left with no choice but to disarm them through compulsion.'³⁷¹ And once UNOSOM ground and air operations were underway, from June to September 1993, no effort was spared in reiterating the importance of such action and the malevolence of General Aideed, who was the primary '...menace to public safety.'³⁷²

The military operations against various factions—particularly against the SNA—began after UNOSOM II had conducted an inspection of an authorised heavy weapons storage facility that was located in the grounds of Radio Mogadishu on 5 June 1993. The inspection turned into a rout

³⁶⁹ S/26317, 17 August 1993. paragraph 73.

³⁷⁰ S/24859, 24 November 1992.

³⁷¹ S/26317, 17 August 1993. paragraph 15.

³⁷² S/26022, 1 July 1993. paragraph 32.

for UNOSOM forces, who were ambushed by local 'militia' which (quite reasonably) interpreted the act as an attempt to take-over the radio station. Twenty-six Pakistani peacekeepers and an unknown number of Somalis died in the incident, which led to a hasty Security Council resolution that reaffirmed the secretary-general's authority in carrying out such operations, and authorised him to '...take all measures against all those responsible.'³⁷³ Interestingly enough, the resolution seems to confirm Somali suspicions about UN intentions with regard to the radio station when it expressly reaffirmed '...the crucial importance of neutralising radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against the Operation.'³⁷⁴ This would not have surprised John Drysdale, a former advisor to UNOSOM II, who has suggested that UN officials developed a certain preoccupation with Radio Mogadishu and pushed for its removal from Aideed's control in the immediate run-up to the June incident.³⁷⁵

From this point on, UNOSOM conducted an extensive set of ground and air operations against General Aideed. This focused on all elements of his power base; in terms of armaments, what is interesting is that the UN not only focused on striking 'clandestine' munitions sites but 'authorised' storage facilities as well—underlying the end of a regime of voluntary disarmament and the onset of one of compulsion by the UN. But action was not now officially limited to disarmament: Radio Mogadishu was taken out by air strikes on 12 June, and Aideed's 'headquarters' were destroyed on 17 June.³⁷⁶ Various other ground and air strikes targeted the leaders of the SNA, including a combined assault on a conference centre hosting a meeting of Aideed's Habir Gadir sub-clan in which 73 prominent Somalis lost their lives.³⁷⁷ The UN maintained throughout these military operations that their actions were 'surgical' and 'precise', conducted 'valiantly' and with 'great courage' by UN troops in order to avoid 'collateral damage'.³⁷⁸ Whereas for Admiral Howe the Somalis who attacked UN troops were 'terrorists'

³⁷³ S/RES/837, 6 June 1993.

³⁷⁴ Ibid.

³⁷⁵ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* pp.8-9. In particular, Drysdale suggests that April Glaspie (a US State Department diplomat seconded to UNOSOM II as a 'political advisor' to Howe) was responsible for the strategy of demonising Aideed and focusing UNOSOM II attention on Radio Mogadishu. It may be recalled that Glaspie had previously been caught-up in a previous diplomatic controversy when as US Ambassador to Iraq just prior to its invasion of Kuwait she had apparently suggested to Saddam Hussein on 25 July 1990 that the US had no opinion in the event of conflict between the two Arab countries.

³⁷⁶ Boutros-Ghali released the following statement: 'Today's action was also taken to facilitate the restoration of law and order by neutralising a radio broadcasting system that has contributed to violence in Mogadishu.' SG/SM/5009, 12 June 1993.

³⁷⁷ Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* pp.202-204; 'Manhunt' *The Economist* (London), vol.328, issue 7829, p.26; 'Somalia: Hope Denied' *Africa Confidential*, vol.34, no.14, 16 July 1993.

³⁷⁸ S/26022, 1 July 1993. paragraph 26.

and ‘cowards’ who placed ‘...women and children in front of armed men.’³⁷⁹ But the legality of UNOSOM action was eventually brought into question by the UN’s own legal affairs advisers who demurred at such activities. UN lawyer, Ann Wright, wrote in an internal report of ‘Operation Michigan’:

‘The issue boils down to whether the Security Council’s directive authorising UNOSOM to ‘take all necessary measures’ against those responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces meant for UNOSOM to use lethal force against all persons without possibility of surrender in any building suspected or known to be SNA/Aidid facilities; or did the Security Council allow that persons suspected to be responsible for attacks against UNOSOM forces would have an opportunity to be detained by UNOSOM forces and explain their presence in an SNA/Aidid facility and then be judged in a neutral court of law...’³⁸⁰

What this demonstrates is the extent to which UN officials went to carry out the enforcement provisions of UNOSOM II—particularly those that required the UN to suppress and roll-back local armed elements within the state. Conscious perhaps of the leviathan role that had for the first time been entrusted to its officials, the UN pursued these responsibilities with real zeal. For some this zeal went above and beyond the legal and ethical parameters that the UN was entitled to—behaving more like an occupying power of the Anglo-American variety. But the ease with which the UN slipped into the typical operating procedures, both military tactics and ideological rationalisations, of certain Western liberal states in their interventions in the South should not be surprising given the make-up of the forces and the historical functions of the UN in policing post-colonial states. And yet it cannot be said that this was simply a US mission disguised as a UN one; the intrinsic functions of UNOSOM II, the rationalisation of UNOSOM II’s militant liberalism, and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, the very bearing of the operation’s tactics were all fundamentally shaped by the secretary-general and several of his top-lieutenants eager to push the boundaries of UN peace practices to their logical limits.

³⁷⁹ ‘UNOSOM II Takes ‘Decisive Action’ To Restore Peace’, *UN Chronicle* (New York), vol.30 issue 3, September 1993, p.4.
³⁸⁰ Ann Wright cited in: Michael Maren, ‘Cleaning Up From the Cold War in Somalia’ *Somalia News Update*, vol.2, no.25, 20 September 1993.

The UN peace-enforcement experiment

The above discussion has sought to provide an account of the UN's post-Cold War engagement with Somalia that is sensitive to the wider transformations that the organisation was undergoing. Here it has been argued that the origins and development of the UN 'peace enforcement' operation in Somalia is best understood in the context of an attempt by UN managers to put into practice new peace roles assigned to the world body in the wake of a resurgent post-Second World Security Council. These 'new roles' tentatively sought to rework the parameters of conventional UN peace activities, especially the necessity of local consent as a basis for engagement and the related possibility that in future the UN may enforce cease-fires. In key respects, Somalia was used as a testing ground for these revised practices. Initially, this related to the way in which local consent was gradually phased-out of the process of UN intervention in the country; as we have seen, in a crucial step before the onset of the US military operation, in late August 1992, the SNA was simply not told of a significant increase in UN peacekeeping troops that had been discussed and then authorised by the Security Council.³⁸¹ But the apex of the UN experiment in Somalia was undisputedly UNOSOM II, which incorporated the full spectrum of functions and authorisations that UN managers had been arguing for from autumn 1992. A countrywide operation with enforcement provisions under UN command and control, UNOSOM II was a pioneering attempt to move the organisation into the realms of policing Southern societies through coercion. Here, the specific rationale of the operation was to compel the local inhabitants to submit to the instruments and institutions of a central state. It represented, in short, an ambitious bid to craft the UN as an agency with a wider remit for managing the reincorporation of 'failed' and 'collapsed states' back into the liberal world order.

But as we have seen, from engagement to enforcement, the whole process was one that was fraught with difficulties and beset with problems. At first, UN managers were even forced to argue for the opportunity to utilise these new practices, not least because of what was seen by Western European states as the more pressing issue of the fragmentation of the state-system at their borders, in Yugoslavia. Boutros-Ghali reflected on the experience in this way:

'Deaths in Africa are no less significant than deaths in Europe. I tried to goad the Security Council into a sense of urgency. I contrasted their indifference to the horrors of the Horn of Africa with their preoccupation with the 'rich man's war' in the former

³⁸¹ S/24480, 24 August 1992.

Yugoslavia, where the horrors of what was called ‘ethnic cleansing’ were taking place. I said that this double standard must stop.’³⁸²

Once the UN had been provided with this opportunity to forcibly reincorporate the territory of Somalia back into the liberal fold, the essential problem became one of UN legitimacy and authenticity. As a coercive apparatus explicitly functioning like a Western liberal state, the UN’s most central utility in policing the South—the imprimatur of international society—was severely undermined. It was simply the case that through its zealous deployment of force the UN alienated public opinion both within the territory and in the international community more generally.

To a large extent, therefore, the peace enforcement experiment in Somalia was widely seen as a failure. In the UN milieu, enforcement was now perceived as a ‘double-edged sword’ by officials and practitioners who felt that, in future, the UN should sub-contract police action to major powers and leave the UN to concentrate on those peace activities which it did best.³⁸³ On one level, this would allow for a fruitful division of labour between UN officials and the Security Council—with, as one highly placed commentator put it, the secretary-general playing ‘...good cop negotiator, warning from time to time of what the bad cop Security Council might do if negotiations failed.’³⁸⁴ And to some extent this type of relationship was pursued in places such as Sierra Leone and Liberia. But on another level, this also meant that the UN would return to trusted templates for managing change in the South; namely interceding at the formal request of local elites as an ostensibly impartial umpire tasked with micro-managing the implementation of peace accords between two or more local groups. And of course, these two levels were not mutually exclusive. Rather in certain extreme circumstances Western states, or other security groupings, could conduct the military side of operations and then leave the UN to get on with the longer-term project of reconstituting acceptable state-society relations through essentially civilian and technocratic roles.

But despite the clear realisation among UN officials that peace operations are best conducted under the rubric of consent and impartiality, the discourse of conflict and conflict resolution deployed in Somalia to justify intervention has remained remarkably resilient. Indeed, a more nuanced view of local forces has now been developed by UN commentators and practitioners

³⁸² Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, pp.54-55.

³⁸³ Boutros-Ghali in: United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.6. The Brahimi Report also explicitly recognises this division of tasks. A/55/305-S/2000/809, paragraph 53.

³⁸⁴ Picco, ‘The U.N. and the Use of Force’, p.17.

who generally agree that while the format of UN peace practices must for practical purposes rest largely on the consent of local groups, these forces must also be managed far more effectively by relevant international officials.³⁸⁵ Because the UN now views conflict in the South—as it did in Somalia—through the prism of predatory elites seeking to entrench their systems of resource extraction through particularistic politics and generalised violence, international officials are now trained to retain a certain wariness and scepticism of local factions. In short, UN officials now understand these groups as potential ‘spoilers’ who may for a variety of political and economic reasons obstruct the successful implementation of an operation.³⁸⁶ The UN has therefore moved towards developing a more robust strategy of engagement with ‘locals’, in which parties to a conflict are not necessarily treated as ‘moral equivalents’ and peacekeeping officials have credible means to promote certain ‘international standards’.³⁸⁷ So while as a result of Somalia the UN returned to the familiar template for conducting peace operations by placing at the heart of its doctrine the full formal consent of subject societies, this has been tempered by a far more methodical and instrumental approach to managing factions and elites.

³⁸⁵ Of course, many commentators demur at this type of political compromise. See Mary Kaldor and Michael Ignatieff for two prominent Western examples of commentators who advocate forceful ‘cosmopolitan’ action against local militias and so forth.

³⁸⁶ A/55/305-S/2000/809, paragraph 22.

³⁸⁷ Ibid. paragraph 50.

Chapter 5

Post-Colonial Rwanda and United Nations Conveyance Operations: From trusteeship to neo-liberal state transformation

‘Banyarwanda: This appeal is addressed to you by the United Nations Visiting Mission. We have come here in order to help Mwami, the Belgian Administration and the political parties to come to an understanding, restore calm in the hearts of all Banyarwanda and ensure happiness and peace in Ruanda. We urgently request you to remain perfectly calm. Do not believe false rumours. Do not assemble in crowds. The Mission is anxious to hear all those who desire a hearing, wherever they may be. But do not come in excessively large groups. Send us your representatives who you trust in groups of ten or so. We will listen to them with the closest attention. Help the mission. Remain calm. Avoid incidents.’ United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, (T/1538, 8 March 1960).

‘The Council is following with great concern the situation as described by the Secretariat in its oral report. There has been considerable loss of lives, including the deaths of Government leaders, many civilians and at least ten Belgian peacekeepers...The Council strongly condemns these horrific attacks and their perpetrators, who must be held responsible...It further demands that all measures be taken to provide security throughout the country and particularly in Kigali and the demilitarised zone (DMZ)...The Council appeals to all Rwandese and to all parties and factions to desist from any further acts or threats of violence and to maintain the positions they held before the incident.’ Statement by the President of the Security Council (S/PRST/16, 7 April 1994).

Managing social change in Rwanda

The United Nations has had a long and intimate association with the territory of Rwanda. Before Rwanda attained formal independence from Belgium in 1962, the UN was involved in steering and interceding in the complex politics of the kingdom in order to assist in a sequenced and legitimated transition to sovereignty. Fifty years later the UN was again involved in trying to manage change in Rwanda, only this time it was in the form of a ‘peace operation’, which was far more active and intrusive, designed to preside over a transition in political systems and state structures. What should be immediately striking about these encounters—from the perspective of this study at least—is that they were both structurally designed to manage a transition from one social and political order to another: in the 1950s from indirect colonial rule to political pluralism

and formal sovereignty; and in the early 1990s from a one-party state to multiparty market democracy and 'open' civil society.

Understandably, perhaps, these facets of UN intervention have been overshadowed by the second salient feature of these experiences—which is that they both dramatically failed, ultimately with horrific human consequences. By the time of formal independence in 1962, Rwanda was a one-party regime based upon an inverted racial colonial ideology, which led to the systematic victimisation of one, previously privileged, sector of society (the Hamitic 'hypothesis' that cast the Tutsi as a racial foreigner). This 'social revolution' of 1959 was the first to occur under the distant gaze of the UN Trusteeship system. In 1994, the transition to market democracy that the UN was theoretically deployed to oversee as a result of the Arusha Accords was halted in its tracks by a wave of genocidal killings and a resumption of the civil war that left anywhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Rwandans dead.³⁸⁸

The concern of this chapter is not to account for how and why UN transition operations failed in the Rwandan context: there is already an over abundance of material (largely alike) that explicitly apportion blame to this or that international actor, and that have been tailored or commissioned to learning institutional 'lessons'.³⁸⁹ Produced exclusively in a post-1994 context, this material is a microcosm of UN peace operation and conflict-resolution material more generally. Designed to be policy-relevant, the literature is mainly limited to detailing the diplomatic story of the UN in Rwanda during the 1990s and is concerned with critiquing *the lack* of international action in the immediate run-up to, and during, the bloody events of 1994. While this focus may be legitimate,

³⁸⁸ The question as to the origins of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 is the subject of much academic literature. Here a rather rigid discourse relating to the exclusivity of the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi in the 1990s has emerged that has narrowed the issue to one of the role of the Hutu Power elite and media manipulation in planning and executing ethnic violence in the country. There are, however, dissenting voices who have broadened the question to include the longer history of genocidal violence in the region—in Eastern Congo, Burundi and Rwanda—carried out by various groups at various times. For example: Rene Lemarchand, 'Genocide in the Great Lakes: Which Genocide? Whose Genocide?' *African Studies Review*, vol.41, no.1 (1998), pp.3-16.

³⁸⁹ For literature on the international facets of the Rwandan genocide see, among many others: Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: the United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002); Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, *The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (London: Transaction Publishers, 1999); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The international dimension of genocide in Rwanda* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda crisis: history of a genocide* (London: Hurst & Co, 1998); Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: the dynamics of failure* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001); Peter Uvin, *Aiding violence: the development enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1998); Roméo A. Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, *Shake hands with the devil: the failure of humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Canada, 2003); Shaharyar M. Khan, *The shallow graves of Rwanda* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000); and Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: the Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000).

and wholly reasonable given the scale of the violence, it is an approach that fails to appreciate the wider post-colonial relationships in which Rwanda and the UN are a part. Indeed what is noticeable in the standard Anglo-American rendition of the crisis is the narrow definition of intervention applied, the constricted period of time under investigation, and the general lack of critical discussion relating to the genealogy of UN peace interventions.³⁹⁰

Most concerning has been the manner in which a rigid story of the Rwandan crisis has been adopted by outside scholars with hitherto no knowledge or interest in Central African affairs and the way in which debate or dissent on the subject has been displaced.³⁹¹ With relation to the UN, a salutary fable of great power and bureaucratic 'indifference' has been established that casts various actors in positive or negative terms.³⁹² For example in many accounts there is the good liberal humanitarianism of the Force Commander of UNAMIR, Major-General Roméo Dallaire, willing to break the rules and halt internecine violence only to be blocked by bureaucrat-soldiers in New York (in this case Canadian colleague Maurice Baril) concerned to tow-the-line no matter what the (human) cost may be. Samantha Power's description of Dallaire is emblematic:

'If there was a peacekeeper who believed wholeheartedly in the promise of humanitarian action, it was the forty-seven-year-old major general who commanded UN peacekeepers in Rwanda. A broad-shouldered French Canadian with deep-set, sky blue eyes, Dallaire has the thick, callused hands of one brought up in a culture that prizes soldiering, service, and sacrifice. He saw the United Nations as the embodiment of all three.'³⁹³

³⁹⁰ Nonetheless, a few excellent accounts of Rwanda have been produced in the post-1994 context, namely: Mahmood Mamdani, *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001); Johan Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda: conflict, survival and disinformation in the late twentieth century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). In terms of literature produced pre-1994, the seminal accounts of Rwanda and the region include: Catharine Newbury, *The cohesion of oppression: clientship and ethnicity in Rwanda* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); and René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970).

³⁹¹ For the manner in which the international community—particularly in the Anglo-American media—has 'imagined' Rwanda and Central Africa in the 1990s, the recent monograph by Pottier is instructive: *Re-imagining Rwanda*.

³⁹² For one example of a commentator who has created a good/bad dichotomy with relation to the story of humanitarianism in Rwanda, see: David Reiff, *A Bed for the Night* (New York: Vintage, 2002), pp.155-62.

³⁹³ Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Flamingo, 2003), p.335. Winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2003, Power's investigative journalism has been seminal in establishing in the US a general perception of Western *non-intervention* in the South.

For David Reiff such a culture meant that despite the efforts of Maurice Baril to ‘...set him straight’ on matters relating to his mission, Dallaire was ‘...not content to stand by and watch the heavens darken while consoling himself that his mandate precluded doing what he could to stop the catastrophe.’³⁹⁴ In other words, Rwanda has come to serve as an ideological affirmation of liberal-internationalism, proof that the West must intervene more rather than less in Africa.³⁹⁵ The consequence of this has been a thoroughly political shift towards developing regimes of domestic surveillance of societies such as Rwanda—as embodied, as we saw briefly in Chapter Three, in the ‘early warnings’ and ‘preventative diplomacy’ that is the preserve of the UN’s Department of Political Affairs.

In contrast to this view, this account of the United Nations and Rwanda seeks to stress the depth and breadth of the organisation’s involvement in the territory from its time as a Belgian trusteeship to current conflagrations in Eastern Congo. It suggests that it is more meaningful to view the relationship between Rwanda and the UN as closely connected from the start: after all, the organisation played the role of guardian during Rwanda’s journey to independence, and since, has sought to protect and buffer the sanctity of this nation-state through the care of various waves of refugees in the region and the monitoring of its borders. Later, when the country was ushered down the path of neo-liberal state-society transformation and regime change, the UN was on hand, again, to help the territory through its labour pains. As a result, the structural roles of the UN in managing various changes in Rwanda can be seen as consistent with the UN’s wider functions in post-1945 world order management in the periphery. Rwanda is in many ways a typical example of the range of associations that many post-colonial states have had with the UN.

But above all else perhaps, the story of United Nations intercession in Rwanda reflects the degree to which UN officials have replaced their erstwhile colonial colleagues as the arbiter of the ‘native question’. From sitting as evaluator of progress towards self-rule and ultimately independence at a distance in New York, or even on annual ‘Visiting Missions’, to the gritty task of holding-the-ring between competing local elites seeking to take charge of a society in neo-

³⁹⁴ Reiff, *A Bed for the Night*, pp.158-9. The OAU’s report into the Rwandan genocide contends that Baril wanted to keep Dallaire—the ‘cowboy’—on a ‘tight leash’. OAU, *International Panel of Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events* (Addis Ababa: OAU, 2000), Chapter 13, paragraph 38.

³⁹⁵ As Dallaire concludes: ‘As soldiers we have been used to moving mountains to protect our own sovereignty...In the future we must be prepared to move beyond national self-interest to spend our blood for humanity...No matter how idealistic the aim sounds, this new century must become the Century of Humanity...*Peux ce que veux. Allons-y.*’ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, p.522.

liberal transition, Rwanda underlines clearly the advance of an international regime of indirect governance to which some less fortunate societies have become subject. Peacekeeping operations during the 1990s in Rwanda and elsewhere—with doctrines of consent, impartiality and neutrality—have been a central if often a gravely unsuccessful facet of this regime.

UN Trusteeship and the emergence of the Hutu power republic

It is rarely recalled other than in passing that the United Nations has had a long and tenuous relationship with the territory of Rwanda dating back to its period as a UN Trust Territory. This is surprising considering not only the functional objectives of the UN trusteeship of Ruanda-Urundi, but also the way in which, in practice, this affiliation inadvertently helped foster an environment of intense violence and conflict in the former kingdom that was part and parcel of the social ‘revolution’ of 1959 and beyond. Here the UN not only played the preliminary role of catalyst for social and political modernisation in the territory but also became deeply involved in the complex and contested politics of this particularly troubled transition to independence. Put more generally, what this episode ultimately underlines is the deep historical association of the UN with nation-building and social transformation in Rwanda and the way in which these intercessions have turned on occasion horribly askew.

Initially, the United Nations played an important role in seeking to transform the organisation of social life in the kingdom. This primarily entailed the attempt by the Trusteeship Council—through triennial Visiting Missions, petitions, resolutions and general discussion—to push the Administrating Authority (Belgium) down the path of liberalising political, social and economic life.³⁹⁶ This was promoted under the generic trusteeship banner of the ‘advancement’ of indigenous populations to a certain standard that would enable eventual self-governance.³⁹⁷ In Rwanda the nature of this programme is brought into sharp relief because of the extreme form of social organisation that existed in the kingdom and relied upon by the colonial powers for indirect rule. Here the feudal relationship that existed between Tutsi and Hutu—in which the minority Tutsi aristocracy governed the majority of the mainly Hutu peasant population through cattle

³⁹⁶ There were five UN Visiting Missions to Ruanda-Urundi: 1948; 1951; 1954; 1957; and 1960. This does not include a number of special ‘commissions’ established by the General Assembly in various resolutions to carry out tasks such as monitor events in Ruanda-Urundi and supervise elections in September 1961.

³⁹⁷ The term ‘advancement’ was used to structure the progress reports of visiting missions: i.e. after an outline of a missions itinerary, reports then typically divided into: ‘Political Advancement’, ‘Economic Advancement’, ‘Social Advancement’, ‘Educational Advancement’, and then finally, ‘Dissemination of Information About the UN’.

(Ubugake) and labour (Ubugereetwa) clientship—was an early and obvious target for modernisation by United Nations Visiting Missions in 1948 and 1954.³⁹⁸ These feudal institutions were rightly seen as fundamentally contrary to the organisational principles and values of a post-1945 world, in which a world of modest nation-states simply provided the regulatory framework for private wage-labour market economies.³⁹⁹ The UN preference then, was for the modernisation of social life in the kingdom by removing the extra-economic instruments from subsistence production and exchange.

To a large extent, this was achieved fairly quickly: the Ubugake was formally eradicated in a series of decrees and announcements by the Belgian authorities and Tutsi king (Mwami) between 1951 to 1954 in anticipation of, and in response to, UN Visiting Mission exposure of the issue.⁴⁰⁰ For example, the UN's 1954 Visiting Mission to Rwanda was the occasion for a declaration by the Mwami and Conseil Supérieur (High Council) of the '...progressive suppression of the *ubugake* contracts'.⁴⁰¹ In fact the UN representatives were guests of the Mwami during this 'historic meeting', of which they noted in their Trusteeship Report—perhaps a bit too keenly—that:

‘The whole matter had been discussed with seriousness and civic responsibility, and the decision was taken by a body mainly composed of *shebuja* [patrons], who by their own action undermined the essential basis of their dominant social position.’⁴⁰²

³⁹⁸ Simply put *Ubugake*, cattle clientship, involved the lease of a cow from a patron to a client. The client would gain the milk of the cow (and any off-spring) and in return would provide a host of services to the patron. In practice, of course, this was a far more nuanced and complex process with a whole range of social implications—for example, for the few wealthy Hutu's with their own cattle the issue of *Ubugake* was an absolutely vital one for if they did not engage a patron then their own cattle remained unprotected. Conversely, though, by accepting a cow from a patron a client was putting any cattle owned by himself into the hands of the patron. *Ubugereetwa*, on the other hand, was a form of clientship that was far less complex, and reciprocal, in that it simply compelled Hutu men to perform menial tasks for local chiefs. During the colonial period these practices seemed to become much more fixed by Belgian legislation, and by some accounts, much harsher. Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, pp.134-141. On these forms of clientship as a target of modernisation by UN Visiting Missions see, again, Newbury. *Ibid.* p.145.

³⁹⁹ See especially the questionnaire (reproduced in Lemarchand's *Rwanda and Burundi*) that was put to local Hutu peasants by a Visiting Mission delegate in which issues of wage-labour versus forced labour are raised. Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.123.

⁴⁰⁰ Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, p.145.

⁴⁰¹ T/1168: United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territories in East Africa, 1954: *Report on Ruanda-Urundi*, paragraph 69.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.* paragraph 72.

In practice of course, Ubuguhake continued up until the social revolution of 1959 because of the loopholes in the decree, and due to the simple fact that the vast majority of (Hutu) peasants relied upon access to their patrons land for pasture.⁴⁰³ Besides, as Catharine Newbury has pointed out, Tutsi rule was cemented through a variety of other processes that became salient during the colonial period such as privileged access to secondary education.⁴⁰⁴

Nonetheless, these 'reforms'—including the official abolishment of forced labour clientship, the Ubureetwa, in 1949—were primarily a result of growing UN criticism of the Administrating Authorities and its failure to 'advance' the social position of the indigenous population of the territory.⁴⁰⁵ This was also the case with relation to the territories 'political advancement', which was a constant source of UN condemnation. Here, UN Visiting Missions habitually reminded the Belgian authorities of their responsibilities vis-à-vis political development. The 1954 UN report contained many statements to this effect:

'The mission considers that urgent and serious attention should...be given to speeding up the political education of the people by granting them increasing doses of political power and responsibility and by other positive measures such as adult education, democratisation of the indigenous authorities, adult suffrage, education for direct elections etc.'⁴⁰⁶

The fact that this had been a '...regrettably low priority' for the Belgian Administrators led the UN Visiting Mission to suggest and the General Assembly to eventually endorse a call on Belgium to set a 'timetable' and 'targets' for the attainment of independence.⁴⁰⁷ General Assembly Resolution 1413 (XIV) adopted on 5 December 1959 included the following operative paragraph:

'2.Invites the Administrating Authorities to formulate...early successive immediate targets and dates in the fields of political, economic, social and educational development

⁴⁰³ Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, p.146; and Mamdani, *When victims become killers*, p.114.

⁴⁰⁴ Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*, p.146.

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid. p.145; Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.79; Mamdani, *When victims become killers*, p.115.

⁴⁰⁶ UN Visiting Mission, 1954, *Report on Ruanda-Urundi*, paragraph 131.

⁴⁰⁷ Ibid. paragraph 129 and 133.

so as to create, as soon as possible, favourable conditions for the attainment of self-government or independence.⁴⁰⁸

Interestingly, the view of such a timetable as held by the 1954 Visiting Mission was quite expansive—all agreeing that while ‘three to four decades’ of ‘tutelage’ was unnecessary it was ‘within the bounds of possibility’ that Rwandese may be capable of self-rule in ‘...twenty to twenty-five years’.⁴⁰⁹ What this attests to—apart from the vagaries of human foresight of course—is the store that UN officials placed upon the prerequisites for a transition to modern nation-states. This was clearly much more than a matter of setting-up the structures of a state—a police force, army, diplomatic corps, legislator—it was also a matter of modernising African societies. Crucially in the Rwandan context, this entailed the dismantling of feudalism and ‘backwardness’, and its replacements with a political and economic system that allowed for the full development of the ‘...composite personality of the African’ necessary for ‘democratic way of life’.⁴¹⁰ As some UN conflict resolution specialists are beginning to rearticulate in our current global governance context, UN officials then believed earnestly that the implantation of democracy in African societies would be a protracted process of advancement and education by enlightened and benevolent authorities.⁴¹¹

As it turned out, such an idealised largely Western vision of societal transformation in the territory was derailed by political developments on the ground that saw the UN’s involvement in the territory turned essentially upside down. In fact it would seem that the very zeal with which the UN approached the issue of advancement in the territory helped foster a sense of militancy and urgency in Hutu political groups fearful that change would largely entail the end of colonialism but not the end of Tutsi over-lordship.⁴¹² At first of course, UN Visiting Missions gave Hutu political parties the opportunity to rally support and increase pressure for democratic change. The official reports of these Visiting Missions are full of descriptions of crowds of Hutu peasants lining the roads of their routes with placards and banners such as: ‘Abas le colonialism

⁴⁰⁸ UN General Assembly Resolution 1413(XIV), 5 December 1959.

⁴⁰⁹ UN Visiting Mission, 1954, *Report on Ruanda-Urundi*, paragraph 133.

⁴¹⁰ Ibid. paragraph 130. Hence the importance attached to education by the UN Trusteeship reports and discussions.

⁴¹¹ See, for a recent example of conflict resolution specialists beginning to advocate far more thorough forms of ‘advancement’, Paris, *At War’s End*, pp.179-212.

⁴¹² Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.190.

Tutsi. *Democratie D'abord Independence*'.⁴¹³ And, as is well known, the Bahutu Manifesto ('Notes on the social aspects of the racial native problem in Rwanda') was produced precisely to help influence the 1957 Visiting Mission towards recognising the internal '...political monopoly which is held by one race, the Tutsi...'⁴¹⁴ But as change proceeded under the encouragement of the UN, the major political group of the Mwami and the Tutsi (UNAR) began to push for immediate independence from Belgium essentially to forestall further indigenous social or political reform.⁴¹⁵ This was clearly confirmed—to the Administrating powers as well as the Hutu majority—during a UNAR rally in September 1959 in which one of the major speakers, Rukeba, stated:

'The whole of Africa is struggling against colonialism, the same colonialism which has exploited our ancestral customs in order to impose alien ones upon us. The goal of our party is to restore these customs, to shake off the yoke of Belgian colonialism, to reconquer Rwanda's independence. To remake our country we need a single party, like UNAR, based upon tradition and no other ideology.'⁴¹⁶

The consequences of such a position adopted by the leading Tutsi political group was immense. After all, until this time, the local colonial powers had instituted their indirect rule in the colony through support of a Tutsi aristocracy and its racial feudal system. Indeed, the entire edifice of this system of racial preference for the Tutsi had been put together and then internalised into the institutions of the state (such as in education, labour laws and state administration) by the Belgian authorities and the Catholic church.⁴¹⁷ By declaring outright opposition to Belgian rule, UNAR provided the backdrop for local colonial authorities reversing their original 'native' policy of ruling through the feudal system of Tutsi privilege, and placing their support for the republican aspirations of Hutu parties.⁴¹⁸ This was dramatically demonstrated during the disturbances of November 1959—which saw Belgium commit itself to revamping political structures—and ultimately in January 1961, when Belgium discreetly helped facilitate the PARMEHUTU coup

⁴¹³ UN Visiting Mission, 1960, *Report on Ruanda-Urundi*, paragraph 14; see also some interesting photographs of Hutu protest during Visiting Missions reproduced in Newbury, *Cohesion of Oppression*.

⁴¹⁴ Mamdani, *When victims become killers*, p.116.

⁴¹⁵ UNAR: union nationale rwandaise.

⁴¹⁶ Rukeba cited in: Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.159.

⁴¹⁷ Mamdani, *When victims become killers*, p.88

⁴¹⁸ Of course, Belgian authorities were also cognisant of the growing tide of popular (Hutu) resistance to the feudal system that they had constructed. By switching sides to the PARMEHUTU, the Belgian Authorities hoped to sacrifice its Tutsi proxies (the monarchy) in return for retaining influence in the country in a post-independence era.

d'état in Gitarama, where a declaration of a republic and provisional government was announced.⁴¹⁹

The upshot then of early efforts by the UN to provide for some accelerated transmission of liberal modernity to Rwanda was the creation of a radically transformed balance of forces within the territory. The former guardians of colonial rule, the Tutsi monarchy and aristocracy, which had come under sustained attack by the forces of modernisation in the form of the UN, turned on Belgian colonialism as a way of protecting their privileged order. The Hutu now became aligned to the Administrative Authorities and together they pressed—contrary to both their previous positions—for accelerated independence. In such a situation, the UN held fast to the modernising principles that it had consistently pressed for. And once again this involved the doctrine of gradualism and consensual politics. So after the disturbances of November 1959—when a great deal of Tutsi chiefs were replaced by the Belgian Special Resident with Hutu ones and the first wave of political (Tutsi) refugees had fled the country—the UN took the view that this was contrary to the spirit of liberalisation that was supposed to be under way. Here the UN demanded an ordered and sequenced process of liberalisation, now including the repatriation of political refugees, prisoner amnesty, and freedom of political association (all by now largely Tutsi). This was shown principally in UN General Assembly 1579 (XV) on 20 December 1960, which sought to set out the necessary conditions before national elections were conducted (crucially urging their delay from January 1961 to later that year).⁴²⁰ Apart from suggesting that a national reconciliation conference be held before these elections (quickly arranged between 7-12 January 1961 in Ostend) the resolution set-up a three man commission to oversee and supervise the conduct of the elections, attend the 'national' conference, and monitor general developments in the territory.⁴²¹ Ultimately it was this resolution that gave the impetus to instigators of PARMEHUTU's January 1961 coup d'état in Gitarama, who were by now deeply suspicious of the intentions of such a delay, of a national conference, and of generally increased outside interference by the UN.⁴²²

Even after the coup, the first to occur in a Trust Territory, the UN persisted in demanding a formal, organised and legitimated transition to independence. Indeed, General Assembly Resolution 1579 (XV) was followed by Resolution 1605 (XV) in April 1961, which castigated

⁴¹⁹ PARMEHUTU: parti du mouvement de l'émancipation hutu.

⁴²⁰ UN General Assembly Resolution 1579 (XV), 20 December 1960.

⁴²¹ UN Year Book 1960 (New York: UNDPI), p.457.

⁴²² Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.190.

the authorities for not providing for the ‘...necessary conditions and atmosphere for the conduct of the national elections’ and especially its ‘...de facto recognition...of governmental bodies which were established by unlawful means and which cannot be regarded as fully representative of all segments of the population in the absence of free and fair election on the basis of direct universal adult suffrage.’⁴²³ These points, among others, were clear references to the Belgian support of the PARMEHUTU coup and its continued suppression of other political tendencies.⁴²⁴ The resolution even went as far as demanding the return of the Mwami and the conduct of a referendum on the future of the monarchy to be held alongside legislative elections in September 1961.

The Belgian government in Brussels acceded to some of these demands for reasons relating essentially to its continued diplomatic clash with the UN membership and establishment over the secession of Katanga in the Congo.⁴²⁵ As the General Assembly demanded, legislative elections and a referendum on the monarchy were finally held in September 1961 under UN supervision. The results were of no surprise with PARMEHUTU returning 77% of the vote in the legislative elections, and 80% of the electorate voting for the abolition of the monarchy in the referendum.⁴²⁶ While the UN commission monitoring these elections noted that they were generally free, they concluded that the pre-election environment was seriously prejudicial to free political expression.⁴²⁷ Most observers would agree with René Lemarchand’s conclusion:

‘Given the circumstances, the outcome of the UN-supervised legislative elections of September 1961 was a forgone conclusion. They merely confirmed the de facto supremacy of PARMEHUTU, while the referendum on the question of the mwami officially abolished a regime that had already been overthrown.’⁴²⁸

What this necessarily brief and general overview of UN trusteeship has sought to highlight is just how involved the UN has been from the outset in the transmission of liberal modernity to Rwanda. The organisation—contrary to common wisdom—was absolutely central in Rwanda’s journey to formal sovereign independence, consistently playing advocate for social and political modernisation and ‘advancement’. This entailed much more than simply providing for the formal

⁴²³ UN General Assembly Resolution 1605 (XV), 21 April 1961.

⁴²⁴ UN Year Book 1960, p.461.

⁴²⁵ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.191.

⁴²⁶ UN Year Book 1961, p.486.

⁴²⁷ Ibid.

⁴²⁸ Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, p.196.

institutions and symbols of the state and liberal democracy; it included, rather unremarkably for the time, a project for advancing the indigenous population beyond the feudal system of which they were part. This was the real and emphatic 'civilising mission' that colonial authorities had often hollowly declared. Admittedly, the UN did not achieve its objectives in many important respects: social and political reforms, when carried out, were typically superficial; an ordered transition to independence was precipitously interrupted by a revolution and then a coup; and elections, when finally conducted, seemed to simply ratify a new racial dictatorship. And this is to say nothing of the redundant but persistent attempts of the UN to force political union between the administrative units of Ruanda-Urundi.⁴²⁹

And yet most of these 'failings' simply underline further the importance of the nascent UN regime in the story of social transition for post-colonial territories. Indeed the other equally salient aspect of this episode, one that the UN is perhaps anxious to set aside, was the way in which UN intercession in the territory helped transform the political dynamics of the kingdom to such an extent that it set in motion the events that led to both the 1959 'revolution' and the 1961 PARMEHUTU coup d'état. This is mostly because it waded into the politics of the kingdom and provided fodder for the emerging Hutu elite seeking justice and equality with the Tutsi—here as we have seen the UN transformed the comfortable world in which Tutsi rule had been secured, creating an imperative for the Mwami's party (UNAR) to forge an anti-colonialist but traditionalist platform. It is precisely because of the UN's initial effectiveness in instigating social change that events began to unravel as and when they did. For better or worse, the UN was a force in Rwanda's transition from a world of empire to a world of nation-states.

As we will now go on to see, half a century later the UN became once again deeply involved in the business of managing social change in Rwanda. Only this time it was far more intrusive and micro-managed than in the 1950s and 1960s, overseeing the liberalisation of the polity. And remarkably enough, the very early success of this peculiarly contemporary form of the 'advancement' of Southern societies was to unfold, yet again, into a high level of violence and conflict.

⁴²⁹ The United Nations Trusteeship Council was of the opinion that Rwanda and Burundi should assimilate into one state after independence. After much pressure the UN managed to arrange a conference in Addis Ababa on the potential for unity between the two countries. But both Rwanda and Burundi were against such a union—a United States of Rwanda and Burundi as one proposal put it—even though they agreed to some form of monetary and customs union (which in the event turned-out to be very short-lived). Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi*, pp.86-87.

UN peacekeeping and Rwanda's transition to market-democracy

More than any other event in Tropical Africa, the Rwandan genocide and civil war of 1994 has received the most 'outside' attention. Commentators and analysts from every conceivable corner of human inquiry have turned *en masse* to describing and accounting for the violent events of 1994. The world of conflict resolution and international studies has been particularly active in this regard with new articles, monographs and edited volumes produced regularly on every facet of the crisis from the role of the media to intelligence gathering in the United Nations.⁴³⁰ The common image of UN peacekeeping in Rwanda in this literature is overwhelming one of poorly armed and equipped 'Blue Helmets' who were unable and in some cases unwilling to help forestall the carefully calibrated plans for genocide in the country.⁴³¹ It is regularly recalled here that apart from being instructed to help evacuate foreign nationals (largely European of course), UN peacekeeping contingents became helpless and passive actors in the unfolding civil war and genocide.⁴³² The charge is not only that the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was hopelessly understaffed and resourced for a rapid reaction to the violence, but that great-power and bureaucratic indifference to this Central African country led to a wholesale policy of delay and procrastination in the corridors of power and decision-making in Washington and New York that made an effective response all but impossible.⁴³³ Ultimately, the UN is seen to have abandoned Rwanda. As Dallaire laments in his very personal chronicle of the encounter:

'I know that I will never end my mourning for all those Rwandans who placed their faith in us, who thought that the UN peacekeeping force was there to stop extremism, to stop the killings and help them through the perilous journey to a lasting peace. That mission, UNAMIR, failed. I know intimately the cost in human lives of the inflexible Security Council mandate, the penny-pinching financial management of the mission, the UN red tape, the political manipulations and my own personal limitations. What I have come to realize as the root of it all, however, is the fundamental indifference of the world

⁴³⁰ Like conflict resolution literature more generally, a significant proportion of the material on the international dimensions of the Rwandan episode have been produced by some of the main UN participants in the crisis. For example, Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, Khan, *The Shallow Graves of Rwanda*, and Henry K. Anyidoho, *Guns Over Kigali* (Accra: Woeli Publishing Services, 1999).

⁴³¹ For example: Reiff, *A Bed for the Night*, pp.155-62; and Power, *A Problem From Hell*, pp.329-45.

⁴³² Lindsey Hilsum writes: 'The UN's main failure in Rwanda...may have been moral rather than military. Despite pleas from the heads of UN agencies in Kigali, UN secretary-general...refused to allow the evacuation of Rwandan staff working for UN agencies.' Lindsey Hilsum, 'Settling Scores', *Africa Report*, vol.39, issue 3 (May/June 1994), p.13.

⁴³³ The most comprehensive and cogent account of UN 'indifference' is by Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*.

community to the plight of seven to eight million black Africans in a tiny country that had no strategic or resource value to any world power.⁴³⁴

At first glance there is much logic to such a narrative. After all, if the record of the UN during the genocide is traced back to the immediate diplomatic context of its deployment and subsequent operation then it appears clear that the UN had reached the 'high-point' of its post-Cold War interventions in Mogadishu, and was now experiencing a rapid and US instigated era of 'roll-back' in its peace activities.⁴³⁵ From this perspective, an increasingly belligerent US approach to peacekeeping as a result of the death of 18 US Rangers in Somalia can be linked to the meagre resources and rigid Rules Of Engagement (ROE) applied to the Rwandan operation. If there was any doubt as to the veracity of the new found US and UN temperance with relation to its peace operations, then the machinations of the Security Council in the immediate days and weeks following the outbreak of the violence on 7 April 1994 is taken by commentators as the final and damning proof of the new illiberal climate sweeping the Western world.⁴³⁶

And yet there is something profoundly parochial—even ethnocentric—about this type of account. It is as if there should be no questioning of the specificity of UN activities in the country, or admission that the organisation (as we have seen in detail) has a long and ignominious pedigree of interceding in the politics of Rwanda dating all the way back to the Trusteeship period. It is also as if UN 'second-generation' peacekeeping operations such as UNAMIR were not in and of themselves deeply invasive instruments of international regulation. These silences of mainstream Rwanda literature has helped foster a rather uncritical narrative of the UN and Rwanda and helped downplay some simple but salient points. First, as we shall see, UNAMIR was in many regards a standard UN operation deployed to oversee a standard peace accord—deigned like many others of the period to provide for a transition in state structures as well as possible regime change. Second, as opposed to nominally involved, the UN was in actuality an actor that was caught-up deeply with pushing and prodding the parties down the line of liberalisation through a variety of diplomatic means. And as it happened this was a major contributory factor in the polarisation of Rwandan politics and society in late 1993 and early 1994. Finally, this involvement, as we discussed in Chapter Three, was part-and-parcel of a transformation of the

⁴³⁴ Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil*, p.6.

⁴³⁵ The policy of 'tough love' instituted by the Clinton Administration is, again, most cogently expressed by Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide*, pp.33-43.

⁴³⁶ For an extensive account of the unfolding of diplomatic events in the UN Security Council, see: Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, pp.111-114, pp.152-167.

United Nations itself towards peace operations, which were expanded and refocused around the promotion of what was labelled 'good internal governance' within Southern societies. In this, the UN was rediscovering its 'comparative advantage' of overseeing social change in periphery. But while in a colonial and feudal Rwanda this comprised of an attempt to modernise social life in the territory, in the 1990s this was crucially about redefining the polity through a process of political liberalisation and a change in the incumbent regime of President Juvénal Habyarimana and the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND).⁴³⁷

The transition to multiparty democracy and liberal market economy had begun in Rwanda following a combination of exogenous pressures that included the collapse of the Second World, a shift in French foreign policy towards promoting democratisation in Africa, and the onset of a guerrilla war that had been launched by second-generation Rwandan Tutsi exiles in Uganda (the Rwandan Patriotic Front, RPF).⁴³⁸ Initially, however, the pace of liberalisation was set by economic reforms conducted under IMF and World Bank Structural Adjustment loans in 1990 and 1991, which saw aid tied to a typical package of macroeconomic measures. These included, among others, fiscal stabilisation policies (reduction of government expenditure and subsidies to state enterprises and coffee producers), tight monetary policies (interest-rate rises), removal of price controls, privatisation of state enterprises, the lifting of trade tariffs and other protectionist measures, and the introduction of fees for public services such as health and education.⁴³⁹ They also included provisions more specific to the Rwandan context, for example promoting free 'internal' labour migration.⁴⁴⁰

In line with a revised division of labour among multilateral organisations at the international level, these economic reforms were seen as the preserve of the Bretton Woods Institutions and were treated—for the most part anyway—as distinct from the liberalisation of the political 'space'.⁴⁴¹ Indeed, during the early 1990s Western development aid to Rwanda in general was

⁴³⁷ In 1991, this single party was re-named: Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRNDD).

⁴³⁸ For accounts of the origins and development of the RPF, see: Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, pp.159-234; and Ogenga Otunna, 'Rwandese Refugees and Immigrants in Uganda', in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (eds.), *The Path of a Genocide: the Rwanda crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, pp.3-29.

⁴³⁹ Andy Storey, 'Economics and Ethnic Conflict: Structural Adjustment in Rwanda', *Development Policy Review*, vol.17, no.1 (1999), pp.45-6.

⁴⁴⁰ Uvin, *Aiding Violence*, p.58.

⁴⁴¹ Ibid. p.45. But as we will see, there was an important exception to this 'separateness' of economic and political liberalisation in July and August 1993.

kept separate from issues of political liberalisation and negotiations with the RPF.⁴⁴² This 'separateness', however, has in the post-1994 Rwandan genocide context come to be seen as a significant topic of concern for aid agencies not only because of the way that economic aid and reforms served to exacerbate ethnic tensions in the country, but also because of the fact that aid was not utilised as a lever to reign in the Rwandan government and forestall the deteriorating political and security situation.⁴⁴³ To a large extent, it was recognised by practitioners that overseas development aid could and should be much more systematically coordinated and harnessed for helping progress political liberalisation—and not simply economic liberalisation—and for moderating the actions of certain Southern elites.⁴⁴⁴ Indeed within the UN system, while the general division of labour remains, there has developed much more synchronisation across various agencies in terms of the release or withholding of aid, and with the establishment in the World Bank of a conflict resolution unit designed to assess the political impact of its economic loans and projects.⁴⁴⁵

In so far as efforts to reform the political space, and to resolve a guerrilla conflict that was taking an increasing toll on the Rwandan economy and society were concerned, the pace of negotiations and liberalisation was much more protracted than the economic sphere, with a complex interplay of domestic, regional and international political issues and actors.⁴⁴⁶ It is suffice to note here that with relation to the external environment the Habyarimana regime was put under immense pressure to negotiate with the RPF—through their intermittent military advances and the less than subtle nudges of various patrons, especially France and the US, for Rwanda to enter such a process.⁴⁴⁷ These factors among others led the Habyarimana regime to engage in a protracted period of negotiations with the RPF over a package of protocols that dealt with: the rule of law; the functioning and sequencing of a Broad-Based Transitional Government; the repatriation of refugees; the future of the army, the gendarmerie and a call for a 'Neutral International Force' (NIF); and other 'miscellaneous' provisions including a timetable for implementation. These

⁴⁴² Regine Andersen 'How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda' *Third World Quarterly*, vol.21, no.3 (2000), pp.441-2.

⁴⁴³ Uvin points out that development aid was only withheld, suspended or reduced on a couple of occasions by Western aid agencies. Uvin, *Aiding Violence*, p.90.

⁴⁴⁴ Andersen, 'How multilateral development assistance triggered the conflict in Rwanda', p.453 and Uvin, *Aiding Violence* pp.236-8.

⁴⁴⁵ See: <www.worldbank.org>.

⁴⁴⁶ For a good account of this process, see: Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, pp.159-234.

⁴⁴⁷ On international pressure on the Government of Rwanda to negotiate with the RPF, see: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Report no.2 1992: Rwanda, pp.19-20; and Herman Cohen, *Intervening in Africa: Superpower Peacemaking in a Troubled Continent*, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), pp.170-2. On the RPF invasion of Rwanda, see: Prunier, *The Rwandan Crisis*, pp.93-108, pp.174-192.

protocols concluded in August 1993—commonly known as the Arusha Accords—constituted a complete package of political reforms that would see the one-party state transformed into multiparty democracy and plural society within a period of 22 months.⁴⁴⁸ As Bruce Jones has innocuously put the matter:

‘The deal laid out, in rich and complete detail, the basis for a new order in Rwanda, one based on the rule of law, on democratic processes, and on the rights of refugees and returnees.’⁴⁴⁹

In essence, the Accords were pushed upon Habyarimana and represented, politically, an overwhelming defeat for his regime.⁴⁵⁰ While this was a result of a successful offensive launched by the RPF in February 1993, which threatened to bring about the immediate collapse of the regime had it not been for French military support, it was also because the ‘international community’ put pay to any final reticence of Habyarimana to sign-up to the Arusha Accords by an extraordinary threat to cut off World Bank and Western funding if there was no accord.⁴⁵¹ In any case, the content of the Arusha Protocols underscored the humiliating defeat of the regime and held-out in its provisions the gradual transfer of power from Habyarimana and the ruling MRNDD to ‘...other political forces in Rwanda’.⁴⁵² It was, for some, ‘une paix militaire.’⁴⁵³ For a start, Habyarimana would remain in office with the establishment of the ‘broad-based transitional government’ until national elections but would have many of his powers transferred to the Prime Minister.⁴⁵⁴ It is significant too that the RPF was able to force a power-sharing model on the transition period, which guaranteed the rebel movement and opposition parties portfolios in the Transitional Government and ‘Deputies’ in the Transitional National Assembly before any

⁴⁴⁸ The Arusha Protocols reproduced in: *The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996* (New York: UN DPI), pp.169-201.

⁴⁴⁹ Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p.92.

⁴⁵⁰ As Herman Cohen has put it: ‘As I left office in April 1993, my analysis of the Rwandan conundrum was less concerned about possible extremist action by the Hutu-dominated regime than by a slow and insidious return of minority Tutsi control, a throwback to preindependence days’. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.176. On why Arusha was a defeat, see: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (JEEAR) *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management* (Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, 1996), pp.26-28.

⁴⁵¹ As reported in Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story* (London: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p.124.

⁴⁵² Article 2 (a), Annex VI: Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing, The Arusha Protocols.

⁴⁵³ Cited in: JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, p.26.

⁴⁵⁴ On the exact provisions, see: Annex VI: Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing, The Arusha Accords. See too, JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, p.25.

elections that may well have favoured the incumbent party.⁴⁵⁵ Certainly, it was unlikely that the RPF would have gained such a strong representation in executive or legislative had any democratic elections actually taken place.⁴⁵⁶ Moreover, the portfolios allotted to the RPF were taken as a sign of the balance of power shifting in favour of the exiled rebels—given Rwanda and Burundi's history this was especially the case with relation to the Ministry of Interior.⁴⁵⁷ But perhaps most humiliating from the perspective of the establishment was the agreement on the integration of armed forces, which saw a 60:40 split in favour of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) but a 50:50 split on all officer positions with the RPF.⁴⁵⁸

This then was the immediate context in which the negotiation, authorisation and deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda took place. While the UN was not directly responsible for the peace accords—as is occasionally the case—the organisation began to pay much more attention to the negotiations from early 1993 when the prospect of a UN force was raised. In fact the UN was initially requested by the Ugandan and Rwandan governments in February 1993 to deploy an observer mission between their borders in order to monitor the ceasefire and verify that the RPF were not crossing freely from Uganda into Rwanda. This was finally authorised by the Security Council in May 1993 (S/RES/846) and formed the basis of the United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR). It is from this period that the UN began to monopolise peace activities, with the OAU and its peacekeeping force gradually sidelined by Boutros-Ghali. Incidentally, this OAU force—the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG)—which was deployed in 1992 in Rwanda to monitor a 'buffer zone' between the RPF and FAR was the first *internal* peacekeeping force that the regional organisation had deployed and represented an attempt by secretary-general Salim Salim to transform its priorities, in-line with global trends, towards issues of internal governance (formalised with the establishment of the OAU Conflict Resolution Mechanism).⁴⁵⁹ In the Rwandan context it was an effort that was short-lived due to a lack of resources and logistics, which were requested from Boutros-Ghali and the Security

⁴⁵⁵ On the division of posts and deputies see Arusha Protocols: Protocol of Agreement on Power-sharing (continuation of the Protocol of Agreement signed on 30th October 1992).

⁴⁵⁶ It should be recalled here that RPF was unpopular with a great deal of the Rwandan population. Indeed, every offensive that the RPF launched led to the systematic emptying out of those areas under its control. Commentators have attributed this to a variety of factors including: government and media propaganda; abuses perpetrated on occasion by the RPF; and a RPF military policy of depopulating areas in order to put pressure on the GOR.

⁴⁵⁷ Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p.210.

⁴⁵⁸ JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, pp.25-26; Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, pp.210-12.

⁴⁵⁹ JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, p.24.

Council in March 1993 but rejected on the grounds that operational ‘...command and control’ must lie with the UN.⁴⁶⁰

In any event, the UN DPA had an observer at Arusha from March 1993 onwards and contributed to several ‘technical’ discussions relating to the modalities of the peace accords.⁴⁶¹ And even though the UN had held out on a commitment to send a peacekeeping operation until September 1993 when secretary-general Boutros-Ghali commended it to the Council, by the time the accords were signed it was clear that the UN would be called upon to provide a supervising role.⁴⁶² Indeed, the protocol on the integration of armed forces signed on 3 August 1993 contained the main provisions relating to the possibility for a UN operation under the title ‘The Neutral International Force’ (Annex VI, paragraph 2 of the Arusha Accords). This paragraph called for a UN force to help ‘...assist in the implementation of the Peace Agreement’ particularly as it related to the monitoring of the cease-fire and the quartering, demobilisation and integration of armed forces.⁴⁶³ It was anticipated that in due course the UN would supervise national elections at the end of the transition period.⁴⁶⁴

The broad parameters of UN action therefore were focused on political and military issues. This formally entailed helping provide for a transition in state structures—particularly the army and the gendarmerie—and monitoring the ceasefire. In terms of specific tasks, there were, of course, important nuances. Many accounts for example stress the difference between the request of the Arusha Protocol for the UN to ‘...guarantee the overall security of the country’ and the final UN Security Council Resolution (S/RES/872, 1993) authorising UNAMIR, which limited this to: ‘...contribute to the security of the city of Kigali, *inter alia*, within a weapons secure area established by the parties...’. While this was indeed an important distinction, it was quite normal for the UN to rework its own authorisation given that the mission was always going to be a standard Chapter VI operation (i.e. governed by consent and neutrality). Phrases such as ‘...guarantee the overall security of the country’ would imply and entail a Chapter VII enforcement operation. Much is also made of the delay in deployment that UNAMIR faced and

⁴⁶⁰ Ibid. p.27. At one point the OAU had optimistically envisaged filling the role of the NIF. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p.104.

⁴⁶¹ S/26350, 24 August 1993: ‘Further Report of the secretary-general on Rwanda, concerning the Arusha Peace Agreement and the possible role of the United Nations in its implementation’; and Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p.75.

⁴⁶² JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, p.28.

⁴⁶³ Annex VI, paragraph 2 of the Arusha Protocols.

⁴⁶⁴ Paris, *At War's End*, p.72.

the reduced number of troops available for the operation. With relation to troops, it is regularly recalled that the reconnaissance mission to Rwanda in August 1993 scaled down its initial troop number assessment from 8,000 to 4,500 peacekeepers.⁴⁶⁵ Knowing that even this figure would be too much for some Security Council members to consider (namely the US), the Secretariat further reduced this number in its recommendations to 2,548.⁴⁶⁶ In the world of conflict-resolution this process has been labelled 'self-censorship', a practice which has seen the Secretariat's DPKO and Executive Office (EO) learn to tailor reports and requests to the Security Council according, in the language of that well-worn phrase, to '...what the traffic will bear'.⁴⁶⁷

But what needs to be stressed is that this was not unusual or out of the ordinary. In fact this was a process that the UN was well used to from the Congo in the 1960s to Angola in 1992.⁴⁶⁸ It is rather the case that operations such as those in Somalia and South West Africa were the anomaly—extraordinarily well funded, equipped and staffed.⁴⁶⁹ The process of deployment too was not out-of-kilter with what was normally the case with standard UN peace operations. The Arusha Accords had initially called for the deployment of UN troops within 37 days. This was an unrealistic request given the need to assess the situation (August 1993), obtain authorisation for the mission (5 October 1993), find willing troop contributors for the operation (August–November 1993), and finally deploy (October 1993–February 1994). In fact, if the UN was far from efficient and judicious in UNAMIR's deployment then it was at least relatively timely in this regard.

All of this becomes even clearer if the UN's involvement with Rwanda is compared with that of its neighbour Burundi during the same period. Here, following the assassination of Burundi's first democratically elected President in October 1993, inter-communal violence erupted and was brutally put down by the army. With an estimated death toll of between 50,000 and 100,000 Burundians and the creation of 800,000 Hutu refugees (mostly displaced to Southern Rwanda),

⁴⁶⁵ Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to Tell the Story*, p.131; Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p.110; JEEAR, *Study II: Early Warning and Conflict Management*, p.36.

⁴⁶⁶ S/26488, 24 September 1993: 'Report of the secretary-general on Rwanda, requesting establishment of a United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) and the integration of UNOMUR into UNAMIR.'

⁴⁶⁷ The Brahimi Report (A/55/305-S/2000/809), paragraph 59.

⁴⁶⁸ For example, as we will see in the next chapter, it is often suggested by commentators that during the Bicesse peace process in Angola (1991–92), the UN mission (UNAVEM II) was funded on a 'shoe-string'.

⁴⁶⁹ The UN peace enforcement mission in Somalia (UNOSOM) was an experimental form of peace operation. And even though it had important implications with relation to the rise of liberal-humanitarian discourse, and for the rationalisation of concepts of conditional sovereignty in the South, the particular form that it took (Chapter VII enforcement) has yet to be repeated by the UN elsewhere.

UN secretary-general Boutros-Ghali dispatched a special representative to Burundi to head a small diplomatic mission.⁴⁷⁰ The Burundian mission was to help restore democracy, facilitate dialogue, and establish a commission of inquiry into the October massacres.⁴⁷¹ For these tasks a three-member team running on an operational budget of \$1,000 a day was considered an ample international response.⁴⁷² The comparable figures for Rwanda in early 1994 was 320 civilian staff and 2,548 peacekeepers with a total operational budget of \$1.2 million per day.⁴⁷³ This is not to say that the Burundi operation is directly analogous with the one in Rwanda; on the most basic of levels UNAMIR was a peacekeeping operation while Burundi was a new breed of 'preventative missions' run by the DPA. But what even the briefest of contrasts makes obvious is that the UN mission to Rwanda was a significant and weighty operation for the UN to undertake—whether in the 'illiberal' context of October 1993 or more generally.⁴⁷⁴

What it also helps underline is the specificity of the UN-Rwanda operation, designed and deployed not to forestall violence *per se* but to help micro-manage the transition in state structures and regime. UNAMIR was more about supervising the assembly of a new political order than 'good-offices'. Indeed, as we have already seen, the functional objectives of the UN mission must be viewed in the context of a peace accord that was primarily structured to initiate regime change. The UN's role was to help guarantee and facilitate this change by supervising the integrity and implementation of the transition (especially the military and political side of this process) between elites and political institutions. To a very large extent this is also borne out by the way in which the UN mission functioned in practice from its deployment in October 1993 onwards. Here, UN activities and behaviour not only show that the world body was deeply as opposed to nominally involved in interceding in the politics of the country but also that its representatives were principally concerned with pushing and prodding the regime at all costs

⁴⁷⁰ The experiences of these Hutu refugees—in fact, of the Burundian Hutu more generally—reinforced the perception of the Rwandan Hutu population of the insidious nature of Tutsi power in the region. After all, the democratic experiment in Burundi, in which decades of minority Tutsi dictatorship was finally supplemented by the inauguration of a democratically elected Hutu president, ended in a Tutsi coup and army pogrom against the population. This tended to reinforce the belief in Rwanda that the Arusha process was simply a victory for the RPF.

⁴⁷¹ Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. *Burundi on the Brink 1993-95: A UN Special Envoy Reflects on Preventative Diplomacy* (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 2000), p.38.

⁴⁷² Ibid. pp.39-40.

⁴⁷³ Ibid. p.40. The cost of UNAMIR from 5 October to 4 April was \$51,120,000 gross (\$50,478,000 net). S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: 'Second Progress Report of the secretary-general on UNAMIR for the period from 30 December 1993 to 30 March 1994, requesting an extension of its mandate for a period of six months, paragraph 44'.

⁴⁷⁴ A point made to me by a former UN special representative. Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 21 September 2001.

down the path of liberalisation. It is only once this has been discerned that it becomes possible to identify the way in which UNAMIR, like its distant Visiting Mission ancestors, helped polarise an already volatile society to such an extent that the deployment of violence became a logical strategy for a great number of the Rwandan citizenry.

But at first glance it is easy to overlook the implicit bargain that an incumbent government enters into with the UN when a peacekeeping operation is agreed and then deployed. It is, for a subject government, an acceptance of the UN's right to comment publicly on domestic developments, to enter into a wide variety of dialogues with various forces in the polity and, perhaps most significantly, to submit the state to some form of supervision and possible censor by the UN Security Council. It is in short an endeavour that transforms the subject government's balance of considerations significantly. In the Rwandan context, this is important to bear in mind when thinking about the nature of UNAMIR and the behaviour of UN officials because most accounts implicitly assume that these types of operations are politically unproblematic and unobtrusive—that UN deployment had no inherent political import. In this regard it should be recalled that the regime of Habyarimana accepted UN peacekeeping troops as a necessary alternative to defeat on the battlefield and increasing international isolation. The Arusha Protocols were a negotiated surrender for his regime and harbinger of an impending transformation of the polity. In its dealings with the regime, the UN as a whole was conscious of this dynamic and adopted a logical approach of tying a continuation of the operation with attendant progress in the implementation of transitional institutions. If the Habyarimana regime behaved appropriately, and earnestly implemented its political commitments, then the secretary-general and the Security Council would endorse further UN services in the country. If, however, the regime pursued an evasive strategy vis-à-vis the process of liberalisation then the UN would consider constricting and reducing UN involvement. Hence, abandoning an increasingly isolated and beleaguered Government of Rwanda to its fate on the battlefield.

This was a logic that was applied fairly consistently by the UN throughout the deployment period in a variety of diplomatic contexts, with an especially active role assigned to UN officials on the ground charged with micro-managing the process. Here UN officials were not only supposed to authenticate the implementation of provisions but also, where need be, pressure parties down the path of liberalisation through threats of withdrawal and the like.⁴⁷⁵ This became quite a desperate

⁴⁷⁵ This is why there is so much misunderstanding regarding the requisite role of UN officials in the country—especially as it relates to Roméo Dallaire and 'early warnings' of impending genocide in

effort once the security situation began to deteriorate significantly in January 1994 with an array of diplomatic initiatives and demarches presented to Habyarimana to expeditiously establish the transitional government. In fact, if the secretary-general's Reports to the Security Council on UNAMIR during this period are read closely—and for that matter other official UN documents—it becomes evident just how involved a process this actually was. This is especially the case following the failure of Habyarimana to secure the establishment of transitional institutions in December 1993, when incremental pressure from the UN system began to be put upon Rwanda. In January 1994, for example, the secretary-general wrote a letter to Habyarimana setting out, in characteristic fashion, the UN position:

‘As far as the commitments Rwanda has made to the international community are concerned, you are not unaware that the Security Council, in its resolution 893 (1994) of 6 January, strongly urged the parties to...comply fully with the Arusha Peace Agreements...and in particular to establish a broad-based transitional government at the earliest opportunity in accordance with this agreement. Moreover, the Council stressed that continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation by the parties of the Arusha Peace Agreement.’⁴⁷⁶

Such a letter merely reflected the outward culmination of a variety of diplomatic activities. In his report to the Security Council of 30 March 1994, the secretary-general recounts an assortment of initiatives undertaken by his representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, to secure the establishment of transitional institutions from arranging all party-consultations to encouraging the president to comply with the Arusha provisions.⁴⁷⁷ During this time too, the Security Council

Rwanda. Here, Dallaire's enthusiasm to proactively investigate reports of arms caches and disarm militias was seen by the UN establishment as far too brash (particularly as it relates to the January 1994 'genocide fax' which is frequently taken as forewarning of the genocide). It is simply the case that Dallaire was seen as jeopardising the incremental diplomatic approach to pressuring the regime that was being pursued by UN Special Representative Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, DPKO and the secretary-general. For example Dallaire asked DPKO for permission to carry-out arms retrieval operations and more resources on: 11 January, 22 January, 2 February, 15 February (with SRSG Booh-Booh), 27 February, and 13 March. Human Rights Watch, *Leave None to the Tell the Story*, pp.147-71.

⁴⁷⁶ 'Letter dated 27 January 1994 from the secretary-general to the President of Rwanda expressing concern over delays in establishing a transitional Government and national assembly in Rwanda' Reproduced in: *The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996*, p.242.

⁴⁷⁷ Boutros-Ghali urges Habyarimana to establish a transitional government by telephone on 14 January, 24 February and by letter on 27 January. Special Representative Booh-Booh convenes 'all-party consultations' for attempts to establish a BBTG on 7,10,13,25,26, and 27 February 1994. S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: paragraph 4-22.

underlined the secretary-general's position with, for example, a blunt statement demanding implementation in February 1994:

'The Security Council, taking note of the fact that the President of Rwanda has been sworn in as the interim Head of State, encourages him, in the context of that responsibility, to continue his efforts for the speedy installation of the other transitional institution...the Security Council calls the attention of the parties to the consequences for them of non-compliance with that provision of the Agreement. It notes that UNAMIR will be assured of consistent support only if the parties implement the Arusha peace Agreement fully and rapidly.'⁴⁷⁸

But after a protracted period of attempting to increase the pressure on the regime to establish the transitional institutions, Habyarimana and other political forces within Rwanda continued to draw out the process in a variety of ways and for a variety of reasons.⁴⁷⁹ Every gesture of international pressure was met by provisional agreement by the President on the date for the establishment of the institutions—on December 31, January 5, February 14, 22 and 23, and March 25.⁴⁸⁰ After these targets came and passed, it was left to the secretary-general to turn-up the pressure on the regime by noting in his March 30 report that:

'My special representative and I have stressed to the Rwandese political leaders that, without the early establishment of the broad-based transitional government and the Transitional National Assembly, it would be difficult to affirm sufficient progress has been made in the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement to warrant the continued support of the international community.'⁴⁸¹

In essence, the secretary-general was ratcheting-up the threat of withdrawal by moving from simply recalling the conditions upon which the continuation of operation was premised as seen by the Security Council, to suggesting explicitly that he might not be able to recommend the continuation of the operation. In the event this remained just a threat with Boutros-Ghali

⁴⁷⁸ S/PRST/1994/8, 17 February 1994: 'Statement by the President of the Security Council expressing concern over delays in establishing a transitional Government and the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda'.

⁴⁷⁹ On the domestic struggles that Habyarimana was facing during this period and partly as a result of external pressure to liberalise, see: Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp.127-206.

⁴⁸⁰ S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: paragraphs 4-22.

⁴⁸¹ Ibid. paragraph 10.

concluding that because the parties ‘...maintained the process of dialogue’ he was willing on this occasion to recommend the extension of UNAMIR’s mandate for a further six months.⁴⁸² The Security Council however was much less sanguine—considering that practical pressure was now called for in their relations with Habyarimana. Indeed, in Resolution 909 (1994) of 5 April 1994, the Security Council cast aside the secretary-general’s conclusion and authorised the continuation of the mission for a further period of only four months and then only if the secretary-general reported within six weeks that transitional institutions had been established and sufficient progress made.⁴⁸³ It was a calculated move designed to increase international pressure on Habyarimana and demonstrate that the Security Council was serious in its conditions for deployment.⁴⁸⁴ In an informal Security Council meeting the day before the vote, the US in particular argued that UNAMIR should be shut-down if transitional institutions were not set-up—a threat that was finally carried out on 21 April 1994 when the Council voted in the midst of a vast amount of organised bloodletting to reduce the mission, evacuate foreign nationals, and abandon the regime to the RPF.⁴⁸⁵

Of course this line of policy was perfectly consistent with past ultimatums and postures of both the secretary-general and the Security Council. It was one that recognised the fragility of the regime’s existence and the wider power political transformations underfoot in the country. Here the policy of pressure was one intended to ensure that Habyarimana live-up to his commitments to dismantle fully the one-party state, devolve real political authority to ‘representative institutions’ and allow an exiled guerrilla group a significant slice of power in the polity. It was one that saw the increased political and ethnic violence in the state, and felt that these were the last gasps of a fading and anachronistic dictatorship.⁴⁸⁶ With the establishment of an assembly and government, it was widely agreed within the UN in New York that the ‘security situation’ would improve and the ‘...provision of more effective assistance to the population in need’

⁴⁸² Ibid. paragraph 48.

⁴⁸³ S/RES/909 (1994), 5 April 1994.

⁴⁸⁴ Informal Security Council Meeting Minutes, UN Headquarters New York, 4 April 1994. Made available to me by Linda Melvern.

⁴⁸⁵ Informal Security Council Meeting Minutes, UN Headquarters New York, 4 April 1994.

⁴⁸⁶ Violence was becoming widespread and seemingly systematic from January 1994 onwards. The UN DPKO was made aware of such a situation by Dallaire on: 6 January (Code Cable MIR 39) and 2 February (Code Cable MIR 267). But most infamously, Dallaire sent Code Cable 67 (11 January 1994), titled ‘Request for Protection for Informant’, which has since been labelled by Phillip Gourevitch as the ‘Genocide Fax’. Philip Gourevitch, *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families* (New York: Picador USA, 1998), p.103.

met.⁴⁸⁷ But by pushing and prodding the Habyarimana regime relentlessly down the path of implementation, the Security Council and secretary-general played a central role in polarising social and political relations in the country—helping inspire perhaps the initial outbreak of violence on 7 April.⁴⁸⁸

Whatever the actual sequence of events and consequences of particular UN actions, it seems broadly clear that the UN had an important impact on the way in which events unfolded in Rwanda in 1993 and 1994. Not only was the UN an actor tasked with micro-managing neo-liberal change in the country, but the organisation also had a particular position vis-à-vis the method for achieving such change. And perhaps fatefully, considering the impact of past UN forays in the territory, such a task and position helped foster a climate of fear and violence in Rwanda that culminated in such large-scale death and destruction.

Post-colonial Rwanda and the United Nations: from trusteeship to neo-liberal transformation

When looked at from the broader vista of Rwanda's post-colonial journey it is clear that the United Nations has been an important player at several critical junctures in the territory's history. As we have seen, the UN was seminal in shaping two transitions in the territory—from colonialism to self-rule and ostensibly from a one-party state to multiparty polity. By way of conclusion, therefore, it seems worthwhile underlining some of the more striking continuities and discontinuities of these encounters.

For our purposes, there are perhaps two noteworthy symmetries with relation to the 'transition' operations examined above: the role of transmitter of Western liberal modernity that the UN assumed with relation to social developments in the kingdom and then in the Hutu Republic; and the position of indirect arbiter of the 'native question' that the organisation—rather disastrously as it has turned out—has willingly and occasionally unwilling taken-up. In the first instance, the UN clearly and unambiguously set out in its relations with the Administrating Authorities during the 1940s and 1950s to promote and foster the general 'development' of Rwandan society and the progressive liberalisation of public life. The notions of 'advancement' and 'modernisation' were

⁴⁸⁷ S/1994/360, 30 March 1994: paragraph 9. And S/PRST/1994/8, 17 February 1994. Except of course Dallaire, who felt that more active and forceful measures to guarantee the security situation were called for.

⁴⁸⁸ An opinion also tentatively expressed by: Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, pp.213-14; and Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p.114.

the cornerstones of this policy of liberalisation, with UN Visiting Missions constantly evaluating 'progress' in various spheres. While in the early 1950s it was economic life under the scrutiny of Visiting Missions keen to erase all feudal, extra-economic, forces in society, in the late 1950s attention switched to 'political development' and educational opportunities in a bid to open-up the territory's public life and help provide the prerequisites for eventual self-rule. And in the 1990s, the UN again took up a liberalising mantle in Rwanda by agreeing to supervise a formal transition from a dictatorship to a liberal market democracy. To this end, the UN deployed a significant peacekeeping force and engaged in a variety of diplomatic measures to earnestly promote an agenda of democratisation that largely entailed pressuring the regime to establish representative transitional institutions.

To be sure there are many important and varied differences in this liberalisation venture. The least that can be said here is that while Visiting Missions took a broad and somewhat elastic view of its 'advancement' of Rwandan society, from economic to educational, in the early 1990s the UN was solely concerned with liberalising the political kingdom along very specific lines. In this regard, the UN's activities in Rwanda were reflecting a revised and renewed division of labour with relation to international organisations in the 1990s that saw various activities farmed-out to the 'relevant' specialist institutions (even if this was not as clear and consistent in each and every case). While the IMF and World Bank were charged with transforming the economic regulatory framework of the Rwandan state, the UN was mandated to oversee the political transformation of the country according to prevalent models of formal liberal democracy.

The second notable symmetry between the two transitions is that they outline, in rough form, a type of indirect international governance that borderland societies have occasionally been subject since their emergence from colonialism. This is to say that both the 'trusteeship' and 'multidimensional peacekeeping operations' that Rwanda has been subject, represent complex forms of external intervention and intercession. During trusteeship, the modest and largely distant surveillance of Ruanda-Urundi by the UN meant that the organisation had a central—it could be argued divisive—role in the polity. This was clearly seen in the way the UN helped change (by design and indirect implication) the balance of forces in the territory during the 1950s towards the Hutu peasant majority. When the Trusteeship Council tried to reverse some of the more unpleasant and radical transformations that ensued (from the social revolution of November 1959 to the PARMEHUTU coup in January 1961), the UN was far less successful. Nonetheless, events during this latter period can be read as a protracted struggle on the part of PARMEHUTU to

extricate itself from the provisions and proclamations of the UN in New York seeking to reverse the unauthorised abolition of the monarchy and declaration of a Hutu Republic. As noted earlier, the UN was seminal in Rwanda's journey from a European colony and kingdom to a one-party republic. This influence can also be discerned in the 1990s, where the UN can be seen to have had a lethal impact on the calculations of various domestic and regional political forces. This is not least because the peacekeeping force, and the scrutiny of the secretary-general and the Security Council, were all primed towards encouraging the Habyarimana regime to cede power through an organised and (theoretically) peaceful transition. Hence the obsessive preoccupation of UN officials with the swift establishment of a 'broad-based transitional government' and assembly.

In these encounters then, the UN was a principal—albeit deeply ineffectual—arbiter of the native question. Here the organisation had some implicit position on the question of who rules and under what conditions in Rwanda in both the 1950s and 1990s. These are reflected in the actions and deeds of UN officials and remain consistent, for the most part anyway, with the wider structural role of the UN in promoting liberal modernity in the periphery. And yet there is one noticeable and important distinction between these instances of managing post-colonial affairs in Rwanda, which relates to the scope and extent of UN intercession. UN oversight in the 1950s was from a distance and limited to infrequent Visiting Missions, Trusteeship resolutions, and debate. While these activities had enormous import on political developments in the territory, they remained far less involved and intrusive than their 1990s peacekeeping relatives. Indeed, UNAMIR was an endeavour whose scale and ambition was way beyond its Visiting Mission precursors. It involved a great deal of technical capacity from organising quartering and demobilisation sites to helping train the gendarmerie. All at the same time as observing the integrity of borders, buffer zones, weapons-free areas, and the 'security situation.' But more than anything else perhaps it entailed UN officials deployed permanently on the ground micromanaging the process and pushing the Rwandan parties towards implementation and liberalisation. It was, in many respects, much more 'hands-on'.

What all this goes to show is that it is practically meaningless to view UN intercession in Rwanda, and in the region more generally, as either nominal or neutral. Not only has the UN been involved in the Rwandan nation-building project from the late colonial era, but its 1994 peacekeeping operation was particularly intrusive. And this is to say nothing of the UN's continued engagement in the region, with peacekeeping in the Congo, 'preventative' diplomacy in Burundi, and a UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda established—in Arusha of all

places—to put on trial the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide. In these ways, it is hard to overlook the seminal role of the UN in the political development of Rwanda through the decades, and now the sub-region, and avoid the conclusion that the territory has intermittently been part of the UN's shifting remit for managing a post-colonial world.

Chapter 6

Manufacturing Peace in Angola: The Lusaka Protocol and the standard of UN peace operations

‘We’ve brought the horse to water, now it’s up to them to make it drink’ UN official on the wind down of UNAVEM III (‘Angola: its not over yet’, *Africa Confidential*, vol.38, no.4, 14 February 1997).

‘The United Nations came to Angola at their explicit request and can be proud of what it accomplished. It has brought four years of relative peace, the longest such period Angola has ever enjoyed since its independence. However precarious and imperfect that peace may have been, UNAVEM III and MONUA provided to the Angolan parties ample political space in which to reach a peaceful solution and achieve national reconciliation...History of course, will pass judgement on the reasons for which this unique opportunity was missed. In the meantime, however, the parties and their leaders must assume full and direct responsibility for the suffering of their people.’ Kofi Annan (S/1999/49, 17 January 1999).

The functions of UN peace operations in Southern Africa

For all practical purposes this statement by the UN secretary-general to the Security Council in early 1999 ended a decade of troubled UN peacekeeping in Angola. In effect, a long and tenuous struggle to restore UN credibility in the face of an earlier UN peacekeeping fiasco in Angola in 1992 and elsewhere, in the Balkans, Rwanda, and Somalia came to a bitter, albeit rather belated end in this low-key report of the secretary-general.⁴⁸⁹ Resigned to monitor Angola from the sidelines, the UN’s misfortunes in the country were masked only by the near-universal belief that the war was impossible to resolve given the malevolence of the *Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola’s* (UNITA) leader, Jonas Savimbi, and the availability of valuable natural resources to sustain the conflict. No matter what the UN had done, most commentators agreed, UNITA was bent on the total capture of the Angolan state:

⁴⁸⁹ UN exit from the country was belated because the Government of Angola had withdrawn its support for MONUA, and had formally requested its dissolution: S/1999/49, 17 January 1999.

‘Savimbi is a...man of towering arrogance and of uncontrollable rages...parliaments and power sharing are of no interest to him.’⁴⁹⁰

Whatever the veracity of this common belief, it has nevertheless helped conceal the remarkable political story of the UN’s engagement in the country, and the region, and some of the general dynamics exogenous to Angola that drove UN policies.⁴⁹¹ The objective of this chapter, in line with the previous two chapters on Somalia and Rwanda, is to provide a broader context and framework in which to situate and understand this particularly protracted and unhappy UN encounter with micro-managing post-colonial affairs in Southern Africa. In order to do this, the chapter begins by highlighting some of the historical functions of the UN’s operations in the country—especially how they fitted into wider projects of world-order management during the early 1990s—and then goes on to explain in detail how, in practice, these roles were interpreted and put into effect by the UN during the third and by far the largest of the organisation’s peace operations in Angola, during the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III) and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

In the first instance, it is argued that the UN’s engagement with Angola must be seen as part and parcel of a wider attempt to realign the political economy of the entire region along liberal-capitalist lines. On the broadest level, this included a long-overdue transition to independence for the territory then known as South West Africa (a former UN Trust Territory), a transition from a minority white regime to a liberal market democracy in South Africa, and a managed end to war and insurgency and a transition from Afro-Marxism to free-market liberalism in the other Southern African Lusophone state, Mozambique. Here, the historical record makes plain the fact that the first national peace accords in Angola were imposed upon the parties by the US and represented only one element of a comprehensive effort to fully integrate the entire sub-region into the liberal capitalist system. From this perspective, therefore, the historic and structural role of the UN has been to help manage aspects of this transition in various ways, at various times,

⁴⁹⁰ David Birmingham, ‘Orphans of the Cold War: Angola’s People’, *African Affairs*, vol.96, no.384, p.443. This opinion has been reinforced since Savimbi’s death in 2002. See, for one example: ‘The Late Jonas Savimbi’, Jeremy Harding, *The London Review of Books*, vol.24, no.6, 21 March 2002.

⁴⁹¹ For literature that examines UN peace operations from a technical and problem-solving perspective see: Vladimir Krška, ‘Peacekeeping in Angola (UNAVEM I and II)’ *International Peacekeeping*, vol.4, no.1, (1997), pp.75-97; Assis Malaquias, ‘The UN in Mozambique and Angola: Lessons Learned’ *International Peacekeeping*, vol.3, no.2 (1996), pp.87-93; Norrie MacQueen, ‘Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.36, no.3 (1998), pp. 399-422; Anthony G. Pazzanita, ‘The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.29, no.1 (1991), pp.83-114; Anthony W. Pereira, ‘The Neglected Tragedy: the Return to War in Angola, 1992-3’, *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.32, no.1 (1994), pp.1-28.

and in various places. Indeed, among other things, the UN helped administer South West Africa's transition to independence in 1990, presided over a large civilian and military peacekeeping operation between 1992 and 1994 that formally delivered Mozambique into the fold of nascent liberal market democracies, and helped monitor national elections in South Africa in April 1994.⁴⁹² In Angola, where as we will see events went seriously askew, over a ten year period the UN made numerous attempts to entrench a liberal order.

The first UN engagement with Angola, however, began with the deployment of a small mission that was tasked with implementing a long standing US and apartheid South African foreign policy preoccupation of removing the sizable and militarily accomplished contingents of Cuban armed forces from Angola. Essentially, the UN accepted the linkage created by the US between South Africa's handover of South West Africa and Cuba's withdrawal from sovereign Angola, and deployed a small mission of military observers between 1989 and 1991 to oversee and verify the process of Cuba's retreat as part of the general settlement leading to Namibian independence. After the successful implementation of this relatively straight-forward and in some ways 'traditional' military observer role, the UN was enlisted by the US, USSR and Portugal to maintain and then expand its presence in Angola and carry out different tasks that related to the implementation of a negotiated settlement which had been brokered between the warring parties in the country by the above 'troika' in the Portuguese town of Estoril in 1991 (commonly known as the Bicesse Accords). The role of the UN was to verify the demobilisation of fighters and their integration into a unified Angolan army and, crucial for the legitimacy of this externally imposed peace process, validate a formal transition of political systems and very possibly of political elites by observing the 'free and fair' conduct of national elections. Euphemistically termed by high officials at the UN as '...a small and manageable operation', UNAVEM II was primarily produced to provide legitimacy to a peace process sponsored, managed and imposed by outside powers, and was designed, through its oversight of national elections, to provide a symbolic representation of the Angolan state's transition from Afro-Marxism to a liberal market

⁴⁹² In South Africa the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOSA) played an important role in assessing the conduct of the electoral process. By 17 April 1994, for example, there were 2,120 UN observers in the country. United Nations, *The United Nations and Apartheid*, p.118. In Mozambique, the UN was drafted in to play a significant role in the implementation of the Rome Accords (4 October 1992). Indeed, chastened by failure months earlier in Angola, the special representative and UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) were given central roles in the management of the process, which at its height saw the deployment of 6,576 military staff and 1,087 civilian staff. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.323, p.725.

democracy.⁴⁹³ But despite the limited, albeit highly symbolic, role that UNAVEM II actually played in this peace process, when it collapsed in October 1992 the organisation was saddled with much of the blame simply because of its high profile and public association with the elections and demobilisation process.

It is in this context that the third and most significant UN operation (UNAVEM III) was deployed in Angola in order to put-back on track a settlement broadly conceived to shore-up and secure a client neo-liberal regime and its writ over the country. In this instance, unlike previous encounters, the major powers subcontracted to the UN the lead role and resources for delivering a settlement in Angola. Indeed, it could be said that with UNAVEM III the UN was finally given an opportunity to redeem itself as a competent and semi-autonomous agent of world order management in the South after the peacekeeping and peace enforcement fiascos of the early 1990s. It is the UN's management of this important operation that the second part of the chapter examines in detail. Here it is argued that the UN, desperate for a success in its peace operations and keen to re-establish its managerial capacity, especially in Africa, went to great lengths to ensure that the Lusaka Protocol, signed in late 1994, and its attendant peace operation, UNAVEM III, would not be derailed. This objective, it is suggested, was sometimes pursued at any cost. In particular: Security Council preconditions relating to the deployment of first, UN observers, and second, UN peacekeepers, were disregarded; infidelities relating to the quartering and demobilisation of UNITA's forces were constantly overlooked; and violations of the ceasefire and in the trade of arms by both sides were ignored. These features of UN policy went hand-in-hand with a protracted period of intense UN mediation with the parties that epitomised the whole of the implementation process. Such intensive shuttle diplomacy, a policy as it will be recalled that UN managers explicitly objected to in Somalia, reflected a deep commitment to micro-manage the political process and, in the end, manufacture progress at any cost. The chapter concludes by suggesting that this hands-on policy of stage-managing every facet of the Angolan peace process reflected an attempt by the UN to forge an informal peace operations doctrine of coercive diplomacy—that is, one that respected the formal prerequisites of peacekeeping operations such as consent, neutrality and impartiality, but within these parameters, utilised to the

⁴⁹³ The term '...small and manageable operation' was used consistently by senior UN officials in relation to UNAVEM II, and has since been made renowned by Dame Margaret Anstee and her use of the term to denote her experience as UN special representative to Angola during this period. Margaret Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War: The Inside Story of the Collapse of the Angolan Peace Process, 1992-3* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p.32.

maximum the various diplomatic and bureaucratic tools at its disposal to impose progress on local political elites and bind them into internationally constructed settlements.

In order to understand the nature of UN peacemaking in Angola it is necessary first to place these activities in the wider historical and regional context in which they were first developed. This is not least because UN activities in Angola in the 1990s were only one integral part of a larger project of reordering the entire region along more conventional state-society lines. The UN's role and function in this remarkable transition was largely—but not wholly—limited to formally validating and legitimising such change towards the end of these externally imposed processes. That is, the UN was only inducted into the process of managing change in Southern African states once agreed settlements had been achieved on various issues. Among other important roles, these included overseeing Namibia's transition to independence in 1990, verifying a Cuban withdrawal from Angola by 1991, and validating a liberal peace settlement in Angola in 1992 and Mozambique in 1994.

Managing transition in a 'bad neighbourhood'

In the post-World War II era, Southern Africa increasingly came to be seen as an abnormal region of the Western world order. This world order, as already discussed, was one that was generally and loosely structured around the universalisation of modern nation-states and a private liberal world economy. In Southern Africa, however, decolonisation was far more protracted than elsewhere—with Portugal seeking to keep hold of its large settler colonies in Angola and Mozambique well into the 1970s—and the white-minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia refusing to define a majority of their population as citizens or equal subjects. And while for some time these were not necessarily unfamiliar arrangements in other European empires, or indeed if compared to race and class relations in the US itself, from the late 1970s the issue became one of increasing political—and economic—urgency. This urgency was not simply a result of the fact that the model of social organisation that white minority regimes represented was increasingly an anathema to the needs and wants of global capitalism and the sensitivities of Western public opinion—although as time went on this was ever more important—but it was also because in Lusophone countries indigenous and external forces had eventually managed to bring down Portuguese rule and establish alternative socio-economic development programmes and political systems that were invariably defined against both Western liberal capitalism and white minority rule. There was also the matter of the last outstanding colony of South West Africa on the

continent—a Trust Territory assigned to South Africa after World War I by the League of Nations that was eventually terminated by the UN in 1966 but which continued under de facto control from Pretoria. It was in this broad context that war and conflict in Southern Africa, between states and between various social and political forces within states, became such a troublesome and endemic feature of the region and, as importantly, marked it out as a key global ideological and political battleground throughout the 1970s and 1980s.⁴⁹⁴

In all of this early period the UN endeavoured to act as a progressive agent for change in the region. Indeed when the UN was driven by radically alternative visions of world order in the 1960s and 1970s in particular, the organisation produced a steady stream of resolutions and programmes designed to bolster the legitimacy and diplomatic capacity of indigenous resistance movements and frontline states in their struggle against apartheid.⁴⁹⁵ Here, the Special Committee Against Apartheid and the Centre Against Apartheid were established in 1963 and 1976 respectively to contribute to these ends.⁴⁹⁶ Specialised agencies of the UN system played their part too—with the ILO, UNESCO, and UNCTAD all contributing to the anti-apartheid campaign.⁴⁹⁷ More conventionally, and in-line with its original functions, the UN also engaged itself in a protracted legal struggle with South Africa over the future of the ex-German colony of South West Africa. At first the General Assembly pushed to no avail for the territory to be formally placed under its supervision. Later the UN Security Council (especially under the influence of those Western states known as the ‘Contact Group’) established the parameters of an eventual settlement for the territory and its transition under UN and South African supervision to independence in Resolution 435 (1978). This landmark document represented one part of Western efforts to resolve several issues of the region throughout the 1980s and eventually resulted in the establishment of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which partially administered Namibia’s orderly move to independence in 1990.⁴⁹⁸ But beyond the resolutions and declarations of support of a diminishing General Assembly and its related committees and

⁴⁹⁴ It is in this context that Dr. Chester Crocker, former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs and architect of the highly activist regional strategy of ‘...changing things’ that the US embarked upon in 1981, euphemistically labelled the region a ‘bad’ and ‘rough neighborhood.’ Crocker, *High Noon*, p.456.

⁴⁹⁵ Among many others, see the following landmark UN General Assembly resolution on Apartheid: Resolution 2627 (XXV) passed on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the UN, which declared Apartheid a crime against humanity.

⁴⁹⁶ See Chapter Two.

⁴⁹⁷ For example ILO member-states voted to eject South Africa from the organisation in 1961—even though there was no procedure in the ILO statute that provided for such a measure. As a result, South Africa continued to send delegates to the ILO.

⁴⁹⁸ UNTAG would supervise the South African administration of the transition of Namibia to its independence. S/RES/435 (1978).

programmes, the UN was locked out of any meaningful dialogue or process of instigating change in the region. Of course, the UN was seminal in the anti-apartheid and sanctions campaign, and its resolutions on Namibia provided the accepted international normative framework for any future settlement. But its ability to participate in any regional process was ultimately blocked by the US, which had its own specific vision for a satisfactory regional settlement that excluded the strident economic nationalism of the General Assembly's pronouncements.⁴⁹⁹ It would not be until the UN was more disciplined and focused around its specialised tasks of peace operations and supervised more closely by the Security Council—a process that as we have seen was initiated towards the end of the 1980s—that the organisation would be entrusted with some perfunctory roles relating to the endorsement and legitimisation of US engineered settlements in the region.

In order to grasp this US vision for the region it is useful first to quickly review some of the contradictions of its Southern African policies that administration officials hoped to iron-out. Here, the least that can be said is that the standpoint of the US during this period was a complex and nuanced one. On the one hand it supported Namibian independence but, on the other, only if it was not likely to be led by an Afro-Marxist regime.⁵⁰⁰ In South Africa, successive US administrations were appreciative of Pretoria's anti-communist actions in the region and within the country but, at the same time, were dismayed by the way in which the old guard refused to adapt to changing economic and political realities. And as far as Angola was concerned, the US was happy to diplomatically and materially sponsor conservative guerrilla forces within the state and endorse South African adventurism for as long as the incumbent regime remained formally outside the liberal world system, and Cuban troops continued to bolster the MPLA from its internal and external opponents. But simultaneously, private corporations in the US were quite content to purchase petroleum and do business with the regime, and diplomats at the US State Department were often shuttling in and out of Luanda opportunistically seeking some form of hasty exit for Cuban troops from the region without offering anything of much consequence in return.

⁴⁹⁹ Of course South Africa was also steadfastly opposed to any UN role. As Crocker relates, but with absolutely no sense of irony or self-reflection: 'A long history of pro-SWAPO pronouncements and activities (including the General Assembly's 1977 endorsement of SWAPO as "sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people") had severely compromised the United Nations' standing as a decolonizing agent.' Crocker, *High Noon*, p.39.

⁵⁰⁰ Forward by George P. Shultz, in Crocker, *High Noon*, p.12.

It is in this general environment then that the US embarked from the early 1980s on a strategy of what one prominent State Department diplomat intimately involved in the process, Dr Chester Crocker, considered as moving the 'planets' into '...perfect alignment' for a set of interlocking settlements in the region that would be more in-sync with US principles of world order.⁵⁰¹ The end product for US 'grand strategy', according to the same diplomat, was that this and other 'bad neighbourhoods' must be '...more effectively linked to the global system'.⁵⁰² With South Africa a policy of 'constructive engagement' was developed that was apparently to encourage some form of internal reform among 'modernisers' while essentially cashing-in on the rewards of Pretoria's activism in the region.⁵⁰³ Most strikingly with respect to the latter, the US developed a policy of linking South Africa's withdrawal from South West Africa with a Cuban exit from Angola. This policy of linkage had numerous advantages for the US and its allies. Not only would a successful linkage rid the region of South Africa's only serious conventional military adversary, it would also remove one critical source of support for the MPLA and certain factions within it.⁵⁰⁴ Furthermore, the independence of Namibia—conducted under US terms—would remove a significant irregularity from the organisation of the Western world and deprive Washington's enemies in the South and East of one potent source of ideological and political fodder.

But the process of diplomacy and negotiations that eventually secured this linkage and agreement was protracted, in the end spanning most of the 1980s. At first, the various parties still had a range of diplomatic and military options open to them—while South Africa still hoped to indefinitely retain South West Africa and believed for some time that it could decapitate the Angolan regime, the MPLA still aspired for an outright military victory against UNITA and searched for the capacity to protect its sovereignty. It was only when the South African Defence Forces (SADF) began to suffer serious military setbacks in Southern Angola at the hands of Cuban forces in the late 1980s and the Angolans and Cubans began to count the financial cost of large-scale military deployments (combined of course with the tantalising prospect of securing once and for all UNITA's southern heartlands when the SADF withdrew from first Angola and then South West Africa) that the various regional elements were in place for the US to secure the deal. Indeed, the US had precisely been working to manufacture this type of correlation of

⁵⁰¹ Crocker, *High Noon*, p.18.

⁵⁰² Ibid. pp.465-6.

⁵⁰³ Ibid. p.75.

⁵⁰⁴ Ibid. p.388.

forces—for example ensuring that UNITA would not or could not be defeated by supplying the group with emergency arms if and when it was in difficulty.⁵⁰⁵

Once reached, the settlement itself was relatively straightforward to implement: the Brazzaville Protocol signed in December 1988 provided for the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola over a 27 month period and the transition to independence of South West Africa a year after the process was formally initiated.⁵⁰⁶ But in order to ensure for the US and Apartheid South Africa the veracity and legitimacy of the process of Cuban withdrawal from the region, the UN was enlisted to deploy a small observer mission to monitor the incremental stages of troop withdrawal from Angolan air and sea ports and their general movement towards the centre and north of the country.⁵⁰⁷ For Crocker, the architect of the entire process, UNAVEM I's main utility was actually ensuring the legitimacy of the linkage as opposed to its verification skills per se:

‘It was not the United Nation’s capacity to conduct verification that impressed Pretoria. Rather, the proposal further legitimised Cuban withdrawal as an integral part of the settlement [on Namibia].’⁵⁰⁸

Following the successful and timely withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and Namibia’s transition to independence, there was a widespread belief among the international community, particularly in the US, that Angola’s internal situation could now be fully addressed. This feeling was a result of a variety of factors that were serving to place extreme pressure on the Angolan regime to reform. In the first place, as far as war and insurgency in the country were concerned, the US refused to halt aid to UNITA or recognise the Angolan state, until the MPLA conducted and concluded negotiations with UNITA on equal terms.⁵⁰⁹ At first, the MPLA and Cuba had attempted to exchange an end of US aid to UNITA in return for Cuban withdrawal but the US coyly declined to include this leverage until the issue of Angola’s domestic settlement was on the agenda.⁵¹⁰ In fact in the late 1980s a staged policy of incremental normalisation of relations with

⁵⁰⁵ Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.99.

⁵⁰⁶ The Brazzaville accords incorporated two previously agreed documents: the New York Principles (July 1988) and the Geneva Protocol (August 1988). Namibian independence was actually declared at midnight 21 March 1990. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.203.

⁵⁰⁷ S/RES/626, 20 December 1988.

⁵⁰⁸ Crocker, *High Noon*, p.455.

⁵⁰⁹ Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.88; Crocker, *High Noon*, p.462.

⁵¹⁰ Crocker, *High Noon*, p.377. The Cubans and Angolans were dismissed outright on this account by US diplomats, who argued that this was an attempt to: ‘...sell the same horse twice—giving Cuban troop withdrawal to Pretoria for Resolution 435 and offering it to Washington for the termination of UNITA aid.’

the MPLA was held-out by the US in return for a domestic peace settlement capped-off with democratic elections (in which it is was understood that UNITA may very plausibly win).⁵¹¹ Crucially, it was understood by the MPLA that in the context of Soviet 'new thinking', a faltering economy, vastly increased domestic debt and continued South African aggression that the normalisation of relations with the US and admission to international economic institutions was an absolute necessity for the regime's continued survival.⁵¹² In fact with an international audience and domestic economic troubles in mind, the MPLA had begun moving down the path of reform for some time: in 1987, for example, President Dos Santos announced a package entitled *Saneamento de Economica e Financeiro* (SEF), which was supposed to initiate the process of Angola's transition to a market-economy;⁵¹³ and in 1990, the MPLA renounced Marxism as official party doctrine, and enacted several laws that were intended to liberalise the political system.⁵¹⁴

But despite these piecemeal reforms indicating the MPLA's commitment to a new social order, the US maintained that until or unless the regime negotiated with UNITA and submitted to the guerrilla group's demand for internationally supervised and sanctioned elections, it would continue to aid UNITA and withhold much needed diplomatic recognition.⁵¹⁵ In this context the MPLA moved slowly but surely towards the US position and signed an agreement with UNITA in May 1991 under Portuguese auspices. The agreement's provisions included the establishment of a cease-fire, the formation of a national army, and the conduct of national elections at the end of the process. To support this endgame, the UN Security Council established UNAVEM II whose mandate was to monitor and verify the cease-fire and the neutrality of the police, and

This was of course a disingenuous argument: the US was clearly working as a matter of priority for a way of extracting Cuba from the region. US official, Larry Napper, cited in: Crocker, *High Noon*, p.378.

⁵¹¹ Ibid. p.456.

⁵¹² It must be said that the MPLA found itself in an increasingly difficult domestic and international environment as the 1980s wore on. In the first place the slump in world oil prices that hit Angola in the late 1980s affected its export earnings considerably and pushed the country into severe debt with Cuba and the Soviet Union—a development that these external patrons were none too happy with. Domestically, the centrally planned economy had caused significant production and pricing problems, and had encouraged the meteoric rise of an alternative black market. And of course Soviet perestroika in the USSR, and retrenchment abroad, indicated to MPLA leaders that a realignment of their foreign policy would be an increasingly urgent priority. On Angola's changing development strategy through the 1980s, see: Tom Young, 'The Politics of Development in Angola and Mozambique', *African Affairs*, vol.87, no.188 (1988), pp.165-184. On the Angolan state and economy more generally see: Keith Somerville, *Angola: politics, economic, society*, (London: Pinter press, 1986).

⁵¹³ Tony Hodges, *Angola From Afro-Stalinism to Petro-diamond Capitalism* (Oxford: James Currey, 2001), p.104.

⁵¹⁴ Ibid. p.50.

⁵¹⁵ Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.96.

supervise the free and fair conduct of national elections. This set of UN roles simply amounted to another validation operation in Angola—designed to legitimise a process that had in essence been outlined and then imposed on the Angolan regime by the US. Certainly, in this regard it is hardly surprising to note the Angolan President’s desire to discuss with Sir Marrack Goulding the fate and fortunes of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua—who had just been voted out of power in another internationally imposed settlement crowned with elections that were supervised by the UN.⁵¹⁶

As it turned out, the peace process that followed the Estoril accords proved to be short-lived. Despite a year of relative peace in the country in which some tentative progress had been made towards the implementation of the accords, conflict broke out following UNITA’s surprise first round defeat in the presidential elections of 1992.⁵¹⁷ While UNITA was publicly blamed for returning the country to war in the wake of its rejection of the election results, UNAVEM II with its highly visible association with the peace process and the elections came to be seen as an unmitigated failure.

UNAVEM II and the validation of regime change in Angola

The shortcomings of UNAVEM II have become infamous in the conflict resolution world. For many, UNAVEM II graphically illustrated the institutional weaknesses of UN operations and came to be held as proof of the manner in which the UN has been forced into carrying out inadequately financed and resourced peace operations:

‘I had been given a 747 Jumbo to fly but provided with fuel sufficient only for a DC-3.’⁵¹⁸

This commonly cited quote by Margaret Anstee on the challenge she faced in running UNAVEM II is one that sums-up the type of explanation given at the time, and post-facto, for the failure of the operation in November 1992.⁵¹⁹ Lack of international ‘resolve’ and a ‘quick-fix’ approach to a

⁵¹⁶ Goulding, *Peacemonger*, p.186.
⁵¹⁷ Presidential results: Dos Santos 49.7%; Savimbi 40.07%. Legislative results: MPLA 54.74%; UNITA 34.1%. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.244. Because Dos Santos received less than the required 50% for an outright victory, a run-off second round election was theoretically required.
⁵¹⁸ Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, p.38.
⁵¹⁹ See among many typical examples of this strand of argument, in the press in particular: ‘Raw deal for UN in Angola’ Karl Maier, *The Independent on Sunday* (London), 18 October 1992; ‘Angola teaches lesson to UN’ Chris McGreal, *The Guardian* (London), 11 December 1992.

peripheral Cold War conflict, so the common argument runs, resulted in a hasty UN operation that was ill-equipped to deal with the ferocious nature of Angola's conflict. At first glance there would appear to be some merit in these claims: UNAVEM II was authorised to operate with only 440 military and police observers and spent a total of \$175 million.⁵²⁰ Compared to other missions of the time—\$368 million in Namibia, \$1.6 billion in Cambodia—UNAVEM II's resources were meagre.⁵²¹ Combined with the rigid and rushed implementation timetable that the Bicesse Accords adopted, UNAVEM II seemed to reflect the peripheral importance placed upon Angola by the international community.⁵²²

In this context, it is accurate to note that at the time the Security Council was more concerned with the escalating costs of peacekeeping operations, and preoccupied by the intensification of violence in the Balkans on the borders of Western Europe rather than on conflict-resolution in Angola.⁵²³ But while the general design of UNAVEM II and the Bicesse process can be faulted for a variety of technical problems this kind of argument invariably tends to overlook the fact that the central international actors in the Bicesse process were the Troika, and not the UN Security Council. To the extent to which this is recognised, the salutary lesson taken away from the UNAVEM II debacle is that the UN should always seek to participate in the wider negotiations under which a UN operation is deployed.⁵²⁴

On a deeper level, however, the problem with these explanations is that they have disregarded the specific political functions of UNAVEM II and the wider relations of power that brought about the Bicesse accords in the first place. In the first instance, special representative Anstee struggled assiduously to increase UNAVEM II resources to no avail because UN managers in New York understood very well that as a 'small and manageable operation', UNAVEM II only had a token role to play in the process. This role, defined by the Troika and agreed by the Security Council, was important in so far as it provided legitimacy for the peace agreement. Crucial for the success of the Bicesse process was not money or troops but the validation process that UNAVEM II would provide. In the second instance, and related to the first, the Bicesse Accords were the result

⁵²⁰ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.240.

⁵²¹ Ibid. p.711, p.741.

⁵²² 'Angola teaches lesson to UN' Chris McGreal, *The Guardian* (London), 11 December 1992.

⁵²³ Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001; 'U.N. Chief Focuses on Africa's 'Underdog Conflicts'' Barbara Crossette, *New York Times* (NYC), 23 July 1995. 'Conflict in the Balkans; U.N. Chief keeps promise to visit war-torn Africa' Barbara Crossette, *New York Times* (NYC), 15 July 1995.

⁵²⁴ Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, p.533; Hare, *Angola's last best chance*, p.134.

of a particular constellation of regional and international interests, most important of which was a general attempt by the US to transform its relations in Southern Africa from one based upon support for anti-communist regimes and movements, to one that sought to manufacture legitimately governed and functioning states that were compatible with US economic and political values. As we have already seen, from the 1980s the US was deeply involved in trying to integrate the sub-region into a coherent political economy unit; the transformation of the People's Republic of Angola from a centrally-planned economy and one-party state into an ostensibly free market economy and multi-party democracy was one important element of this project. Again, this was a process that was a long-time in the making with the incumbent regime groping towards economic and political reform—as well as membership of international liberal economic institutions—throughout the 1980s.⁵²⁵ In a sense then the Bicesse Accords were designed to resolve and finalise all the outstanding issues, such as which local elite and faction would preside over the new Angolan order. Indeed the Bicesse Accords provided the very real and tantalising possibility for the US and South Africa of regime-change from the MPLA to UNITA.⁵²⁶ The UN was drafted in to validate and officiate over this formal transition—of the symbolic integration of an ex-Afro-Marxist state into the liberal capitalist system and, if need be, of a legitimate and orderly transfer of power from an incumbent regime to a guerrilla movement turned quasi-political party with an old and long established relationship with the Western alliance.

Some of these key functions of UNAVEM II can be shown through a brief examination of UN Secretariat-UNAVEM II relations. Throughout UNAVEM II's duration, Margaret Anstee worked to implement her mandate and clashed constantly with UN headquarters. From the outset of her appointment she argued with UN headquarters, in particular under secretary-general for political affairs, Marrack Goulding, for greater manpower and material resources.⁵²⁷ She also argued for a revised mandate. On more than one occasion the response from UN headquarters was dismissive—Anstee was reprimanded by Boutros-Ghali and told to discontinue her practice of lobbying UN managers and international diplomats.⁵²⁸ In addition, her reports from Angola, which noted resource problems and the precarious political situation in the country, were toned down before their inclusion in the secretary-general's reports to the Security Council. It should

⁵²⁵ For example, the MPLA had sought membership of the IMF for some time prior to its admission in September 1989 (facilitated, finally, by the US).

⁵²⁶ The least that can be said is that the US supported and advanced the UNITA position in negotiations, which was essentially that negotiations on equal terms should be concluded with national elections taking place as quickly as possible after the signing of a peace accord.

⁵²⁷ Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001.

⁵²⁸ Ibid.

also be noted that in contrast to normal practice with special representatives, Anstee was prevented from briefing the Security Council personally because of the fear within DPKO and DPA that her outspoken views may raise alarm among non-permanent members of the Security Council.⁵²⁹ This process of UN ‘self-censorship’ was designed to maintain a ‘small and manageable operation’ in Angola whose role was simply to verify the cease-fire and elections.

Indeed, the logic of such a position held by UN managers in New York was that UNAVEM II was never designed or developed to be a comprehensive peace operation; UNAVEM II, it was recounted by UN officials, was an operation whose mandate was limited to verifying the cease-fire and neutrality of the police and to certifying the conduct of free and fair elections. Therefore, when compared to the precise roles that the UN has undertaken elsewhere, the resources allocated to UNAVEM II were proportionate to the role of the operation.⁵³⁰ Nevertheless it could be argued, as Anstee did, that even if this was the case the resources allocated to UNAVEM II were still insufficient: for example the September 1992 election was ‘monitored’ by 400 international observers split into pairs who were deployed in 200 of the 5,800 polling stations set up in the country.⁵³¹ Disregarding the problematic rationale of (and motives for) implanting a Western European model of elections on the country, this seemed like a rather token attempt at probing the fidelity of the election process.

This divergence of opinion relates to a different conception of what the process was about. For Anstee, the Bicesse process and UNAVEM II’s role within it was about engendering the political and military conditions necessary for an end to the conflict and about the earnest belief that the Angolan population alone should decide the question of ‘who rules’. Her resort to subterfuge to secure additional resources for the elections—such as procuring additional aircraft for electoral logistics—reflected this conviction.⁵³² However, apart from a major preoccupation with not damaging UN Secretariat-Security Council relations by requesting additional resources and a revised mandate, UN officials in New York saw UNAVEM II exactly for what it was: an

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

⁵³⁰ Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, p.40. In an angry response to claims of UN failure, Marrack Goulding replied in a New York Times ‘Letter to the Editor’ that: ‘Those who, like you, wish the United Nations to develop into a more effective instrument for establishing peace in the world, should not blame the United Nations for failing to perform tasks that it was neither mandated nor equipped nor financed to perform’. ‘U.N. Can’t Force Peace On Parties In Angola’ Sir Marrack Goulding, Letter to the Editor *New York Times* (NYC), 16 February 1993.

⁵³¹ United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, p.244.

⁵³² See Anstee’s account of acquiring the loan of US vehicles. Anstee, *Orphan of the Cold War*, pp.111-117.

appendage to a pre-packaged peace-settlement delivered by the Troika. For New York, UNAVEM II was designed to provide a legitimising function, to 'rubber-stamp' the negotiation and implementation of the Bicesse Accords by the Troika, the MPLA and UNITA. It is precisely because the function of UNAVEM II was simply to 'rubber-stamp' the agreement that the resources allocated to UNAVEM II for elections and other functions were so low. In many respects, the resources that the operation received were incidental so long as it could credibly judge the cease-fire and the outcome of the elections. Hence UN managers explicitly pursued the policy of 'a small and manageable operation'.

In the event, even these basic requirements could not be met: a bungled demobilisation process in which both UNITA and the MPLA had failed to fully 'quarter' their troops, and in which they were both said to have retained 'secret' armies meant that an important precondition for the conduct of elections had been sidestepped. The policy of elections at any cost was sealed when a key requirement of the Bicesse Accords, the formation of integrated army (FAA), was superficially established just two days before the national ballot.⁵³³ These were serious indiscretions, which for one reason or another the UN implicitly sanctioned. Yet, despite New York's clearly politicised approach to UNAVEM II, the primary responsibility for such impropriety lay with the Troika's management of the process.

In reality, the peace process that was secured in Estoril in Portugal in May 1991 was the outcome of international dynamics that had served to place extraordinary pressure on the two main parties to the Angolan conflict. While domestic and regional factors were clearly important here, it was US and USSR collaboration on the Angolan issue that served to deliver the MPLA and UNITA to the negotiating table.⁵³⁴ Most importantly, the Angolan regime was driven to engage in direct talks with UNITA as the central condition for the incremental normalisation of relations with the US—a tactic explicitly pursued by State Department officials. More generally, pressure was placed directly on the parties through diplomacy backed by the threat of sanction, and on regional allies who were to curtail MPLA and UNITA's political and military activities.⁵³⁵ Their drive to collaborate was motivated by a variety of concerns. As the George H. Bush Administration saw

⁵³³ Unified Armed Forces (FAA) was established on the 27 September 1992 but only 10,000 troops had been integrated. Gregory B. Simpkins, *Angola: A Chronology of Major Political Developments* (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Democratic Studies, 1996), p. 27.

⁵³⁴ It was apparently during a Baker-Shevardnadze foreign ministers meeting in Houston in December 1990 that the US and USSR hammered out the parameters of a final peace agreement, which was to be forced on the parties. Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.105.

⁵³⁵ Ibid. pp.89-96.

the matter: 'We wanted peace in Angola and a dignified exit for ourselves, a view shared by the Soviets.'⁵³⁶ It was also motivated by a radically reshaped US foreign policy that sought to realign what were seen as redundant Cold War alliances. In this regard, Assistant-Secretary of State for Africa at the time, Herman Cohen, relates instructions given to him by his superior, James Baker III:

'You had better cut a deal on Angola fast...because time is running out on our ability to deliver assistance to UNITA. These Cold War programs are going out of style.'⁵³⁷

Part of the implication here is that some form of settlement was required in order to transform US support of a guerrilla movement into US support for a legitimate political party and expectantly, government. Elections validated by the UN were seen to be the vehicle for such a transformation.⁵³⁸ In fact it can be further argued that the wider role of UNAVEM II was to validate a peace settlement in Angola based upon mainly US foreign policy interests in the region by providing for elections that many, including the US, expected UNITA to win.⁵³⁹ Indeed it is no secret, however underreported it may have been, that up until the signing of the Bicesse accords the US was still providing arms to UNITA as a way of ensuring that the MPLA could not win an outright military victory and until the incumbent regime submitted to a negotiated settlement with UNITA that incorporated democratic elections.⁵⁴⁰ Even during the implementation of the Accords, the Bush Administration was providing private electoral advice to UNITA's leaders.⁵⁴¹

⁵³⁶ Ibid. p.90; Perez de Cueller, *Pilgrimage for peace*, p.326.

⁵³⁷ James Baker III cited in: Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.102.

⁵³⁸ It could be legitimately noted here that during the early 1990s democratic elections of the Western variety were increasingly being used by the US, in an experimental fashion perhaps, as a vehicle for regime change in the South, such as in Nicaragua, South Africa and the Philippines. Indeed, promoting a certain type of democracy—as William Robinson has so thoroughly demonstrated—has become a central foreign policy instrument for the US. On this, see: Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*.

⁵³⁹ The British Embassy in Luanda, for a long-time the conduit for US interests in the country, reported back to London days before the election that a victory for Dos Santos: '...now appears a possibility that many would have viewed as unlikely three months ago.' Indeed, the prospect of an MPLA victory was, among diplomatic circles, considered quite unlikely until the final days of the election campaign. British Embassy Luanda telegram 474 (18 September 1992). Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001; Speech by senior Angolan minister at British Angola Forum (BAF) Chatham House (24 September 2001); Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.112; 'Winner does not take all', *Africa Confidential*, vol.33, no.18, 11 September 1992; 'Angola To Vote, Unsure About West's Democracy' Kenneth Noble, *New York Times* (NYC), 27 September 1992.

⁵⁴⁰ Crocker, *High Noon*, pp.462-3 and Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*, p.96.

⁵⁴¹ Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 13 August 2001; Cohen, *Intervening in Africa*. p.110, p.112.

As it turned out, and as a side point, the usefulness of UNITA for the US in general and the Bush Administration in particular had evaporated with the organisation's inability to transform itself into a semi-acceptable political movement—as was seen by US astonishment at UNITA's execution of two of its top political figures, Tito Chingungi and Wilson dos Santos, and its repudiation of the election results.⁵⁴² To be sure, UNITA still had powerful friends in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, that resulted in continued good-will towards the movement up until the collapse of the Lusaka Protocol in 1998, but these events marked a general shift of US support away from the movement and towards the recently brought-into-the-fold MPLA. As the top diplomat of the newly established US Embassy to the Republic of Angola remarked: 'The U.S. never owned Savimbi, we just rented him.'⁵⁴³

It should also be remembered that while there were important ideological allegiances between numerous US private and public institutions and UNITA, which had the historic effect of the US generally favouring this rebel movement, it is also true that other alliances, between elements of the MPLA and US institutions such as the State Department, were being forged for some time prior to the Bicesse Accords.⁵⁴⁴ Indeed, informal diplomatic contacts had been established throughout the 1980s between various US administration officials, private US business executives (generally in the petroleum industry), and certain pro-Western factions within the ruling MPLA. Needless to say, the US sought to engage those figures within the MPLA that were sympathetic to the Western model of social organisation and built, over time, durable working relationships with these partners.⁵⁴⁵

In sum, UNAVEM II was an operation that was fraught with difficulties. These revolved around problems of limited resources and a limited mandate in a context that had been shaped by superpower interests and Portuguese influence. Given a symbolic role intended to shore-up international legitimacy of the peace accords, the UN's role was important, albeit legally and

⁵⁴² 'Prospects of Vengeance and Victory for UNITA' *Africa Confidential* vol.33, no.13, 3 July 1992; 'Angola: Bullets threaten the ballots' *Africa Confidential* vol.33, no.20, 9 October 1992.

⁵⁴³ Cited in: 'No War, No Peace, No Angolan Solution' Mercedes Sayagues, *Weekly Mail and Guardian* (Johannesburg), 3-9 July 1998.

⁵⁴⁴ 'Angola: Mobutu holds key to peace' *Africa Confidential* vol.30, no.25, 15 December 1989.

⁵⁴⁵ For example: Pedro de Castro van Dunem, a former foreign minister and oil minister, had strong ties with the US oil industry and George H. Bush. This member of the van Dunem clan—like most others—were often looking for greater ties to the US from the early 1980s onwards; at the same time the State Department, in contrast to the Pentagon, saw Pedro as a member of small group of former Marxists within the MPLA centred around the President that were willing to move fully into the Western camp and sought to encourage these elements through admittance to the IMF and World Bank. 'Angola: War and Peace in the MPLA' *Africa Confidential*, vol.30, no.16, 11 August 1989.

politically narrow. The UN's emblematic role in the process is reflected in its perfunctory approach to UNAVEM II's responsibilities, and in its dismissive reactions to Margaret Anstee's protestations. This was a perilous strategy; the original mistake that UN officials made was to assume that because it had not designed or supervised the implementation of the Accords, the organisation would be free from blame in the event of its collapse. Because of this miscalculation, the UN stood by the policy of a 'small and manageable operation' in Angola, despite clear shortcomings, focusing its attention instead on managing its shifting relations with the Security Council and pursuing peacemaking opportunities elsewhere—in Bosnia and Somalia. With a highly visible return to war following the elections, this policy turned out to be a serious blunder: the UN's reputation was badly tainted and its credibility as an effective peacemaking body, was under question.⁵⁴⁶ More assiduously, many UN officials felt that UNAVEM II had been used to shield relevant member-states from their oversights in Angola; in essence the UN had become a 'scapegoat' for the collapse of a settlement in which they only played a token part.⁵⁴⁷

The management of the Lusaka Protocols

In contrast to the previous roles assigned to the UN in Angola, the deployment of UNAVEM III and its oversight of the Lusaka accords marked a significant upgrading of tasks assigned to the organisation in the country. It was not so much that the political functions of a peace settlement in Angola fundamentally changed with the new UN mission and peace accords. Rather, it was the means to achieve such prefabricated ends—of finalising and consolidating the question of which local elite and faction would preside over the new and nascent social order in the country—that changed. Here, the UN was given the lead role, the requisite resources, and a degree of relative autonomy for delivering this settlement in Angola. It is to the management of this process, especially the way in which UN officials sought advance the progression of the settlement that the chapter now turns.

⁵⁴⁶ In November 1992 the secretary-general acknowledged the difficulties the UN was having following its Angolan operation. The comment of one UN official was: 'We've hit a sticky patch all right.' Cited in: 'No Peace For The U.N.' Paul Lewis *New York Times* (NYC), 29 November 1992. Many other commentators linked the UN with failure in Angola. 'Perils For The U. N.' Paul Lewis, *New York Times* (NYC), 20 December 1992; 'The U.S. Can Learn From Angola's Losers' Bill Keller, *New York Times* (NYC), 17 January 1993; 'Angola teaches lesson to UN' Chris McGreal, *The Guardian* (London), 11 December 1992. 'Raw deal for UN in Angola' Karl Maier, *The Independent on Sunday* (London), 18 October 1992.

⁵⁴⁷ Confidential interview with senior UN official, New York, 1 December 2000; Confidential interview with senior UN official, New York, 24 November 2000; Confidential telephone interview with former UN special representative, 18 August 2001.

There were high stakes involved for the UN at the outset of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol in December 1994. Not only had the UN invested over 14 painstaking months negotiating the agreement with the MPLA and UNITA, but the organisation had also suffered a great loss in its prestige and credibility in the wake of its previous foray in the country in 1992, as well as in Somalia in June 1993, and in Rwanda and Bosnia in 1994.⁵⁴⁸ Compounding this pressure was the sheer magnitude of the post-Bicesse conflict, a scale of violence not seen since the civil war of 1975-1976. Dubbed the 'war of the cities', it was estimated by UN agencies that 1,000 Angolans a day were dying in the conflict and its related consequences in early 1993.⁵⁴⁹ For these reasons, the UN went to great lengths to ensure that previous shortcomings in the design of UNAVEM II would not be repeated again in any further UN operation in the country.⁵⁵⁰ This, it should be noted, was done extremely thoroughly by UN officials involved in the design of the Protocols and of UNAVEM III: a power-sharing dynamic was adopted; full demobilisation of UNITA was expected; a relatively realistic timeframe was set; the UN became the central negotiator and implementer of the Protocols; and a significant amount of human and material resources were allocated to UNAVEM III.⁵⁵¹ However, the standards that the UN set out for itself were severely depreciated by how it came over time to define the successful implementation of the various Protocols. In particular, during the major implementation period, December 1994 to December 1996, UN officials successively blurred various conditions of the agreement, including: conditions relating to the deployment of UN peacekeepers in the first place; the definition of quartering and disarmament; and the continued integrity of the ceasefire and arms embargo on the parties.

The adoption of these attitudes towards the implementation of key facets of the Protocol by UN officials was the result of three related factors. First, there was the normative belief of some UN officials at the time—in this case the new special representative to Angola, Alioune Blondin Beye—that internal conflicts could only be resolved through a power-political approach to

⁵⁴⁸ 'Sniping Is Growing At U.N. Over Weakness In Peacekeeping' Richard Bernstein, *New York Times* (NYC), 21 June 1993.

⁵⁴⁹ This was a widely cited figure that originated from S/26434, 13 September 1993 paragraph 20. For example: 'Angola's Return To War Scars Its People And Now Its Cities' Bill Keller, *New York Times* (NYC), 20 September 1993; 'Over 1,000 a day die in Angola' Michael Littlejohns, *Financial Times* (London), 15 September 1993.

⁵⁵⁰ The New York Times commented that: 'This time the peace is taking place under the high-powered scrutiny of a United Nations chastened by earlier failure.' 'Angolan Foes Sign A Truce In Step Toward A Formal Peace' Bill Keller, *New York Times* (NYC), 16 November 1994.

⁵⁵¹ Lusaka Protocols (15 November 1994) available online: <www.usip.org/library/pa/angola/pa_angol.html>.

mediation. Conflict-resolution was seen as a process of adjudicating between mutually exclusive armed actors and as being determined by their relative power. Private diplomacy and mediation were required to manage changes in this 'balance' and achieve peace. It has to be said that this was applied selectively in peace operations, as was seen in the case of Somalia and the manner in which UN officials sought to ostracise the major warring-parties. It should also be noted that in the post-Rwanda milieu, this was an increasingly unfashionable and unpopular approach among international technocrats for managing crises in the periphery.

Possibly as significant in the Angolan case are a second-set of related explanations that revolve around: the institutional concern of UN officials to ensure success in the Angolan context; and the way in which UN officials came to rely (in the process of ensuring such a success) on a dogged engagement with local elites as a method of maintaining the UN's sway in the country. Firstly, the UN can be seen to have compelling reason to push through with the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol because of way in which it was saddled with the blame for the failure of the previous peace process in Angola in 1992 and because of high-profile failures elsewhere in Africa. In this respect UNAVEM III—at the time the largest UN peacekeeping operation deployed—was seen as an important opportunity to reassert its capacity and revive its reputation for managing transitions in the periphery. In many ways, therefore, failure in Angola this time around was not an option for UN officials keen to retain their specialised peace functions in the South. It can be argued here that when it became clear that UNITA and MPLA non-compliance on various issues would be protracted, the definition of successful implementation of the protocols became rather fluid. In short, success could be defined in a variety of ways. Finally, and in some ways with a slightly different accent to the rationale outlined above, the protracted and fluid interpretation of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocols by the UN can be read as a determined effort to stay-the-course in Angola by prodding and pushing the local elites down the path of so-called reconciliation. Indeed on this more abstract level, UN actions in Angola during the Lusaka period can be seen to reflect the emergence a peace operations doctrine that emphasised micro-managing and stage-managing developments as a method of cajoling uncooperative locals to accept by attrition—as opposed to overt coercion—internationally imposed settlements. By continually binding local groups in a web of international diplomacy and conflict management, the UN perhaps hoped to remain a principal force in the country's politics.

The politics of implementation and the deployment of UNAVEM III

Central to the dynamics of the UN's policy towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol was the way in which UN officials sought to protect the process's continued survival by adopting an elastic and pragmatic approach to its provisions. This occurred in a variety of spheres and circumstances, sometimes as a reflex response to serious moments of crisis, and sometimes as an underlying political strategy designed to stimulate and manufacture compliance to the agreements.

From the very outset of the Lusaka Protocol, the UN disregarded its own preconditions for engagement. Important here were conditions relating to the effective cessation of hostilities that were set by the secretary-general and endorsed by the Security Council before first, military observers and second, peacekeeping troops, were to be deployed in Angola. The secretary-general noted in his report to the Security Council in December 1994 that:

‘The Angolan parties must abide fully by the Protocol before the UN can consider committing major resources to a substantial expansion of its operation. The Security Council has reiterated that the UN can assist only once the Angolans themselves have demonstrated the necessary political will.’⁵⁵²

As a first step, the secretary-general required the MPLA and UNITA to ‘...meticulously implement the cease-fire’ and to have this confirmed by his representative, Blondin Beye, before military observers be restored to their previous strength under UNAVEM II.⁵⁵³ Only four days later, and despite a precarious military standoff between the parties, Beye reported back to Boutros-Ghali that the ceasefire was ‘generally holding’ and that the MPLA and UNITA had requested ‘...the planned enlargement of UNAVEM.’⁵⁵⁴ The upshot of this letter was that the precondition for redeployment had been sidestepped: a ‘meticulously’ implemented cease-fire had been substituted for one that was ‘generally holding’, and the rationale for enlarging military observers was now based on its explicit request by the parties. There was, of course, some logic to Beye’s recommendation; how could the UN verify the status of the cease-fire without sufficient military observers on the ground? Nevertheless, the atmosphere in Angola that had

⁵⁵² S/1994/1376, 4 December 1994.

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ S/1994/1395, 8 December 1994.

preceded and followed the signing of the Lusaka accords was, to say the least, tense and belligerent.⁵⁵⁵ The initialling of the Protocols on 17 October 1994 was followed by an extensive military offensive by government forces against Huambo, and the signing of the Accords on 20 November was followed by an offensive against UNITA in Uige and M'banza Congo, in the north.⁵⁵⁶ Throughout December too there were reports of MPLA military activities in northern provinces coupled with public and private pronouncements by UNITA that were manifestly hostile to the Lusaka Protocol and the UN.⁵⁵⁷ Such an atmosphere could hardly be demonstrative of '...the necessary political will' that the secretary-general had insisted upon before UN re-engagement.

The decision to redeploy military and police observers by UN officials was therefore a political one; a choice that was not based upon the fulfilment of the conditions that the UN had set, but based upon securing the continued viability of the Protocols. It reflected the UN's willingness to tailor provisions as and when it was necessary to keep the transition to a new social order on-track. This approach to the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol became clearly defined in the episode that saw the eventual authorisation of UNAVEM III and the deployment of 4,000 UN peacekeeping troops. Like the decision to redeploy observers in Angola, the secretary-general in February 1995 outlined in detail several stipulations that should be met by the MPLA and UNITA before the deployment of UN peacekeepers could take place. These included: an effective cessation of hostilities, the full disengagement of troops; the creation of verification mechanisms; the establishment of communications between the parties; the provision of military data on both sides to UNAVEM; and the commencement of de-mining.⁵⁵⁸ Despite these informal conditions, the secretary-general concluded in the 'Observations' section of the report that:

'Given the...respect for the cease-fire shown by the Government and UNITA, their commitment to ensuring the safety and security of the UN personnel and their

⁵⁵⁵ Paul Hare, *Angola's Last Best Chance for Peace: An Insider's Account of the Peace Process* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), pp. 59-71.

⁵⁵⁶ ICRC, *ICRC Activities in Angola: 1993-7 December 2000* (ICRC: Geneva, 2000), p.7; 'Ceasefire in Angola fails to stop guns' Karl Maier, *The Independent* (London), 28 November 1994. Simpkins, *Angola: a chronology*, p.32. See also Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/1994/63 in which concern is noted '...over the recent reports of the intensification of military operations in particular those towards Huambo.'

⁵⁵⁷ Hare, *Angola's last best chance*, p.67. It has been widely recalled, for example, that Savimbi did not attend the signing of the Lusaka Protocol.

⁵⁵⁸ S/1995/97, 1 February 1995.

commitment to the Lusaka process and national reconciliation, I recommend that a new UN operation in Angola, UNAVEM III, immediately take over from UNAVEM II.⁵⁵⁹

With one important proviso, the Security Council accepted this recommendation. In Security Council Resolution 976 (8 February 1995) it was decided that UN infantry troops would only be deployed once the stipulations outlined by the secretary-general in the above report had been fulfilled.⁵⁶⁰ This proviso also placed the onus upon the secretary-general to establish exactly when these conditions had been met. In line with the UN's decision to redeploy military observers in December 1994, however, the detailed preconditions relating UNAVEM III's deployment that had been set out in Boutros-Ghali's February report were gradually but substantially diluted. At that time it could not possibly be argued that most of the conditions could or would be realised.⁵⁶¹ There was still a high incidence of what were deceptively termed 'localised' cease-fire violations that amounted to around 120 incidents a month in 1995, and UN personnel had come under attack on several occasions.⁵⁶² Instead, UN officials presented a situation in Angola that was stable but still uncertain. The UN continued to stress that the cease-fire had been 'generally holding' and that the MPLA and UNITA had reaffirmed their commitment to the peace process.

But in order to justify the deployment of UN peacekeepers, which was done in March 1995, UN managers necessarily went a step further in the rationalisation of their decision. In fact, the conditions were effectively shelved altogether with a completely different set of reasons given by the secretary-general for deployment. This was prompted by Ismit Kittani's visit to assess the

⁵⁵⁹ Boutros-Ghali also noted that: 'For the international community, there are obvious risks involved in investing in a new peacekeeping operation in Angola. If the above-mentioned political will is found to be lacking or if the cooperation required from the parties is not forthcoming, I will not hesitate to invite the Security Council to reconsider its commitments in Angola.' S/1995/97, 1 February 1995.

⁵⁶⁰ The Security Council in its resolution: 'Decides that the deployment of infantry units will take place on the basis of a report from the secretary-general to the Security Council that the conditions contained in paragraph 32 of the secretary-general's report, *inter alia*, effective cessation of hostilities, provisions of all relevant military data, and the designation of all quartering areas, have been met, provided the Council does not decide otherwise.' S/RES/976, 8 February 1995. Yet Chris Garuba, UN Chief Military Observer in Angola, believed in February 1995 that: '...under the current circumstances there is no way that the international community will allow peacekeeping troops to come into Angola because the process is being stalled.' 'Delays In Angolan Peace Process' *Inter Press Service International News*, Monday 27 February 1995.

⁵⁶¹ This was a position that, as indicated above, Chris Garuba held. 'UNAVEM man says Unita is stalling' *SouthScan*, vol.10, no.9, 3 March 1995.

⁵⁶² There were on average 120 violations of the cease-fire a month in 1995. Human Rights Watch Arms Project and HRW Africa, *Angola: Between War and Peace. Arms Trade and Human Rights Abuses since Lusaka Protocol* vol. 8, no. 1 (A), February 1996, p.10. See also: 'Angola: Inside the tent' *Africa Confidential*, vol.36, no.14, 7 July 1995.

situation in Angola in March 1995 on the secretary-general's behest, in which he argued that the Lusaka process required a push-start:

‘...It is clear that it is becoming increasingly necessary to assist the parties in overcoming their mutual mistrust and to create additional impetus to the peace process.’⁵⁶³

This represented a revised rationale for UN engagement, where UNAVEM was to be deployed as a way of stabilising the precarious ceasefire and peace process. Instead of verifying the implementation of the provisions, UNAVEM was to help foster a constructive environment for its development. More telling was the inference that the peace process was not proceeding as anticipated. As the secretary-general explicitly conceded in the letter to the Security Council in late March 1995 authorising the planning stage of deployment:

‘...With a view to avoiding dangerous delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol which might destabilise conditions on the ground, I have decided that it would be in the best interest of the peace process to proceed with the preparations for the deployment of the UN infantry units to Angola. I fully realise that there are certain risks involved in the above decision.’⁵⁶⁴

In the end, therefore, the decision to prepare for deployment was based upon a completely different set of criteria than had been originally agreed in Security Council Resolution 976 (8 February 1995).⁵⁶⁵ This decision set the pattern of UN policies towards the implementation of UNAVEM III, and sealed an approach to its provisions that was above all else politically pragmatic. The decision, like its antecedent in December 1994, was a direct response of the UN to the perilous state of the Lusaka accords. Because the process was so fragile, in moments of crisis it required innovative and flexible approaches to its implementation. But this pattern of behaviour went further than simply a UN response to crisis points in the peace process. As we will now see, the evolution of the UNITA ‘quartering process’ translated over time into a protracted period of horse-trading. This policy was so pronounced partly because of an approach to conflict-resolution that UN officials held that privileged private diplomacy and power politics,

⁵⁶³ S/1995/230, 28 March 1995.

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁵ S/RES/976, 8 February.

and partly because of an increasingly desperate diplomatic attempt by these same UN officials to ensure that UNITA formally complied, no matter how superficially, with the Protocols.

The politics of definition and the quartering of UNITA's army

In a statement broadcast on Angolan television on 14 December 1996, the secretary-general's representative in Angola, Blondin Beye, officially confirmed that UNITA had fulfilled its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol relating to quartering its troops: 'UNAVEM III declares that henceforth, as far as it is aware, despite some reservations, UNITA has carried out all its military tasks.'⁵⁶⁶ After two years of protracted and, to say the least, belated steps taken by UNITA to surrender its armed forces, the statement represented a significant moment of respite for UNAVEM III's leadership.

Behind the façade of this qualified success, however, there was considerable unease, both within the UN system and within the international community more generally, about the integrity of the quartering, integration and demobilisation process and the veracity of UNAVEM's claims. Indeed, it was felt by UN officials deployed at quartering locations that the whole process had been politically manipulated by UNAVEM to such an extent that it had become practically meaningless.⁵⁶⁷ As will become clear, this was because in the absence of satisfactory progress in the dismantlement of UNITA's military machine, UNAVEM III interpreted the process rather charitably: UNAVEM quartered a large percentage of troops that were clearly civilians, occasionally government POWs; accepted UNITA disarmament that was all but superficially applied; and disregarded the continued existence of significant UNITA forces posing as police, or personal protection units, for Jonas Savimbi.

The quartering of UNITA troops was a central component of the Lusaka Protocol. It could be argued that after the establishment of a ceasefire, it ranked along with the establishment of a power-sharing formula as the most important principle of the Lusaka Protocol to be implemented. Indeed, it was widely argued that the failure to carry this out during the Bicesse Accords was what had allowed UNITA to pursue the military option after its election defeat in September

⁵⁶⁶ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 17 December 1996: UNAVEM statement read out by Blondin Beye on Televisao Popular de Angola, 14 December 1996.

⁵⁶⁷ Peter Simkin speech at SOAS 1997. ACTSA; CIIR; Christian Aid 'Achieving Lasting Peace in Angola: the Unfinished Agenda. Report of conference held at SOAS, London, 4 September 1997' (London SOAS), p.23; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), *Complex Crisis Complex Peace: Humanitarian Coordination in Angola* (New York, February 1998), 7.6.

1992. The process agreed upon in the Lusaka Protocols was one that envisaged the quartering and disarmament of all of UNITA troops in designated UN areas throughout Angola followed by either their integration into the FAA, or their demobilisation and reintegration back into civilian life.⁵⁶⁸ The process was due to begin as soon as peacekeepers had been deployed and the UN and UNITA had built quartering areas. In the event, the quartering process did not start until November 1995 when the UN and the US began to exert significant diplomatic and material pressure on UNITA to comply with the military provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.⁵⁶⁹

The declaration in December 1996 that UNITA had completed the quartering process was problematic for a variety of reasons. For UN officials of the Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) who were responsible, among other things, for planning and coordinating demobilisation and maintained for this purpose staff in all quartering areas, there were significant discrepancies in the process.⁵⁷⁰ Most staff noticed some general patterns in UNITA practise that were condoned by UNAVEM in order to facilitate the numeric targets being met.⁵⁷¹ In the first place it was estimated that out of the 41,796 UNITA troops demobilised, a significant proportion were civilians, underage conscripted soldiers (4,799), or disabled soldiers (10,728).⁵⁷² As Peter Simkin, former Director of UCAH explains:

‘Most of the UNITA soldiers, who were registered in the Quartering Areas as ex-combatants, were raw recruits scooped up from the surrounding rural areas. In private registration interviews many expressed their desire to return home rather than be integrated into a combined army.’⁵⁷³

Perhaps even more troubling for those observing the process was UNAVEM’s cursory supervision of UNITA’s disarmament. In one instalment of 12,500 UNITA troops that were quartered on 12 February 1996, for example, only 1,200 unusable weapons were handed in.⁵⁷⁴ The charade of this process was well known and commented on. While one official in a

⁵⁶⁸ The Lusaka Protocols, Annex 3 General Principles.

⁵⁶⁹ Madeline Albright’s visit to Angola in January 1996 was part of a campaign to exert pressure on the parties to implement the Protocols. On its details, see: Hare, *Angola’s last best chance*, p.99.

⁵⁷⁰ OCHA, *Complex crisis complex peace*, 4.1.

⁵⁷¹ Simpkins, *Angola: a chronology*, p.23.

⁵⁷² Human Rights Watch, *Angola Unravels: The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), p.32.

⁵⁷³ Simpkins, *Angola: a chronology*, p.23.

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid. p.36. The UN estimated that 30-40% of weapons handed in were not ‘serviceable’. S/1996/171, 6 March 1996.

quartering area noted to a human rights investigator that 'Nobody believed UNITA was handling in their real weapons', another observer stated that in one assembly area '...the weapons on display looked as if they had last been fired in the Boer war.'⁵⁷⁵ But the meaning of this practice went further than simply relating to disarming UNITA; quartering a UNITA soldier was officially preconditioned by a weapon being handed over. In essence, therefore, it was also an issue of fulfilling 'quartering targets'. And contrary to this protocol that all troops must hand in a weapon before registration, UCAH was pressed as a matter of policy to 'bend the rules' in order to meet these 'targets'.⁵⁷⁶ Again, as Peter Simkin relates:

'The Joint Commission and the UN Special Representative of the secretary-general allowed the majority of UNITA soldiers to register in the fifteen Quartering Areas without handing in their weapons.'⁵⁷⁷

In all of these various patterns of quartering discrepancies, the UN noted, albeit mutedly, some of its shortcomings. Indeed throughout 1996, the secretary-general's reports to the Security Council were lightly infused with references to the paucity of weapons surrendered, and the sheer extent of UNITA's so-called 'police force'.⁵⁷⁸ Yet in many other important details, the reports gave a rather erroneous account of the progress of quartering. There is little mention of underage soldiers or 'raw' recruits, and there is no explanation given for why UNAVEM accepted the policy of quartering 24,867 UNITA troops without their weapons.⁵⁷⁹ Most disingenuous, however, was Blondin Beye's December 16 announcement in Luanda: how could it plausibly be stated by UNAVEM that '...as far as it is aware, despite some reservations, UNITA has carried out all its military tasks'?

The answer in part relates to the personal approach that Beye adopted to the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and to the general policy of seeking to complete the protocols of the peace process at any cost. Indeed the 'numbers game', as Ambassador Paul Hare put it, reflected a policy of political pragmatism embraced by the UN that, in lieu of substantive progress in

⁵⁷⁵ Cited in: HRW, *Angola unravels*, p. 34; Hare, *Angola's last best chance*, p.100.

⁵⁷⁶ 'Angola: Slow, Painful' *Africa Confidential*, vol.37, no.12, 12 April 1996.

⁵⁷⁷ Simpkins, *Angola: a chronology*, p.23. 24, 867 UNITA troops were quartered without weapons up to the 27 September 1996. S/1996/827, 4 October 1996.

⁵⁷⁸ S/1996/171; S/1996/328; S/1996/503; S/1996/827.

⁵⁷⁹ Underage troops and civilians forced into quartering areas by UNITA are mentioned in passing in S/1996/171, 6 March 1996.

UNITA's quartering, accepted any technique that would avoid scuttling the process.⁵⁸⁰ But in the broader context, it is also clear that the UN, the US and UNITA were all engaged in a diplomatic battle of wills and wits in which the rebel group sought to delay and redefine the conditions of its disbandment. After numerous diplomatic demarches, from the US, UN and others, UNITA belatedly began the process in a much diluted form, which was accepted as better than nothing by UN officials administering the process. It was simply the case that the UN made a political compromise as to the extent of UNITA's dismemberment in the process of trying to impose this crucial protocol on the rebel group.

UN power politics during Lusaka

In a considerable broadside against this approach that Blondin Beye adopted towards the peace process in general and quartering process in particular, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) noted in a report assessing humanitarian activities in the country the overly pragmatic approach to Lusaka that the UN consistently took:

'In highly politicised conflict or post-conflict periods, the UN mission, the warring parties, or the Observer Governments may make a political decision to misrepresent or not disclose known information. The decision to forego transparency and public accountability in favour of private dialogue is a political decision which, with the benefit of hindsight, may or may not be justified. In Angola, humanitarian organisations sometimes found that the Angolan situation presented by the SRSB [Blondin Beye] and the UNAVEM mission differed considerably from their own experience and understanding.'⁵⁸¹

It is implied here that, in some way or another, UNAVEM was adopting a real-politick approach to the conflict and that it did this because in its judgment this would be beneficial to the continuation of the peace process. As we have already seen, the UN applied a fluid diplomatic approach in relation to the deployment of UN peacekeepers and to the verification of UNITA's quartering as a method of coaxing the parties down the path of implementation and binding them into the process. This general 'high-diplomacy' approach that Beye and other UN managers

⁵⁸⁰ Hare, *Angola's last best chance*, p.100.

⁵⁸¹ OCHA, *Complex crisis complex peace*, 7.6.

adopted was also reflected in the way in which the UN constantly talked-down violations of the cease-fire and the procurement of heavy arms by both the government and UNITA.

From the outset of the Lusaka process, the military activities of the government and UNITA threatened the survival of the Lusaka accords because of its consequences for the deployment of UN peacekeepers and because various actions on the battlefield served to hinder the progress of implementation. For example, cajoling UNITA to 'quarter' its troops became all the more difficult with tactical military forays by the government. Yet, it was obvious that at certain moments of the process there was very little peace to keep; during 1995 there were 1,200 cease-fire violations, 235 of which took place during the month of March when the secretary-general had decided to plan for UN deployment.⁵⁸² Government operations against UNITA between the signing of the accords and 1997 in particular were low-key but constant: a massive rearmament programme for the FAA was accompanied by tactical military movements and, sporadically, offensives in a variety of provinces. Typical of such an atmosphere, a UN officer commented in July 1995 on tensions in the north, with troop movements and standoffs in M'banza Congo, Zaire, Uige, and Lunda Norte:

'Everyday we hear new reports of troop movements, attacks on barracks and troops pillaging the local population in the interior...We see invasions of buffer zones established in the major disengagement areas like in Uige, but these have never been respected by either side.'⁵⁸³

Yet, in general these incidents were dismissed as 'technical' and 'low-level' by Blondin Beye, and were reported as such in reports to the Security Council.⁵⁸⁴ In addition, it was felt by other UN officials working in Angola that Beye deliberately avoided highlighting government and UNITA violations. For one outspoken critic, Beye: '...shied from publicly assigning blame for violations. This seems to have been official UN policy.'⁵⁸⁵ As we have seen, this was initiated in

⁵⁸² Ibid. 2.3.

⁵⁸³ Cited in: 'Concern Over Tensions In Angola' Reuters News Service, 21 July 1995. Available from: International Peacekeeping News <<http://csf.Colorado.edu/defax/ipn>>.

⁵⁸⁴ For one example: S/1995/177, 5 March 1995. Chris Garuba disagreed with Beye's approach and maintained that skirmishes, troop movement, small and large-scale attacks were violations. As it was put in one analysis: 'Garuba is forthright: Beye practices quiet diplomacy.' Cited in: 'Angola: Inside the tent' *Africa Confidential*, vol.36, no.14, 7 July 1995.

⁵⁸⁵ 'No War No Peace No Angolan Solution', Mercedes Sayagues. *Weekly Mail and Guardian* 3-9 July 1998. Sayagues was a World Food Programme (WFP) information officer who became critical of UNAVEM and Beye's approach after she was banned from talking about the dire humanitarian situation

December 1995, when Beye denied that any serious violations of the ceasefire had occurred since its initiation, despite the FAA offensive against UNITA in Uige and M'banza Congo during November. Beye's caveat was: 'Of course that doesn't mean to say there hasn't been certain hostilities.'⁵⁸⁶

Apart from the reticence of such UN public diplomacy what this goes to show is just how pragmatically minded UN managers were in their approach to the Lusaka Protocols. Most fundamentally, the entire progress of the settlement depended upon the existence of a cease-fire—and the UN's most basic task was to monitor this truce. Moreover, the very deployment of UN peacekeepers and the continuation of UNAVEM III were premised upon this formal and practical cessation of hostilities. On one level, therefore, it can only be inferred that the UN made a political decision to overlook these widespread indiscretions as a necessary way of guaranteeing a UN presence in Angola and a continuation of the process. On another level though, UN officials also understood—as in other peacekeeping contexts—the exigencies of UN troops for the survival of UNITA or the government at various times, and decided that it was vital to continue to fulfil this function. It would seem that as important as anything else in this context, UN officials knew that they could utilise this dependency in return for compliance on certain other issues. Indeed, even by brushing over cease-fire discrepancies—violations that the UN high-command in New York ritually stated would lead to the end of UNAVEM III—UN officials were participating in a delicate but well-worn game of engaging local elites and enveloping them further into the process. In the extreme, the UN and others could raise the explicit spectre of troop withdrawal, which in due course they did as a way of prodding the parties down the route of an orderly submission.

In sum, it can be concluded that from the very outset of the Lusaka Protocols, the UN sought to ensure that the process would not be derailed or sabotaged by the outright non-compliance of local elites. Here, as we have seen, important prerequisites such as an effective cease-fire and a judicious demobilisation effort were resisted by the parties who were keen to avoid handing any type of advantage to their local opponents and, perhaps just as importantly, to international forces like the UN operating extensively in the country. To a large extent the UN played along with this game; during endless rounds of shuttle diplomacy UN officials invariably accepted some degree

she had seen in Cuito as a result of a deal reached by UNAVEM and UNITA to allow the evacuation of trapped UN personnel in the town. 'Inter-Agency Differences Bedevil UN Aid Distribution in Angola' Chris McGreal, *The Guardian* (London), 16 November 1993.

⁵⁸⁶Cited from: ANC daily news briefing, Friday 9 December 1994: <www.anc.org.za/anc/newsbrief/>.

of compromise and concession on the implementation of the accords to placate the parties and tie them into making some effort at carrying out their externally imposed obligations. The quartering of UNITA's troops was perhaps most stark in this regard because the UN's and US's irritation at the group's persistent delays, culminating in high-level demarches and threats, was matched by a sense of relief when the process, hugely diluted, did eventually get underway. Walking UNITA down the path of organised surrender in this area in particular was a turbulent one for UN officials to handle and resulted in their acceptance of a far from perfect process.

The UN had relatively less trouble in its dealings with the regime—except on the issue of human rights and cease-fire violations—largely because the immediate onus for implementation rested with UNITA. Nonetheless the MPLA's limited freedom of movement should not be underestimated: most importantly the regime had conceded a power-sharing agreement during Lusaka and surrendered a large role for the UN in the country's affairs. In a very real sense the Angolan government was inviting the UN to extensively interfere in its politics and giving formal legitimacy, once again, to UNITA. This position not only reflected various changes in the military balance in the country between UNITA and the MPLA, or the region more generally, but also a continued campaign by the US to trade incremental diplomatic support for the regime with continued MPLA cooperation and general good behaviour. On the whole, therefore, it is fair to suggest that both UNITA and the MPLA found themselves in a web of international diplomacy and peacemaking that sought through endless rounds of negotiations to lock them into an organised process of political and military capitulation. In this respect, the management of the Lusaka Protocols by the UN can be interpreted as a dogged and determined diplomatic effort to ensure that the two-factions kept to the script of the peace process—even if its provisions were pragmatically tailored in the course of events.

The anatomy of a manufactured peace and the standard of UN peace operations

A decade of troubled and often tragic UN peacemaking in Angola has had the unfortunate effect of reducing analysis of this encounter to the functional facets of the conflict, the personalities of the major belligerents, and the technical capacities of the so-called international peacemakers.⁵⁸⁷ What has undoubtedly been set-aside and sacrificed in these narratives has been the historical and

⁵⁸⁷ See, Krska, 'Peacekeeping in Angola'; Malaquias, 'The UN in Mozambique and Angola'; MacQueen, 'Peacekeeping by Attrition: the United Nations in Angola'; Pazzanita, 'The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola'; Anthony W. Pereira, 'The Neglected Tragedy: the Return to War in Angola, 1992-3.'

political framework in which UN missions to Angola and the region have operated, and equally, the way in which when given the opportunity the UN has sought to act as a loyal and symbolic marker of change to a liberal order for states and societies in the region. Indeed considering the empirical record it is quite reasonable to suggest that the major facet of this UN encounter has been missed: that is, the historic and structural function of the UN in Southern Africa has been to legitimise, on essentially US terms, the final stages of the region's staged reintegration into the Western capitalist world-order.

In Angola, in particular, this has been the underlying basis of all the UN's peace operations. At first, the UN was simply called in to legitimate and officiate over a withdrawal of Cuban troops from country—a long-standing US policy goal that it was hoped would fatally undermine the incumbent regime or, at the very least, narrow its relative autonomy from international exigencies. When the regime then moved decisively down the road of US and UNITA defined national reconciliation—a risk that the MPLA considered necessary given its need to end its international isolation in the twilight of the Second World—the UN was again enlisted to preside over a formal transition of political systems, and possibly regimes. The UN role here was symbolic, heralding the endgame of a long fought for reintegration of the Angolan state back into the liberal world system.

Only allotted this token role to officiate over the process, it was other powers that played the role of micro-managing the imposition of the settlement and the contest for power between the two sets of local elites. Indeed, as Dame Margaret Anstee has so poignantly reminded us, the UN high command always saw UNAVEM II as a '...a small and manageable operation' with only a symbolic role to play in the imposition of the Bicesse Accords. This role, as we have seen, changed substantially after UNITA demurred at its unexpected electoral defeat and scuttled the whole process by returning to war. In fact, when UNITA was eventually hauled-back into direct talks with the MPLA by the imposition of UN sanctions and US pressure, the UN found itself at the helm of negotiations and in a position to extract a large and powerful role for itself in any future settlement. In addition, when the Lusaka Protocols were finally signed in late-1994, the US and others were only too glad to sub-contract the responsibility for managing this intractable process to the UN.

The deployment of UNAVEM III did therefore mark some sort of departure for UN activities in the country. This was not so much in terms of pursuing different ends, which remained largely if

not wholly the same task of holding-the-ring between UNITA and the MPLA and managing an orderly transfer to a peaceful liberal social and political order. Rather it was the scope of UN management, and the means harnessed, that marked a departure for the UN in the Angolan context. Indeed, the UN was given some latitude to pursue the objectives of the settlement, which to a large extent was utilised by UN officials to drive the parties as far as possible down the path of the process. As we have seen, at times this was a farcical and desperate spectacle, with the UN engaged in endless rounds of high-level shuttle diplomacy to keep UNITA and the regime on-board.

But looking beyond this spectacle, the UN was actually engaged in a serious process of pragmatic politics and diplomacy, which was intended in one way or another to lock the parties into an inescapable web of international regulation. And to some extent this worked; for at least three-years the UN managed to keep UNITA in the game and moving very slowly down the path allotted to it. The only way UNITA could disentangle itself from the UN and the process at large was to lurch into all out war—an option it did eventually take and one which cost the movement very dearly. Indeed, with this act UNITA lost all remaining support and became hostage to the military and political changes that Central Africa was undergoing as a whole.

It can be concluded more generally though that the UN management of the Lusaka process underlines a certain generic standard of UN behaviour in post-colonial societies. That is to say, to some extent UN actions in Angola faintly reveal the political strategy of UN officials in their management of Southern societies and in their dealings with local elites. In the Lusaka process we see UN officials who understand the value and utility of discretion, compromise and pragmatism in embedding themselves into the politics of a situation and for the furtherance of the wider structural agenda underfoot. It is this art of manoeuvring the UN into the position of a powerful local patron that UN officials are so well versed—a skill it should be conceded that was forged during nascent UN transition operations in Jerusalem, West Irian and the Congo.

Chapter 7

United Nations Peace Operations and the Management of the World Political Order in the Periphery

‘How can we forget the betrayal of the hope that Patrice Lumumba placed in the United Nations? How can we forget the machinations and manoeuvres that followed in the wake of the occupation of that country by United Nations troops, under whose auspices the assassins of this great African patriot acted with impunity?...Who can deny the sad role that the imperialist compelled the United Nations to play?’

Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, 11 December 1964.

‘Il faut faire de la politique!’

Mahmoud Khiary, UN official in the Congo, 1961 cited in Conor Cruise O’Brien (To Katanga and Back, 1962).

The specificity of the UN and its peace operations

In the summer of 2003, the UN special representative to Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello, and twenty-two other UN officials were killed in a truck-bomb attack on the UN’s new headquarters in the troubled city of Baghdad. Sergio de Mello had just been appointed to this controversial posting, apparently at the behest of Washington because of his experience in running large-scale transitional authorities in East Timor and Kosovo and because of his notoriously tough-minded approach to local politics.⁵⁸⁸ The UN position in Iraq was of course a very delicate and complex one following the failure of the Anglo-American coalition to generate immediate backing and legitimacy for its invasion and subsequent occupation—and one of Mello’s immediate tasks was to lubricate the return of the international community to the country.⁵⁸⁹ Indeed the dispatch of Mello in June 2003, following Security Council Resolution 1483 (22 May 2003), marked a rapid attempt by secretary-general Annan to deploy the organisation in Iraq and re-involve itself in political, as well as humanitarian activities.⁵⁹⁰ Just over fifty years earlier and during what was essentially the very first political operation conducted by the UN in managing social change in the periphery, in Jerusalem in 1948, the UN ‘Chief Mediator’ and Swedish aristocrat and

⁵⁸⁸ Alexander Casella, ‘After the Bomb’ *Prospect*, September 2004, pp.15-16.

⁵⁸⁹ ‘Handmaid in Babylon: Annan, Vieira de Mello and the UN’s Decline and Fall’, Alexander Cockburn, *Counter Punch*, 30 August 2003. Later, in March 2004, the UN sent another prominent member of the UN establishment, Lakhdar Brahimi, to help the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III, in the political and diplomatic task of suturing an acceptable interim sovereign Iraqi government. UN Press Release SC/8035 (24 March 2004). ‘Security Council 4930th Meeting (AM). Security Council in Presidential Statement Strongly Supports Decision to Dispatch UN Assistance Teams to Iraq ‘As Soon As Possible.’’

⁵⁹⁰ S/RES/1483 (2003), operative paragraphs 8-9.

philanthropist, Count Folke Bernadotte, was assassinated by a member of the Stern Gang. The Count was shot at point blank range on his way back from Government Hill House in Jerusalem, which was then being considered as a possible UN headquarters, on 17 September 1948.⁵⁹¹ Both events, standing half a century apart, serve to powerfully remind us of the contested roles that the UN plays, especially in facilitating certain post-colonial settlements, and how locals and other actors can occasionally and violently object to this alien UN presence.⁵⁹² Of course in between these two notorious events the UN has carried out numerous activities under the catch-all rubric of 'peace operations' that have in one way or another sought to coax social and political change and, in the process of such assistance, have interceded in the local politics of these societies. Nearly every single one of these peace operations has been deployed in the Southern hemisphere, with the exception only of those deployed in the Former Yugoslavia, divided Cyprus, parts of the ex-Soviet Union and Central America.⁵⁹³ But in the course of such a widespread utilisation of these practices, particularly following the collapse of the Second World, they have come to be treated as a customary and perfectly acceptable set of activities for an international organisation to conduct in non-Western societies. It would seem that in today's world, UN peace operations have become an unquestioned facet of global politics—unless of course the onus of inquiry is to criticise the lack of UN action, the sluggish response of the Security Council or, more emotively, the 'indifference' of UN peacekeepers to the South. The singular critique of UN peacekeeping consequently remains a liberal one, which stresses that there is not nearly enough UN political intervention in the affairs of subject African and Asian societies.⁵⁹⁴

⁵⁹¹ Government Hill House remains UNTSO headquarters for the Middle East. On the Count and his activities refer to: David Hirst, *The Gun and the Olive Branch*, (London: Futura Publications, 1977).

⁵⁹² There still remains some speculation regarding the death of Hammarskjöld in an airplane crash in Central Africa in 1961. Some commentators have suggested that the DC-6B plane that he was travelling in was shot-down over Northern Rhodesia by European mercenaries incensed by the UN's position regarding Katanga. David N. Gibbs, 'Dag Hammarskjöld, the United Nations, and the Congo Crisis of 1960-1' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.31, no.1 (1993), p.163. There was also some loose speculation as to the causes of the crash of the light aircraft carrying UN special representative to Angola, Blondin Beye, in Cote d'Ivoire in June 1998 with some saying that it was UNITA initiated. More generally, the UN has often been the object of post-colonial violence: For instance, much is made in the Western world of the way local forces have targeted UN peacekeepers as a political strategy to precipitate early UN withdrawals, as in Somalia and Rwanda.

⁵⁹³ Strictly speaking, UN activities in Haiti and Central America are classified as being conducted in the Western hemisphere though they fit much more closely into the structure of the South. See Appendix Two.

⁵⁹⁴ This is not to say that other critiques of the UN do not exist, far from it. As recorded throughout this study there remain many individuals who have critically assessed various aspects of UN peace activities. Rather the point is simply that the mainstream account of UN peacekeeping is actually one that accepts uncritically the desirability and necessity of intervening in the South.

This study has sought to reverse this basic liberal conception of UN peace operations and provide in its place an alternative more critical account of the history, functions and politics of these practices. The objective of this final chapter is to bring together various elements of this alternative account and make some observations about what this study can tell us about the much broader issue of the management of world order in the periphery and international politics. But before going on to discuss various themes of the study, and its conclusions for how we understand the UN and wider international politics, it seems worthwhile to quickly run through the major narrative of the political and ideological specificity of UN peace operations that has been put forward over the previous six-chapters.

In a sense the negative side of this account has simply been to demonstrate that it is practically worthless to view UN peace operations as a normal, natural or neutral set of activities for the UN to conduct. The UN is an organisation that was clearly established to underpin a specific new type of world order—and its activities in the periphery of the world system during its early years, in Palestine, Suez and the Congo underline the retreat of the European world of empire blocks and the onset of the so-called ‘American Century’. But the UN’s ‘programme of work’ developed in unexpected ways as soon as the internal balance of forces moved decisively away from the American camp and towards the non-aligned movement in the 1960s. Then the organisation became far more concerned with issues of international economic equity and, in the light of various forms of covert and proxy great-power intervention, deeply worried about upholding the sovereignty of its African, Asian and Latin American members. During this period the UN was an organisation that resisted—however meekly and inconstantly—the ‘big-boss’ tendencies of the US in the General Assembly and was hostile to the prevailing liberal-capitalist orthodoxy. Later, when the collapse of the Second World finally unravelled the last remnants of organised resistance in the UN, the organisation was once again brought back into the Western fold and tasked with a new set of activities in many Southern states that can only be described as about reconfiguring the political wiring of these societies along neo-liberal lines. It may be added that simultaneously, the UN was unceremoniously stripped of the world economy functions that it had accrued for itself during the heady days of the 1970s—and even those mostly Keynesian values that were built into the UN Charter at its inception—and left to develop its skills in the areas of producing ‘good internal governance’ in non-Western states.

If we then consider the actual application of UN peace operations in the 1990s the myth of neutrality and impartiality is exposed even further; for these operations, and most others, were

deployed in circumstances in which there was a wider political and sometimes regional agenda underfoot and in a situation in which the UN was sub-contracted to micro-manage a transition in regimes and social order. Moreover, once fully deployed the UN collaborated and conflicted with other forces active in these situations—some of them external state actors—in order to push and promote its own particular agenda. It is hard to ignore some of the continuities in UN behaviour here: while between 1960 and 1962 the UN in the Congo served as a tentative proxy force for the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations and its entrance onto the stage of Central African politics by serving (eventually) to put down the succession of Katanga against some European interests, more recently in Angola, Rwanda and Somalia the least that can be said is that the UN merged broadly with the US point of view on the interpretation of its mandates and in its dealings with local forces.⁵⁹⁵ After all, in Somalia the UN was severally at odds with the Italian and French ‘approach’ to the local militias (i.e. with relation to General Aideed), and in Rwanda the UN was participating in a peace process that would lead to the near certain defeat of the incumbent regime and the end of a long era of French domination of the entire Central African region.⁵⁹⁶ And this is to say nothing of the way in which various local forces have been favoured or spurned by the UN and others, such as in the Congo where Patrice Lumumba was effectively decommissioned as a national force by the cabal of American UN officials running the Congo operation, or in Somalia where General Aideed was from the start deliberately disadvantaged by UN diplomacy that favoured the businessman Ali Mahdi.⁵⁹⁷

Taken together then, one aspect of the study has been to outline the political contingencies and specificities of these fairly curious activities that are now so regularly deployed in the South. To simply show how, before they gained uncontested hegemony within the organisation’s programme of work, they were a controversial and contested set of activities institutionally and, when applied, have often served the wider political and economic agendas of Western states. The other, one might say, positive side of this study has been to fashion an alternative account of UN peace activities that focuses on analysing them in terms of their engagement with subject societies, including their wider political functions and the way in which they are calibrated to

⁵⁹⁵ For an account of how the UN served to promote the US position in the Congo (over Katanga) against the European position, see: Gibbs, ‘Hammar skjöld’. For a detailed history of shifting US foreign relations with the Congo during this time, see: Stephen R. Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo 1960-1964*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974).

⁵⁹⁶ In Angola, the UN was drafted in to validate potential regime change and, more widely, facilitate the reintegration of the entire sub-region into capitalist world system (with varying roles in South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mozambique).

⁵⁹⁷ It is widely accepted by many directly concerned that UN Congo policy was run, apart from Dag Hammar skjöld, by three US-UN officials: Bunche, Cordier, and Wieschhoff.

engage in the local politics of any given situation, and the narrower political and ideological battle within the UN to determine the direction and spirit of the organisation. It is to various elements of this account and what it can tell us about international politics that the chapter now turns.

The long history of UN involvement in post-colonial affairs

One of the most under-explored and overlooked aspects of UN peace operations has been their long history of involvement with many Southern societies, especially in the African milieu. This is surprising considering the striking continuities and discontinuities of some of these encounters, especially the way in which the UN has acted as a conduit for social change in these societies in the immediate post-World War II era and in a Post-Command Economy world, as well as the way the UN has interceded in the local politics of these places. And in some ways it is difficult to get any sense of perspective about the nature of current forms of UN intervention and their recent applications, particularly in Africa, without looking at the broader contours of this engagement. It certainly seems fanciful to stress the lack and paucity of United Nations involvement in the Rwandan crisis of 1993 and 1994, as is often the case for instance, if it is acknowledged that the UN had been deeply involved in trying to modernise Rwandese social relations in the 1950s.

What is important to recognise here is that while the basis, extent, and occasionally orientation of the UN's political engagement in post-colonial societies may have ebbed and flowed according to the rhythms of international politics, transforming quite radically in some important respects, the UN has always been an important factor in the history of many of these places. Whether it has been the way in which the UN sought to push a particular colonial authority to expedite a transition to independence in the 1950s or 1960s, or has interceded in the form of a peacekeeping operation to manage a transition in local elites in the 1990s or 2000s, the UN has often been an intrinsic part of the post-colonial journey of several societies.

To some extent, therefore, there must be something more general, even elementary, about the UN's functions in parts of the Southern hemisphere that relates to the attempted management of local politics and imposition of order by external forces. On one level this of course relates to the novel modalities of intercession and patronage that were needed for a world that is universally divided-up into theoretically and formally equal and sovereign nation-states in which there is supposedly no global hierarchy. The UN was useful insofar as it could legitimate and effectively

govern aspects of this new order. While, to be sure, the larger 'concert-role' that the US envisaged for the UN did not long survive the perceived exigencies for regional security alliances such as NATO, the UN did manage through the Trusteeship Council and ad-hoc peacekeeping measures to develop an approximate ability to crisis manage transition in the periphery and develop unobtrusive formats for managing the native question that appeared at once sensitive to the new modalities of political organisation in the ex-colonies.⁵⁹⁸

Indeed from the very outset of the organisation's life some of its activities were directed towards helping manage—fairly loosely it may be conceded—the transition of social systems from European colonies to formally independent nation-states. The UN Trusteeship machinery was the most prevalent factor in this regard, with many African societies placed under the loose surveillance of the Trusteeship Council and its 'Visiting Missions'. But loose as this oversight may well have been, the UN Trusteeship system established the goal of independence for subject colonies as a legitimate and attainable one, and provided some checks and balances on the exercise of European power in these societies. Most importantly, it provided a set of timetables and functional checklists for the governing authorities to meet and attain in the 'progression' of these societies towards liberal and modern civilisation and, quite crucially, provided a source of support for this or that local force in their efforts against the Trusteeship Authority. For example the way in which the UN helped shape the Ruanda-Urundi Trusteeship in favour of the local Hutu party in the early 1950s by pushing the Belgian authorities to modernise social relations, labour laws, and educational rights and by giving a platform for PARMEHUTU to express their grievances and mobilise their supporters.⁵⁹⁹ In Somalia too the UN imposed strict conditions upon a return of Italy to the Horn of Africa, including timetables for certain progressive benchmarks to be met.

In a few other instances, the UN actually went beyond these official and relatively distant functions of Trusteeship to pursue activities that were much more heavily involved in directing the course of post-colonial politics. Here, there was a small set of actual peace operations that were deployed to directly manage social change—in Jerusalem, West Irian, and the Congo. What was important about these conveyance roles for the UN was that they moved the organisation into the arena of micro-managing post-colonial affairs. In the Congo in 1961, for example, the UN

⁵⁹⁸ For a lucid review of the institutional design of the UN by US planners, and how it subsequently diverged from this plan in practice, see: Gowan 'US:UN', pp.5-26.

⁵⁹⁹ Recall that later the UN tried to reverse some of the more 'illiberal' changes that had occurred as a result of the rapid political rise of PARMEHUTU. For details, see Chapter Five.

played a crucial role in delicately reconstructing the African face of Congolese politics after helping to remove Patrice Lumumba quite literally from the national scene. Locked away in the grounds of the University of Leopoldville, UN official Mahmoud Khiary and another colleague worked their magic among the assembled local forces to produce a government that's core they had pre-fixed before (some of those who were involved suggested this was achieved through outright bribery).⁶⁰⁰ This type of hands-on activity is now a mainstay of the UN's management of Southern politics—one need only recall the central role in manufacturing local settlements that the UN high-official, Lakhdar Brahimi, has played in recent years from fabricating a 'Loya Jirga' to seemingly 'rule' Afghanistan in 2002, to the negotiations that he conducted to bring-in an all Iraqi veneer (with Sunni Arab participation) and some semblance of international legitimacy to the Interim Iraqi Government and Anglo-American occupation.⁶⁰¹

In some important ways therefore early UN conveyance operations remain important antecedents to current peace activities, and can illuminate various aspects of the UN's political and historic role in world order management. In fact they show how one very controversial aspect of the UN's practices evolved to become the most significant contribution that the UN currently makes to maintaining political order, and its inherent hierarchy, in the periphery. This becomes all the more clear if we consider and compare the fluctuating historical fortunes of Trusteeship to these early peace operations. At first, however, peace operations were so tarnished with US seigniorage after the Congo episode that they became practically of no use and were temporarily decommissioned. Here, the actions of UN officials in Leopoldville during the crucial hours and days that led to Lumumba's political immobilisation, and later physical elimination, stirred-up a great deal of bitterness and enmity directed at the organisation in general and the secretary-general in particular.⁶⁰² The episode clearly demonstrated to the UN the dangers, among many others, of becoming too closely associated and identified with US interests.⁶⁰³ One manifestation of this was that while at the beginning of the operation it was seen as wholly unproblematic to have three prominent American citizens run virtually every aspect of the UN operation in the Congo—Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinz Wieschhoff—by the end it was seen as politically expedient

⁶⁰⁰ Weissman, *American Foreign Policy in the Congo*, p.189.

⁶⁰¹ Loya Jirga is Pashto for 'grand council', where tribal elders meet to settle disputes. Brahimi was a key architect of the 'Bonn Agreement', which created the interim administration led by Karzai.

⁶⁰² Recall the demand of the Soviet Union for Hammarskjöld to resign and for a Troika of officials to replace the position of secretary-general. More generally, for Non-Aligned member-states, UN actions were seen as unashamedly driven by US interests.

⁶⁰³ A lesson the UN has had to relearn in the wake of the attack on the UN in Iraq, which killed de Mello in 2003.

to bring on board as an outer core some extra-American personalities.⁶⁰⁴ The temporary lull in the utilisation of these activities was also, of course, crucially related to the decline of the US ability to corral various representative organs of the UN; while the Congo operation occurred at the very highpoint of the US domination of these various organs and offices of the UN, the birth of many new Afro-Asian states during this period marked the beginning of organised NAM resistance towards the US-UN agenda. It was only with the collapse of this resistance, in the late 1980s, and the shift in power back from the General Assembly to the Security Council, that UN conveyance operations became so widely and freely utilised.

In contrast, the machinery of Trusteeship was very active during the 1960s and 1970s, becoming an established feature of the UN landscape. But by its very nature the Trusteeship system, defined to bring about only one type of social transition in the periphery (from colonialism to independence), was a finite one. As formal colonies evaporated, the agenda of the Council shortened and shortened until it no longer had any outstanding decolonisation issues to resolve, which happened on 1 October 1994 with the independence of Palau.⁶⁰⁵ Here the slow and inevitable death of the Trusteeship system has meant that the highly specialised ‘peace operation’ has become the surviving UN mechanism for managing transition in the South. It is in this context that the debate about a ‘revitalisation’ of the Trusteeship Council around perhaps ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed states’ needs to be understood. The debate was about recalibrating the UN to formally and permanently manage the affairs of its most troublesome African and Asian members—perhaps ‘overseeing’ the reconstruction of a state by a supposedly ‘benevolent’ Western power or even exercising ‘executive authority’ of the state itself. As Edward Mortimer, Director of Communications in the Office of the secretary-general has suggested, the international community could: ‘...revive and reform the Trusteeship Council, using it as a mechanism through which the community of nations could effectively exercise the tutelage and responsibility for the interests of those unfortunate peoples who from time to time find themselves in need of international protection’.⁶⁰⁶ While this prospect has for now been killed-off because of its overtones of paternalism and colonialism, in effect the UN is endorsing these practices and conducting these types of protectorates under different institutional names and through ad hoc arrangements.⁶⁰⁷ Certainly, the UN has recently endorsed Western military

⁶⁰⁴ Conor Cruise O’Brien, *To Katanga and Back* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p.55.

⁶⁰⁵ After the independence of Palau, the Trusteeship Council was subsequently suspended.

⁶⁰⁶ Edward Mortimer, ‘International Administration of War-Torn Societies’, *Global Governance*, vol.10, issue 1 (2004), p.5.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.* p.2.

occupation (Afghanistan) and actually taken over the executive roles of the state, as was the case with Sergio Vieira de Mello in East Timor in 2000. More broadly, a great deal of the UN's peace activities feature important elements of 'international administration'—from Cambodia to Somalia—it is just that for political and ideological reasons the institutionalisation of these practices has become much more opaque and the phraseology toned-down to innocuous terms such as 'Transitional Authority' and 'Transitional Administration'.⁶⁰⁸ Unsurprisingly, UN managers have quietly ignored the bold labels and names, such as 'Guardianship', that some liberal Western commentators have earnestly suggested for these practices.⁶⁰⁹

The simple overall point surely is that the UN has forged a role for itself—in different ways and at different times—in managing our unique world order of 'independent' nation states in the very periphery of the world system. These roles have evolved along their most extreme and controversial axis of UN conveyance operations that micro-manage local elites and administer local affairs to become the specialised and privileged focus of the organisation. Moving on to discuss the specific functions and practices of current UN peace operations will help unpick this unique role in world affairs further.

The functions of UN peace operations

From the perspective of this study there should be little doubt that the functions of UN peace operations are related in the broadest sense to managing transitions in social order in the periphery. From the controversial conveyance operations that were conducted in the UN's early years to the widespread use of peace operations within states in our current post-Cold War era, these activities all share the same function of helping oversee various transformations of social life. By now we also know that the essential difference between these two eras relates to the type of transformation underway: in the early years the UN forged a role in helping manage the transition from colonialism to independence, whereas from the late 1980s the UN began to specialise in reforming state structures, managing political transformations and even handling regime change between local elites.

⁶⁰⁸ For example, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

⁶⁰⁹ While Peter Lyon cautions against the use of the 'old name' of Trusteeship, he suggests the term 'Guardianship': Lyon, 'The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship', p.108.

What we can say about the current era of transformation that the UN is engaged in delivering in the periphery is that it dates back to the universalisation of the liberal market-economy orientated state that followed the debt crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Indeed these moments allowed for the historic integration of the 'Second World' and 'Third World' into the liberal-capitalist and US led 'First World'.⁶¹⁰ This has, to be sure, been a very problematic and difficult process. In the Second World of Eastern Europe, subjected to a different intensity of integration than the Third World, the coordinated Western policy of 'Shock Therapy' has been an unremitting and brutal exercise in disciplining and rationalising the political economy of the region.⁶¹¹ It has also been about breaking-up the area's interdependencies in favour of what Peter Gowan has suggested is a hub-and-spokes relationship with Western Europe and the US.⁶¹² This aspect would also seem to be a partial template utilised in the Third World context—especially as it relates to the politics of debt and loan negotiations. By forcing each and every post-colonial state to negotiate separately with Western banks, aid agencies, and ministries of finance, the collective ability of these states to resist or rebel has been significantly reduced. Nevertheless, in general it is fair to suggest that the intensity of integration into a universal liberal capitalist order has been different in the periphery than it has been in Central and Eastern Europe, near the heartlands of global capitalism.

In the South, the Third World developmental state has been the prime object of reform and remodelling, with international economic institutions playing a lead role in embedding the regulatory framework of neo-liberalism through legislation protecting the sanctity of private property, the freedom of foreign capital, and the privatisation of a whole host of public utilities and services.⁶¹³ This has entailed much more than simply promoting technical economic reforms; it has been about carving-out working market-economies from the ashes of command economies, or mixed systems, and helping to foster social forces that can nurture and then protect the new

⁶¹⁰ The integration of the Second and Third World into one universal capitalist order was precisely what the Clinton Administration's national security strategy of 'engagement and enlargement' was about—extending and deepening free markets and democracy. *A National Security Strategy For A New Century* (Washington D.C: the White House, October 1998). Still for a short time after the collapse of the Soviet Union this universal capitalist order retained a couple of significant exclusions, most important in terms of the world market was China and to a lesser extent North Korea. For an interesting discussion of these issues, see: Cummings, 'The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East', and Gowan, 'The American Campaign For Global Sovereignty', pp.2-27.

⁶¹¹ For a detailed examination of the strategy of Shock Therapy in Eastern Europe, its theory, application and social consequences, see: Gowan, *The Global Gamble*, pp.187-247.

⁶¹² Ibid. p.190.

⁶¹³ This is a process that Leo Panitch has generally called the process of 'Constitutionalising neo-liberalism' at the state and inter-state level. Panitch, *Rethinking the Role of the State*, p.96.

capitalist order.⁶¹⁴ For example, Western aid channelled to ‘civil society’ is often targeted to circumnavigate the apparatus of the state and cultivate local forces such as the by now ubiquitous liberal orientated NGO—a development it may be added that has changed the whole character of sovereignty in the periphery.⁶¹⁵ As important as carving out an autonomous economic and civil sphere has been the drive to reconstruct the ‘political kingdom’ along formal liberal democratic lines.⁶¹⁶ This has been as much about dislodging old elites and empowering new modern ones as it has been about creating a political infrastructure that is imitable to external public and private interests.⁶¹⁷ One important facet of this, as William Robinson has detailed, is political aid from G-7 and OECD public and private institutions to Western orientated local political parties that will guarantee the continuation and extension of this new order.⁶¹⁸ Another has been the way in which various Western institutions have sought to implant, nurture, and bolster potentially sympathetic and like-minded bureaucratic units and departments against others with embedded interests in the ‘old order’—such as ministries of finance against ministries of industry.⁶¹⁹

The role of the United Nations in this transformation has been focused on addressing the political side of this project in particularly troublesome African and Asian societies that have been racked with organised political violence. It would be foolish to argue here that this function was ever meant to be a total and thorough refashioning and reconstruction of the political fabric of these places—certainly from what we have seen in a couple of African contexts they were fairly hasty and often haphazard.⁶²⁰ And save for the total and long-term occupation of a society by external forces, such as that which occurred in post-World War II Germany and Japan, the project of completely embedding a liberal market democracy may never long survive the vicissitudes of events.⁶²¹ It would seem wise therefore to consider recent UN roles with some circumspection,

⁶¹⁴ Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique Since Independence*, (London: Hurst & Co, 1997), p.227.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid. pp.217-234.

⁶¹⁶ Young, *You Europeans Are Just Like Fish!* p.123.

⁶¹⁷ As Robinson explains the matter: ‘The purpose of ‘democracy promotion’ is not to suppress but to penetrate and conquer civil society in intervened countries, that is, the complex of ‘private’ organizations such as political parties, trade unions, the media, and so forth, and *from therein*, integrate subordinate classes and national groups into a hegemonic social order.’ Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*, p.29.

⁶¹⁸ Ibid. pp.73-116.

⁶¹⁹ Broad, *Unequal Alliance*, pp.12-19.

⁶²⁰ Again, the focus of much recent debate in the literature has been the necessary depth and longevity of UN peace operations. See Paris’s concept of Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation in *At War’s End*, pp.179-211.

⁶²¹ Germany and Japan were not only reconstructed along liberal political economy lines but they were also compelled to forgo many of their great power prerogatives. Deudney and Ikenberry refer to them as ‘semi-sovereign’ or ‘partial great powers’, where they have in important respects been tied into a US global liberal order. Deudney and Ikenberry, ‘The nature and sources of liberal international order’, p.188. For an

especially in those instances in which the comprehensive transformation of a society and success of a peace operation has been hastily proclaimed by the UN after the completion of Western-style presidential or parliamentary elections.⁶²²

But be this as it may, the UN has successfully forged a niche role for itself in the post-1989 universal capitalist system that is trained on the ability of the organisation and its officials to shepherd a change in political systems and to reorganise institutions of law and order at the borderlands of the international system. And the immediate effect of these activities and their utility for world order management should not be downplayed—if only because the UN remains the only institution with the technical capacity, expertise and international authority to carry out these delicate and sensitive functions. As the George W. Bush Administration has discovered to its cost in Iraq, United Nations peace activities are useful not only because they intercede in local politics in seemingly unobtrusive ways, but also because they often have the competence to suture local elites into one political programme—as was shown by the momentary success of Lakhdar Brahimi in forging a quasi-sovereign Interim Iraqi Government and National Independent Electoral Commission in June 2004.⁶²³

The straightforward role of the UN in this particular post-1989 transformation of problematic Southern societies, therefore, has been to perform certain political and institution-building tasks. The recasting of national institutions to give some substance to the state has obviously been an important, largely technical, role here with the UN providing expertise and funding for training police forces, armies and the judiciary. While on one level this has simply been about ensuring the continued viability of the state in peripheral lands (something we will come on to discuss shortly), it has also been about reformulating existing institutions to embody liberal values. For example, human rights components have now become a significant dimension of UN ‘institution building’, such as in police training programmes that the UN has conducted in East Timor and Kosovo.⁶²⁴ The capacity of the UN to manage the political process too—the organisation, conduct

in depth discussion of Germany and Japan’s integration, see: John W. Dower, *Embracing defeat: Japan in the aftermath of World War II* (London: Allen Lane, 1999); Richard L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. occupation policy and the German public, 1945-1949* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); and John Montgomery, *Forced to be Free: the Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957).

⁶²² A point made by Margaret Hall and Tom Young in: *Confronting Leviathan*, p.234.

⁶²³ UN Press Release SC/8113 (11 June 2004): ‘Security Council 4984th Meeting (PM). Lakhdar Brahimi Briefs Security Council on ‘complicated and delicate’ process leading to Iraq’s Interim Government, Electoral Commission.’

⁶²⁴ The Brahimi Report (A/55/305–S/2000/809), paragraph 39.

and independent verification of an election for instance—has also been relied upon to plant the seeds of formal pluralism and has been used as a symbolic marker of change in these states and their wider integration into international society.

But in a sense the role of UN peace operations that has just been outlined is only one albeit crucial side of the story—the side that looks at the specific place of the UN in integrating borderlands states into a universal international capitalist system after 1989. The other side of story is the one of the fungible nature of these functions today and of the fluctuating fortunes of the UN in trying to expand, consolidate and formalise these roles. Indeed, what is striking when we look at the spread of peace operations that the UN has conducted in the 1990s and 2000s is the attempt of the UN to market its prospective practices as actions designed to prohibit the disintegration of the international system in the South. It has been portrayed as the UN seeking to rehabilitate ‘failed’ and ‘collapsed’ states, where sovereignty has ‘lapsed’ and the integrity of the international (capitalist) system is under threat.⁶²⁵ In Somalia these types of arguments were successfully utilised by UN managers to buffer their case for a forceful UN take-over of the country and as part of an attempt to expand the organisation’s repertoire of peace activities. Part of the rationale here has been to suggest that the UN’s real utility is its ability to monitor the borderlands for disintegrating states and its capacity to resolve any such situation through the reconstruction of the vital institutions of the state and management, temporarily of course, of the local political process.

What it is absolutely crucial to recognise is that the UN is trying to transform what is potentially a transitory set of functions in the South—post-1989—into a much more permanent set of roles. Indeed, the emphasis of UN discourse and behaviour is towards intimating that it could and should have a much more enduring and possibly formalised role in managing post-colonial politics; hence the debate about a revival and redefinition of the Trusteeship Council that we have already discussed as well as the ongoing attempts of UN managers to institutionalise its peace practices through such documents as the ‘Brahimi Report’.⁶²⁶ In addition, unlike the decolonisation process and the UN’s role within it, which was inevitably a finite one, the set of tasks that the UN is conducting today are far more malleable to the needs and wants of the global capitalist order. Not only can the UN move from one African state to another peddling its format

⁶²⁵ Mortimer, ‘International administration of war-torn societies’, p.2.

⁶²⁶ As detailed in Chapter Three, the ‘Brahimi Report’ (A/55/305–S/2000/809) is an important recent attempt by UN officials to institutionalise and expand the organisation’s peace practices.

for liberal change but the very institutional reforms and political projects that the UN implements can be tuned according to the ever-shifting fashions of global governance. Liberal human rights for instance has become an ever-growing part of UN peace operations throughout the 1990s; attempts too by the UN to break into the sphere of 'civil society' through various educational and 'outreach' programmes have added an extra-dimension to peace operations. It is not then that the specific emphasis of UN conveyance functions have remained or will continue to be strictly fixed, as just stated they are always in flux, but that the UN is seeking to formalise its position as transmitter of these evolving functions. One key aspect of this generic role that can be identified in our current era is the UN's position as a manager of local politics and as an arbiter of the 'native question'.

The UN's engagement in the local politics of post-colonial states

When UN peace activities are viewed in their broad historic context, it is hard to ignore the fact that the organisation and its high-officials have played an important role in the local politics of many Southern societies. In the post-1989 milieu the UN has dramatically expanded and, in some regards, deepened this role with at any one time dozens of UN managers deployed 'on-the-ground' or in 'the field' to help direct and steer UN operations and carry out explicit and implicit diplomatic tasks. Various observations can be made about this engagement, which relate to the role of the UN in transmitting a certain Western diplomatic agenda among local elites and in occasionally mediating inter-capitalist competition in the periphery. An important aspect of this relationship is the way in which UN peace operations are sometimes developed to promote orderly and peaceful changes in local regimes: in both Angola and Rwanda the UN mission was structured to oversee a transfer in regimes though, in the event, they both unfolded in unexpected ways. But when it comes to the deployment and implementation of a peace operation, the UN often shapes the local political scene according to the preferences of one or another external power. Here the UN may not only play an important role in promoting Western interests in any given local context, but the UN may also work towards the agenda of one major power in its competition with others in the Southern hemisphere.

This is not necessarily a new development; in the Congo in the 1960s, the UN through its representative in Leopoldville, Andrew Cordier, significantly helped shape the political battle that was developing between President Kasa Vubu and the Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba in favour of the former. It is no secret here that a great deal of the Western world, and Cordier himself,

considered the nationalist Prime Minister a serious threat to African order and were contriving in various ways to exclude him from the political scene.⁶²⁷ Indeed Cordier was well aware of the President's plan to dismiss Lumumba and his parliament in the September 1960 'Constitutional Crisis' and was explicitly asked by Kasa Vubu to help him ensure the success of such a manoeuvre by closing down the radio stations and grounding all air-traffic in the country—requests that Cordier in due course acceded to.⁶²⁸ Considering the fact that Lumumba's powerbase was in the east of the country in Stanleyville, 800 miles from the capital, and the fact that sympathetic forces across the river, in Congo-Brazzaville, had made their airwaves available to the pro-Western President, these were highly political decisions that helped tip the balance decisively in favour of Kasa Vubu. On this occasion the UN's choices chimed with the broader direction of Western policy—from the UK, France and Belgium to the US—which sought to ensure that a decolonised Congo would not diverge too far from the path of paternalism that Brussels had envisaged or threaten the social, economic or political status of the continent in general. But later when this inter-state capitalist consensus was breaking down, essentially over issues regarding the territorial integrity of the country and the privileged position of Belgian companies in mineral-rich Katanga, the UN moved towards the US position and reading of the situation. Here the UN eventually enforced the reintegration of the renegade province of Katanga and deposed European and other white mercenaries that had propped up the Elizabethville regime, all against European public opinion.⁶²⁹ In the broadest sense, therefore, the direction of the UN in Katanga was consistent with the way in which it was occasionally utilised to extricate European powers from certain post-colonial situations (recall Suez as the other obvious example) and the way it served as a mechanism to promote the US agenda above its European competitors. Certainly, from the perspective of the Kennedy Administration, the UN in the Congo was seen as a useful surrogate for direct US intervention because it was helping to breakdown the monopoly

⁶²⁷ Even after Kasa Vubu launched his mini-coup (itself an idea pressed on him by various members of the Belgian community) the CIA were in the late stages of planning an assassination attempt, which had envisaged Lumumba being poisoned by a European mercenary. Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, had sent 'The Firm's' Chief Scientist, Gottlieb, to Leopoldville in October 1960 to deliver the toxin to be used in the operation. De Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*, pp.46-51.

⁶²⁸ Very few commentators, including many of the personalities involved, deny the impact of the UN's actions on the course of events during the 1960 'Constitutional Crisis'. What commentators disagree about is the legitimacy and legality of such action as well as the motives of Cordier and Hammarskjöld. But given the release of recent documents in the UN and in Belgium, and the research of Ludo de Witte in this regard, it seems more than reasonable to suggest that the UN in general and the personalities in particular (Cordier and Hammarskjöld) were happy to see the marginalisation of Lumumba and that they helped within their limited parameters to facilitate such an end. For the official version of these events, see: Urquhart, *A Life in Peace and War*; Urquhart, *Hammarskjöld*; and General Carl von Horn, *Soldiering for Peace* (New York: David McKay Company INC, 1966). For more critical points of view, see: O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, and de Witte, *The Assassination of Lumumba*.

⁶²⁹ O'Brien, *To Katanga and Back*, pp.195-247.

of European powers in Central Africa and transmitting the Administration's shifting Africa agenda.⁶³⁰

Though perhaps not as patently transparent as the Congo episode, there remain some important continuities in this type of relationship of which the UN is a part with its major patrons. In Somalia, the UN diverged from the European position quite starkly, with a public row erupting between the Italian government and Kofi Annan over the political dialogue that the Italian peacekeeping contingents were pursuing with General Aideed and his sub-clan in 1993. This particular episode was merely the outward manifestation of competing Western agendas in the Horn of Africa and their support for this or that local force.⁶³¹ In Rwanda too, there was a general divergence between the UN and US support for the RPF, and the French backing of the incumbent regime. In the first place the role of the UN was to oversee a peace process whose major political import was to bring to power an exile rebel army, which had been reared in Uganda and its key officers trained in the US, and to end the rule of a regime that had been a stalwart ally of the French establishment in Central Africa. When this transition collapsed in April 1994, the UN made good on its previous diplomatic demarches to the regime and left it to be driven out of the country and into Zaire by the advancing RPF.⁶³²

Whether the UN is tasked with administering a political transition or mediating inter-state capitalist conflict in post-colonial societies, one of the distinctive aspects of many peace operations over the years has been the way that UN officials have been intimately involved in these processes. From the Congo and Rwanda to Kosovo and East Timor, it has been high-UN officials deployed *on the ground* or *in the field* who have had to convert the various political agendas into a reality. This has become particularly noticeable in our current era, where over the last decade there has been a rapid increase in UN political officials and civil administrators, above

⁶³⁰ Gibbs, 'Dag Hammarskjöld' pp.170-171. For the extensive covert entanglement of the US in Central African politics, relating particularly to CIA engagement in underwriting counter-revolutionary operations in the Congo from the early 1960s onwards, see the recent historical work by Piero Gleijeses in: *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), pp.57-76, pp.124-159.

⁶³¹ Prunier, 'The Experience of European Armies in Operation Restore Hope', p.145.

⁶³² Of course, the UN Security Council did belatedly authorise—in the face of growing international media and public pressure—a military humanitarian operation led by France. One consequence of *Operation Turquoise*, as the intervention was labelled, was that it served to slow the unhindered advance of the RPF and its complete capture of territory—an outcome that reflected the French desire to forestall the total destruction of its ally.

that of the traditional 'Blue Helmet', deployed in various peace roles.⁶³³ In many respects this rise would seem to herald the institutionalisation of the UN's political functions of managing and mediating between various internal forces in the periphery and the partial shedding of those excess military roles. In the first place this has something to do with the shifting division of labour that the UN is part of in relation to international peacemaking. Here, as David Chandler has argued, there has been a farming-out of potential military functions to organisations such as NATO that are better disposed to total Western public and private control and a concentration of the UN on the specialist tasks of rebuilding institutions and administering subject states.⁶³⁴ Both Kosovo and Afghanistan were important moments in the construction of such a new global order. But it has also been a matter of the UN seeking to consolidate and expand its political functions in the South by the creation of whole new categories of UN peace practices such as 'preventative diplomacy' and 'post-conflict peace-building'. With relation to the first there has been the tentative establishment in the UN Secretariat of a bureaucratic structure of political surveillance of the South, no matter how rudimentary this may be, as well as a far more serious attempt to create a cadre of UN envoys who are dispatched to the borderlands in order to suture local elites, or offset rebellion from below, through diplomacy.⁶³⁵ There are even 'best practices' and irregular seminars hosted for how these officials should go about achieving cooperation from local forces in the implementation of their mandates. For example in 'Command From the Saddle', the Recommendations Report of the Forum on Special Representatives, much is made about the UN's mutual synergies with Bretton Woods Institutions:

'The SRSR and the senior representative of the World Bank in the mission can be very helpful to one another...Establishing co-operative relations with the World Bank in particular can have a large positive impact on the degree of co-operation between the parties and the UN system.'⁶³⁶

In the case of post-conflict peace-building, an activity formally introduced into the lexicon of UN peace practices by *An Agenda For Peace*, the UN has effectively deepened its civilian and

⁶³³ There were 84 UN Special Representatives, Deputy Representatives and Envoys deployed in dozens of countries, in a couple of regions and in various capacities as of October 2005. To browse through these titles—as well as the very prominent individuals who fill them—see: <www.un.org/news/ossgrsrg>.

⁶³⁴ Chandler, 'International Justice', pp.55-66.

⁶³⁵ Rudimentary because, as this author observed during 2000, the institutionalised surveillance aspect of 'preventative diplomacy' consisted of a dozen officers responsible for monitoring various regions and countries with little more than open media sources to guide them.

⁶³⁶ Recommendations Report of the Forum on Special Representatives, *Command From the Saddle: Managing United Nations Peace-Building Missions*, (Oslo: FAFO), p.23.

political functions of institution-building and, in some cases, carried out executive roles. This has been justified by UN managers and sympathetic commentators with the argument that to rehabilitate a society you need to move beyond the façade of signed peace accords or the conduct of one democratic election and move into the reconstitution of various elements of the state and civil society.⁶³⁷ Based in the Department of Political Affairs, as is ‘preventative diplomacy’, post-conflict peace building reflects the shifting emphasis of the UN’s programme of work over the decades from the economic to the political and from the international to the domestic.⁶³⁸ Indeed, the creation and subsequent evolution of the Department of Political Affairs in general indicates a bid to universalise and institutionalise the ad-hoc UN roles in overseeing and managing the local politics of Southern societies.

What we can conclude from the observations outlined above about the role of the UN in the periphery is that the organisation has had a long history of seeking to manage transformations in social life in the South and that, very recently, the UN has sought to institutionalise and formalise many of these extreme and rather controversial ‘conveyance’ roles. This has especially been the case with the UN’s political responsibility for managing local elites and for administering the appropriate reconstruction of various institutions of law and order in the post-colonial state. This radically reshaped ‘work’ of the UN—its overbearing emphasis on the peace activities outlined above—ultimately reflects the shifting way in which world order in its widest sense is organised and managed, and the way the UN as an institution has functioned to historically promote or resist such orders depending on its internal correlation of forces. It is to these wider political processes that the chapter now turns.

The evolving organisation and management of world order in the periphery

It should by now be clear that the UN has played a significant role in the organisation and management of our contemporary world order in the periphery. What we can reasonably surmise here is that there are two-sides to this role: the historic one that has witnessed the UN tasked with trying to integrate peripheral states into a universal liberal capitalist order after the collapse of the Soviet Union and other Command Economies; and an ongoing one that has seen UN managers and G-7 states seek to forge an organisation whose focus is set on a generalised surveillance of the borderlands and on conducting crisis diplomacy in the local politics of these places. The

⁶³⁷ Brahimi Report (A/55/305–S/2000/809), paragraphs 38–39.
⁶³⁸ See Chapter Three for an examination of the institutional mechanics of this process.

shifting internal organisation of the UN's departments and programmes over the 1990s and 2000s reflects the evolution of these twin roles, with increasing emphasis being placed on institutionalising and broadening the political functions that the UN conducts within Southern states. Here, in lieu of the formal revival of the Trusteeship Council, the creation and subsequent expansion of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has been fundamental to the project of formalising the UN's place in micro-managing local elites and temporarily administering post-conflict societies.⁶³⁹

We are now in a position to say that these evolving tasks in the periphery amount to a fairly intrusive regime of supervision and political regulation by the UN over Southern societies and, as David Chandler has argued, mark a dramatic and general erosion of the principle of sovereign-equality for these particular states.⁶⁴⁰ It is not necessarily the case that these places have not experienced the interventionary practices of the UN before. Far from it, there has often been a long history of past UN involvement in many post-colonial contexts such as in the Congo, Rwanda, and Somalia. Nor is it the case that sovereignty and the non-interference in the internal affairs of states clause of the UN Charter (Article 2,7) was ever meaningfully respected by a whole range of state and inter-state actors—who in any case necessarily and very deliberately developed alternative and fairly successful templates for influencing events and shaping various

⁶³⁹ The creation of a department for the UN's new institutionalised political roles in the periphery—the DPA—has been important in order to formalise and rationalise these roles. But a department in the UN Secretariat is no substitute for a revival and redefinition of one of the consultative organs, such as the Trusteeship Council, which would legitimate these pervasive peace practices as a formal UN activity. Having said this there is some not insignificant utility in keeping the situation as it is—without any additional oversight by potentially hostile, Third World, states. After all, peace operations are ultimately authorised and overseen by the Security Council.

⁶⁴⁰ The question of the retreat of formal sovereignty in the South in the 1990s as a result of the rise of peace operations is one that is persuasively tackled by David Chandler in: *From Kosovo to Kabul* and 'International Justice.' This study of peace operations broadly agrees with Chandler's formative arguments relating to the consequences of the new doctrines of intervention for sovereignty in the South. A question mark however remains as to the extent to which there has become an effective or generalised division of labour between NATO and the UN, with the former now carrying out the military roles and the UN conducting the civilian ones. Clearly this has happened in some form or another in Afghanistan and Kosovo and it may translate in the future into other cases. But it remains to be seen whether this system can be stretched to incorporate the key objects of the UN's interventionary practices today, at the very borderlands of international politics and capitalism. Both Kosovo and Afghanistan, and Iraq if NATO involves itself further in the country, have historically been the sites of various forms of great power conflict and inter-capitalist competition. Furthermore, the extent to which Chandler suggests that there has existed *in practice* a 'UN Charter System' is open to some speculation: as we have seen, a world of equal nation-states also saw the development of different modalities of intervention, from UN peacekeeping and low-intensity conflict to 'democracy promotion' and outright great-power intercession. And, in any case, the UN's historical preoccupation with 'sovereign-equality' was in part a function of the very real concern of Non-Aligned states at what they considered the general and widespread interference in their societies by Western Europe and the US.

dimensions of the post-colonial state.⁶⁴¹ But rather, what marks this emerging regime out from what has gone before it is that the UN's practices have moved from an informal and contested repertoire of political activities in the South to a formal and institutionalised set of activities that are much more freely utilised and widely accepted as a device for world order management in the periphery. This has necessarily seen a subtle redefinition of the organising principles of the inter-state system.

Perhaps most significantly the last couple of decades have seen a gradual chipping-away of the rhetorical façade of sovereignty in the South by UN managers and G-7 leaders who have sought to put forward various doctrines for the international oversight and management of peripheral lands. The seeds of this were evident in the seminal *Agenda for Peace*, which was written by UN managers seeking to crystallise a new order of UN intervention in Africa and Asia, from suggesting the creation of 'peace enforcement units' to the questioning of the need for local 'consent' before the deployment of any peacekeeping operation.⁶⁴² To a significant extent these new ideas were translated into practice by the UN in Somalia, where a discourse of 'collapsed-states' was aggressively marketed to justify a forceful international take-over of the territory in 1992 and 1993. Here, the UN and US argued that because the institutions of the state had lapsed and the territory had descended into lawlessness and anarchy, the international community had an obligation to temporarily administer the country and return the land and its people back into the family of nations.⁶⁴³ Of course, what is noteworthy here is that the notional legitimacy of universal sovereignty is not itself under attack—once fully rehabilitated countries like Somalia could once more be 'sovereign'. Rather, what is being put forward is a criteria of what Robert Jackson has called 'empirical statehood' for determining which states are subject to interventionary supervision and practices and which are not.⁶⁴⁴ This has, in effect, created

⁶⁴¹ On a deeper level the UN itself was product of a specific attempt of US post-World War II planners to develop an extra-European and non-territorially based world order over which the US could indirectly preside. Later, UN peace operations were precisely seen as a useful template for managing post-colonial affairs because they would not violate the principles of sovereignty in the periphery.

⁶⁴² Recall how *Agenda for Peace* suggested '...Forces under Article 43' would be useful '...in meeting any threat posed by a military force of a lesser order', and how the same document hinted that '...consent of all parties concerned' may in future not be necessary. *Agenda For Peace*, paragraph 43.

⁶⁴³ Madeline Albright's comments in August 1993 remain the most emblematic in this regard: 'The decision we must make is whether to pull up stakes and allow Somalia to fall back into the abyss or stay the course and help lift the country and its people from the category of failed state into that of an emerging democracy. For Somalia's sake, and for ours, we must persevere.' Albright cited in: Boutros-Ghali, *Unvanquished*, p.96.

⁶⁴⁴ Robert H. Jackson. *Quasi-states, Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

different classes of states—with a bottom tier of states unquestionably subjected to international regulation and general interference.⁶⁴⁵

But beyond the prevalence of such a rationale to justify international intervention today in Afghanistan, Kosovo and elsewhere, there has also developed a much more general discourse relating to the international oversight of post-colonial states. This essentially relates to the doctrine of 'good internal governance', which has been put forward as a set of liberal political and economic standards that Southern states must adhere to if they are to avoid international censure and discipline.⁶⁴⁶ That is to say, the rights and privileges of states and their regimes have been increasingly made conditional on them meeting a whole host of standards, from some acceptable level of formal pluralism and human rights to meeting the basic requirements of a free-market economy.⁶⁴⁷ The UN has been at the forefront of this campaign with an increasingly large institutional structure dedicated to monitoring and advancing various political and social dimensions of this 'good internal governance' agenda. Perhaps one of the most important organisational developments has been the creation of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which is calibrated to instil local institutions and societies with appropriate liberal values, including through democracy and human rights promotion.⁶⁴⁸ Indeed, an institutional system is being tentatively fashioned under the name of 'preventative diplomacy' in the DPA to monitor and respond to the haemorrhaging of liberal values in any given Southern state.⁶⁴⁹ This concept, given its elastic and evolving nature, is even beginning to be used by the UN to justify pre-emptively pushing liberal political change on trouble-ridden states.⁶⁵⁰ But in every case, the basic outcome has been to allow the UN much more freedom to comment on, and interfere in, the

⁶⁴⁵ For an incisive critique of Robert Jackson's taxonomy, see: Roxanne L. Doty, *Imperial Encounters: the politics of representation in North-South Relations* (Minnesota, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp.145-162.

⁶⁴⁶ The concept of good internal governance was also introduced into the lexicon of international diplomacy by *An Agenda For Peace*, which announced: 'The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty...has passed...it is the task of leaders of states to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world.' *An Agenda For Peace*, paragraph 17.

⁶⁴⁷ For example as in: *An Agenda For Peace*, paragraphs 9-10, 17-19, 81-82.

⁶⁴⁸ A/59/2005 (21 March 2005). 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all, report of the secretary-general', paragraphs 140-152.

⁶⁴⁹ The release of the Brahimi Report in September 2000 resulted in much bureaucratic manoeuvring in the UN International Secretariat. Considering the contents of the report and its emphasis on preventative diplomacy and post-conflict peace building, DPA officials were fairly satisfied with the report and began enthusiastically planning for the new and deepened focus on peace activities. This author participated in a couple of these preparations—one of which was a packed 'conflict-prevention seminar' held in the Secretariat in New York in November 2000 for UN officials to get-up to speed with the latest developments in 'early warnings' and 'preventative diplomacy'.

⁶⁵⁰ As in the UN 'Millennium Report' (A/54/2000), p.45.

internal politics of the weakest sets of states in the international system. Needless to say this is a significant development for an organisation whose *raison d'être* was the theoretical sovereign-equality of all its member-states, and whose documentary output has so studiously sought to buffer and uphold such a principle—as it was with the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) and other seminal General Assembly resolutions of the 1960s and 1970s.

The emerging picture of world order in the periphery we are left with then is one where the continued importance of the sovereign state-system as an over-arching organising principle of international politics has been tailored to legitimate the international intercession and oversight of a certain bottom-rung of member-states. With the creation of different categories of states—encouraged by the various UN and G-7 doctrines of 'Failed States', 'Collapsed States' and 'Rogue States'—the obstacle of 'sovereign-equality' has been overcome and a general regime of international surveillance and intercession institutionalised to selectively oversee or govern the lower tiers of this new hierarchy. The UN's emphasis of work today is indeed towards monitoring, managing, and occasionally remaking the political side of states that fall within this subordinate category of the capitalist state-system.⁶⁵¹

This type of inter-state hierarchy has of course been complimented by the reworking of the political and economic wiring of a great many Southern states that followed the end of the Cold War and the expansion of the global capitalist system. Most importantly this has seen the Third World state reconfigured to become much more susceptible to Western public and private influence—particularly to the influence of various sides 'global governance'. Here, while certain institutions of the state have been strengthened and bolstered by international organisations and Western state aid—such as national armies, border police, judiciaries—other elements of the state have been deliberately weakened by such external intervention.⁶⁵² Getting the state out of the economy and out of providing some 'public goods' such as utilities, healthcare and education are the most obvious and cited examples here. But it has also entailed, as implied above, creating political systems and regimes that are far more permeable to G-7 public and private interests and influences through, for instance, the creation of social and political forces that share roughly the same neo-liberal values and ideologies. The UN is playing its part here too, with an increasing

⁶⁵¹ Though of course the UN is also called-upon to involve itself, more irregularly, in situations which are important sites of inter-capitalist competition or of significant geo-political value—such as in Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia.

⁶⁵² A point that has been made by Tom Young in: *Readings in African Politics*, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003), p.4.

emphasis of its work and public pronouncements targeting various elements of ‘civil society’ and focused on circumnavigating ‘the state’ so that it can deal directly with ‘the people.’⁶⁵³ Yet, having said all of this about new elaborate forms of intercession, good-old fashioned Western imperialism and proxy-rule cannot be discounted. For instance, in a case such as Afghanistan it is not at all clear what differentiates its current incarnation as a pro-Anglo-American ‘democratic’ regime led by Hamid Karzai from the barefaced installation of proxy rulers in the past—whether it was by Moscow in Kabul in the 1980s and in Chechnya in the early 2000s or by Washington in countless other Third World contexts.⁶⁵⁴

These remarkable exceptions apart, however, the overall point that needs to be conveyed is that in general the nature of the state in the South has undergone significant transformations at the hands of the UN and others and is, more than at any time since the colonial period, seen as the legitimate object of intercession and direct intervention by these Western-orientated international entities. Here what appears to be emerging is a certain global hierarchy of states, whose members are rated according to their level of incorporation into the liberal capitalist system, with those most enlightened ones entitled to comment on and ‘progress’ those much further-down the ladder. The United Nations is at the forefront of the institutionalisation of this new inequality at the interstate level, with its programme of work disproportionately trained on conducting political operations in the borderlands of international capitalism.

⁶⁵³ See ‘Millennium Report’ (A/54/2000) and the ‘Human-Centred Approach to security’ which it puts forward for a seminal UN attempt to put the ‘rights’ of individuals at least on the same par as the ‘rights’ of states. Recently this type of balance has been put forward in the high-profile report by the secretary-general entitled: *In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all*, (A/59/2005, 31 March 2005). Of course, this recent report, discussed during the 59th session of the General Assembly in New York in September 2005, is a broad ranging attempt by UN managers to regain the initiative in light of the shifts that international politics has been going through since 11 September 2001, including establishing terrorism and counter-terrorism on the UN’s agenda of work, raising the profile of counter-proliferation, human rights and democracy promotion (all of which remain the essence of the G-8 agenda) and proposing a relatively large-scale reform programme of UN organs (the Security Council). The report also tries to draw a line under the arguments over the Iraq war that proved so divisive in 2002-2003 (paragraph 10).

⁶⁵⁴ Karzai’s regime is a barely concealed front for the Anglo-American alliance: the British and American Embassies in Kabul virtually direct executive policy in the country, such as it relates to tackling opium production for instance. As far as Chechnya is concerned, after a brutal war of independence between 1994-1996, and the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian army from the territory, Moscow reinvaded in 1999 and installed a local puppet administrator, Akhmad Kadyrov (later ‘elected’ president in October 2003). Kadyrov was subsequently assassinated in Grozny in May 2004 by the Chechen resistance.

The continued but contested American hegemony of the United Nations

In the end, the unique role of the UN in our current era needs to be understood in the context of an evolving US led world-capitalist order. Not only is the UN itself a product of the unique liberal peace that the US practically forged after 1945 but it has, to a large extent, recently been recalibrated to articulate contemporary US needs after its international social victory over the Second and Third World from the mid-1980s onwards. Indeed, after this 'victory' the UN's programme of work was refashioned to undertake a formal role in expanding and maintaining this international capitalist social system in the periphery of the world system. It is simply the case that UN's agenda of work—in this instance its overbearing emphasis on peace operations—cannot be understood outside of this wider political context. Yet, the US hegemony of the organisation that allows, in large part, for the evolution of the UN's specific political role is one that is never quite complete or total; rather it is one that is continually shifting and evolving. Most obviously in the 1970s, the UN was seen as a virtual pariah in the US for its radical 'Third Worldism' and, much more recently, seen as 'irrelevant' by the George W. Bush Administration because of its insubordinate refusal to endorse a pre-emptive war on Iraq. But it has to be said that in the midst of another attempt to refashion the organisation to articulate emerging US concerns of counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation and democracy promotion, the UN's strategic place in underpinning a specific US inspired inter-state capitalist order remains unchallenged.

In the first place our contemporary world order—with its entire global organisational infrastructure—remains rooted in a specific peace settlement that was designed by the US to replace or at least moderate a world dominated by Europe. It was in fact an idea that went back to the First World War and Woodrow Wilson's vision of a world social order that would see the end of empires (in some places) and the gradual universalisation of nation-states peacefully coexisting with a private world economy. This vision was one that sat comfortably with the rising economic and political power of the US in the 1940s—which needed domestic and international markets for the products that its fast-growing industries were churning-out, primary resources to feed these Fordist industries and which yearned to compete without the general inequality of empire trading blocks and monopolies.⁶⁵⁵ The US vision of world order then was one that was not only put forward as an alternative to the model that the Bolshevik Revolution held-out in 1917, but one that was also in direct opposition to other peer European competitors. As Neil Smith has put the matter in a recent study:

⁶⁵⁵ Deudney and Ikenberry, 'The nature and sources of liberal international order', p.192.

‘...American globalism...represents a long-term strategic rebuttal of European colonialism and anticolonial movements alike. Simultaneously a precursor and a successor to Soviet socialism, American globalism also supersedes the two-hundred-year old nexus of world power connecting European states and their colonies.’⁶⁵⁶

The United Nations, no less than the Marshall Plan, NATO, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, were all structurally designed to underpin, promote and secure this ‘American globalism’, as Smith terms it. This is not to say that various facets of these institutions did not contradict or undercut each other at one time or another; at the outset for instance, as Peter Gowan has delineated, there was a fundamental tension between the ideal of a universal collective security mechanism of the UN and the practical regional arrangements, such as NATO, that US military planners were far more comfortable relying on.⁶⁵⁷ And of course the US did in the end depend on mechanisms such as NATO for protecting and corralling the capitalist core—or to paraphrase its first secretary-general Lord Ismay, to keep the Soviets ‘out’, the Americans ‘in’ and the Germans ‘down’.⁶⁵⁸ But it is to insist that the inter-state infrastructure that was established after World War II—regional or international, political or economic—was meant to support a hidden and ‘spaceless’ geography of US public and private power.⁶⁵⁹

The place of the United Nations in this ‘American Century’ was to act as the political congress for a world increasingly made-up of independent and formally equal nation-states and decreasingly organised around empire blocks. While, as alluded to above, this vision was partially frustrated and replaced by other types of US oversight such as NATO, the UN did manage to fashion a role outside the capitalist core and in the periphery. Indeed, in its early years the UN was explicitly and controversially used to help extradite European powers from its traditional spheres (Suez and West Irian), or at least replace them after their premature departure (as in Jerusalem and Congo). But these extreme conveyance roles that the UN performed in its early years were put on hold by the Cold War and the entrance of radically aligned Third World states into the organisation who supposedly ‘hijacked’ its agenda. On the one hand, the Security

⁶⁵⁶ Smith, *American Empire*, p.2.

⁶⁵⁷ See Gowan’s ‘US:UN’ article for his particular argument relating to the triumph of the regional security protectorate system over the UN collective security system.

⁶⁵⁸ The purpose of NATO, according to Lord Ismay, was: ‘...to keep the Russians out, Americans in, and Germans down.’ Cited in: Deudney and Ikenberry ‘The nature and sources of liberal international order’, p.183.

⁶⁵⁹ Smith, *American Empire*, p.17.

Council became locked not by the French and British veto of US inspired international censure, as was the case during the Suez crisis, but by the Soviet realisation that the forum could act as a mechanism for policing the capitalist 'rimlands'—a lesson that the Soviet Union learnt after its unfortunately timed absence from the Security Council allowed the body to sanction US military action against North Korea in order to return the peninsula back into the nascent capitalist political economy that was being forged in the Far East at the time.⁶⁶⁰ One important consequence of this stalemate in the Security Council was that it shifted the balance of power towards the other consultative organs, especially towards the General Assembly whose output increased exponentially. And with the membership of the Assembly growing at an unforeseen rate, and the political character of these new members broadly hostile to what was seen as 'Yankee Imperialism', this output began to challenge the US vision of the United Nations. From the podium of the General Assembly, Third World leaders denounced every aspect of US foreign policy as well as continued European colonialism and racism. Che Guevara's address to the Assembly in December 1964 is perhaps emblematic though rarely cited:

'We would like to see this assembly shake itself out of complacency and move forward. We would like to see the committees begin their work and not stop at the first confrontation. Imperialism wants to turn this meeting into a pointless oratorical tournament, instead of solving the serious problems of the world. We must prevent it from doing so....We feel we have the right and the obligation to do so, because our country is one of the most constant points of friction. It is one of the places where the principles upholding the right of small countries to sovereignty are put to the test day by day, minute by minute. At the same time our country is one of the trenches of freedom in the world, situated a few steps from United States imperialism, showing by its actions, its daily example, that the present conditions of humanity the peoples can liberate themselves and keep themselves free.'⁶⁶¹

It was only with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Third World development-orientated state in the late 1980s that the US was able, through its new ability to corral various organs of the UN, to refashion the organisation's place in world order management. This was a sort of reversal of the process that the UN underwent in the 1960s and 1970s: the end of the

⁶⁶⁰ On the Korean War: Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁶⁶¹ Ernesto 'Che' Guevara Address to the 19th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, 11 December 1964.

Soviet veto in the late 1980s unlocked the stalemate of the Security Council and resulted in a shift in power back from the General Assembly to this great-power forum; and the material and diplomatic disciplining of political regimes in the Third World, as a result of the debt crisis and Soviet 'New Thinking', brought many non-aligned states back into the Western fold.⁶⁶² These changed correlation of forces within the UN has given rise to a specific and limited agenda of reform that has essentially focused on jettisoning those international economic roles that the UN picked-up in the 1970s and turning to those activities that it does 'best'. As it turns out the types of activities that the UN does 'best' here are exactly those controversial and extreme political ones, within states, at the periphery of the international system, designed to progress a place and its people into liberal civilisation, that the UN conducted when it was last an unremitting American proxy in the 1950s and 1960s. Of course we know by now how contemporary UN peace roles differ from these early formative ones; but the simple point to be made here is that there should be no surprise at the widespread incidents of these generic political activities when the organisation is dominated by the US. What perhaps is unique in our current period is the lacklustre opposition of subject states to these controversial political roles that the UN routinely conducts.⁶⁶³

But even when the US enjoys uncontested control of the organisation, as it largely does today, there are parameters in which the US cannot diverge if it wishes to maintain organisational backing. In one sense this clearly relates to key occurrences of inter-state capitalist and geo-political competition, for example, as happened with the refusal of China and Russia to allow the UN to legitimise the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. More recently it has also become patently clear in relation to the French, German, and Russian opposition—in the narrowest sense—to Anglo-American plans to manufacture UN support for the US-UK invasion of Iraq in 2003. This divergence of interests was remarkable for its intensity, which included the utilisation of the full gamut of diplomatic tools available to these capitalist powers for pressuring countries in key non-permanent positions in the Security Council to line-up in their coalitions.⁶⁶⁴ This was

⁶⁶² Recall too that previously the 'Second World' states of Eastern Europe that had now become pro-Western helped shift the balance in the General Assembly back towards the US during this period.

⁶⁶³ Although impassioned denouncements of Western foreign policy occasionally reappear in the General Assembly (such as by Hugo Chavez), one can hardly imagine the type of robust and frequent rebuttal of UN and US imperialism that radical Third World leaders, such as Che Guevara, espoused in the 1960s and 1970s.

⁶⁶⁴ For example recall the degree of lobbying that the UK, Spain and US engaged in to persuade Chile, Angola, and Mexico (all holding non-permanent seats on the Security Council) to vote for a draft resolution giving Iraq an ultimatum to comply with certain demands in March 2003 (S/2003/215, 7 March 2005, Provisional) as well as the successful counter-lobbying by France and Russia.

not of course a principled opposition: after all, the UN has sanctioned over a decade of unrelenting air strikes and crippling sanctions against the country and has, post-facto, been quite happy to quickly 'move-on' and legitimise the 2003 Anglo-American occupation. But what it does serve to show is the continued importance of great power inter-state capitalist competition over key geo-strategic regions of the globe and the way in which this type of conflict can serve to fracture what is ultimately a delicate US consensus in the world body.

After the refusal of the UN to endorse the pre-emptive Iraq war, various parts of the US establishment have sought to rebuild Washington's hegemony along much firmer lines through the tried and tested means of politically and materially disciplining the organisation.⁶⁶⁵ One angle of attack has been an attempt to place pressure on Kofi Annan for his role in allowing for a fracture of the organisation. Most important here has been the effort of the US Senate's 'Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations' to tar the secretary-general with the mismanagement and abuse of the UN's Oil-For-Food programme in Iraq, claiming that his son Kojo Annan was able to use his family connections to secure lucrative contracts for his former employer, Cotecna, which were still paying him a monthly retainer. It was largely as a way of regaining the initiative, or at least taking it out the hands of hostile US Senators, that UN managers commissioned in 2004 Paul Volcker, a former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve, to form a committee to look into the matter of the Oil-for-Food programme and Annan's role in it. To no-one's great surprise, Volcker has found in favour of the secretary-general, suggesting that Kojo had deceived his unsuspecting and trusting father.⁶⁶⁶ Senator Nat Coleman, Chairman of the 'Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations', however, has remained unmoved:

'Kofi Annan is responsible for the failed management that resulted in the fraud and abuse of the Oil-for-Food Program. His lack of leadership, combined with conflicts of interest and lack responsibility and accounting point to one, and only one, outcome: His resignation.'⁶⁶⁷

⁶⁶⁵ In March 2003, Richard Perle was one of the first to attack the UN's betrayal with relation to Iraq. He told *The Spectator*: 'Saddam Hussein's reign of terror is about to end...He will go quickly, but not alone: in a parting irony he will take the United Nations down with him.' Perle cited in: 'U.N. Still Battered By U.S. Action On Iraq', Barbara Crossette, *Unwire* (NYC), 1 July 2003. More recently, former US ambassador to the United Nations, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, informed the US Congress in March 2005: 'I think we either need to reform it or destroy it.' 'Annan has a plan to revitalise U.N.', Maggie Farley, *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 2005.

⁶⁶⁶ On the Volcker Commission, its reports and findings, see the official website: <www.icc-offp.org>.

⁶⁶⁷ Senator Nat Coleman, 29 March 2005: 'Statement regarding Second Volcker Report on UN Oil-For-Food Scandal.' Available from: <<http://coleman.senate.gov>>.

In any event, the pressure applied on the UN from different quarters within the US has seemed to pay off, with UN officials bending over themselves to prove their relevance and worth. While the Volcker Commission was about protecting and re-establishing the credibility of the UN and its secretary-general in the US, the UN has also sought to stress to Washington its willingness to reform. Indeed the most important opening gambit in this regard has been the publication in March 2005 of a wide-ranging report by the secretary-general outlining a new agenda for the organisation, under the title *In Larger Freedom*, which mimics aspects of the foreign policy phraseology of George W. Bush's administration.⁶⁶⁸

This report and current efforts to reform the organisation must also be seen in the larger context of the shifting emphasis of US foreign policy since 11 September 2001. Indeed, it can be fairly stated that as a result of a much more activist 'grand strategy' that has been pursued by the US since the attacks on the 'Twin-Towers' and Pentagon, the UN has become the subject once again of a significant bid to refashion its work. Here the UN is most definitely in another general phase of reconstitution—over its programme of work and even its legislative structure—although the overall shape of this is difficult to discern at this stage. What is apparent is that UN managers have sought to regain the initiative by proposing a wholesale redefinition of the UN's place in international politics that retains its primary political roles of democracy and human rights promotion and institution-building in the periphery but includes a bigger place on its agenda for emerging G-8 and especially US concerns.⁶⁶⁹ It is clear here that terrorism and counter-terrorism, proliferation and non-proliferation, and a greater focus on democracy promotion are a series of issues that are gradually being internalised into the UN's agenda by a desire to placate the US establishment after the Iraq war and the 'War on Terror' in general. With relation to other G-8 states, and emerging Asian and South American powers, it seems that proposals relating to the expansion of the Security Council were meant to assure concerns that the body no longer fitted

⁶⁶⁸ Though of course in the detail of the report, the phraseology does differ from the Bush position on many issues, especially those surrounding aid and development. It is much closer on the issues of UN reform, democracy, human rights and terrorism.

⁶⁶⁹ 'Annan has a plan to revitalise U.N.: the world body is facing a crisis of confidence. The secretary-general will present a blueprint to make it more effective and accountable', Maggie Farley, *Los Angeles Times*, 19 March 2005.

with contemporary geo-political 'realities'—though this tactic is already floundering on regional rivalries.⁶⁷⁰

It remains to be seen what will be the outcome of this new process of reconstitution that the UN is beginning to go through again at the hands of the US. It is possible that a new regime of surveillance of Southern states designed to forestall revanchist competitors in key geo-strategic regions, otherwise known as 'Rogue Regimes', will emerge alongside all the other layers of UN oversight of the periphery. The Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism agendas in the UN are at least in part about institutionalising a material status quo globally. But two trends seem clear so long as the present correlation of forces in the UN remain broadly as they are: the UN will continue to underplay the sovereign-equality aspects of its founding charter in favour of a good governance agenda centred around democracy and human rights—the beneficial effect of which for Western states and capital has been to slowly create various categories of states. With the creation of these categories, the UN has helped fashion a lower-tier of subordinate societies that are increasingly treated as the legitimate object of open international intercession and liberal 'advancement'. What is also not in doubt is that the UN will continue to play a major role in managing and administering this 'progress' in the periphery of the world-system until a far more fundamental political change in this system occurs. But perhaps if and when this happens, the UN's specificity in underpinning an American liberal capitalist order will become wholly apparent and the organisation will necessarily be cast-aside for some other regulatory mechanism. For the time being, however, the UN is evolving its doctrines and altering its outlook to be at the forefront of the move to institutionalise a clear global hierarchy of states and societies.

⁶⁷⁰ For example in relation to the creation of 'new' seats in the Security Council, Pakistan is lobbying against Indian membership, China against Japanese membership, and Argentina against Brazilian membership.

Appendices

Appendix 1:	UN Security Council Vetoes January 1989 – December 2005	220
Appendix 2:	UN Peacekeeping Operations January 1989 – December 2005	222

Appendix 1

United Nations Security Council Vetoes January 1989 — December 2005

Year	Date		Subject	Member State Casting Veto
2004	October 5		Israel – demanding halt to military operations in Occupied Arab Territories	USA
2004	April 21		UNFICYP – termination of mandate in Cyprus	RUSSIA
2004	March 25		Israel – condemnation of the assassination of Ahmed Yassin	USA
2003	October 14		Israel – the construction of separation wall in the Occupied Arab Territories	USA
2003	September 16		Israel – threat to ‘remove’ Yasser Arafat	USA
2002	December 16		Israel – the killing of UN employees	USA
2002	June 30		Bosnia and ICC – renewal of peacekeeping mandate and the immunity of US troops from ICC prosecution	USA
2001	December 14		Israel – withdrawal from Occupied Arab Territories	USA
2001	March 27		Israel – the establishment of UN observer force in Occupied Arab Territories	USA
1999	February 25		UNPREDEP – extension to Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	CHINA
1997	March 21		Israel – halt of settlement building in Jabal Abu Ghneim in Occupied East Jerusalem	USA
1997	March 7		Israel – halting of settlement building in Occupied East Jerusalem	USA
1997	January 10		Guatemala – authorisation of observers	CHINA
1995	May 17		Israel – expropriation of Palestinian territories	USA

1994	December 2		Bosnia – free access of humanitarian goods	RUSSIA
1993	May 11		Cyprus – finances	RUSSIA
1990	May 30		Israel – establishment of commission to examine conditions in the Occupied Arab Territories	USA
1990	January 17		Panama – violation of diplomatic immunities	USA
1989	December 23		Panama – invasion by USA	FRANCE, UK, USA
1989	November 7		Israel – situation in Occupied Arab Territories	USA
1989	June 9		Israel – situation in Occupied Arab Territories	USA
1989	February 17		Israel – situation in Occupied Arab Territories	USA
1989	January 11		Libya – complaint against the shooting down of aircraft by US	FRANCE, UK, USA

Sources: Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, *The Procedure of the UN Security Council*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.236-7 and Global Policy Forum
<http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto.htm>

Appendix 2

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations January 1989 — December 2005

Region	Country	UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATION		Year
AFRICA:				
	Angola	UNAVEM I		1989-91
		UNAVEM II		1991-95
		UNAVEM III		1995-97
		MONUA		1997-99
	Aouzou Strip	UNASOG		1994-94
	Burundi	ONUB		2005-ff
	Central African Republic	MINURCA		1998-2000
	Democratic Republic Of Congo	MONUC		1999-ff
	Ethiopia & Eritrea	UNMEE		2000-ff
	Ivory Coast	UNOCI		2004-ff
	Liberia	UNOMIL		1993-97
		UNMIL		2003-ff
	Mozambique	ONUMOZ		1992-94
	Namibia	UNTAG		1989-90
	Rwanda	UNAMIR		1993-96
	Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL		1998-99
		UNAMSIL		1999-2005
	Somalia	UNOSOM I		1992-93
		UNOSOM II		1993-95
	Sudan	UNMIS		2005-ff
	Uganda-Rwanda	UNOMUR		1993-94
	Western Sahara	MINURSO		1991-ff
ASIA:				
	Cambodia	UNAMIC		1991-92
		UNTAC		1992-93
	East Timor	UNTAET		1999-2002
		UNMISET		2002-ff
	Georgia	UNOMIG		1993-ff
	Kuwait	UNIKOM		1991-2003
	Tajikistan	UNMOT		1994-2000

CENTRAL AMERICA & CARRIBEAN:				
	Central America	ONUCA		1989-92
	El Salvador	ONUSAL		1991-95
	Guatemala	MINUGUA		1997
	Haiti	UNMIH		1993-96
		UNSMIH		1996-98
		UNTMIH		1997
		MIPONUH		1997-2000
		MINUSTAH		2004-ff
EX YUGOSLAVIA:				
	Former Yugoslavia	UNPROFOR		1992-95
	Bosnia	UNMIBH		1995-2002
	Croatia	UNCRO		1995-96
		UNTAES		1996-98
		UNMOP		1996-2002
		UNPSG		1998-98
	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UNPREDEP		1995-99
	Kosovo	UNMIK		1999-ff

Sources: United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Information, 1996) and <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp>

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3. Official UN documents;
4. Internal and confidential UN documents;
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6. Treaties, governmental and non-governmental reports and statements;
7. Speeches and papers;
8. Confidential interviews and speeches (dates and locations).

Official UN document symbols with the prefix 'A' indicates an official document of the General Assembly, 'S' an official document of the Security Council, 'T' an official document of the Trusteeship Council, and 'ST' an official document of the UN Secretariat.

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